{"id":13582,"date":"2025-03-06T19:54:11","date_gmt":"2025-03-06T18:54:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=13582"},"modified":"2025-10-17T08:51:45","modified_gmt":"2025-10-17T06:51:45","slug":"pathos-proof-fallacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/pathos-proof-fallacy\/","title":{"rendered":"PATHOS FROM PROOF TO FALLACY"},"content":{"rendered":"

PATHOS 2: FROM PROOF TO FALLACY<\/span><\/h2>\n

The standard theory of fallacies considers emotions to be the main pollutant of rational discourse; to be valid, the argumentative discourse should be an-emotional. Pathos<\/a>, the essential component of rhetorical argumentation, is therefore the typical target of this criticism. The \u201cpassions\u201d are grouped into a family of ad passiones<\/em> fallacies, and these are to be eliminated.
\nThis is an essential point of articulation and opposition between rhetorical<\/em> and logical-epistemic<\/em> argumentation. Emotions, with their ability to subvert the mind and bypass rational reflection, are considered to be the most powerful of rhetorical tools and, for the same reason, they are forbidden within critical argumentation.<\/p>\n

1. Ad passiones<\/em><\/strong><\/span> arguments<\/span> <\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

The standard theory of fallacies holds that wherever emotion is allowed to flourish in discourse, reason is in danger of being overshadowed:<\/p>\n

I add finally, when an Argument is borrowed from any Topic which are suited to engage the Inclinations and Passions of the Hearers on the side of the Speaker, rather than to convince the Judgment, this is Argumentum ad passiones<\/em>, an Address to the Passions: or, if it be made publicly, \u2019tis called an Appeal to the People. (Watts, Logick<\/em>, 1725, quoted in Hamblin 1970, p. 164; capitalized in the text).<\/span><\/p>\n

In an argumentative situation, emotions, like fallacies, tend to be the emotions of the<\/em> other<\/em>, the opponent: \u201cI’m trying to stay cool and rational, why are you so upset?<\/em>\u201d. This is a common strategy in controversies over both scientific and political issues (Doury 2000). It can be seen as a typical case of the ad fallaciam<\/em> argument, see evaluation<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The sophisms of passion are not included in the original Aristotelian list, see Fallacy (2)<\/a>. The label \u201cad<\/em> + Latin name\u201d has been widely used in modern times to refer to \u201cfallacies of passion\u201d, and traces of this use can still be found. The herbarium of ad passiones<\/em>\u00a0 is well stocked, as Hamblin’s list of ad<\/em> fallacious arguments shows. The labels that make a clear and direct reference to the affects have been underlined.<\/p>\n

The argumentum ad hominem<\/em>, the argumentum ad verecundiam<\/u><\/em>, the argumentum ad misericordiam<\/u><\/em>, and the argumenta ad ignorantiam<\/em>, populum<\/u><\/em>, baculum<\/u><\/em>, passiones<\/u><\/em>, superstitionem<\/em>, imaginationem<\/em>, invidiam<\/u><\/em> (envy), crumenam<\/em> (purse), quietem<\/u><\/em> (repose, conservatism), metum<\/u><\/em> (fear), fidem<\/em> (faith), socordiam<\/em> (weak-mindedness), superbiam<\/u><\/em> (pride), odium<\/u><\/em> (hatred), amicitiam<\/u><\/em> (friendship), ludicrum<\/u><\/em> (dramatics), captandum vulgus<\/u><\/em> (playing for the gallery), fulmen<\/u><\/em> [thunderbolt], vertiginem<\/u><\/em> (dizziness)) and a carcere<\/u><\/em> (from prison). We feel like adding: ad nauseam<\/em> but even this has been suggested before. (Hamblin, 1970, p. 41)<\/span><\/p>\n

This list does not include only emotional arguments: for example, the appeal to ignorance (ad ignorantiam<\/em>) is an epistemic<\/em>, not an emotional<\/em> argument. Others denot various forms of appeal to subjectivity, but the majority of the labels mentioned refer to personal interests and have a clear emotional content. Note that the concept of emotional language and the analytical method behind the diagnosis of these ad passiones<\/em> fallacious appeals remain unclear.<\/p>\n

The literature on fallacies mentions a dozen fallacies involving emotions, mostly under the label \u00ab\u00a0fallacy in ad + Latin name<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0. As the generic label \u00ab\u00a0ad passiones fallacies\u201d<\/em> allows, this list can be extended to include all emotions.<\/p>\n

