{"id":15629,"date":"2026-04-11T09:22:31","date_gmt":"2026-04-11T07:22:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=15629"},"modified":"2026-04-21T11:44:02","modified_gmt":"2026-04-21T09:44:02","slug":"emo-tension-exclamation-v2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/emo-tension-exclamation-v2\/","title":{"rendered":"EMO TENSION EXCLAMATION V2"},"content":{"rendered":"

FORMAT EN COURS D’ADAPTATION<\/strong><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Tense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions<\/span><\/h1>\n

CHRISTIAN PLANTIN<\/h1>\n

ICAR Joint Research Unit, Universit\u00e9 Lyon II, \u00c9cole Normale Sup\u00e9rieure de Lyon, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) Lyon University<\/span>
\nLa Rochette F43100 Chaniat France<\/span><\/h1>\n

Christian.Plantin@univ-lyon2.fr<\/span><\/h1>\n

Abstract<\/em>
\nTension is a major issue in the analysis of argumentative discourse in ordinary language. Tension <\/span><\/strong>is an operator showing that the speaker is highly involved in her speech, and wants to share her commitments, that is, wants to persuade her <\/span><\/strong>audience. This paper proposes a case study of an extremely tense and controversial argument with strong anti-Semitic undertones (\u00a72). The following sections examine the main <\/span><\/strong>components of tension: (\u00a73) radicalization of arguments; (\u00a74) exclamations; (\u00a75) rhetorical questions; (\u00a76) emotions. <\/span><\/strong>
\nTension is interpreted as a verdictive operator resisting refutation.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

R\u00e9sum\u00e9.<\/em>
\nLa tension est un probl\u00e8me majeur dans l’analyse du discours argumentatif dans le langage ordinaire. La tension est un op\u00e9rateur qui montre que l\u2019oratrice est tr\u00e8s impliqu\u00e9e dans son discours et souhaite partager ses engagements, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire, persuader son public. Cet article propose une \u00e9tude de cas d’un argument extr\u00eamement tendu et controvers\u00e9, ayant de profondes implications antis\u00e9mites (\u00a72); les sections suivantes \u00e9tudient la principale composante de la tension: (\u00a73), la radicalisa<\/span><\/strong>tion des arguments; (\u00a74), exclamations; (\u00a75), questions rh\u00e9toriques; (\u00a76), les \u00e9motions. On interpr\u00e8te la tension comme un op\u00e9rateur de v\u00e9ridicit\u00e9 qui r\u00e9siste \u00e0 la r\u00e9futation.<\/span><\/strong><\/h1>\n

Keywords<\/em>
\nArgumentation, tension, involvement, rhetorical question, exclamation, emotion, resistance to refutation, anti-Semitism.<\/span><\/strong><\/h1>\n

1. Introduction<\/span><\/h2>\n

Tension is a major issue in the analysis of ordinary argumentative
\ndiscourse as a linguistic, inter-subjective, activity. Tension is a complex unitary, multilevel syndrome, cutting across the classical levels of linguistic analysis. Tension and laxity phenomena are currently investigated in linguistics under different headings, such as degree words, gradation, intensity, exclamation, emotional expression, etc.
\nFrom the point of view of argumentation, tension is an operator showing that the speaker is highly involved in her speech and wants to share her commitments, that is, wants to persuade her audience. In face-to-face interactions, Tannen (1984) characterizes high-involvement speakers by the fact that they leave no inter-turn pause. From the perspective of argumentation, tension is a characteristic of radical discourse\u2014discourse that presents all-or-nothing arguments rejecting compromises and negotiations.
\nThis paper presents a case study of such an extremely tense and controversial argument: a polemical Internet intervention that has strong anti-Semitic undertones. The first section introduces the text being analyzed, which is a violent rejection of a new French law compensating \u201cthe US victims of the Holocaust.\u201d The relevant historical context of this law has developed from the Second World War until the present day. The relevant legal texts include the Nuremberg Tribunal conclusions and decisions; the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity; the ratification of this Convention by the French law, and the complex legislation implementing these decisions.
\nThe following sections examine the main components of tension: (\u00a73) radicalization of arguments excluding the relevant counter-discourse; (\u00a74) exclamations as feigned natural signs and prototypization1 operators; (\u00a75) rhetorical questions that both challenge and give no voice to the opponent; (\u00a76) and emotions as specific correlates of tension.
\nThe visions of argumentation are many. The definitions corresponding to the conceptual framework implemented in this study can be found in Plantin (2018). The vision of argumentation as a technique \u201cto make discourse more resistant to refutation\u201d (Doury<\/h2>\n

(1) We ask permission to use the noun protypization (occurrences on the internet), and the verb paragonize with the meaning \u201cto establish as a paragon or a prototype.\u201d<\/h2>\n
\n

2003, p. 13), is especially well adapted to this case, where tension <\/span><\/strong>posits arguments beyond refutation.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

2. The case: Issue and legal context<\/span><\/h2>\n

2.1 The case<\/span><\/h3>\n

The text, henceforth T<\/span>, comes from the Dieudonn\u00e9 Mbala Mbala website. (2) A controversial personality, Dieudonn\u00e9 Mbala Mbala \u201cis a French comedian, actor, and political activist born on February 11, 1966 in Fontenay-aux-Roses\u201d (after Wikipedia).3 His shows and political declarations frequently spark polemics and controversies. He has been repeatedly condemned for anti-Semitism and negationism. (4)
\nT<\/span> is introduced as a reaction to news from the article, \u201cFrance will pay $60 million to US victims of the Holocaust,\u201d published in the French daily newspaper, Le Figaro<\/span><\/em>. This title is followed by a picture from the 2012 inauguration of the \u201cShoah Memorial\u201d in Drancy performed by then President of the French Republic, Fran\u00e7ois Hollande.5 In response to this news, T argues as follows6:<\/h3>\n

