{"id":4699,"date":"2021-10-17T10:57:43","date_gmt":"2021-10-17T08:57:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4699"},"modified":"2025-03-28T13:54:37","modified_gmt":"2025-03-28T12:54:37","slug":"authoritye","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/authoritye\/","title":{"rendered":"Authority"},"content":{"rendered":"

AUTHORITY<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. Auctoritas, a<\/em>uthority, <\/em>authoritarian, authoritative<\/span><\/h1>\n

1.1 Latin Auctoritas<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

The word authority<\/em>, and, with it, elements of the problematic of authority, comes from Latin and Roman law and custom. According to Benveniste, the words auctor, <\/em>\u201cauthor\u201d, and auctoritas<\/em>, \u201cauthority\u201d are related to the primary meaning of the verb augere<\/em>, \u201cto bring forth, to promote\u201d<\/strong> ([1969], no pag.):<\/p>\n

In its most ancient uses, augeo<\/em> (1) does not denote the increase of something that already exists, but the act of producing out of itself; a creative act which causes something to emerge from a nutrient medium and which is the privilege of the gods or the great forces of nature, but not of men (ibid<\/em>.).<\/span>
\n(1) Augeo<\/em> is the first person singular of the present indicative of augere <\/em>(CP)<\/span><\/p>\n

The speech given with auctoritas<\/em> is creative:<\/p>\n

The primary sense of augeo is discovered in auctoritas<\/em> with the help of the basic term auctor<\/em>. Every word spoken with authority determines a change in the world; it creates something. This mysterious quality is what augeo<\/em> expresses, the power that makes plants grow and a law come into being. This is the auctor<\/em> who promotes, who alone is endowed with the quality […]. In this auctoritas<\/em>, this gift that is reserved for a handful of people there are hidden and powerful values that can cause something to come into being and can literally bring into existence (ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

Obscure and potent values reside in this auctoritas<\/em>, this gift which is reserved to a handful of people who can cause something to come into being<\/p>\n

This has nothing to do with what we now call an \u201cargument from authority\u201d that supports a belief about a given reality. Ellul describes the institutional exercise of the auctoritas<\/em> as follows:<\/p>\n

The auctoritas<\/em> is the quality of the auctor<\/em>. He gives his support, his approval to the act done by another person. In the beginning, it was probably an act of sacred law: one individual performs the legal act, and another validates this act by an intervention that manifests the approval of the gods. (Ellul [1961], pp. 248-249)<\/span><\/p>\n

The auctoritas<\/em> is held by the father, the priest, the judge; its use is fundamental to family life, as well as to religious and legal life:<\/p>\n

The auctoritas<\/em> appears as the authority of a person that serves as the basis for a legal act. This act has value and effectiveness only through the auctoritas<\/em>. […] The pater<\/em> [\u00ab\u00a0father\u00a0\u00bb] gives his auctoritas for the marriage of his son. In religious life, the priest’s auctoritas<\/em> delimits the domain of the sacred, and draws the boundaries of the profane. In juridical life, the auctoritas<\/em> delimits the domain of the legitimate and separates it from the illegitimate (ibid<\/em>).<\/span><\/p>\n

1.2 Authority, authoritarian, authoritative<\/span><\/h2>\n

The author-authority <\/em>relationship is now broken, an author may not have so much authority, and the person with authority is not necessarily an author<\/em>.
\nAuthoritarian<\/em><\/strong> and authoritarianism<\/em> develop along a lexical line that stigmatizes authority.
\nIn contrast, authoritative<\/em><\/strong> as \u201cpossessing recognized or evident authority\u201d (MW, Authority<\/em>)\u00a0refers to a positively oriented lexical line associated with authority<\/em>.<\/p>\n

