{"id":4654,"date":"2021-10-16T11:33:33","date_gmt":"2021-10-16T09:33:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4654"},"modified":"2025-03-28T10:41:05","modified_gmt":"2025-03-28T09:41:05","slug":"argumentation-i-definition-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/argumentation-i-definition-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Argumentation 1: Definitions"},"content":{"rendered":"

ARGUMENTATION 1: DEFINITIONS<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

The analysis of argumentation has been intensively and specifically studied since the post-World War II period (references infra) :<\/p>\n

The bi-millennial framework of logic as an \u201cart of thinking\u201d<\/strong> in natural language has been taken up and reworked in the new intellectual framework of the post-Fregean mathematical logic as a Substantial Logic<\/em>, an Informal Logic<\/em>, or a Natural Logic<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

A new vision of argumentation as discourse orientation<\/strong> has been developed in the semantic theory of Argumentation within Language<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ancient rhetoric has been recast as New Rhetoric<\/em><\/strong>. Dialectics<\/strong> has been revisited in relation to pragmatics and speech act theories, and expanded into a powerful critical tool within the framework of Pragma-dialectic<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The perspectives of rhetoric and dialectics<\/strong> are now ubiquitous in contemporary studies and teaching programs on argumentation. The connections between rhetoric, textual linguistics and discourse analysis<\/strong> have been recognized and rearticulated.<\/span><\/p>\n

The spectacular results of interactions analysis<\/strong> have opened up the immense field of everyday conversational interactions as a specific domain of investigation, where argument<\/em> as \u201cdispute\u201d intertwines with argument<\/em> as \u201cgood reason\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

The various theories of argumentation developed in the late twentieth century are based on different visions and definition<\/strong>s of their objects, methods and goals.<\/span> Given this diversity, and the apparent and real discrepancies between definitions, there is a real temptation of synthesize, that is, to look for a definition that, while not trivial, will restore order, unity, simplicity and consensus.
\nExperience shows, however, that many new definitions intended to replace older ones, simply add to the existing lists<\/strong>,<\/span> thereby exacerbating the problem that they were intended to solve.<\/p>\n

Another solution could be to start with things as they are, that is, to admit that the field of argumentation studies does not develop in the hypothetical-deductive style of starting from an overwhelming \u201cmaster definition\u201d and deriving its consequences, but rather in a more empirical, data-driven, manner.
\nIn practice, this suggests that one can very well start with a corpus of definitions<\/strong> of the concept of argumentation<\/span> in order to identify the points of consensus and divergence, while emphasizing the points of view that have proven to be the most fruitful<\/p>\n

1. Rhetorical argumentation, an instrument of <\/span>persuasion<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/h2>\n

Socrates<\/strong><\/span> views and rejects rhetoric as an enterprise in social persuasion through speech. He shares this definition with his opponents, especially Gorgias:<\/p>\n

Gorgias\u202f\u2014\u202fI’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councilors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any political gathering that might take place. (Plato, Gorgias<\/em>, 452e; p.\u2009798)<\/span><\/p>\n

Socrates\u202f\u2014\u202fWell, then isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the souls by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in private? (Plato, Phaedrus<\/em>, 261a\u2009; CW<\/em>, p.\u2009537)<\/span><\/p>\n

This defines the common use<\/em> of the word rhetoric<\/em> in ancient Greece, what people call<\/em> rhetoric.
\nNow what rhetoric is<\/em>, in its substance,<\/em> or lack of substance, is another story:<\/p>\n

By my reasoning, oratory is an image of a part of politics. (Plato, Gorgias<\/em>, 463d; CW<\/em>, p. 807)<\/span><\/p>\n

Politics is defined as the craft of addressing \u201cthe soul\u00a0\u00bb (ibid<\/em>, 464b, p. 808), and rhetoric is discarded as an insubstantial \u201cimage\u201d, an eidolon<\/em>, a counterfeit of politics<\/strong>.<\/span> Socrates unreservedly condemns rhetorical discourse aimed at persuasion, as a lie, an illusion, a manipulative enterprise, antagonistic to truth-seeking philosophical discourse.
\nThis unqualified and irrevocable condemnation of rhetoric as counterfeit is at the root of the popular negative meaning of the word, and this obviously includes argumentative rhetoric as well. The criticism of rhetoric is part of the field of rhetoric, and the same is true of the field of argument.<\/span><\/p>\n

Aristotle<\/strong><\/span> positions rhetoric not as a counterfeit but as \u201cthe counterpart of dialectic\u201d<\/strong> (Rhet<\/em>, I, 1, 1354a1; RR p. 95) and defines it as an empirical<\/strong> techne<\/em>, a craft, oriented toward the study of specific cases:<\/p>\n

