{"id":4620,"date":"2021-10-16T09:54:29","date_gmt":"2021-10-16T07:54:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4620"},"modified":"2025-03-28T08:06:04","modified_gmt":"2025-03-28T07:06:04","slug":"analogy-iii-structural-analogy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/analogy-iii-structural-analogy\/","title":{"rendered":"Analogy 2: Structural Analogy"},"content":{"rendered":"

Analogy 2: STRUCTURAL ANALOGY<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

1. Terminology<\/span><\/h1>\n

Structural analogy connects two complex domains, each of which articulates an indefinite and unlimited number of objects and relations between these objects. It combines intra-categorical analogy<\/em> (a property of objects) with proportional analogy<\/em> (a property of relations). One could also speak of formal analogy<\/em> (the domains have the same shape) or borrow the mathematical term \u201cisomorphism<\/em>\u201d, see Intra-categorical analogy<\/a>; Proportion<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The term \u201cmaterial analogy<\/em>\u201d refers to the relationship between two objects when one is a replica<\/em> of the other. The concept covers various phenomena, such as the relationship between a model and its original<\/em>, or the relationship between a prototype<\/em> and the object to be produced. The reasoning based on the model or prototype is then applied to the original.<\/p>\n

Structural analogy is used in the following two situations.<\/p>\n

(i) A, B, C are similar \u00ad\u2014 <\/strong>To determine whether the complex objects or domains A, B, C<\/strong> are similar<\/em>, one must compare<\/em><\/a> their components and the relationships between them. The result of this investigation will be a claim such as \u00ab\u00a0A<\/strong>, B<\/strong>, C <\/strong>are similar\u00a0\u00bb; \u00ab\u00a0A<\/strong>, B<\/strong>, are indeed similar, but C<\/strong> is something different\u201d, and so on.<\/p>\n

One might ask whether the Great Depression of 1929, the Lost Decade of Japan in the 1990s, and the Argentine crisis of 2001 share some significant characteristics. The whole purpose of the study may be to establish a typology of economic crises, without relying \u2014 as much as possible \u2014 relying on preconceived notions of how people will use the conclusions of this study.<\/p>\n

The areas are symmetrical from the point of view of the study, which does not favor any of the areas over the others, but only focuses only on their relationships.<\/p>\n

(ii) A is similar to B \u2014<\/strong> A contrario<\/em>, the importance of the previous situation appears when the series includes the 2008 crisis. Given the topicality of this last crisis, it will certainly be tempting to see if we can \u00ab\u00a0learn lessons\u00a0\u00bb from the previous crises and to apply them to the case of 2008, with the intention of making provisions for the current situation. If the proponent uses the analogy 1929 ~ 2008 to predict a third world war, her opponent can refute the inference by showing that the domains are not similar, and therefore it is impossible to rely on the first instance, in 1929, to infer anything about what will happen in 20** and beyond (see below).<\/p>\n

The difference in status between the two domains is expressed in different ways. In his analysis of the metaphor<\/a>, Richards contrasts tenor <\/em>and vehicle<\/em> (1936); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca speak of theme<\/em> and phore<\/em> ([1958], p. 501). A simple way of naming these domains might be comparing domain<\/em> \/ compared domain<\/em>; or, in terms of argument analysis, R<\/strong>esource domain \/ T<\/strong>arget domain<\/em>.
\nThe argument by analogy works on the asymmetry of the compared domains. Therefore, these two domains are denoted, if necessary by the letter R<\/strong>, the resource field, and \u03a0<\/strong> (Greek capital letter \u201cpi\u201d), \u00a0\u00a0the P<\/strong>roblematic domain<\/em>, targeted<\/em> by the investigation. The field R<\/strong> is the source or R<\/strong>esource<\/em> on which the arguer relies to explore the target domain \u03a0<\/strong>, or to derive certain consequences about \u03a0 <\/strong> from R. In other words, the resource field R<\/strong> is the argument<\/em> domain and the target field \u03a0<\/strong> is the inference<\/em> domain.<\/p>\n

The two domains are distinguished from epistemic, psychological, linguistic and argumentative perspectives.<\/p>\n