2. Authority as a social issue<\/span><\/h1>\n

The concept of authority is being redefined and discussed in all the fields of the human sciences, in relation to submission<\/em> and in opposition to freedom<\/em> or freedoms<\/em>. Major studies on authority, power and totalitarianism have marked the last century: in psychology, especially since Stanley Milgram’s shocking experiences on \u00ab\u00a0Obedience to Authority\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> (1974); in philosophy, with Theodor Adorno’s the study on the \u201cThe Authoritarian Personality<\/em>\u201d of\u00a0 (1950); in history with Hannah Arendt’s \u00ab\u00a0The Origin of Totalitarianism\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> (1951); in sociology with Max Weber (1922), whose distinctions between traditional<\/em>, charismatic<\/em>, and rational-legal<\/em> authority are now a part of common knowledge.<\/p>\n

In our society, basic authority is expressed through various explicit rules and norms, enforced by law, backed by the police and the legal institutions, in relation with the current political authorities.
\nOrganizations must define a mode of authority to be exercised within their sphere of competence, and to which their members must subscribe.
\nLike the definition and exercise of authority<\/strong>, resistance to illegitimate authority<\/strong> is a never-ending enterprise.<\/p>\n

3. Authority in Argumentation Studies<\/span><\/h1>\n

3.1\u00a0Position<\/span><\/h2>\n

Along with the question of authority, the study of discourse engages in a multidisciplinary reflection on the epistemic level<\/em> (non-truth-conditional conditions of the acceptability of a statement); on social influence<\/em> (management of the powers of discourse); on interpersonal<\/em> relations <\/em>(interactional manifestations and effects of the relative authority positions of the participants).
\nIn the specific field of argumentative rhetoric, the notion of authority is considered in relation to speech: In what identifiable ways, from implicit evocation to explicit invocation, can authority invest a statement? What is an appeal to authority? What are the kinds of critical responses to authoritarian and authoritative speech?<\/p>\n

Insofar as it invokes reason and free inquiry, argumentation is antithetical to authority and violence, even when they claim legal and even moral legitimacy. Argumentative speech, however, operates on a razor’s edge.<\/strong> As a critical discourse, it denounces the discourse of authority<\/em>; as powerful affirmative discourse, it affects the minds of others and seeks to change the representations of the audience in the name of rationality. Argumentation must find a way to be authoritative<\/em>, without being authoritarian<\/em>.
\nClaiming to be the instrument of reason, argumentation studies develop develop a reflection on how this argumentative reason<\/strong> interacts with legitimate social authority<\/strong>, a fundamental element of social life, see Agreement<\/a>; Role<\/a>; Persuasion<\/a>; Evaluation<\/a>. The ideal of rational persuasion and consensus served by argumentation is invoked, but, on the other hand, the decision rests with the legal-legitimate authority, and the best argument may or may not be reflected in the voter’s decision.<\/p>\n

3.2\u00a0Forms of argumentation appealing to authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

\u2014\u00a0Basically, the argument from authority<\/em><\/strong> explicitly cites a hetero-attributed<\/em> authority. It is sometimes specified according to the nature of the source of authority: consensus, ad antiquitatem, ad numerum<\/em>… (see beow).
\n\u2014 Authority, or lack of authority, can be self-attributed<\/em>, embodied and manifested in the speaker’s speech and attitudes, see Ethos<\/a>; Modesty<\/a>.
\n\u2014\u00a0The authority of the testimony<\/em><\/a> is supported by the character and reputation of the witness, and is thus rellated to ethos. The criticism of the testimony is to be compared with that of the expertise.
\n\u2014\u00a0The authority of the precedent<\/em><\/a> is based on a previous judgment (in every sense of the word judgment<\/em>). The case may also have been decided in the fable or parable; see Example<\/a>; Exemplum<\/em><\/a>.
\n<\/strong>\u2014\u00a0Dialectic<\/a> problematizes discourses supported by various kinds of social authority, see Doxa<\/a><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

The following sections develop various forms and argumentative uses of authority.<\/p>\n

4. The speaker’s Inherent Authority<\/span><\/h1>\n

4.1 Performative auctoritas<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

The speaker possesses a unique form of authority, the auctoritas<\/em> which is related to the performativity of different classes of utterances. According to Austin [1962], the performative utterance<\/strong> produces the reality that it states: by saying, \u201cI promise<\/em>\u201d, I promise. The speaker is the auctor<\/em> of the reality created, her promise.<\/p>\n