(2) I thank Ruth Amossy and her students who proposed this text for discussion during a data session that took place in Ruth Amossy\u2019s PhD seminar on argumentation theory at Tel Aviv University on January 2016. The text is violent and possibly shocking as is often the case in online discussions.
\n(3) After Wikipedia https:\/\/fr.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Dieudonn\u00e9 (03-11-2019).
\n(4) http:\/\/www.francetvinfo.fr\/societe\/justice\/dieudonne\/ (03-11-2019).
\n(5) \u201cThe Cit\u00e9 de la Muette [in Drancy] became an internment camp in 1941, and
\nthen in 1942 a regroupment camp for the Jews of France in preparation for their
\ndeportation to extermination camps. Between March, 1942, and August, 1944,
\napproximately 63,000 of the 76,000 Jews deported from France went through
\nDrancy.\u201d
\nhttp:\/\/www.memorialdelashoah.org\/en\/english-version\/the-shoah-memorial-in-
\ndrancy.html (02-21-2019).
\n(6) French original: Les victimes am\u00e9ricaines de la Shoah ? Des victimes deve-
\nnues am\u00e9ricaines post-shoah car il ne me semble pas qu’un seul SS ait foul\u00e9 le
\nsol am\u00e9ricain. Mais de qui se moque-t-on ? Et surtout jusqu’\u00e0 quand va-t-on
\ndevoir payer ? \u00c7a fait 70 ans, qui est encore responsable de cette saloperie ?
\nQue donnent les Am\u00e9ricains aux victimes d’Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Bagdad,
\nSa\u00efgon, Kaboul, et \u00e0 tous ceux qu’ils agressent en permanence et en toute
\nimpunit\u00e9 depuis ces m\u00eames 70 ans ? Putain, mais quelle honte, c’est scan-
\ndaleux ! Et on pr\u00e9tend faire de la lutte contre l’antis\u00e9mitisme une cause natio-<\/h3>\n

(our numbering):<\/strong>
\n1. The US victims of the Shoah? 2. The victims became American post Shoah, because I don’t think that a single SS ever trod the American soil. 3. But whom are they trying to fool? 4. And especially until when will we have to pay? 5. That was 70 years ago, 5b. who is still responsible for that shit? 6. What do the Americans give to the victims of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Baghdad, Saigon, Kabul, and to all those who have been endlessly attacked with impunity for the same 70 years? 7. Fuck! It’s a disgrace, it’s scandalous! 8. And we say the fight against anti-Semitism is a national cause? 9. Do we not create it by making such a disparity between the atrocities caused by human beings? 10. What is France doing to repair the damage caused by colonization, the slave trade, 10b. or simply to pay their pensions to the Africans who came and died for France? 11. Nothing! Sod all! 12. And as a famous comedian once said: \u201cIf we do not make it up to the niggers, there are some who will have to pay back a few dollars…\u201d 13. Fucking mafia clan!<\/strong><\/p>\n

At first reading, the reader is left with a feeling of confusion and unease, due to the violence of the text and to a felt discrepancy between two possible, but inconsistent, argumentative orientations leading to an apparent ambiguity of the general intention: on the one hand, a plea for the victims of imperial wars, slave trade and colonization, and, on the other hand, a rabid anti-Semitic attack. In any case, such was the feeling of the students who proposed the text for discussion.<\/h3>\n
\n

nale ? N’en cr\u00e9ons-nous pas en faisant une telle disparit\u00e9 dans le traitement des
\nhorreurs caus\u00e9es par les humains ? Que fait la France pour r\u00e9parer les d\u00e9g\u00e2ts dus \u00e0 la colonisation, \u00e0 la traite n\u00e9gri\u00e8re, ou tout simplement pour payer les pensions des Africains venus mourrir pour la France ? Rien ! Que dalle ! Et comme disait un c\u00e9l\u00e8bre humoriste : \u201csi on ne r\u00e9pare pas pour les n\u00e9gros, y en a qui vont \u00eatre amen\u00e9s \u00e0 rembourser quelques dollars\u2026\u201d Clique mafieuse de merde ! (01-12-2017)<\/h3>\n

Tense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 351
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371<\/h3>\n

2.2 Legal context<\/span>
\nThe issue is the compensation for the damages suffered by the victims of deportation and spoliations in France during the Second World War. The relevant legal texts include the Nuremberg Tribunal conclusions and decisions; the Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the ratification of this Convention by the French law. The current French law states that these damages arose from the anti-Semitic legislation in force during the occupation of France by Nazi Germany. This anti-Semitic legislation was enforced by \u201cThe French State,\u201d led by Marshall P\u00e9tain, which replaced the French Republic during the Nazi German Occupation (from July 10, 1940 to August 20, 1944). As a consequence, and following a statement made in 1995 by Jacques Chirac, then President of the French Republic, \u201cthe victims of deportation and spoliations arising from the anti-Semitic legislation in force during the Occupation\u201d7 have a legal right to a financial compensation.<\/h3>\n

The specific issue here is the compensation due to American victims. T<\/strong> attacks a 2015 law creating a \u20ac60 million fund, administered by the Americans, to that effect. This fund allows full compensation for the Holocaust victims deported from France, who had not been able to receive compensation under the French law because they lived in the US and\/or have taken the US nationality. So, the purpose of the 1995 law is to make up for this unfair treatment of the victims under a pre-existing law.8<\/h3>\n

3. Argumentative tension: the argument of the loser<\/span><\/h3>\n

3.1 The arguments<\/span>
\nThe analysis of the argumentative refutation structure is relatively straightforward. First there is an argumentative correction, which is then followed by the following three arguments backing up the
\n7 http:\/\/www.civs.gouv.fr\/images\/pdf\/thecivs\/Livret_Ruzie_Avril07_AN.pdf
\n(12-08-2019)
\n8 More information:
\nhttps:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/affichJuriAdmin.do?idTexte=CETATEXT00002
\n6618461<\/h3>\n
\n

352 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371<\/h3>\n

conclusion \u201cwe shouldn’t pay\u201d: 1) argument from the statute of\u00a0 limitation, 2) argument from categorization and a pari, and 3)
\nargument from consequences.
\nFor two reasons, these arguments will be accompanied by key elements of their respective refutation discourses. The first reason is deontological and legal: under its anti-Semitic reading, the text is highly controversial and can be attacked in court. The second reason is methodological: since arguing is an interactional activity, arguments can only be properly understood and appreciated by confronting their counter-argument. Moreover, these counter-arguments are common knowledge. Since nobody is supposed to ignore the law, they belong to the argumentative space as framed by the issue. This amounts to approaching that speech from a jurislinguistics perspective, with the analysis being framed as potentially useful counsel for a judge, not a transcendental rational judge, but an ordinary court having to enforce the law.<\/h3>\n