\u2014 Epistemically<\/em>, the resource domain is the best-known domain; the target domain is the domain under investigation.<\/span>
\n\u2014 Psychologically<\/em>, the intuitions and values that operate in the resource domain are brought to bear in the target domain.<\/span>
\n\u2014 Linguistically<\/em>, the resource domain is well covered by a stabilized, familiar and easily spoken language; the target domain is not.
\n<\/span>\u2014Practically,<\/em> we know what to do in the resource domain but we do not know what to do in the target domain.<\/p>\n

2. Explanatory Analogy<\/span><\/h1>\n

In Ernest Rutherford well-known analogy between the atom and the solar system, the resource field is the solar system, the goal domain is the atom:<\/p>\n

The atom is like the solar system.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is a didactic analogy, intended to provide a first intuitive understanding of the atomic structure, taking advantage of a (supposed) better understanding of the solar system. The asymmetry of the fields is obvious: the resource field, the solar system, has been known and understood for a long time. The targeted field, the atom, was new, then poorly understood, inaccessible to direct perception, mysterious.<\/p>\n

The explanatory analogy retains some pedagogical merit, however partial. Comparison is not identification, and two systems can be compared only in order to identify the limits of the comparison, that is, the irreducible specificities of each field, cf. infra, \u00a76.<\/p>\n

The analogy has explanatory value in the following situation:<\/p>\n

In the world \u03a0<\/strong>, the proposition \u03c0<\/strong> is badly understood. In a world R<\/strong>, there is no debate about r<\/strong>. \u03a0<\/strong> is isomorphic to R<\/strong> (structural, systemic analogy). The position of \u03c0 in \u03a0<\/strong> is the same as that of r<\/strong> in R<\/strong>. So, the knowledge, images, commitments associated with r<\/strong> are now transferred to \u03c0<\/strong>; \u03c0<\/strong> is now a little better understood; we know how to deal with \u03c0.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The analogical relation allows the unknown to be integrated on the basis of the known. As causal explanations, analogical explanations break the insularity of the domains.<\/p>\n

The analogy is an invitation to see and treat the problem through the resource. The resource domain is viewed as a model of the target domain. The relationship of the domain under study to the resource domain is treated as of the relationship of the domain under study to an abstract representation of that domain. Otto Neurath uses a maritime metaphorical analogy to explain his vision of epistemology:<\/p>\n

There is no tabula rasa<\/em>. We are like sailors at sea, who must rebuild their ship without ever taking it to a dock to be dismantled and rebuilt it with better materials. (Otto Neurath, [Protocol Statement<\/em>],1932\/3.[1]<\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

The analogy can be translated literally: \u201cThere is no ultimate foundation of knowledge from which we could rebuild all of our present knowledge without any presuppositions.<\/em>\u201d This resource is extremely powerful; the image could also be applied to social life: \u201cThere is no ‘good explanation’ (meaning \u00ab\u00a0good discussion of our disagreements\u00a0\u00bb) that would allow us to reconstruct a damaged relationship and start from scratch<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

3. Arguments Based on Structural Analogy<\/span><\/h1>\n

In ordinary situations, analogy is used argumentatively, as in the following case:<\/p>\n

\u2014 In the world \u03a0<\/strong>, we are in a difficult situation; what should we do? Should we accept or reject the perspective \u03c0<\/strong>?
\n<\/span>\u2014 But we know for sure what happens in a world R<\/strong>.
\n\u2014 <\/span>Fortunately, \u03a0<\/strong> is isomorphic to R<\/strong> (structural, systemic analogy); if necessary we can argue for this.
\n\u2014 <\/span>The position of \u03c0<\/strong> in \u03a0<\/strong> is the same as the position of r<\/strong> in R<\/strong>.
\n\u2014 <\/span>So, we can act, in the world \u03a0<\/strong>, <\/strong>on the basis of the knowledge, images, obligations associated with r <\/strong>(in R) \u2014 That is, we can now decide about \u03c0<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