4.2 Taking people at their word
\n<\/span><\/h2>\n

This basic linguistic authority is combined with other types of social authority, that are attributed to the speaker according to the different social identities and roles she plays. These identities and roles cumulate in the displayed<\/strong><\/em> authority<\/em> <\/strong>of the authoritative speaker, precisely as defined by the theory of ethos.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the preference for agreement is not automatic; recipients routinely disagree<\/strong>, and if they do not, they may be to blame.<\/strong><\/p>\n

5. The Argument of Legal Authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

Authority, in the most common sense of the term, is defined by its claim to compliance and obedience; commands can be obeyed<\/strong> by virtue of their source, without being systematically supported by a lengthy justification.<\/p>\n

Context:<\/em> L<\/strong> has the power and means of coercion in domain D
\nL<\/strong> tells O<\/strong> to do F<\/strong> (F<\/strong> is in domain\u00a0 D<\/strong>)<\/span>
\nO<\/strong> does F<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Conversely, orders are invoked as a sufficient justification for action<\/strong>: \u201cI was only following orders<\/em>\u201d. Such an appeal to authority is diametrically opposed to the philosophy of argumentation, which universalizes the imperative of justification and individual responsibility. It can be challenged by appealing to international human rights conventions on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.<\/p>\n

Everyday democratic authority is the authority of legal and regulatory norms, backed by the monopoly of legal force, enforced by those in power, and implemented by those legally responsible. In such a context, the basic expression of a socially valid legal and democratic argument from authority<\/strong> can be schematized as follows, in the case of judicial authority<\/p>\n

Context:<\/em> There is a system of norms<\/strong> N<\/strong>. One of these norms empowers a judge to enforce this system and gives her the means of coercion necessary for its application.<\/span>
\nPerson P<\/strong> has done action A<\/strong>, and somebody complains.<\/span>
\nThe judge assesses, in a procedure that conforms to the requirements of N<\/strong>, whether or not A<\/strong> constitutes a violation of a norm.<\/span>
\nIf it does, the judge sentences P<\/strong> to F<\/strong>, taking into account that R<\/strong> (justification of the decision).<\/span>
\nWillingly or not, P<\/strong> obeys with F<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Judicial sentences are about \u00ab\u00a0making do\u00a0\u00bb<\/strong>, not \u00ab\u00a0making believe\u00a0\u00bb, that is, convincing the condemned. The recipients of the judge’s good reasons are much more likely to be the judge’s colleagues, or P<\/strong>‘s lawyer, than P <\/strong>herself. P<\/strong> may be convinced of the legitimacy of the punishment by the good reasons given by the judge, but this psychological condition is not necessary. P<\/strong> only has to obey with the judge’s decision, willingly or not. One cannot ask everyone to share the theory of redemptive punishment, and to willingly submit to a sentence, even a democratic one.
\nAuthority cannot force anyone to believe anything. But, since belief manifests itself in words and behavior, \u201cmake do\u201d may be indistinguishable from \u201cmake believe\u201d: \u201cKneel down, pray, and you will believe<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

6. The Classical Argument of Authority<\/span><\/h1>\n

6.1 Displayed authority and Cited authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

Critical studies of argumentation make a distinction within ethotic authority<\/strong>, rejecting its seductive charismatic<\/em> component<\/strong> (shown authority) as fallacious, in order to discuss only its expert<\/em> component<\/strong> (cited authority), see Ethos<\/a>.
\nIn the case of ethotic<\/em> authority, the speaker is the source of authority. Authority is \u00ab\u00a0self-authorized\u00a0\u00bb or self-founded<\/em><\/strong>. What is said is believed or obeyed because such and such a person says so.
\nIn the case of the classical argument from authority, the speaker legitimates her argument by referring to a pre-existing, external authoritative, source: authority is hetero-founded<\/em><\/strong>. The technical study of this hetero-founded<\/em> authority lies within the more general framework of discourse repetition, reformulation, reinterpretation, see Resumption of speech<\/a>.<\/p>\n