3.1.1 Argumentative correction
\nThe first move is a correction:<\/h3>\n

1. The US victims of the Shoah? 2. The victims became American post Shoah, because I don’t think that a single SS ever trod the American soil.<\/h3>\n

Mbala Mbala is saying there is nothing like \u201cUS victims of the Shoah.\u201d Rectifying the other discourse, that is, denying the truth of the facts alleged by the opponent and\/or the adequacy of her expression, is a basic refutative move. The speech act of clarification or precization is a way to gain the upper hand over the opponent by framing the exchange as a relation between expert\/ignoramus.
\nA possible counter argument to this move runs as follows: the formulation \u201cthe US victims of the Shoah\u201d is accurate as it is. The expression \u201cUS [citizen]\u201d does not consider whether nationality was acquired by birth or naturalization, and in both cases, US victims are entitled to compensation. In any case: 1) some of the
\npersecuted Jews have chosen the US nationality, whatever their formar nationality might have been; 2) US citizens have been persecuted as Jews when they were living in France under the<\/h3>\n
\n

Tense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 353
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371<\/h3>\n

Vichy regime.9 The suggested rectification, \u201c\u2026to the victims of the Shoah who became American post Shoah,\u201d changes nothing about the issue apart from excluding the case of US citizens persecuted as Jews under the Vichy regime, which would be contrary to
\nthe intention of the legislator.<\/h3>\n

3.1.2 Argument from the statute of limitation<\/h3>\n

4. And especially until when will we have to pay? 5. That was 70 years ago, who’s still responsible for that shit?<\/h3>\n

The answer to this rhetorical question is \u201cwe don’t have to pay since we cannot be held responsible for cette saloperie,(\u2018that shit\u2019)\u201d\u2014meaning the Shoah (see also \u00a76.2.2). A possible counterargument runs as follows: on legal grounds this argument is void because crimes of genocide are not subject to the statute of limitation that \u201csets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated\u201d (Wikipedia, Statutes of limitation).
\nAs nobody can legally ignore this, the conclusion could be that T must be brushed aside as irrelevant, and so, it is fallacious. Beyond this judgment, such a first-level, open irrelevance has a derived interpretation, which is exposed in the following reconstructed dialogue:<\/h3>\n

T \u2014 This is an old story; the issue is cleared up now!
\nO \u2014 This would violate the no limitation statute
\nT \u2014 I know and repeat. The case should be closed. The no limitation status is unfair; genocides should be treated as any other crimes\u2014this is my steadfast position. No exceptions.<\/h3>\n

(9) \u201cHundreds, perhaps thousands of American citizens were in every major
\nconcentration camp: Auschwitz, Mauthausen, Dachau, Buchenwald. Americans
\nwere even in the Warsaw Ghetto. More than 5,000 Americans were imprisoned
\nin internment camps. The total number who died in Nazi camps is uncertain, but
\ndefinitely was in the hundreds. American Jews were subject to the same anti-
\nSemitic regulations and dangers as any other Jews who came under the control
\nof the Nazis.\u201d \u201cIn places like France and Hungary, American property was
\nconfiscated\u201d https:\/\/www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org\/u-s-policy-toward-americans-
\nin-peril (03-22-2019).<\/h3>\n
\n

354 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371<\/h3>\n

So, a deeper issue emerges regarding the exceptional status of genocides and crimes against humanity. The open issue about financial compensation for the victims now appears to be dependent on this ulterior issue.<\/h3>\n

3.1.3 Argument from categorization and a pari<\/h3>\n

6. What do the Americans give to the victims of Hiroshima [\u2026]? 10. What is France doing to repair the damage caused by colonization [\u2026]?<\/h3>\n

Categorization is the central issue here. The victims of the Shoah, of colonization, of Hiroshima are placed in the same category. It follows by application of the rule of justice (a pari principle) thatthey should be treated in the same way, with either all, or none, being entitled to receive compensation. This implies an ad hominem charge of incoherence against France and the United States.
\nThe suggestion is that they violate the same category principle. Some kind of violation of the transitivity principle might also be involved. France does something for American victims of the Vichy regime, while Americans do nothing for Iraqi victims of the same kind of criminal war.
\nA possible counter-argument runs as follows: T’s central a pari argument is legally void because the victims of Hiroshima and the colonized are not legally recognized as victims of genocides that have a right to financial compensation.<\/h3>\n

3.1.4 Argument from negative consequences and victimization strategy<\/h3>\n

8. And we say the fight against anti-Semitism is a national cause? 9. Do we not create [anti-Semitism] by making such a disparity [\u2026]?<\/h3>\n

The claim is that: \u201ceverybody agrees that being an anti-Semite is something negative, and this measure creates anti-Semitism, so it should be condemned.\u201d At face value, this is a pragmatic argument from unwanted consequences. It can be used as a proleptic defense against the charge of anti-Semitism (see \u00a77.3).<\/h3>\n

Tense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 355
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nThe resulting overt conclusion of these three converging arguments is that the law should have been rejected. As it is actually enacted, the argument is interpreted as blame.<\/h3>\n

3.2 Argumentative tension<\/span><\/h2>\n

T is tense first of all because serious, open argumentative situations are inherently tense and emotional. Tension is heightened here through the following argumentative techniques:
\n– A strong-arm strategy<\/span>: One opponent tries to intimidate and overcome the other, which is framed as a fraud; rectification 1. implements this strategy.
\n– No dialogue<\/span>: There is no dialogism, and not even a hint of counter argument. Since the relevant counter arguments are common knowledge, their omission cannot be due to ignorance, and this can be used as an argument to reject T. It can also be interpreted as showing that T is part of a much broader argumentative continent rejecting international and national laws about the Shoah. In both cases, the decision to leave a basic legal principle unmentioned is a major factor in radicalization and argumentative tension.
\n– Arguing after the decision: A major source of tension comes from the special status of this argument. Arguments are currently seen as contributions to an ongoing deliberation that attempt to influence the decision process. Here, the argument develops after the decision has been made. T is not addressed to the opponent or to the judge; T is actually powerless. The argument is lost and T is the loser. The failed
\nproposal is not withdrawn, as logic might require, but radicalized. This is the main source of tension and hateful rage, see \u00a76.<\/h3>\n

4. Exclamatory tension and resistance to refutation<\/h3>\n

The preceding remarks did not take into account a salient characteristic of T, that is, its use of exclamatory sentences, two of which follow rhetorical questions (see \u00a75), and the third being the conclusive insult (see \u00a77). This section proposes to integrate exclamation into an argumentative perspective on the basis of 1) its capacity to<\/h3>\n
\n