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion\u00a0(Rhet<\/em>, I, 2, 1355b25; RR, p. 105).<\/span><\/p>\n

Cicero<\/strong><\/span> follows this functional definition:<\/p>\n

Cicero Junior: \u2014 What is an argument?
\n<\/em>Cicero Father \u2014 A plausible device [probabile] to obtain belief.
\n<\/em>Cicero, Part.<\/em>, II, 5; p. 315<\/span><\/p>\n

Crassus\u202f\u2014\u202fAs becomes a man well born and liberally educated, I learned those trite and common precepts of teachers in general; first, that it is the business of an orator to speak in a manner adapted to persuade<\/span><\/em>.<\/em> (Cicero, De Or<\/em>., I, XXXI; p.\u200940)<\/span><\/p>\n

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s<\/strong><\/span> \u201cNew Rhetoric\u201d\u00a0 also focuses on persuasion:<\/p>\n

The object of the study of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent<\/em>. ([1958], p. 4; italics in the original)<\/span><\/p>\n

By focusing on \u201cdiscursive techniques\u201d and on \u201cthe mind’s adherence\u201d<\/span>, this definition re-builds argumentation studies on the same basis as those of the Aristotelian argumentative rhetoric, persuasive speech. It reconnects the contemporary understanding of argumentation with the experience gained throughout two millennia.<\/p>\n

Thesis<\/em>, mind<\/em>, presented<\/em>, assent<\/em>, discursive techniques<\/em>:<\/strong> this definition articulates the core concepts of what could be called \u201cthe argumentation movement\u201d as a vision of man and discourse in modern democratic societies.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The claims are theses<\/em><\/span><\/strong>. This is a philosophical term; the issues addressed by argumentative interventions are complex and high level, \u201cthe most rational\u201d (id.<\/em>, p. 7). The Treatise<\/em> keeps its distance from everyday arguments and minds: it does not address the ignorant, and more: \u201cthere are beings with whom <\/span>any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable\u2026\u201d (id<\/em>., p. 15).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 These theses are presented to<\/em><\/span> the audience<\/strong>, imposed<\/em> on <\/strong>
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 Moreover, they are presented to the minds of the audience,<\/strong> that is, to men and women wo are endowed with the capacity for choice and decision; and who live under social conditions that allow them to exercise this capacity to the full. <\/span>
\nThis action on the minds <\/em>can be contrasted with the manipulation of souls<\/em> and bodies<\/em><\/strong>: souls with their capacities of emotion and sensibility \/ sensitivity to romantic or mystical appeals; bodies which can be forced to march or vibrate in unison under a musical mantra or image.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 Consent assent<\/a> <\/em><\/span><\/strong>results<\/span> from an explicit judgment of a free and conscious mind. Assent can be given or withdrawn<\/strong>. Expressing one’s assent is in contrast to producing a response under the causal pressure of a stimulus.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Finally, argumentation is a discursive technique<\/em><\/span><\/strong>, that is, a form of speech in which speakers can practice and improve.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The Treatise<\/em> does not deal with fallacies<\/em>, but the evaluation of arguments is a central theme of the book. The sound criticism and evaluation of arguments is not a matter for the orator, but for the partner audiences<\/strong><\/span>, both particular and universal.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Argumentation as a way of dealing with stasis situations<\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n

The Rhetoric to Herennius<\/em><\/strong> <\/span>by an unknown author of the first century BC (formerly attributed to Cicero) articulates argumentative rhetoric with the key concept of stasis<\/a>. In a court of law, the contradiction between the two parties determines the \u201cpoint to adjudicate\u201d and produces a stasis<\/em>, which defines an argumentative situation:<\/p>\n

The point to adjudicate is established from the accusation and the denial, as follows: Accusation: \u2018You killed Ajax<\/em>.\u2019 Denial: \u2018I did not<\/em>.\u2019 The point to adjudicate: Did he kill him?<\/em><\/span>
\n(To Her<\/em>., I, 17; p 53)<\/span><\/p>\n

Argumentation can thus be generally defined as an institutionally developed instrument for dealing with and resolving stasis situations, see<\/span>. Argumentative Question<\/a>.<\/p>\n

3. Argumentation as \u201csubstantial logic\u201d and default reasoning<\/span><\/span><\/h2>\n

According to Toulmin’s \u201clayout of argument<\/a>\u201d, the argumentative passage is defined by its structure. The capitalized concepts originate from Toulmin.<\/p>\n

