{"id":4763,"date":"2021-10-18T11:52:18","date_gmt":"2021-10-18T09:52:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4763"},"modified":"2025-03-31T11:01:31","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T09:01:31","slug":"collections-ii-from-aristotle-to-boethius-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/collections-ii-from-aristotle-to-boethius-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections (2): From Aristotle to Boethius"},"content":{"rendered":"

COLLECTIONS 2: ARISTOTLE, CICERO<\/span><\/h2>\n

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric<\/em> (between 329 & 323 b.c)<\/span><\/h2>\n

1.1 The catalog and its position in the <\/span>Aristotelian <\/span>system of proofs<\/span><\/h3>\n

The catalogue of the Rhetoric<\/em> must be seen within the framework of the Aristotelian typology of the different types of proofs carried by different types of discourses. In this typology of proofs, rhetorical discourse is opposed to diaIectical dialogue and to scientific (syllogistic) discourse. Tricot points out that \u201csyllogism<\/em> is the genre, scientific<\/em> (producer of science) [is] the specific difference that separates the scientific demonstration from the dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms\u201d (S. A<\/em>., I, 2, 15-25; p. 8, note 3). The concept of persuasion in the Rhetoric<\/em> must be seen in this context: scientific discourse produces apodictic<\/em> knowledge; dialectical interaction produces probable<\/em> truth and rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is an element of persuasive<\/em> discourse. Thus, by its very definition, rhetorical discourse cannot be probative; in short, the phrase \u201crhetorical evidence persuades\u201d is a pleonasm.<\/p>\n

The catalogue of arguments is located in the subtypology that organizes the rhetorical proofs (proof = pistis<\/em>, \u201cmeans of pressure\u201d), as follows<\/p>\n

1.2 Wavering distinctions<\/span><\/h3>\n

Aristotle makes the following distinctions between the different types of rhetorical proofs:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The proofs attached to the logos are enthymemes<\/a>,<\/em>\u00a0which correspond to deduction; examples<\/em>, which corresponds to induction; and arguments based on natural<\/em>\u00a0signs<\/em><\/a>, that are probable or certain. Enthymemes and examples are said to be common to the three ancient rhetorical genres (epideictic, deliberative, judicial, S. Rhetoric<\/a>.)
\nThe articulation of these different kinds of proofs, and the consistency of the text of the Rhetoric<\/em> such as we read it now, is problematic (McAdon 2003, 2004). The classification of proofs attached to logos has important variants:<\/p>\n

(a) \u201cI call an enthymeme <\/em>a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes, and nothing else.\u201d (Rhet<\/em>., I, 2, 8; Fr., p. 19)<\/p>\n

(b) \u201cThe materials from which the enthymemes are derived [\u2026] being probabilities and signs [\u2026].\u201d (I<\/em>bid<\/em> I, 2, 14; p. 25)<\/p>\n

(c) \u201cNow the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources \u2014\u00a0probabilities, examples, necessary signs and signs.\u201d (I<\/em>bid<\/em> II, 15, 8; p. 337)<\/p>\n

The example is placed on the same level as the enthymeme in (a), but is considered a form of the enthymeme in (c); enthymemes have four sources in (c), and two in (b). So, it would be risky to look for a rigorous system in these presentations of rhetorical proof, and the above table must be taken as a simple reminder.<\/p>\n

1.3 The topoi of the Rhetoric<\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n

The Rhetoric<\/em> enumerates twenty-eight topoi (topics<\/em>) or \u201clines of argument\u201d (Rhet<\/em>, II, 23), as listed in the following table. An enthymeme<\/em><\/a> is a discursive instance of a topos.<\/p>\n