356 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371<\/h3>\n

paragonize its object, and 2) its capacity to mimic natural
\nsigns and natural causation as opposed to argumentative defeasi-
\nble<\/h3>\n

4.1 Exclamatory<\/h3>\n

Culioli expresses the difference between assertive and exclamatory
\nstatements in terms of the \u201ctension\u201d resulting from the self-
\nprototypization process that characterizes exclamatory sentences.
\nTension goes beyond expressing a high degree of something.
\nTension is a phenomenon of utterance that is attached to the way
\nthings are said not what is said.
\nTension produces a high degree of arousal, providing the sub-
\nstrate on which emotions such as surprise, joy, anger, or hate can
\ndevelop (see \u00a76).
\nIn speech, tension can be signified through linguistic means
\n(I’m excited) or through semiotic actions. Semiotic signifiers are
\nproduced through the experiencer’s body and classified according
\nto their bodily origin, tone of voice, facial expressions, gestures,
\nand postures. Tension, that is affect, can be signified through all
\nthese dimensions. The higher voice and rising intonation tradition-
\nally associated with exclamation can be considered a particular
\nmanifestation of a generally tense body. Other kinds of more or
\nless conventional exclamatory semiotic signifiers also accompany
\nexclamatory tension, such as banging one’s fist on the table, open-
\ning the arms, shaking the head, rolling or rising the eyes to heaven,
\netc. This \u201cpara-exclamatory\u201d behavior is operative in argumenta-
\ntive interactions.
\n4.2 Exclamation as a prototypization process
\nExclamatory sentences presuppose not only the truth of the corre-
\nsponding assertion but also the truth of the assertion of the high
\ndegree of the predication. The utterance, \u201cWhat a hot summer it
\nwas!\u201d presupposes that it was an extremely hot summer. Exclama-
\ntory sentences can be easily reduced to the true\/false assertion that
\nsomething was of a high degree and consequently go unnoticed in
\nan analysis of argumentation focusing on informative content and
\ntruth-values.
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 357
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nIntensity variations are expressed in relation to an intensity scale
\n(he is not very patient, he is patient enough, he is very patient) or a
\nparagon (a foolproof, unshakable patience; an angel’s patience;
\npatient as a cat waiting for its prey etc.). Exclamation corresponds
\nto something different: a specific manner for expressing something
\nof a high degree. Following Culioli (1974) the exclamatory sen-
\ntence can be seen as a statement that constitutes itself in a self-
\nreferential process as the paragon of the high intensity of the
\nproperty it predicates. In \u201cWhat a patience Paul must have had!\u201d
\nPaul’s patience is promoted as the paragon of patience. This ex-
\nclamatory sentence performs two linguistic operations: 1) it predi-
\ncates a high intensity of something about Paul, specifically, \u201cPaul
\nis extremely patient\u201d and 2) it characterizes Paul’s extreme pa-
\ntience as a paragon of its kind. So, the resulting exclamatory sen-
\ntence should not be paraphrased as \u201cPaul’s patience equals the
\npatience of an angel,\u201d but, paradoxically that Paul’s patience is
\nevaluated as matching the paragon it establishes, or, according to
\nCulioli’s formulation \u201cPaul a une patience comme la patience qu’il
\na,\u201d \u201cPaul has the patience he has\u201d (Culioli 1974, p. 8).
\nFrom an argumentative point of view, it follows that nobody
\ncan dispute the fact that Paul is extremely patient (since he par-
\nagonizes patience) any more than they could dispute the fact that
\nHarpagon is extremely stingy. The production of such a paragon
\nand the ensuing self-referring evaluation is a kind of performative
\nact, positing its content beyond all possible refutation. The result-
\ning appreciation is presented as self-evident and analytically valid.
\nThis is the first way for an exclamation to position itself beyond
\nrefutation.
\n4.3 Exclamation as mimicking a natural response to a situation
\nAs interjections, exclamatory sentences are also considered be-
\nyond refutation in virtue of their specific pragmatic function as
\nnatural signs. Both are linguistic signs mimicking causal processes
\nas indicated by exclamation marks in written language (given the
\ncase considered, the issues of oral language won’t be discussed
\nhere).
\nInterjections, even if they are not \u201ctorn out\u201d by the actual situa-
\n358 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\ntion, are presented as such. Ouch! and alas! pose [se donnent
\npour] as consequences of pain or sadness. (…) The feelings and
\nemotions that constitute the meaning of the interjections are at-
\ntested meanings [significations attest\u00e9es] much more than ex-
\npressed meanings [significations exprim\u00e9es]. (Ducrot 1972, p. 19).
\nAs linguistic signs produced under the general conditions of the
\nspecific language they belong to, interjections are conventional
\nsigns, and, as such, can be feigned, insincere, etc. Nonetheless, the
\nspeaker produces them, even when they are pretended, as natural
\nsigns of a response caused by a natural stimulus, or as a compo-
\nnent of a general physical syndrome such as pain or any emotion.
\nThey don’t express pain as \u201cI suffer\u201d or \u201cI’m glad\u201d would do,
\ninstead they present themselves as proving the existence of pain in
\nthe way that bruises prove the existence of an impact. According
\nto Ducrot, this same \u201ctriggering\u201d [d\u00e9clencheur] mechanism is at
\nwork in exclamatory sentences; they present their enunciation as
\n\u201ctriggered by the representation of its object\u201d (Ducrot 1984, p.
\n186) just like interjections \u201cpresent their enunciation as triggered
\nby the feeling they express\u201d (Ducrot 1984, 200).
\nArguing empirically from acceptability judgments, grammari-
\nans conclude that interjections cannot be contradicted:
\nStudies in pragmatics have clearly shown that interjections cannot
\nbe denied: \u201cMadam, you said Ah!, but this is rigorously false!\u201d
\n(Barb\u00e9ris 1995, p. 101). There is no question of thinking of, tell-
\ning oneself, or even imagining an interjection: \u201cOuch! he thought \/
\nhe told himself\u201d (Kleiber 2006, p. 19).
\nThe truth of declarative sentences is asserted, while exclamatory
\nsentences literally show that they are true, their truth being given
\nas visible and tangible evidence. Under this analysis, exclamatory
\nsentences are ideally suited for radical argumentation.