\u2014 A speaker presents a Claim<\/em><\/strong>, based on Data<\/em> that is oriented by general rules or principles, the Backing<\/em>, and the Warrant. <\/em>This defines the monologic<\/em> assertive component<\/em> of the argument.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The Claim<\/em> is defeasible under certain Rebuttal<\/em> conditions<\/strong>, expressed by a Modal<\/em> affecting the Claim. This reservation component<\/em> refers to a dialogic<\/em> and critical<\/em> approach of argumentation.<\/p>\n

The combination of an assertive<\/strong> and a refutative<\/strong> component in an \u201cargumentative cell\u201d, both linguistically and cognitively, defines reasonable-rational discourse<\/span>.<\/p>\n

This Toulminian complex is often reduced to the main parts of its assertive component \u201cData, Claim\u201d,<\/p>\n

Slavery has been abolished, why not prostitution? I do believe in the progress of civilization.
\n<\/span>When snakes come out, it’s going to rain. We know that from experience.<\/span><\/p>\n

Toulmin makes no reference to rhetoric. But as Bird has pointed out (1961), with his Warrant and Backing, Toulmin has \u201crediscovered\u201d the more than two-thousand-year-old concept of topic<\/em>, fundamental to the rhetorical theory of argument.
\nThis approach is fully compatible with a class of classical definitions of rhetorical argument, such as the following,<\/p>\n

Cicero senior<\/em> \u2014 I take it that what you desire to hear about is ratiocination, which is the process of developing the arguments. [\u2026]<\/span>
\nCicero Junior<\/em> \u2014 Of course, that is exactly what I require.<\/span>
\nCicero Senior<\/em> \u2014 Well then, ratiocination, as I have just said, is the process of developing the argument; but this process is achieved when you have taken certain or probable premises from which you draw a conclusion which appears in itself either doubtful or less probable.<\/span>
\nCicero, Part.<\/em>, XIII, 46; p. 345-347; my italics<\/span><\/p>\n

How does one make the doubtful<\/em> a little less doubtful<\/em>?<\/span> Like Toulmin, Cicero sees argumentation (\u201cratiocination\u201d) as a technique to reduce uncertainty<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n

4. Argumentation as Schematization<\/span><\/h1>\n

According to Jean-Blaise Grize,<\/p>\n

As I understand it, argumentation considers the interlocutor not as an object to be manipulated but as an alter ego with whom a vision must be shared. To work on him means to try to change the various representations attributed to him, by highlighting certain aspects of things, hiding others, proposing him new perspectives, and all this with the help of an appropriate schematization. (Grize 1990, p. 40)<\/span><\/p>\n

Arguing consists in schematizing<\/strong><\/a>, or framing<\/strong> the situation for the interlocutor.
\nSuch a generalization extends the concept of argumentation<\/em> over the whole act of saying<\/em><\/strong> something to someone:<\/p>\n

Arguing amounts to making some claims that we choose to compose in a discourse. Conversely, asserting (saying) amounts to arguing, simply because we choose to say and put forward some meanings rather than others. (Vignaux 1981, p. 91)<\/span><\/p>\n

This vision of saying as essentially a rhetorical argumentative activity has deep roots in the rhetorical tradition.<\/p>\n

It can be compared to what Quintilian<\/strong><\/span> presents as the essence of rhetorical argumentation:<\/p>\n

The art of speaking well. (IO<\/em>, II, 15, 37)<\/span><\/p>\n

This famous formula is often quoted in Latin, rhetoric is the \u00ab\u00a0ars bene dicendi\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>; the definition is supplemented by the definition of the orator as \u201ca good man who speaks well<\/em>\u201d.
\nArgumentative rhetoric becomes the legislative technique of persuasive speech, guaranteed by the quality of the speaker<\/span>, see. Ethos<\/a>.
\nThis vision of rhetoric is the backbone of the classical humanities.<\/p>\n

Compared to Grize \u2014 who, as far as I know, never quotes Quintilian, no more than Toulmin referred to the classical science of topoi \u2014 the only difference is that Quintilian emphasizes the educational dimension of rhetoric, while Grize simply analyzes argumentation as it is found in natural discourse.<\/p>\n

This line of thought generalizes rhetoric to all forms of controlled expression<\/em>, thus founding a Rhetorik der Sprache <\/em>(Kallmeyer 1996), a \u201crhetoric of speech\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. Argumentation as <\/span>orientation<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/h2>\n

Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of argumentation within language<\/em> is based on the fact that, in natural language, the argument as a statement is linguistically linked to the conclusion, which is defined as the next statement:<\/p>\n

