{"id":4761,"date":"2021-10-18T11:43:41","date_gmt":"2021-10-18T09:43:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4761"},"modified":"2025-03-30T14:14:19","modified_gmt":"2025-03-30T12:14:19","slug":"collections-i-and-typologies-of-arguments-schemes-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/collections-i-and-typologies-of-arguments-schemes-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections 1 and Typologies of Arguments Schemes"},"content":{"rendered":"

COLLECTION AND TYPOLOGIES OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES<\/span> <\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

Tradition has bequeathed us more or less systematized inventories of argument schemes:<\/p>\n

Collections 2: From Aristotle to Boethius<\/a>
\nCollections 3: Modernity and Tradition<\/a>
\nCollections 4: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations,<\/a><\/p>\n

and a number ries of questions about them:<\/p>\n

\u2014 On their nature and number,<\/p>\n

\u2014 Lists of argument schemes have been and are being compiled; but what is the unifying factor underlying these lists? Do they have a proper systematic organization? Are they amenable to some elementary headings (Blair 2012, Ch. 12 and 13)?<\/p>\n

\u2014 Where do they come from? Are they recurring, remarkably stable structures that are taken up in argumentative discourses of all kinds? Or are they constructed from the a priori categories of the human mind?<\/p>\n

\u2014 Are they logical, cultural, or anthropological entities? Are they culture-dependent?<\/p>\n

\u2014 What kind of historical change, if any, can affect them? The question arises, when\u00a0 Toulmin, Rieke & Janik’s nine \u201cforms of reasoning\u201d of are compared with the Ciceronian and post-Ciceronian lists of topoi, see Collections (4)<\/a> and Collections (2).<\/a><\/p>\n

1. Categorizing arguments: collections and typologies<\/span><\/h1>\n

A class<\/em> is a set of entities; basically, a typology<\/em> is a class divided into different subtypes; the same class can admit different subtypes, differently organized, see classification<\/a>. A catalog<\/em> can be considered as a single-level typology.<\/p>\n

A typology of arguments<\/em> is a set of topics<\/em> or argument schemes<\/em> that connect the argument to the conclusion. Argument typologies include from ten to several dozens of argument schemes.<\/p>\n

To categorize a speech segment (an individual, level 0<\/strong>) as a \u201cpragmatic argument\u201d is to identify in this segment the characteristic features that define the pragmatic argument. This operation is itself argumentative, and obeys the rules of argumentation by definition, see Nomination<\/a>; Definition<\/a>; Argumentation Scheme<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The idea of argument types, the possibility of making inventories of these types, and of giving these inventories an internal structure in order to build a \u201ctypology of topics\u201d, is the very foundation of the theory of rhetorical argumentation. Walter Ong sees these typologies of argumentations as engaged in a perpetual movement of renewal and redefinition:<\/p>\n

As the general intellectual tradition changes, the active associative nodes for ideas change, and classification changes too. Revising the tradition has been a common phenomenon in antiquity, when Aristotle differed from the sophists in the list of topics he proposed, Cicero from Aristotle, Quintilian from Cicero, Themistius from all these, and Boethius from all of them again and from Themistius as well. The revision continues in our day with Professor Mortimer Adler’s \u201cGreat ideas\u201d (augmented beyond their original hundred), and with such articles as P\u00e8re Gardeil\u2019s very helpful study of the lieux communs<\/em> in the Dictionnaire de th\u00e9ologie catholique<\/em>, where, after reporting Melchior Cano’s description of the loci (which he notes are taken at times verbatim from Agricola) and Cano’s organization of theological loci, Gardeil proposes, in true topical tradition, a still better classification of his own. (Ong 1958, p. 122)<\/p>\n

There are many lessons to be learned from this passage. First, it provides us with a definition of topics as \u201cactive associative nodes for ideas\u201d, as they have been theorized since the birth of rhetoric in the context of the theory of argumentation in discourse. The particular interest of this passage lies in the description of the taxonomic trap. In order to put an end to the irritating proliferation of typologies, one might be tempted to propose a new and final one, thus bringing everyone to agreement \u2014 but, in the end, it seems that an additional typology has been added to an already overloaded list, thus exacerbating the very evil, it was supposed to remedy. This observation can be read as an ironic historical counterpoint to the works that, in that year, 1958, revived reflection on argumentation schemes.<\/p>\n

2. The place of collections in the theories of the argumentation<\/span><\/h1>\n

The question of argument schemes plays a key role in some theories of argumentation while in others it is either redefined, or plays only a marginal role.<\/p>\n

(i) <\/strong>The question of argument types does not arise in Anscombre and Ducrot’s theory of Argumentation within Language. The concept of topos is defined as a semantic link between predicates. It follows that the number of topoi is extremely large, even uncountable, while classical theories enumerate less than one hundred topoi.<\/p>\n

(ii) <\/strong>Grize’s \u201cNatural Logic\u201d is based on the concept of schematization<\/a>. The operations of \u201creasoned organization\u201d, or \u201cshoring\u201d essentially amount to the classical concept of a conclusion supported by an argument. The types of arguments correspond to the types of scaffolding. To my knowledge, this line has not been developed further. Grize focuses on inference, causation, explanation.<\/strong><\/p>\n

(iii) <\/strong>In Toulmin’s terminology, a type of warrant<\/em> corresponds to a type of argument, as shown by Ehninger and Brockriede ([1960]). In addition, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984) proposed a short collection of arguments, see Collections (4)<\/a>. The example illustrating Toulmin’s \u201clayout of argument<\/a>\u201d corresponds to a very productive topic, the categorization<\/a> of an individual.<\/p>\n