\nNonetheless, notwithstanding their intended compelling charac-
\nter, exclamatory sentence can actually be challenged in face-to-
\nface interactions. Consider the pair:
\nS1 \u2014 What a heat!
\nS2 \u2014 No.
\nS3 \u2014 Well, no, nothing special, absolutely not exceptional
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 359
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nhere at that time of the year.
\nAcceptability judgments are themselves more or less acceptable;
\ngrooming the examples may be enough to change the perspective.
\nNo is actually a rather dry answer, but does the preceding conver-
\nsation violate any grammatical or interactional rule? According to
\nconversation principles, non-ratification is the second turn that is
\nnot preferred. As such, it is normally followed by some face-to-
\nface work and backed by substantial rectifications and justifica-
\ntions. When these routine elements are duly integrated, the denial
\nprocess runs quite smoothly as in S3.
\nThe rejection of the first exclamatory turn is based upon the as-
\nserted content of the exclamation. The exclamation itself remains
\nuntouched but could be destroyed at another level, for example by
\na well-coordinated ironic joke like \u201cWell, I see that you are actual-
\nly boiling.\u201d Refuting intensity is not quite enough to refute an
\nexclamation as refuting the subjacent analogy is not quite enough
\nto refute a metaphor (Plantin, 2017). Exclamatory sentences are
\nnot irrefutable but are framed as such.
\n5. Interactional Tension: Rhetorical questions (RQ)
\n5.1 RQ in T
\nT is built around eight questions. Question 1. is an echo question
\nintroducing an argumentative correction (see \u00a73.1.1). The follow-
\ning questions illustrate the variety of forms and degrees of \u201crhe-
\ntoricity\u201d of rhetorical questions:
\n– Question 3: de qui se moque-t-on? \u201cBut whom are they
\ntrying to fool?\u201d could be a request for information similar to
\n\u201cwho are you trying to call?\u201d However, this question is typi-
\ncally used as a collocation of: on se moque de nous \u201cthey are
\nlaughing at our face,\u201d and thus its answer is fully con-
\nstrained. Moreover, 1.-2. can be seen as a correction of a
\nbrazen attempt to deceive the reader, that is, as a proof that
\n\u201cthey are laughing at us.\u201d
\n– Questions 4 and 5: 4. And especially how long will we
\nhave to pay? 5. That was 70 years ago, 5b. who’s still re-
\nsponsible for that shit?
\n360 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nSentence 5. plays a pivotal role in the sequence 4.-5.-5b., in
\nrelation to both question 4. and question 5b. As an argument,
\n5. backs a conclusion corresponding to the preferred answer
\nto 5b., which is: \u201cnow, nobody is responsible.\u201d The link is
\npresented through the linking principle or semantic topos
\n\u201c(plus, +) long past, (minus, -) responsibility.\u201d Question 4.,
\n\u201chow long,\u201d literally asks for information about a time limit.
\nContext 5. provides the answer: \u201cwe shouldn’t have to pay
\nnow\u201d according to the topos \u201c(+) paid for a long time, (\u2013
\n) pay now.\u201d
\n– Question-answer pairs 6.-7. and 10.-11: These pairs de-
\nvelop the same argument in parallel structures; they are fol-
\nlowed by a second and third exclamation:
\n6. What do the Americans give to the victims of Hiro-
\nshima, Nagasaki\u2026? 7. Fuck! It’s a disgrace, it’s scan-
\ndalous! 10. What is France doing to repair the damage
\ncaused by colonization, the slave trade, 10b. or simply
\nto pay their pensions to the Africans who came and
\ndied for France? 11. Nothing! Sod all!
\nTheir rhetorical character is derived from the fact that they
\n(pretend to) express a shared knowledge. They are followed
\nby exclamatory sentences adding exclamatory tension to rhe-
\ntorical coercion. 7. further adds an explicit emotional content
\nto the mix. In both cases, the opponent is not given
\na chance to answer the question. This is especially unfortu-
\nnate for the second half of 10. because relevant information
\nabout the regular payment of pensions to African soldiers
\nhaving fought for France is widely available on the Internet.
\nThis can be considered as a case of fake implied infor-
\nmation.
\n5.2 RQ as argumentative moves
\nRhetorical questions are not intended to gather information from
\nthe listener, or to control that she knows the correct answer (as in
\nexam question), or to indirectly request some action (could you
\npass me the salt?). All kinds of questions can be found in written
\ntexts. For example, the writer can frame the issue in a deliberative
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 361
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nquestion, present the possible argumentative answers, argue at
\nsome length the pros and cons, and conclude by taking a more or
\nless firm personal position. In such a case, the deliberative ques-
\ntion is not a rhetorical question insofar as the answer is carefully
\nconstructed. The question turns rhetorical when, all information
\nand arguments being omitted, it immediately solicits or imposes an
\nanswer considered as self-evident.
\nBy using an RQ in an interaction, the speaker proceeds as if the
\nanswer were self-evident for all the participants, and this answer
\ncan be explicitly formulated or not. RQs are intended to evoke and
\nstress a (supposed) common belief in the participants. They are
\n\u201cNo issue!\u201d questions that exclude the dissenting voice from the
\nparticipants included in the current interaction. RQs reframe the
\nsituation as fully empathetic, that is, they encourage the audience
\nto quietly identify with the speaker.
\nIn face-to-face argumentative situations, the use of RQs is risky
\ndue to the physical presence of opponents who won’t hesitate to
\nloudly object that they consider the question as a provocation. In
\nsuch situations, RQs can be characterized as the result of a series
\nof coordinated operations of topic-and-interaction management:
\n(i) Arguer P is defending a claim C, and the audience
\nknows P’s position.
\n(ii) P asks a question Q about a crucial point in the argu-
\nment she develops. For example, Q can be an interrog-
\native reformulation of C.
\n(iii) The audience knows that 1) Q is divisive, and that 2)
\nwhen voiced by P in relation to C, Q has a strongly
\npreferred answer A.
\n(iv) The arguer challenges the participants, and especially
\nthe opponents, to openly produce and defend an an-
\nswer different from A.
\n(v) If the participants fail to produce a different answer (or
\nare not given the opportunity to have their say), then P