This argumentative operation implies that \u201cif the domains are analogous, so are their corresponding elements and the relations between them\u201d, which may turn out to be true or false upon further investigation. The analogy gives us something to think about, but proves nothing; the conclusion projected onto \u03a0<\/strong> may be false or ineffective.<\/p>\n

4. From Analogy to Metaphor and Back<\/span><\/h1>\n

A language<\/em> is associated with the resource domain. For example, \u200b\u200bthe human body<\/em> is referred to in a language that may be incomplete and rather incoherent, but is generally understood, the language of the flow of organic matter, of popular physiology, of good health and illness, of life and death. This language synthetizes and builds a common intuition of the body. Other unfamiliar domains are not equipped with such a dense, effective and functional language. The analogy projects the language of the resource field, the human body, onto the problem field, society. As a result, the target can be problematized in a familiar, non-controversial language; so that social convulsions<\/em> can be discussed and a cure<\/em> found. The analogy is an invitation to see the problem through the lens of the resource; full metaphorization allows us to forget the glasses.<\/p>\n

The following apologue is based on the analogy \u00ab\u00a0society is like a body\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>, as expressed in the metaphorical phrase \u201csocial body<\/em>\u201d. Note the explicitness of the vocabulary of analogy in the last section of the commentary.<\/p>\n

The senate therefore decided to send as their spokesman Menenius Agrippa, an eloquent man, who was also accepted by the plebs because he himself was of plebeian origin. He was received into the camp, and it is reported that he told them, in a primitive and uncouth manner, the following fable. \u2018In the days when all the parts of the human body did not work together as they do now, but each went its own way and spoke its own language, the other members, indignant at seeing that all that was acquired by their care and labor and service went to the belly, while the belly, undisturbed in the midst of them all, did nothing but enjoy the pleasures provided for it, entered into a conspiracy; the hands were not to bring food to the mouth, the mouth was not to receive it when offered, the teeth were not to chew it. While they, in their resentment, were trying to force the belly by starving it, the members themselves were wasting away, and the whole body was reduced to the last stage of exhaustion. Then it was found that the belly did no idle service, and that the nourishment it received was no greater than that which it gave by returning to all the parts of the body that blood by which we live and are strong, evenly distributed in the veins, after being ripened by the digestion of the food<\/em>.\u2019 By using this comparison, and showing how the internal discontent between the parts of the body resembled the animosity of the plebeians against the patricians, he succeeded in winning over his audience.<\/span>
\nTitus Livius, The History of Rome<\/em>, Volume 1, Book 2; between 27 and 9 BC [2]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

The resource does not necessarily exist before it is used in an analogy. An analogy can create a self-evident resource ex nihilo<\/em>, as in the following analogy, proposed by Heisenberg in 1955. The danger mentioned in the first line refers to the Cold War era, and the resource concept is \u201ca ship built with such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing North points toward the iron mass of the ship<\/em>.\u201d Note again that there is no clear line between structural analogy and metaphor<\/a>. Heisenberg calls the situation he envisions a metaphor; and in the next line, he uses a construction that expresses an analogy: \u201cMankind is in the position of a captain<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

Another metaphor might make such a danger even clearer. Through the seemingly un\u00adlimited growth of its material power, humanity could be likened to a captain whose ship has been built from such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing north, is pointing toward the huge iron mass of the ship. Such a ship would get nowhere. It would be blown off course and go around in circles.<\/p>\n

But to return to the situation of modern physics, we must admit that the danger exists only if the captain does not know that his compass no longer responds to the magnetic force of the Earth. Once he understands this, the danger is already halved. Because the captain who does not want to turn back, but wants to reach a known or unknown destination, will find a way to steer the boat, either by using new modern compass that does not react to the iron mass of the boat, or by steering in relation to the stars as sailors used to do. It is true that the visibility of the stars does not depend on us, and perhaps we rarely see them today. Nevertheless, our awareness of the limits of our hope for progress presupposes the desire not to go round in circles, but to reach a goal. Once recognized, this limit becomes the first fixed point that allows a new orientation.<\/span>
\nWerner Heisenberg, [Nature in Modern Physics<\/em>], [1955] [3]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