– fear, designated either directly (ad metum<\/em>) or metonymically through the instrument of threat, ad baculum, a carcere, ad fulmen, ad crumenam
\n<\/em>– respectful fear, ad reverentiam
\n<\/em>– affection, love, friendship, ad amicitiam
\n<\/em>– joy, happiness, laughter: ad captandum vulgus; ad ludicrum; ad ridiculum
\n<\/em>– pride, vanity, ad superbiam
\n<\/em>– calm, laziness, tranquility, ad quietem
\n<\/em>– envy, ad invidiam
\n<\/em>– popular sentiment, ad populum
\n<\/em>– indignation, anger, hatred: ad odium; ad personam
\n<\/em>– humility: ad verecundiam
\n<\/em>– pity: ad misericordiam.<\/em><\/p>\n

In this list, the basic emotions are mixed with vices<\/em> (pride, envy, hatred, sloth<\/em>) and virtues<\/em> (compassion, modesty, friendship<\/em>), both of which are valued emotional states<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The list of emotions constituting pathos and the list of emotions stigmatized as fallacies, overlap to a large extent. The pathemic proofs of rhetoric have become the sophisms ad passiones<\/em> in the modern standard fallacy theory.<\/p>\n

2. Four \u201cemotional fallacies\u201d:<\/span>
\nad hominem, ad baculum, ad populum, ad ignoratiam<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

All emotions can intervene in ordinary argumentative speech, but not all of these emotions have received equal attention, the focus is on the emotional and subjective character of the following four fallacies (Walton 1992).<\/p>\n

\u2014 For arguments that attack the opponent, and other manifestations of contempt, see personal attack<\/a>; dismissal<\/a>. The ad hominem<\/em> <\/a>fallacy involves epistemic subjectivity<\/a>, not emotion.<\/p>\n

\u2014 The appeal to popular feelings in populist argumentation corresponds to a complex range of positive or negative emotional movements: the audience is amused, enthusiastic, pleased, ashamed; the speech plays on their pride, vanity, incites hatred, etc., see ad populum<\/em><\/a>; laughter<\/a>, irony<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Ad baculum<\/em> argumentation relies on various forms of threat or intimidation. Fear<\/em>, possibly respectful, is contrasted with the positive emotion of hope<\/em>, created by the promise of a reward, see threat.<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The appeal to pity, ad misericordiam<\/em>, can serve as a basic example of the role of emotion in argumentation. First, the speaker S<\/strong> must justify his appeal to pity, in order to create a movement of pity. in the listener L,<\/strong> see emotion<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Rhetoric and argumentation can be contrasted on the basis of their relation to affects. If there is a concept of argumentation defined within<\/em> rhetoric (inventio<\/em>), there is also a concept of argumentation defined against<\/em> rhetoric. Rhetoric is concerned with the production of discourse , while argumentation is concerned with the critical production and reception<\/em> of discourse. Confronted with proactive, aggressive, rhetorical attitudes, critical argumentation is defensive<\/em>.<\/p>\n

3. Emotion, rationality and action<\/span><\/h2>\n

The field of argumentation is built on the rejection of what rhetoric considers the strongest evidence, ethotic and pathemic evidence. This an-emotional vision of argumentation corresponds to a classical and popular view of the functioning of the human mind, which contrasts reason, understanding, <\/em>and contemplation<\/em> with emotion<\/em>, will<\/em> and action<\/em>. The following passage is a synthesis of this account:<\/p>\n

Hitherto we have dealt with the proofs of truth, which compel the human understanding when it knows them, and for this\u00a0 purpose, they are effective in persuading men accustomed to follow reason. But they are incapable of compelling the will to follow them, since, like Medea, according to Ovid, \u201cI see and approve the best; I follow the worst.\u201d This results from the misuse of the passions of the soul, and therefore we must deal with them in so far as they produce persuasion, and this in the popular manner, and not with all the subtlety that is possible when one treats them philosophically. (Mayans and Siscar 1786, p. 144)<\/p>\n

The \u201cpassions\u201d are assigned two functions: they change the perception of reality, put knowledge in brackets and thus give a decisive impulse to action.
\nThis vision or emotion as a stimulus to action seems to be based on an etymological argument. The word emotion<\/em> comes from the Latin emovere<\/em>, e-<\/em> (ex-<\/em>) \u201cfrom\u201d and movere<\/em>, \u201cto move\u201d; an emotion is something that \u00ab\u00a0sets people in motion\u00a0\u00bb. In any case, passions are the almighty manipulative instrument of the action-oriented discourse favored by rhetoric, and the main enemy of the truth-oriented discourse favored by logicians.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the mid-twentieth century, the psychologists Fraisse & Piaget argued that emotion is not an organized response, but a disorder of behavior that leads to \u201ca decrease in the level of performance\u201d (1968, p. 98):<\/p>\n

People get angry when they substitute violent words and gestures for efforts to find a solution to the difficulties they experience (resolving a conflict, overcoming an obstacle). [\u2026] [Anger] is also a response to the situation (hitting an object or a person who resists you), but the level of this response is lower than it should be, given the standards of a given culture. (Ibid<\/em>.)<\/p>\n