\nis authorized, by default, to continue from A under the
\nassumption that his progression to C is well on track.
\nHaving not been challenged, A, the answer to the rhetorical ques-
\ntion, is considered to be valid by default for the discussion. RQs
\n362 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nare a privileged vehicle for quick arguments from ignorance.
\nStages (iv)-(v) are the key moments. The speaker assumes that
\nnobody in the audience will dare interrupt her discourse, and that,
\nanyway, she has the floor and won’t leave it to the opponents.
\nThe emphasis put upon the answer originates from such a discur-
\nsive coup: \u201cyou see, there’s no alternative to my claim.\u201d This is an
\nintimidating strategy.
\nA question is 100% rhetorical when it bears upon an analytical-
\nly true statement: \u201cPeter has always lived alone, shouldn’t he be
\nconsidered a single person?\u201d Generally speaking, a question is
\nconsidered to be fully rhetorical when the speaker envisions just
\none precise, known answer. Practically, the speaker can more or
\nless orient the audience towards their preferred answer through
\nvarious linguistic strategies. Questions might exhibit different
\n\u201cdegrees of rhetoricity\u201d depending upon the coercive force of the
\nanswer. (Feigned) consensus is just one technique to postulate the
\nconsensus one wants to create.
\n6. Tension as the affective substrate of emotions
\n6.1 Emotions in argument
\nThe argument developed by T is clear, as are the main lines of the
\ncounter-discourse that could be constructed against it. Now, an
\nadequate representation of T as an argumentative text must also
\naccount for its emotive-emotional character. We will not take the
\neasy way out; we will first declare that emotions are inherently
\nfallacious (that is, we will use the semantic topos \u201c(+) emotion, (+)
\nfallacious\u201d). We will then conclude that such a strong appeal to
\nfallacious emotions is not surprising in an anti-Semitic text. Strong
\nemotions go along equally well with good and bad arguments.
\nOrdinary language is inherently subjective. It includes sets of
\nvalues and interests that play a defining role in the construction of
\nemotional-argumentative positions.
\nTension variation is the defining feature of emotions in gen-
\neral\u2014in discourse as in interactions. These variations can be rep-
\nresented by a wavy (phasic) line fluctuating over time. Specific
\nemotions (anger, depression, etc.) correspond to salient (inflec-
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 363
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\ntion) points on this line (Plantin 2011; 2015; Quignard & al. 2016;
\nNassau 2016; Baker, 2018).
\n6.2 Reconstructing emotions
\nEmotions can be attributed to the experiencer based on the lexicon
\nshe uses. This method avoids the perils of attributing emotions
\nbased on empathy and psychological introspection. The recon-
\nstruction of emotions necessarily relies upon a list of emotion
\nterms that has been independently constructed. Following a lenient
\npolicy and pending verification, all the terms belonging to such a
\nlist will be a priori considered as emotion terms. Such lists are
\nwidely available; some are short, for example Ekman\u2019s list of
\nbasic emotions (1969), while others are more detailed. For French,
\nwe will use Galati and Sini’s list of 146 emotion nouns (2000, p.
\n79), supplemented by the corresponding adjectives adverbs and
\nverbs (Mathieu, 1997). Emotion terms directly refer to emotions;
\nother terms can refer indirectly to emotions. We will suggest that
\nif the definition of a word includes an emotion term, this word has
\nan emotional component and can be the basis of an inference to
\nthat kind of affect. To avoid arbitrary reconstructions, definitions
\nwill be taken from reference dictionaries.
\nThis method will be used to reconstruct T’s key emotions based
\non the words used in the original language, in this case, French.
\nThe reconstruction materializes in emotion sentences mentioning
\nthe following elements: 1) the emotion, (E); 2) the experiencer
\n(Exp) of the emotion; 3) the situation as the source (S) of the
\nemotion; and 4) the allocator (A) of the emotion (emotions can be
\nself-allocated as in: \u201cI’m sad,\u201d or hetero-allocated as in \u201cPeter is
\nsad\u201d). In short, \u201cA [Exp, E, S]\u201d or \u201cAccording to A, EXP experi-
\nences emotion E, originating in S.\u201d
\n6.2.1 Surprise?
\nIn 1.-2. an affect like \/pity\/ could be inferred from the word victim
\n(the slashes note that emotion terms are reconstructed). But the
\nfocus is not on victims in this case. The word is used in a quotation
\nthat will be immediately rectified as 2. ridicules the expression
\n\u201cthe US victims of the Shoah,\u201d the inference to \/pity\/ is cancelled.
\n364 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nAn affect is actually attached to the rectification speech act
\nwhen it bears upon an expression that is framed as not only unfor-
\ntunate but also utterly laughable, that is, stupid. Based on these
\nintuitions, something like \/surprise, derision\/ could tentatively be
\nattached to this segment. In any case, the tension of this segment
\nremains low.
\n6.2.2 Derision, contempt, resulting in disgust, anger and indig-
\nnation
\nConsider the verb (se) moquer (Fr) \u201cto mock,\u201d in question 3. Mais
\nde qui se moque-t-on?; \u201cBut who are they laughing at?\u201d The root
\nsentence is \u201cA se moque de B\u201d; \u201cA mocks B.\u201d Mockery is defined
\nas follows:
\n– Moquer is defined as \u201ctourner en d\u00e9rision\u201d; \u201cto deride, to
\nridicule\u201d (TLFi, moquer).
\n– D\u00e9rision, \u201cderision\u201d is not listed as an emotion term by
\nGalati and Sini. Nonetheless, it is defined as \u201cmoquerie,
\nraillerie m\u00eal\u00e9es de m\u00e9pris,\u201d \u201cMockery combined with
\ncontempt\u201d (TLFi, moquer).
\nTo sum up, the dictionary defines moquer through d\u00e9rision, and
\nthen defines d\u00e9rision using an undisputable emotion term, m\u00e9pris;
\n\u201ccontempt.\u201d The situation is apparently the same for contempt, to
\nmock, and to deride. So, from \u201cA mocks, laughs at B\u201d, one can
\ninfer that \u201c[A scorns, despises B].\u201d The arguer, B, allocates the
\nfeeling of contempt to an experiencer referred to as an indefinite
\nagent on; \u201cone\u201d (3rd person personal pronoun). Moreover, con-
\ntempt, as an emotion term, has an interactive structure according to
\nwhich an emotion can be allocated by default to experiencer B\u2014in
\nthis case T: \u201cIf A despises B, and B knows that A despises