5. Structural Analogy as an Epistemological Barrier<\/span><\/h1>\n

Analogy is fruitful in stimulating discovery and invention, useful in teaching and popularizing knowledge. But it becomes an epistemological barrier when the proposed explanation by analogy seems so clear and satisfying that it discourages further inquiry:<\/p>\n

For example, blood flows like water. Canalized water irrigates the soil, so blood should also irrigate the body. Aristotle was the first to associate the distribution of blood from the heart to the body with the irrigation of a garden by canals (De Partes Animalium<\/em>, III, v, 668 a 13 and 34). Galen did not think otherwise. But to irrigate the soil, it is ultimately to get lost in the soil. And this is the main obstacle to a correct understanding of the blood circulation.<\/span>
\nGeorges Canguilhem, [The Knowledge of Life<\/em>], 1951.[4]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

The systematic rejection of analogy as a tool of knowledge is based on such observations.<\/p>\n

6. Refuting Structural Analogies<\/span><\/h1>\n

6.1 Vain Analogy<\/span><\/h2>\n

In an explanation, the explanation (explanans<\/em>) must be clearer than the thing to be explained (explanandum<\/em>). An analogical explanation must also satisfy this condition, and if the resource area is even less well known than the area under investigation the analogy will not help to understand of things.<\/p>\n

The analogy is also useless if it is used to impress the audience and to show off the speaker’s familiarity with the resource domain. G\u00f6del’s theorem is often used for this purpose (Bouveresse [1999]).<\/p>\n

6.2 False Analogy<\/span><\/h2>\n

An argument by analogy can be rejected by showing that there are critical differences<\/em> between the resource domain and the target domain, that prohibit the projection of the former onto the latter so that no lesson can be learned from the supposed resource domain. For example, the following passage argues that the comparison of the 2008 and 1929 crises is marred by the fact that the current situation in Germany has nothing to do with its situation after 1918 and in the years to come. It is also argued that there is nothing comparable to Hitler and Nazism in the European landscape of 2009:<\/p>\n

Jean-Fran\u00e7ois Mondot<\/em> \u2014 Is the economic crisis weakening our civilization? We sometimes hear intellectuals and columnists draw analogies with the 1929 crisis that led to the Second World War.<\/em><\/p>\n

Pascal Boniface<\/em> \u2014 We often make the mistake of thinking that history repeats itself, and so we make very risky comparisons. Russia bangs its fist on the table, and everyone immediately talks about the Cold War. There is an economic and financial crisis erupts on Wall Street, and immediately an analogy is drawn to 1929, suggesting that Hitler could come to power as a result of these difficulties. But the political circumstances are obviously very different, for no great country is now being humiliated as Germany was after 1918, and so is seeking revenge. This comparison is easy to make, but it has no basis, neither strategic nor intellectual.<\/span>
\nPascal Boniface, [The Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable<\/em>], 2009.[5]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

6.3\u00a0Partial analogy<\/span><\/h2>\n

Partial analogy (\u00ab\u00a0misanalogy\u00a0\u00bb, Shelley, 2002, 2004) is an analogy that has been criticized and recognized as limited. The two domains cannot be equated. Nevertheless, partial analogy still has a pedagogical use, as seen in the case of the analogy between the solar system and the atom (see \u00a72 above):<\/p>\n

A central body: the sun, the nucleus of the atom.
\n<\/span>Peripheral elements: the planets, the electrons.
\n<\/span>A central mass much greater than the peripheral masses: the mass of the sun is greater than that of the planets; the mass of the nucleus is greater than that of the electrons. \u2014etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

Differences (analogy breaks):<\/p>\n

The nature of the attraction: electric for the atom, gravitational for the solar system.<\/span>
\nThere are identical atoms, each solar system is unique.<\/span>
\nThere can be several electrons in the same orbit, whereas there is only one planet in the same orbit, etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

The fact that the limits of analogy are well known prohibits any automatic transfer of knowledge gained in one field to the other.<\/span><\/p>\n