They are identified by their English label or by a brief description, both quoted from Freese (F) or Rhys Roberts (RR).<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n
      \n
    1. \n
        \n
      1. \u201cFrom opposites\u201d (F). S. Opposites<\/a><\/li>\n
      2. \u201cFrom similar inflexions\u201d (F). S. Derived words<\/a><\/li>\n
      3. \u201cFrom relative terms\u201d (F); \u201cupon correlative ideas\u201d (R). S. Correlative terms<\/a><\/li>\n
      4. \u201cFrom the more or less\u201d (F); a fortiori <\/em>(R). S. A fortiori<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n
      5. \u201cThe consideration of time\u201d (F). S. Consistency<\/a><\/li>\n
      6. \u201cTurning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves\u201d (F). S. Ethos<\/a>; A fortiori.<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n
      7. \u201cFrom definition\u201d (F). S. Definition<\/a><\/li>\n
      8. \u201cTopic from the different significations of a word\u201d (F). Aristotle explicitly refers to this topos in his Topics<\/em>. S. Ambiguity<\/a>.<\/li>\n
      9. \u201cFrom division\u201d (F). S. Case-by-case<\/a><\/li>\n
      10. \u201cFrom induction\u201d (F). S. Induction<\/a><\/li>\n
      11. \u201cFrom a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter\u201d, that judgment having been given by one of \u201cthose whose judgment it is not possible to contradict\u201d (F). S. Precedent<\/a>; Ab exemplo<\/em>;<\/a> Authority<\/a>; Modesty<\/a>; Politeness<\/a><\/li>\n
      12. \u201cFrom enumerating the parts\u201d (F). S. Case-by-case<\/a><\/li>\n
      13. \u201cSince in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, [\u2026] employing the consequences to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame\u201d (F). S. Pragmatic argument<\/a>; Dilemma<\/li>\n
      14. [id. 13],<\/em> \u201cbut there is this difference that in the former case [i.e., 13]<\/em> things of any kind whatever, in the latter [i.e., 13]<\/em> opposites\u201d (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma<\/a><\/li>\n
      15. \u201cMen do not praise the same thing in public and in secret\u201d (F). S. Motives<\/a><\/li>\n
      16. \u201cFrom analogy in things\u201d (F).<\/strong> S. Analogy<\/a>; Opposites<\/a>.<\/li>\n
      17. \u201cConcluding the identity of precedents from the identity of results\u201d Instance: \u201cThere is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist\u201d (F). S. Consequence<\/a>; Implication<\/a>.<\/li>\n
      18. \u201cThe same men do not always choose the same thing before and after but the contrary\u201d (F).\u00a0 S. Consistency<\/a>.<\/li>\n
      19. \u201cMaintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it\u201d (F). S. Motives<\/a><\/li>\n
      20. \u201cExamining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not\u201d (F). S. Motives<\/a><\/li>\n
      21. \u201cThings which are thought to happen but are incredible\u201d (F). S. Probable<\/a>.<\/li>\n
      22. \u201cAnother line of argument is to refute your opponent’s case by noting any contrast or contradiction of dates, acts or words that it anywhere displays\u201d (RR). S. Contradiction<\/a>;\u00a0 Consistency<\/a>; Ad hominem<\/em><\/a>.<\/li>\n
      23. \u201cAnother topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander [\u2026] consists in stating the reason for the false opinion\u201d (F). S. Motives<\/a>; Interpretation<\/li>\n
      24. \u201cAnother topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist\u201d (F). S. Motives<\/a><\/li>\n
      25. \u201cWhether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been carried out\u201d (F). S. Consistency<\/a>;<\/strong> Motives<\/a><\/li>\n
      26. \u201cAnother topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together\u201d (F). S. <\/strong>Consistency<\/a>
        \n<\/strong><\/li>\n
      27. \u201cAnother topic consists in making use of errors committed for purposes of accusation or defense\u201d (F). S. Contradiction; <\/strong>Consistency<\/a>
        \n<\/strong><\/li>\n
      28. \u201cFrom the meaning of a name\u201d (F). S. Proper Name<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Even if no clear order emerges from this enumeration, it can be noted that an important subset of topics is essentially concerned with the world of human action and its determination, where motives have been substituted for causes, and behavioral stereotypes about human nature and human motivations have replaced strict scientific causality and taxonomies.<\/p>\n

        2. Cicero, Topica<\/em>, \u201cTopics\u201d (44 b.c.)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/h2>\n

        Cicero proposes a typology of arguments in an early work, De Inventione<\/em>, \u201cOn Invention\u201d and in his last book on arguments, Topica<\/em>, \u201cTopics\u201d. Unlike the Topics<\/em> of Aristotle, which exposes a method for finding and criticizing arguments in the context of a dialectical philosophical exchange, Cicero’s observations and examples always refer to rhetoric as a legal practice. In this context, Cicero makes the following distinction:<\/p>\n