{"id":4746,"date":"2021-10-18T11:16:32","date_gmt":"2021-10-18T09:16:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4746"},"modified":"2025-03-29T21:59:46","modified_gmt":"2025-03-29T20:59:46","slug":"causality-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/causality-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Causality and Argumentation"},"content":{"rendered":"

CAUSALITY<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. The expression of causality
\n<\/span><\/h2>\n

The concept of cause is central to both everyday and scientific argument. It is regarded as a primitive, intuitively clear concept. This means that ordinary language defines cause only in terms that are equally complex.<\/p>\n

Let us consider some ways of referring to and thinking about causal<\/em> connections and processes:<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The cause explains<\/em>, accounts for<\/em> its effect<\/strong>; it gives the why<\/em>, the reason<\/em> for things. The effect is understood<\/em> when its cause is known.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2014 The cause of something is its principle<\/em>;<\/strong> its origin, its basis, its reason, its occasion<\/em>. The cause is a motor<\/em>, that triggers<\/em>, sets in motion<\/em> a series of effects.<\/p>\n

\u2014 Human beings act as caus<\/em>es<\/em>; they are agents<\/em>,<\/strong> makers<\/em>; authors<\/em>, creators<\/em>, inspirers<\/em>, instigators<\/em>, promoters, producers<\/em>…; their aims, purposes<\/em>, intentions<\/em>, motives <\/em>and motivations<\/em>… are considered as potential causes. Their incitements<\/em>, inducements,<\/em> instigations<\/em>, are second level causes.<\/p>\n

\u2014 Metaphorically, the cause is thought of as a spark<\/em>,<\/strong> a ferment<\/em>, a germ<\/em>; a root<\/em>, a seed<\/em>; a source, a<\/em> spring<\/em>. Their causes are the mothers<\/em> of things as they are.<\/p>\n

In addition to the specific verbs corresponding to the preceding nouns, different kinds of causal relations are associated with very general verbs<\/strong> such as to bring about, to give rise to, to make,<\/em> to procure<\/em>, to lift<\/em>…<\/p>\n

Like the logical relation of implication<\/strong>, the causal relation can be associated with clauses expressed by conjunctions or adverbs:<\/p>\n

Since, because \u2026; as soon as \u2026; so \u2026 ; when \u2026; if \u2026 then \u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

These terms and constructions can indicate to some kind of causal relationship, and can therefore be considered as causal indicators<\/a> of some kind, bearing in mind that they can also express other functional relationships<\/strong><\/p>\n

Like analogical relations, causal relations can do without causal indicators<\/strong>. A spontaneous \u201ccausal impulse\u201d<\/strong> always suggests a causal relationship behind a purely temporal sequence, or concurrence (see infra).<\/p>\n

2. Temporal, causal, logical, sequences<\/span><\/h2>\n

The temporal sequence<\/strong> is articulated by three moments: before \u2026<\/em> \/ during \u2026<\/em> \/ after \u2026\u00a0 <\/em>In the temporal world, events coexist (are simultaneous<\/em>) or follow one another (precede<\/em> \/ follow<\/em>); there is no \u201ctemporal loop\u201d.<\/p>\n

The causal sequence:<\/strong> In the material world, apart from feedback loops, the cause precedes its effect<\/em> or consequence<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The logical implication: <\/strong>In the logical world, the antecedent is to the left of the logical connective ‘\u2192’ and the consequent<\/em>, or logical consequence<\/em>, is to the right.
\nSee Logical Connective (Implication)<\/a>; Deduction<\/a>.
\nLogical relations develop the consequences<\/em> of hypotheses or postulates. If the length of the side of a square is doubled, its area is multiplied by four: this result is a consequence linked to a cause which is a mathematical reason<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In natural language, semantic implications <\/strong>are based on the linguistic content of the word, here the word \u201cbirth\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

Mind your words, you speak of the birth<\/em> of the gods, are you saying that the gods did not exist at one time?<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Argumentation dealing with causality<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/h2>\n

3.1 When causality is at the focus of the argument<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

It is not necessary for argumentative analysis, and in practice would be a never-ending task, to try to identify and reconstruct all the multi-level, potential causal relations in an argumentative text.
\nThe key methodological point is that, in order to be of interest for argumentative analysis<\/strong>, the causal relationship must be the focus of an argumentative question or sub-question<\/span>. This is an adaptation of Quintilian’s principle: \u00ab\u00a0as soon as a disagreement emerges, the question arises\u00a0\u00bb, see Stasis<\/a>. If the disagreement is about a causal relationship, this relationship comes to the fore, is dealt with in the lines of argument developed by the participants, etc., and as such, become an object for argumentative analysis.<\/p>\n

3.2 Argumentation <\/strong><\/span>establishing \/ exploiting a causal relationship<\/strong><\/span><\/a><\/h3>\n

We will distinguish between two types of argumentation:
\n\u2014 Argumentation that establishes<\/em> or denies<\/span> the existence of a causal relationship<\/strong> between two facts or events. The existence or non-existence of a causal relationship is the conclusion<\/em><\/strong><\/span> of the argument.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Argumentation that exploits<\/em><\/span> a previously <\/strong>established causal relationship<\/strong>. The argument presupposes<\/span><\/strong> the existence of the causal relationship.<\/p>\n

(i)<\/strong> Cause-effect<\/em> argumentation<\/em><\/strong><\/a> establishes a causal relationship between two facts and eliminates \u201cfalse causes\u201d.<\/p>\n

(ii)<\/strong> Several types of argument exploit a previously established causal relationship. In this second case, we distinguish between:<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Cause<\/em>-to-effect<\/em> argumentation<\/a><\/strong>, going forward<\/em> from cause to effect. A fact-argument considered to be a cause<\/em>, is claimed to have such an effect.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Effect<\/em>-to-cause <\/em>argumentation<\/a><\/strong>, going backward from effect to cause. A fact to which a status of effect<\/em> is ascribed, is claimed to have such a cause, see Abduction<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u2014 Pragmatic<\/em> argumentation. <\/em><\/a><\/strong>In order to decide about a practical measure, the measure is assimilated to a cause, which will have such and such positive or negative effects and the assessment is reported to the alleged cause.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Argumentation based on motives<\/em><\/a><\/strong> aligns the relationship between a motive to do something and the corresponding action with the cause-effect relationship.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0A priori<\/em> and a posteriori<\/em> arguments<\/a><\/strong>, propter quid<\/em> and quia arguments<\/em> make use of causal and logical connections.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

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CAUSALITY 1. The expression of causality The concept of cause is central to both everyday and scientific argument. It is regarded as a primitive, intuitively clear concept. This means that ordinary language defines cause only in terms that are equally complex. Let us consider some ways of referring to and thinking about causal connections and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4746","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4746","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4746"}],"version-history":[{"count":30,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4746\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13858,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4746\/revisions\/13858"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4746"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4746"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4746"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}