\nhim\/her, then B is angry against A.\u201d For the issue under considera-
\ntion, \/anger\/ is a high-degree, socio-political anger directed to-
\nwards an unspecified person or group\u2014that is \/indignation\/.
\nSentence 4.: And especially how long will we have to pay? is a
\nrhetorical question best answered by something like, \u201cNow, we
\nhave paid long enough! Enough is enough!\u201d; in French, \u201c\u00c7a suf-
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 365
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nfit!\u201d associated with a feeling of \/irritation\/ (Fr. \u201cagacement\u201d)10,
\nthat is, in a socio-political context, a feeling of rebellion akin to
\n\/indignation\/. The same reconstruction process is applied to the
\nexpression cette saloperie; \u201cthat shit.\u201d Saloperie refers to some-
\nthing \u201cunclean, despicable, potentially harmful\u201d (after TLFi, Sal-
\noperie). Despicable is an emotion word; the context \u201cunclean,
\nobscene\u201d allows a more precise definition of the specific emotion
\nassociated with saloperie as being \/disgust\/.
\nExplicit emotion terms are found in the exclamatory outburst in
\n7. following a rhetorical question:
\n6. What do the Americans give to the victims of Hiroshima
\n[\u2026] 7. Putain, mais quelle honte, c’est scandaleux! Fuck! It’s
\na disgrace, it’s scandalous!
\nHonte, \u201cshame,\u201d is an emotion word hetero-attributed to the Amer-
\nicans by T: \u201cT [They, shame, compensation].\u201d The correlative
\nemotion is expressed twice, first through the interjection putain
\n\u201cfuck,\u201d expressing \/outrage, indignation\/ (TLFi).11 And second
\nthrough the exclamation c’est scandaleux!; \u201cit’s a shame!\u201d12 Both
\nexpressions allocate the emotion to the speaker. The resulting
\nemotion sentence is \u201cT [T, \/indignation\/, compensation].\u201d
\n6.2.3 From indignation to hate
\nT is capped with an insult: \u201cClique mafieuse de merde! \u201cFucking
\nmafia clan!\u201d The expression N de merde, \u201cshitty N,\u201d is used to
\nconvey \u201ccontempt, irritation, anger\u201d (TLFi, Merde). This last
\nexclamatory outburst paragonizes contempt, irritation, anger as
\nfelt in relation to the compensation issue. This series represents the
\nlast and most intense development of the strongly coherent and
\nintense line of emotion that structures the text, going from
\n\/surprise\/, to anger, indignation and, when applied to a human
\ngroup, hate. T culminates in hate speech, and hate speech is pro-
\nhibited by law. Law is the lid put on the hate pot, and this repres-
\n10 fr.wiktionary.org\/wiki\/\u00e7a_suffit, 03-22-2019)
\n11 \u201cPutain: [\u2026] Marque la surprise, l’\u00e9tonnement, l’admiration ou l’indignation\u201d
\n(TLFi, Putain)
\n12 \u201cScandaleux: [\u2026] Qui cause du scandale, qui provoque l’indignation, la
\nr\u00e9probation\u201d (TLFi, Scandaleux)
\n366 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nsion or \u201ccompression\u201d certainly contributes to the tension ex-
\npressed by T.
\n7. In cauda veritas: an anti-Semitic orientation
\n7.1 Progressive and regressive conclusions
\nT concludes as follows:
\n12. And as a famous comedian [Dieudonn\u00e9 Mbala Mba-
\nla] once said: \u201cIf we do not make it up to the niggers, there
\nare some who will have to pay back a few dollars…\u201d 13.
\nFucking mafia clan!
\nThe confusion felt by some readers can be attributed to the fact
\nthat T manages two antagonistic orientations, which are, for con-
\nvenience, called 1) \u201cprogressive\u201d: tending to generalize the exist-
\ning financial compensations, and 2) \u201cregressive\u201d: tending to cancel
\nthe existing compensations.
\nT could be read as a \u201cprogressive\u201d discourse about victims.
\nFirst, it constructs a unique category of victims that includes dif-
\nferent kinds of unquestionable victims of history. Then, there is an
\nunfair treatment of these victims: \u201cthere are important compensa-
\ntion for the victims of deportation, nothing for the victims of slave
\ntrade and other victims.\u201d This historical and social fact is vehe-
\nmently denounced as an injustice. The corresponding moral feel-
\nings of injustice and indignation are good grounds for a call to
\naction. By an a pari reasoning based on the two categories of
\nvictims, this progressive perspective could culminate with a call to
\nsupport some association pleading for a compensation for the
\nvictims of slave trade and other victims. The addressee of such a
\ncall should be France, the Americans, or perhaps Westerners at
\nlarge; the call could summon the UN to create a commission to
\ncarry out the task of determining the level and beneficiaries of the
\ncompensation. According to such an orientation, the compensation
\nobtained by the victims of the Shoah could be praised as a first
\nexemplary step in the process of systematically compensating the
\nvictims of history. This line of argument implies that the Jewish
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 367
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\ngenocide, if not considered to be unique, actually represents the
\nprototype of a category of crimes against humanity.
\nNow, the a pari scheme can be applied the other way around to
\nserve a regressive, anti-Semitic perspective. Since the victims of
\nslave trade are not compensated, the victims of deportation should
\nalso not be compensated. In other words, T calls upon the Jewish
\nvictims of the Shoah to refund their compensations.
\n7.2 An anti-Semitic insult
\nT concludes and culminates with an insult, fucking mafia clan!,
\nwithout further identifying this clan. It can only refer to the bene-
\nficiaries of the compensations and to the Jewish people in general
\nby repeating an anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as a \u201cmafia clan.\u201d
\nThis clearly reveals T’s final target and its anti-Semitic fabric.
\n7.3 Proleptic rejection of the charge of anti-Semitism
\nThe charge of anti-Semitism is rejected in three different ways.
\n7.3.1 The word Jews is not used
\nT speaks of a \u201cmafia clan,\u201d but the reference to Jews is never
\nexplicit. T never uses the word Jew, thus leaving its target behind
\na (transparent) fog of indeterminacy. This is true also in context 3.
\nWhom are they trying to fool? and 12. some will have to pay back
\na few dollars. The referent of they remains unclear\u2014it could be
\nthe US victims of the Shoah or the French government. Some
\nrefers to the victims having already benefited from compensations,
\nleaving aside their identification as Jews.
\n7.3.2 A proleptic defense: anti-(anti-Semitism) creates anti-