A speaker argues when he presents a statement S1<\/strong> (or a set of statements) as intended to make a new statement (or a set of new statements), S2, <\/strong>acceptable. Our thesis is that there are linguistic constraints on this construction. For a statement S1<\/strong> to be given as an argument supporting a statement S2<\/strong>, it is not sufficient that S1<\/strong> gives reason to admit S2<\/strong>. The linguistic structure of S1<\/strong> must also satisfy certain conditions in order to constitute an argument for S2 <\/strong>in a speech. (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, p. 8)<\/span><\/p>\n

This approach leads to a redefinition of the concept of topos, as a semantic link between two predicates<\/span>, see Topos in Semantics<\/a>.<\/p>\n

By redefining the argumentative constraint as a linguistic constraint between constraints, Anscombre and Ducrot generalize the concept of argumentation as a property of the linguistic system (langue <\/em>and not parole<\/em> \u201cspeech\u201d, as defined by de Saussure).<\/p>\n

S. Orientation<\/a>; Argumentative scale.<\/a><\/p>\n

6. Argumentation between Monologue and Dialogue<\/span><\/h2>\n

Argument seems to be a mode of discourse which is neither purely monologic nor dialogic. (Schiffrin 1987, p. 17)<\/span>
\n[I have defined argument as]\u00a0a discourse through which speakers support disputable positions. (Id<\/em>., p. 18)<\/span><\/p>\n

Schiffrin’s work is not primarily concerned to argument. However, this succinct definition, however, perfectly expresses the mixed character of argumentative activity<\/span>.<\/p>\n

7. Argumentation, a discourse submitted to a rational judge<\/span><\/h2>\n

Argumentation is a verbal and social activity, aiming to strengthen or weaken the acceptability of a controversial point of view from a listener or reader, advancing a constellation of proposals to justify (or disprove) that view before a rational judge. (van Eemeren & al.<\/em> 1996, p. 5)<\/span><\/p>\n

This definition combines the rhetorical and dialectical positions. It redefines the position of the third party, the judge, not as an empirical, institutional figure, arguing on the basis of the legal corpus of law and jurisprudence shaped by history and sociology, but instead as a normative rational figure, arguing on the basis of a set of independently defined rational principles, S. Norms<\/a>; <\/span>Evaluation and Evaluators.<\/a><\/p>\n

8. Guidelines adopted in this dictionary<\/span><\/h2>\n

(i) An argumentative situation<\/em><\/strong><\/span> is defined in the Ad Herennium<\/em> style: a complex dialogic situation opened by an argumentative question.<\/span><\/p>\n

(ii) An argumentative question<\/em><\/strong><\/span> is a question to which the arguers (the debaters) give argued answers, possibly both sensible and reasonable, but incompatible, organized in pro- and a contra-discourse.<\/span><\/p>\n

(iii)\u00a0These answers<\/em><\/strong><\/span> express the conclusions<\/strong><\/em> (points of view)<\/strong><\/span> of the arguers about the issue. The elements of pro- and counter-discourse which support these conclusions have the status of argument<\/em><\/strong><\/span> for their respective conclusions.<\/span><\/p>\n

(iv)\u00a0Argumentative situations come in a variety of degrees and types of argumentativity<\/em><\/strong><\/span>, according to the kinds of relationship established between the pro- and counter- discourses and to the interactional and institutional parameters framing the exchanges.<\/span><\/p>\n

Points (i) to (iv) define the external argumentative relevance<\/strong><\/em><\/span>, as the relevance of a conclusion for a question.<\/span><\/p>\n

(v)\u00a0An argumentation<\/em><\/span>,<\/strong> in the monologic sense is defined as the \u201cargumentative cell\u201d, as represented in Toulmin’s layout. <\/span>
\nIn the broad sense, the word argumentation<\/em> covers all the verbal and semiotic activities produced in an argumentative situation.<\/span><\/p>\n

(vi) An argument<\/em> <\/span><\/strong>is an implicit or explicit combination of statements supporting a conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n

(vii) The internal argumentative relevance<\/em><\/span><\/strong>, as the relevance of an argument for a claim is defined in relation to an argument scheme<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ARGUMENTATION 1: DEFINITIONS The analysis of argumentation has been intensively and specifically studied since the post-World War II period (references infra) : The bi-millennial framework of logic as an \u201cart of thinking\u201d in natural language has been taken up and reworked in the new intellectual framework of the post-Fregean mathematical logic as a Substantial Logic, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4654","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4654","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4654"}],"version-history":[{"count":26,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4654\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13836,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4654\/revisions\/13836"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4654"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4654"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4654"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}