According to this vision, emotion would trigger low-quality behavior, and therefore poor reasoning. In interaction, it would necessarily be manipulative: the candidate cries in an effort to distract the examiner from his shortcomings, magically transforming the exam situation into a more interpersonal, private, relationship.<\/p>\n

This leads to a kind of paradox: for rhetoricians, emotions lead to action while psychologists believe that emotions make action worse.<\/p>\n

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca share this vision of emotions as \u201cobstacles\u201d to reason, and thus consider emotions to be incompatible with sound argumentation. However, they retain the motivational quality of emotion in order to explain the relevance of argumentative discourse to action. The solution lies in a dissociation<\/em><\/a> that contrasts emotions with values:<\/p>\n

We should point out that the passions as obstacles must not be confused with the passions that provide a support for a positive argument. The latter will generally be designated by a less pejorative term, such as value, for instance<\/span>. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p.\u2009475\u2009; my emphasis)<\/span><\/p>\n

By this clever operation, emotions are disposed of, and these remain pejoratively marked as obstacles to reason, while their dynamic potential is transferred to values. In this way, the effect of argumentation can be extended beyond the mere production of mental persuasion to become the determinant of action,\u00a0 (id.<\/em>, p. 45); see persuasion<\/a><\/p>\n

5. Alexithymia and Everyday Rationality<\/span><\/h1>\n

If emotions are seen as the ideal manipulative tool, the equation \u201cemotion = fallacy\u201d seems more than justified, so that, extending the example of scientific language to ordinary linguistic practices, a solution can be found in the pure and simple elimination of emotions. But the price of eliminating the emotions from ordinary discourse is high: in everyday circumstances, the use of an-emotional discourse is actually considered to be the symptom of a mental disorder, alexithymia<\/em><\/strong>.
\nThe word alexithymia<\/em> is composed of three lexemes a-lexis-thymos<\/em>, \u201clack – of words – for emotion\u201d<\/span>; alexithymic language is defined as a language from which all expression of feelings and emotions is banished:<\/p>\n

Alexithymia<\/em>: term proposed by Sifneos to describe patients predisposed to psychosomatic disorders and characterized by: 1) the inability to verbally express the affects; 2) the poverty of the imaginative life; (3) the tendency to resort to action; and (4) the tendency to focus on the material and objective aspects of events, situations and relationships. (Cosnier 1994, p. 160)<\/span><\/p>\n

Such an emotionless discourse is reduced to the expression of operational thinking<\/strong>, mirroring, \u201ca mental mode of functioning organized around the purely factual aspects of everyday life. Operational discourse<\/strong> is characterized by objectivity and ignores any fantasy, emotional expression or subjective evaluation\u201d (id<\/em>., p. 141).<\/span><\/p>\n

Similarly, the repression of affect by the neurotic<\/em> personality can lead to the same result.<\/p>\n

From a neurobiological perspective, Damasio has shown that a theory of purely logical reasoning, leaving aside the emotions, cannot account for the way people actually deal with everyday problems:<\/p>\n

The \u2018high-reason\u2019 view, which is nothing more than the common\u00ad- sense view, assumes that when we are at our decision-making best, we are the pride and joy of Plato, Descartes and Kant. Formal logic will, by itself, lead us to the best available solution for any problem. An important aspect of the rationalist view is that to get the best results, emotions must be kept out. Rational processing must be unencumbered by passion. (1994, p. 171)<\/span><\/p>\n

Pure reasoning about everyday matters can indeed be observed in certain types of patients:<\/p>\n

Experience with patients suggests is that the cool-headed strategy advocated by Kant, and others, has far more to do with the way patients with prefrontal damage<\/strong> make decisions<\/span> than with how normals usually operate. (Id<\/em>., p. 172)<\/span><\/p>\n

The exclusion of subjectivity and emotions risks turning argumentation into an operational alexithymic practice<\/em>.<\/span> Insofar as argumentation studies are interested in the treatment of everyday problems in common language, they cannot take\u00a0 the discourse of neurotic, alexithymic or brain-damaged individuals as a model discourse. The question of how emotions develop in argumentative discourse requires much more than simple a priori censorship, see emotions<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/a> The Complete Poems of Tibullus: An En Face Edition.<\/em> Translated by R. G. Dennis and M. C. J. Putnam. With an introduction by J. H. Gaisser. Berkeley, etc: University of California Press, 2013.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

PATHOS 2: FROM PROOF TO FALLACY The standard theory of fallacies considers emotions to be the main pollutant of rational discourse; to be valid, the argumentative discourse should be an-emotional. Pathos, the essential component of rhetorical argumentation, is therefore the typical target of this criticism. The \u201cpassions\u201d are grouped into a family of ad passiones […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-13582","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-dictionary"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13582","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13582"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13582\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14219,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13582\/revisions\/14219"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13582"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13582"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13582"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}