6.1 Rhetorical argumentation of authority and the authority store<\/span><\/h2>\n

Authority is at the foundation of topos # 11 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric<\/em>:<\/p>\n

Another line of argument is based on some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject, or on one similar to it, or one contrary to it. Such a proof is most efficacious when everyone has always so decided; but if not everyone, then at any rate, most people; or when all, or most of the wise or good men have so decided, or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or people whose decision they cannot gainsay because they have complete control over them, or those whom it is not proper to gainsay, such as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.<\/span>
\n(Rhet<\/em>., II, 23, 1398b15-30, RR, p. 365)<\/span><\/p>\n

The \u201cdecisions\u201d to be made may be intellectual or judicial.
\nOn this basis, later rhetoricians list the authorities that can be used to strengthen a party’s position. In the legal field, the Rhetoric to Herennius<\/em> proposes ten \u00ab\u00a0formulae\u00a0\u00bb [loci comunes<\/em>, \u00ab\u00a0commonplaces\u00a0\u00bb, see Topos<\/a>) \u00ab\u00a0to strengthen an accusation\u00a0\u00bb:<\/p>\n

The first commonplace is taken from authority, when we recall how great a concern the matter under discussion has been to the immortal gods, to our ancestors, or to kings, states, barbarian nations, wise men, the senate; and again, especially how sanction in these matters has been provided by laws. (Ad Her.<\/em>, II, 48)<\/span><\/p>\n

These authorities are distinct from the judicial precedent, and can support any form of speech. Quintilian considers them authoritative for the same legal situation,<\/p>\n

Whatever can be adduced as expressing the opinion of nations or people, or of wise men, eminent political figures, or illustrious poets. 37. Nor will common sayings, established by popular belief, be without their use in this way. (IO<\/em>, V, 11, 36-37)<\/span><\/p>\n

This store of authority will be used extensively, with some adjustments; gods<\/em> should read God<\/em>:<\/p>\n

\u2014 Authority of Books, tradition, ancestors (ad antiquitatem<\/em>). The argument of progress is opposed to this form of authority.<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0The famous verses, proverbs, fables, parables\u2026<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0The Chinese, the Americans\u2026<\/span>
\n\u2014 The authority of the media, professionals, scientists, professors\u2026<\/span>
\n\u2014 Truths from the mouths of children, the rich, the poor<\/a>\u2026<\/span>
\n\u2014 The authority of large numbers, prestige of the majority consensus<\/a>, of a particular group\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n

These forms of authority are cumulative: the scientific authority of the master is sometimes mitigated by the charismatic authority of the guru.<\/p>\n

All these varieties of authority can be invoked<\/em>; some can be embodied<\/em> by the speaker as a Chinese, an expert, a poor person, a member of a distinguished community.<\/p>\n

6.2 Invoked authority: the classical argument from authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

The classical argument of authority exploits an authority taken from the authority store. It is based on a quotation, and can be schematized as follows (see Hamblin 1970: 224 et seq.):<\/p>\n

S<\/strong>: \u00a0 \u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> is an authority, A<\/strong> says that P<\/strong>; therefore, P<\/strong> is true and indisputable.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Or, put simply, \u201cA<\/strong> says that<\/em> P<\/strong>\u201d, when the context clearly establishes that A<\/strong> is an authority, and that S <\/strong>is itself defending P<\/strong>, or a position co-oriented with P<\/strong>.
\nThe prototypical example in this category is that of Pythagoras quoted by his disciples, \u00ab\u00a0he said it himself<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/strong> (\u00ab\u00a0ipse dixi<\/em>t\u00a0\u00bb). Pythagoras, of course, has nothing to do with the matter; it is the speaker who quotes him as an authority.<\/p>\n

Authority can justify actions, beliefs, or a combination of both:<\/p>\n

S: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0That’s how they hold their fork and knife in New York.
\n<\/em>S: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0The Master said that compassion is wrong
\n<\/em>S: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014 I never give money to homeless people, I read in a book that it’s just encouraging laziness.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

