{"id":4533,"date":"2021-10-15T13:20:48","date_gmt":"2021-10-15T11:20:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4533"},"modified":"2025-08-06T17:19:50","modified_gmt":"2025-08-06T15:19:50","slug":"abduction-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/abduction-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Abduction"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: center;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000; font-size: 14pt;\"><strong>ABDUCTION<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Latin <em>a<\/em><em>bductio,<\/em> \u201caction of taking\u201d, by an outwardly directed movement (see below, meaning 2).<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">1. Abduction as Inference from Facts to Hypothesis<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>The concept of abduction was introduced to modern philosophy by philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce, there are two kinds of inferences: <em>deductive<\/em> inference and <em>abductive<\/em> inference or <em>abduction<\/em>. Abduction starts from the observation of a fact that is \u201ccontrary to what we should expect\u201d (Peirce ([1958], \u00a7 202), that is to say, a fact that does not fit into an available explanatory system. Abduction is a process by which one proposes a hypothesis accounting for this new fact.<br \/>\nThis hypothesis is not the product of the applying a \u201cdiscovery algorithm\u201d, but rather the fruit of a creative process. \u201cAbduction is, after all, nothing but guessing\u201d (Peirce [1958], \u00a7 219).<\/p>\n<p>Abduction is not an issue in logic, but rather <span style=\"background-color: #ccffff;\">a scientific method<\/span> (<em>id<\/em>., Chap. 6). Scientific work consists of proposing, on the basis of facts, plausible hypotheses \u201csuggested\u201d by these facts. Abduction is the first step in this process.<br \/>\nThe practice of abduction is not guided by logical rules but rather by general principles, such as the principle of exclusion of so-called <em>metaphysical hypotheses<\/em>, that is to say, hypotheses that would have no experimental consequences, or the principle according to which <em>every fact has an explanation<\/em>. An abductive hypothesis is interesting \u201cif it seems to make the world reasonable\u201d (<em>id<\/em>., \u00a7202).<\/p>\n<p>Unlike abduction, which starts with facts and searches for theory, the Peircean <em>deduction<\/em> starts with a theory in search of facts; that is, it seeks to identify the crucial experimental consequences of a hypothesis.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"background-color: #ccffff;\">Rather than being a form of deduction or induction, argumentation should be seen as a form of abduction<\/span>. For example, when the light is on, \u201cI abduct\u201d, that is, I hypothesize, that someone is in the room; however, this hypothesis still needs to be verified, see <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/probable-plausible-true-e\/\">probable, plausible, true<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Woods redefines abductions as \u201cresponses to <em>ignorance-problems. <\/em>An agent has an ignorance-problem in relation to an epistemic target that cannot be hit by the cognitive resources presently at his command, or within easy and timely reach of it\u201d\u00a0(Woods, 2009; Gabbay &amp; Woods, 2005). The study of argument as an abductive process has proved especially fruitful in the fields of medicine, science and law (Walton 2004).<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">2. Abduction as Reduction of Uncertainty<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>In its Peircean sense, abduction is a type of inference by which one arrives at a hypothesis that accounts for a given fact. <span style=\"background-color: #ccffff;\">Aristotle defines abduction as<strong> a kind of dialectical syllogism<\/strong><\/span> (Aristotle, <em>PA<\/em>, II, 25), in which the major premise is true and the minor merely probable, and, consequently, the conclusion also probable. Without the minor, the conclusion alone is more improbable than the minor. Therefore, the minor <strong>strengthens the relative acceptability of the conclusion<\/strong>. This situation recalls the Ciceronian definition of argumentation, see <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/argumentation-i-definition\/\">argumentation 1<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>For example, if the question is: \u201c<em>can virtue be taught?<\/em>\u201d we can reason as follows:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\">A true premise: it is clear that <em>science can be taught<\/em>.<br \/>\nA doubtful premise: <em>virtue is a science<\/em>.<br \/>\nConclusion: <em>virtue can be taught<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Though uncertain, the veracity of the second premise is still <strong>less in doubt <\/strong>than the conclusion \u201c<em>virtue can be taught<\/em>\u201d. Therefore, this second premise may serve as an argument for the conclusion. We find this montage in speeches such as:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\">Citizenship can be taught.<br \/>\nCitizenship is essentially a set of social knowledge and practices.<br \/>\nKnowledge can be taught and all practical skills can be improved by teaching. Therefore, citizenship can be taught.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"background-color: #ccffff;\">Arguments function \u201cfor want of better\u201d.<\/span> Reducing uncertainty modifyies the epistemic status of a belief. This is a logic not of <em>elimination<\/em> but of <em>reduction<\/em> of doubt and uncertainty, see <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/default-reasoning-e\/\">default reasoning<\/a><strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>ABDUCTION Latin abductio, \u201caction of taking\u201d, by an outwardly directed movement (see below, meaning 2). 1. Abduction as Inference from Facts to Hypothesis The concept of abduction was introduced to modern philosophy by philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce, there are two kinds of inferences: deductive inference and abductive inference or abduction. Abduction starts [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4533","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4533","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4533"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4533\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14650,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4533\/revisions\/14650"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4533"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4533"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4533"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}