6.4 Reverse Analogy<\/span><\/h2>\n

A conclusion C1<\/strong> has been reached about a target resource on the basis of an analogy drawn from the resource domain R<\/strong>. The opponent argues that the same analogy drawn from the same domain R<\/strong> leads to another conclusion C2<\/strong> about the same target domain, that is incompatible with C1<\/strong> (\u00ab\u00a0disanalogy\u00a0\u00bb Shelley, ibid<\/em>.). These two contradictory conclusions prohibit the use of the resource domain to argue in the target domain.<\/p>\n

This is particularly effective because the opponent is conceding to play on her opponent’s home turf. The opponent accepts the proponent’s analogy and examines it more closely in order to neutralize the proponent’s conclusions. This strategy is used in the refuting argumentative metaphors.<\/p>\n

Argument: \u00ad\u2014 This is the heart of our discipline<\/em>.
\n<\/span>Refutation: \u2014 That’s true. But disciplines also need eyes to see clearly, legs to move, hands to act, and even a brain to think<\/em>.
\n<\/span>Other refutation \u2014 <\/span>That’s true, but the heart can keep beating very well preserved in a jar.<\/span> <\/em><\/p>\n

An advocate of hereditary monarchy speaks against universal suffrage:<\/p>\n

Argument: \u2014 An elected president, that’s absurd, we don’t elect the\u00a0 ship’s pilot<\/em>.
\n<\/span>Rebuttal: \u2014 There are no natural-born ship’s pilot<\/em> either<\/em>.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

Both sides are staging the same metaphorical field. This form of rebuttal has the force of an ad hominem<\/em><\/a> refutation, based on the speaker’s own beliefs about the speaker: \u201cYou are your own refuter<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

Counter-analogy \u2014<\/strong> As with any argument, an argument by analogy can be countered with a counter-argument (an argument whose conclusion is incompatible with the original conclusion). This rebuttal can be of any kind, including another argument by analogy, taken from a different resource domain; one analogy balances another analogy:<\/p>\n

Argument: \u00a0 \u2014 The university is (like) a business, so …
\n<\/em>Rebuttal: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014 No, it is (like) a day-care center, an abbey …<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/span><\/a> Otto Neurath, \u201cProtokolls\u00e4tze\u201d. Erkenntnis<\/em> 3 (1932\/3), p. 206. Quoted in A. Beckermann \u201cZur Inkoh\u00e4renz und Irrelevanz of Wissensbegriffs\u201d. Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophische Forschung<\/em> 55, 2001. P. 585. [\u00ab\u00a0On the incoherence and irrelevance of concepts of knowledge\u00a0\u00bb. Journal for Philosophical Research, etc.]\n<\/span>[2]<\/a> Translated by Rev. Canon Roberts, edited. by Ernest Rhys. J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 1905. Quoted from; http:\/\/mcadams.posc.mu.edu\/txt\/ah\/Livy\/Livy02.html<\/a>. No pag. (11-08-2017)
\n<\/span>[3]<\/a> Quoted from Werner Heisenberg (1962) La Nature dans la Physique Contemporaine<\/em>. Paris: Gallimard, 1962. P. 35-36. [<\/span>Nature in Contemporary Physics<\/em>]\n[4]<\/a> Quoted after Georges Canguilhem, La Connaissance de la Vie. <\/em>Paris: Vrin, 1965. P. 26-27. [<\/span>The Knowledge of Life.
\n<\/em>[5]<\/a> Pascal Boniface, \u201cLe clash des civilisations n’est pas in\u00e9vitable\u201d. Interview by J.-F. Mondot, Les Cahiers de Science et Vie<\/em>, 2009. www.iris-france.org \/ Op-2009-03-04.php3] (09-20-2013) [<\/span>\u201cA clash of civilizations is not inevitable\u201d.<\/em>]\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Analogy 2: STRUCTURAL ANALOGY 1. Terminology Structural analogy connects two complex domains, each of which articulates an indefinite and unlimited number of objects and relations between these objects. It combines intra-categorical analogy (a property of objects) with proportional analogy (a property of relations). One could also speak of formal analogy (the domains have the same […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4620","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4620","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4620"}],"version-history":[{"count":25,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4620\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13831,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4620\/revisions\/13831"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4620"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4620"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4620"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}