6.3 Evoked Authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

When analyzing discourse based on an external authority, one must consider the fact that the quotation is not always direct and open. The speaker may also use an allusion<\/em><\/strong> to refer indirectly to a discourse, that is considered authoritative because it is dominant, prestigious or associated with an expert. Through the subtle use of terms such as \u201cdiscursive formation<\/em>\u201d, \u201cideological state apparatuses<\/em>\u201d; \u201cthe<\/em> great other<\/em>\u201d … I suggest my knowledge of and complicity\u00a0 with respectively with the thought of Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, etc.<\/p>\n

The philosophy of argument invokes an ideal of exposure to refutation, according to which it is perfectly legitimate to argue with authority<\/strong>, if the argument is explicit, if one knows exactly who said what and when. This rational demand for explicitness is opposed to burying authority in the depths of discourse in order to protect it from possible refutation.<\/p>\n

7. Expert authority<\/span><\/h1>\n

From a logical-scientific point of view, a discourse is sound if it collects and articulates true propositions, in order to deduce a new true proposition, according to procedures accepted in the relevant community. In argumentation, the acceptance of a proposition or a global vision is based on authority when it is not based on an examination of the good reasons that support it, or on a direct examination of the correspondence of the proposition with things themselves<\/strong>, but relies on the source and the channel<\/strong> through which the information was transmitted.
\nThe argument from authority substitutes peripheral, indirect evidence<\/strong> for direct evidence or examination, which is considered inaccessible, too costly, or too tedious. Such everyday practice is justified by a principle of economy, division of labor<\/strong>, or simply because someone else was more qualified, or in a better position to tell how events unfolded. It works quite well and rationally, as a default argument<\/em><\/strong>, that can be edited as more information becomes available. From this perspective, authority removes nothing and no one\u00a0 from dispute, it simply shifts the burden of proof<\/strong> to the person challenging it, S. Dialectic<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The argument of authority is therefore a form of argumentation when it exposes the authority which it claims. One could oppose the authoritarian support <\/em>of a statement, as supported by the socio-discursive position of the speaker, to the argument of authority<\/em>, hetero-founded, whose source is clearly exposed. In other words, the argument of authority is neither authoritarian nor fallacious when it is invoked to open the debate<\/strong>, , but it is when it claims to close the discussion<\/strong>, S. Modesty<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The method of counter-discourse provides a principle for evaluating and criticizing arguments from authority. Referring to the structure of the argument of authority, discourses against authority are directed as follows.<\/p>\n

7.1 Against the Citation itself<\/span><\/h2>\n

S<\/strong>: \u2014 A<\/strong> says that Qo<\/strong><\/p>\n

The refutation questions the citation as such or the relevance of the citation to the present discussion. This move preserves the status of A<\/strong>‘s status as an authority.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A <\/strong>did not say Q; Q<\/strong> does not correspond to the letter of what A actually said.<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0Q<\/strong> is quoted out of context.<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0Q<\/strong> is a misquote<\/strong> of A<\/strong>; it contains elements of rewording and mischievous <\/span>redirection.<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0As meant by A<\/strong>, Q<\/strong> is not relevant to the present issue (Q<\/strong> is misinterpreted)<\/span><\/p>\n

7.2 Against the Authority Cited
\n<\/span><\/h2>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> has changed her mind<\/strong>, as evidenced by her recent statements.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> has no direct evidence<\/strong>, so A<\/strong> is not a real authority on point Q<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 There is no consensus among experts<\/strong>; \u201cA+<\/sup><\/strong>, a greater expert, rejects Q\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 Applying the ad hominem<\/em> argument to the source A<\/strong>: <\/span>Q<\/strong> is incompatible, contradictory<\/strong>, with other statements (or prescriptions) of A<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> has spoken outside of her area of \u200b\u200bexpertise<\/strong>; she is not an expert in the precise area referred to by Q<\/strong>-type assertions.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> is not an expert, his or her views are outdated<\/strong>;<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> is wrong<\/strong>, and has been wrong many times in the past.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> is biased, manipulated<\/strong>, paid to say what she says<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A<\/strong> can be dismissed<\/a> with a personal attack (ad personam<\/em>): \u201cA<\/em> is not an expert but a fool<\/em><\/strong>\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