\nSemitism
\nRecall the following passage:
\n8. And we say the fight against anti-Semitism is a national
\ncause? 9. Do we not create [anti-Semitism] by making such
\na disparity [\u2026]?
\n368 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nSentences 8.-9. can be interpreted as a proleptic defense against
\nthe charge of anti-Semitism looming over the website hosting T.
\nThe charge is rejected, and the issue is re-defined through a coun-
\nter-accusation that admits the possibility: I may be an anti-Semite,
\nbut redirects the responsibility to the accuser: You made me so,
\nthus you are the guilty one.
\n\u201cNigger\u201d; n\u00e9gro is an \u201cunambiguously pejorative and racist\u201d
\nterm (Wikipedia, Nigger 03-19-2019). Dieudonn\u00e9 has a dual na-
\ntionality, French-Cameroonian and is from Cameroonian descent.
\nThe reasoning might be that one cannot be a racist against oneself;
\nso, using the word n\u00e9gro cannot be considered a racist slur here,
\nbut rather a mere word play. It can also be given a polyphonic
\ninterpretation in relation to the main argument line: \u201cVictims of
\nslave trade and colonization are not compensated, they are actual-
\nly treated now as n\u00e9gros, and the word just mirrors your (the
\nopponent\u2019s) reality, even if you don\u2019t want to see it.\u201d In any case,
\nthis move opens up 1) the free use of any racist terms \u201cfor fun\u201d
\nand, possibly, 2) a line of defense against the accusation of anti-
\nJew racism, under the derived principle \u201cI use racist language
\nagainst myself, so I can use it against anybody else, for example,
\nthe Jews.\u201d
\n7.3.3 \u201cThat shit\u201d?
\nSaloperie refers to something \u201cunclean, despicable, potentially
\nharmful\u201d (after TLFi, Saloperie; see \u00a76.2.2). Should we under-
\nstand that the Shoah was a saloperie done to the Jews by Nazi
\nbastards, or that, on the whole, the Shoah is just something dis-
\ngusting, that must be kept at a distance? This is strange; the Shoah
\nis not a lousy trick but a crime against humanity.
\n8. Conclusion: Tension as a veridictive operator
\nThe following graph schematizes the degree and persistence of the
\nspeech arousal as it develops along T. The lines represent the
\nglobal level of tension. The arrows note a tension surge (exclama-
\ntion). The last arrow expresses the emotional conclusion as a
\ntransformation of indignation speech into hate speech. This graph
\ncan be considered as a representation of an emotion episode de-
\nTense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions 369
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nfined as the coherent development of an emotion along a textual
\nunit (Plantin 2011). The 4 lines below the graph read:
\n– Line 1: argument moves (correction, arg. from limitation,
\ncategorization, limitation, categorization) and conclusion
\n– Line 2: T
\n– Line 3: \u2018\u2013\u2019 = Assertion; \u2018?\u2019 = Question; \u2018!\u2019 = Exclamation
\n– Line 4: experiencer and specific emotions
\nBy saying P, a speaker indicates that they considers P to be true.
\nMoreover, they can try to back up the truth of P by asserting that P
\nis indeed true: \u201cThat\u2019s true, I assure you.\u201d Lay speakers cannot be
\ntheir own self-auditor.
\nSelf-authority is a type of backing that is inferior to argument,
\nbut arguments are only default proofs. They don’t fit well with
\nabsolute truths. Tension is a suturing operation\u2014a supplement
\nallowing the transition from \u201ctrue in my opinion (in my world
\n370 Plantin
\n\u00a9 Christian Plantin. Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2019), pp. 347\u2013371
\nview)\u201d or \u201ctrue insofar as my argument is good\u201d to just true. Ten-
\nsion is a veridictive operator,13 a seal that language imposes on
\ntruth when expressed in everyday speech (Beneveniste 1971). The
\nLatin adjective veridicus refers both to the fact that a sentence is
\ntrue and to the fact that a speaker tells the truth, as though to be
\ntrue (for a sentence) and to tell the truth (for a speaker) were one
\nand the same thing. Tension is an overall phenomenon. In a tense
\nargument, the arguer brings her whole person, mind and body, to
\nbear upon the issue, that is, the truth of what she says and the
\nrelevance of her argument. Arguments are tensed insofar as they
\nare communicated through the speaker’s body incorporating the
\nclaim \u201cI embody the truth.\u201d Bodily signifiers unfold beyond refu-
\ntation in a sphere alien to any kind of linguistic negation. Chal-
\nlenging a tensed claim amounts to challenging the person in their
\nphysical existence; the opponent is framed as an enemy. Nonethe-
\nless, high tension is no more an epistemic or moral guarantee than
\nany other self-certified backing. Even when accepted by soul and
\nbody, hate and racism speech remain hate and racism.
\n9. References
\nBenveniste, \u00c9mile. 1971. Subjectivity in language. In Problems in
\nGeneral Linguistics. Trans. M. E. Meek, 223-230. Miami: University
\nof Miami Press. (First published 1958).
\nBaker, Michael J. 2018. Striking a balance: argumentation and socio-
\nemotional processes in collaborative learning interaction. Learning,
\nCulture and Social Interaction 16: 1-19. (Eds. Jaana Isoh\u00e4t\u00e4l\u00e4, Piia
\nN\u00e4ykki, Sanna J\u00e4rvel\u00e4, Michael J. Baker)
\nCulioli, Antoine. 1974. \u00c0 propos des \u00e9nonc\u00e9s exclamatif. Langue Fran-
\n\u00e7aise 22: 6-15.
\nDoury, Marianne. 2003. L’\u00e9valuation des arguments dans les discours
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FORMAT EN COURS D’ADAPTATION Tense Arguments: Questions, Exclamations, Emotions CHRISTIAN PLANTIN ICAR Joint Research Unit, Universit\u00e9 Lyon II, \u00c9cole Normale Sup\u00e9rieure de Lyon, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) Lyon University La Rochette F43100 Chaniat France Christian.Plantin@univ-lyon2.fr Abstract Tension is a major issue in the analysis of argumentative discourse in ordinary language. Tension is […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15629","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-emotion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15629","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15629"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15629\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15689,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15629\/revisions\/15689"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15629"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15629"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15629"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}