(iv) <\/strong>The concept is central to the New Rhetoric<\/em> of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, as well as for Pragma-Dialectic and Informal Logic, see Collections (4)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

3. Dimension of the classification: Number of argument schemes<\/span><\/h1>\n

Classical lists of argument schemes tend to propose a relatively large number or argument schemes. Aristotle’s Rhetoric<\/em> offers a set of twenty-eight schemes, plus some \u201clines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes\u201d (Rhet<\/em>., II, 24; RR, p. 379)<\/strong>; plus, some rules taken from the Topics<\/em>. Cicero’s Topica<\/em> lists a dozen schemes, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria<\/em> twenty-five. Boethius handed down fifteen forms on to the Middle Ages, see Collections (2)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Dupleix’s Logic<\/em> (1607) and Bossuet’s Logic<\/em> (1677), may probably be regarded as representative, in modern times, of this classical tradition. The former contains fourteen schemes and the latter twenty.<\/p>\n

Other modern typologies are quite different: Locke [1690] proposes a typology \u2014 if it can be considered as such \u2014 consisting of four elements to which Leibniz [1765] adds one. Locke’s scientific world however, is extremely different from, and antagonistic to the rhetorical world of the classics.<\/p>\n

Bentham enumerates thirty-one argumentative formulas for the field of political arguments<\/a>.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

In contemporary times, Conley counts \u201cmore than eighty different argument types\u201d in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca Treatise<\/em> (Conley 1984, p. 180-181) see Collections (4)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

4. Forms of collections<\/span><\/h1>\n

In the Rhetoric<\/em>, Aristotle presents a catalog of twenty-eight randomly listed <\/strong>topoi.<\/p>\n

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca have constructed a clearly organized four-level typology<\/strong> of the various \u201ctechniques of argumentation\u201d<\/p>\n

\u2014 A segment of speech (an individual, level 0<\/strong>) can be categorized as a \u201cpragmatic argument\u201d; that is, this segment presents the essential features that define the pragmatic argument (Level 1<\/strong>).<\/p>\n

\u2014 Level 1 arguments are grouped into a super-category; for example, a \u201cpragmatic argument\u201d is classified as an \u201cargument based on the structure of reality\u201d (Level 2<\/strong>).<\/p>\n

\u2014 Level 2 arguments are grouped into the class of the \u201ctechniques of association\u201d, (Level 3<\/strong>), one of the two kinds of \u201ctechniques of argumentation\u201d (Level 4<\/strong>, top level).<\/p>\n

5. Foundations of collections<\/span><\/h1>\n

The collections of argument schemes can be organized in different ways.<\/p>\n

(i) From the point of view of their contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge<\/em>,<\/strong> inconclusive<\/em> arguments are contrasted with compelling<\/em> arguments. The latter are generally equated, in modern times, with mathematical demonstration and scientific proof. In Locke’s words, they \u201cbring true instruction with [them] and advance us on our way to knowledge\u201d (Locke [1690], Ch. 17, \u00a7 19-22), see Collections (3)<\/a>. Person-centered arguments are irrelevant from this point of view. The same might be said of those arguments that play only with the guilty pleasures of natural language and the nuances of interpersonal relations.<\/p>\n

(ii) In terms of their linguistic form<\/em><\/strong>,\u00a0metonymic<\/a> arguments based on a relationship of contiguity, can be distinguished from the\u00a0metaphor<\/a>ic arguments based on a relationship of similarity. This distinction reflects the opposition between the arguments \u201cestablishing the structure of reality\u201d (analogy type) and those \u201cbased on the structure of reality\u2019 (causal type) (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] p. 261; 350), See Collections (4)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

(iii) From the point of view of their productivity.<\/strong> The productivity of an argument scheme depends on the number of actual arguments (enthymemes) derived from it. Intuitively, s<\/strong>ome topics are very productive. One might think for example of those based on the twin argument schemes of categorization<\/a> and definition<\/a>; or arguments based on causal or analogical relations, or from the contraries, etc. Others, including the argument from waste<\/a> are less productive. Other argument schemes may be more common than their name suggest, such as the argumentative exploitation of syzygies<\/a>.<\/p>\n

(iv) From the point of view of their legitimating power.<\/strong> A good example of organizing argument schemes according to their strength is given by the hierarchy of legal and theological arguments in the Arab-Muslim culture and religion, such as proposed by Khall\u00e2f ([1942]). He distinguishes between ten sources, ranked according to their degree of legitimacy. The most legitimate forms are those based on the Qur’an and the Tradition. Those with the weakest degree of legitimacy are, \u201cthe laws of the monotheistic peoples\u201d, and, perhaps surprisingly given the present situation, \u201cthe opinions of the Prophet’s companions\u201d, in that order. Arguments presented at the time of the emergence of Islam are given the least weight in the hierarchy of arguments. Such was the situation in 1942; it has changed significantly with the rise of Salafism.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

COLLECTION AND TYPOLOGIES OF ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES Tradition has bequeathed us more or less systematized inventories of argument schemes: Collections 2: From Aristotle to Boethius Collections 3: Modernity and Tradition Collections 4: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations, and a number ries of questions about them: \u2014 On their nature and number, \u2014 Lists of argument schemes have […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4761","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4761","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4761"}],"version-history":[{"count":15,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4761\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13863,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4761\/revisions\/13863"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4761"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4761"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4761"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}