7.3 Arguments for Establishing Expert Authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

One can distinguish between two different strategies in dealing with authority: arguments that <\/em><\/strong>establish<\/em> an authorit<\/strong>y<\/a> as such, and arguments that exploit<\/strong><\/em> an established authority<\/strong><\/a>. This distinction is of general value, see Causality<\/a>, Definition<\/a>, Analogy<\/a>. Discourses (7.1) against authority attack the use made of authority, whereas discourse (7.2) attacks the authority itself.
\nIt follows that discourse (7.2) against authority reflects a discourse defining a legitimate expert:<\/strong><\/p>\n

A<\/strong> is speaking in his field of expertise, and is aware of the state of the matter; A<\/strong>‘s system is coherent; A<\/strong> has direct evidence, reputable experts agree with what A<\/strong> says; A<\/strong>‘s previous predictions have been proven correct.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

7.3 Against the Person who Submits to Authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

The focus on interaction shifts the focus from the claim of authority itself to the relationship of authority<\/em>. The criticism is now directed at the pusillanimity<\/strong><\/a> of the interlocutor.<\/p>\n

7.4 Counterargument ad rem<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Finally, the opponent can argue that Q can be countered with direct arguments i.e. <\/strong>arguments that deal with the issue at hand<\/strong><\/span>, and are not based on authority but on scientific reason, or historical knowledge, which are considered superior to lazy appeals to authority<\/strong><\/span>.<\/p>\n

8. Refutative Uses of Authority<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

8.1 Refutative Uses of Positive Authority<\/span><\/h2>\n

The preceding paragraphs deal with authority in the sense that it serves to support a claim. Such an authoritative assertion can be used to rebut a claim:<\/p>\n

S1:<\/em>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0P<\/strong>!
\nS2<\/em>: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0X<\/strong> says the opposite, and she knows what she is talking about!<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

If X<\/strong> and S1<\/strong> share the same affiliation, the refutation combines authority and ad hominem<\/em><\/a>.
\nPositive authority can also be used to destroy not the content of what is said, but the claim to authority<\/em> and thus the competence of the speaker:<\/p>\n

S1:\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0P<\/em><\/strong>!
\n<\/em>S2: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0That’s exactly what Perelman is saying!
\n<\/em>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014 We’ve known that since Aristotle!<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

Thinking is an inner dialog? We’ve known that since Plato!<\/em> [2]<\/span><\/p>\n

8.2 Negative authority: \u201cReductio ad Hitlerum<\/em>\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n

Negative authority is used to refute a claim in the following case:<\/p>\n

S1:\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0P<\/em><\/strong>!
\n<\/em>S2: \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u2014\u00a0H<\/em><\/strong> says exactly the same thing!<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

H<\/strong> is a person, a party rejected by the community of speech to which S2<\/strong> belongs, or by the third parties arbitrating the discussion, or possibly by S1 <\/strong>herself; H<\/strong> is an anti-authority, an anti-model, see Imitation<\/a>.
\nIn the case of a positive authority, the proponent<\/em> associates the statement with an authority. Here, the opponent <\/em>makes the connection between the disputed statement and the negative authority.<\/p>\n

Hitler is the paragon of the negative authorities, whose words cannot be repeated. The reductio ad Hitlerum<\/em> ends any argument.<\/p>\n

Last year, you may recall, a number of financial-industry barons went wild over very mild criticism from President Obama. They denounced Mr. Obama as being almost a socialist for endorsing the so-called Volker rule, which would simply prohibit banks backed by federal guarantees from engaging in risky speculation. And as for their reaction to proposals to close a loophole that lets some of them pay remarkably low taxes \u2014 well, Stephen Schwarzman, chairman of the Blackstone Group, compared it to Hitler\u2019s invasion of Poland.<\/span>
\nPaul Krugman, \u201cPanic of the Plutocrats\u201d, 2011.<\/span><\/a>[2]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/a> Racine, Andromache,<\/em> 1667. I, 2. Quoted from: http:\/\/www.poetryintranslation.com\/PITBR\/French\/AndromacheActI.htm#anchor_Toc169494154<\/a> (11-08-2017)<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]\u00a0SOCRATES: Very good. Now by \u2018thinking\u2019 do you mean the same as I do?<\/span>
\nTHEAETETUS: What do you mean by that?<\/span>
\nSOCRATES: A conversation that the soul has with itself about the objects it contemplates. Of course, I’m only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It seems to me that when the soul thinks, is simply carries on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirming and denying. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or by a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call that its judgment. So, in my opinion, judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement that is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. And what do you think?<\/span>
\nTHEAETETUS: I agree with that.<\/span><\/p>\n

Plato, Theaetetus<\/em>, 189e-190d. Translated by M. J. Levett, Rev. Myles Burnyeat. <\/em>In Plato, Complete Works<\/em>. Edited, with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper; associate editor D. S. Hutchinson. Hackett, Indianapolis\/Cambridge, 1997.<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> www.nytimes.com\/2011\/10\/10\/opinion\/panic-of-the-plutocrats.html? _r = 1&ref=global-home (11-08-2017)<\/span><\/p>\n

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AUTHORITY 1. Auctoritas, authority, authoritarian, authoritative 1.1 Latin Auctoritas The word authority, and, with it, elements of the problematic of authority, comes from Latin and Roman law and custom. According to Benveniste, the words auctor, \u201cauthor\u201d, and auctoritas, \u201cauthority\u201d are related to the primary meaning of the verb augere, \u201cto bring forth, to promote\u201d ([1969], […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4699","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4699","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4699"}],"version-history":[{"count":40,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4699\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13845,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4699\/revisions\/13845"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4699"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4699"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4699"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

Citing an authority in support of a proposition has repercussions on the ethos of the speaker. When the Greek messenger Orestes says to Pyrrhus, \u201cAll the Greeks speak to you through my voice<\/em>\u201d [1]<\/a>, he does more than quote the Greeks, he embodies the authority he quotes<\/strong>. Self-quotation does not add much authority to what is said, but quoting a respected authority enhances the personal authority of the speaker. The master’s voice comes from the speaker’s mouth, the speaker identifies with him, reframes the exchange accordingly, and hopes that the audience will follow.<\/p>\n

The ideal of authoritarian authority<\/strong><\/em> is to exert a direct, causal influence on the behavior of others. If the tyrant’s subjects do not submit to his good reasons or charisma, he can still choose for a harsh punishment<\/a> or a sweet reward.
\nRadical authority demands that the person who receives the command obey \u201clike a corpse\u201d (perinde ac cadaver)<\/em>, according to the metaphor used by Ignatius of Loyola uses to illustrate the perfection of the virtue of obedience. For the person who is not a member of the organization, to obey in this way is to reduce oneself to the state of an instrument by renouncing free examination and free will. For a member of the organization, it is simply adherence to the purposeful rationality of the institution as such.<\/p>\n

When someone says, \u201cHello!\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>, even if his friendliness is actually fake, the default belief is that this is genuine friendly behavior. Normally, no argument is needed to make someone believe something<\/strong>, it just has to be said; the speaker’s words are be taken at face value; what she says is believed and acted upon without hesitation. When someone is asked \u201cWhat time is it?\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>, the answer is accepted, without checking the person’s watch.
\nStatements about inner states, \u201cI feel in good shape today\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>, are regularly accepted by default without question, as are statements made by people with special access to the facts under discussion (witnesses). If having authority means having the power to successfully transmit one’s representations to listeners, this is the most common form of linguistic authority, based on the preference for agreement<\/a>.<\/strong><\/p>\n