{"id":4770,"date":"2021-10-18T12:02:16","date_gmt":"2021-10-18T10:02:16","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4770"},"modified":"2025-03-31T11:05:14","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T09:05:14","slug":"collections-iii-modernity-and-tradition-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/collections-iii-modernity-and-tradition-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections (3): Tradition and Modernity"},"content":{"rendered":"

COLLECTION 3: TRADITION AND MODERNITY<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. Scipion Dupleix, Logic, or the Art of Speaking and Thinking<\/em> (1607)<\/span>
\nJacques-B\u00e9nigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin<\/em> (1677)<\/span><\/h1>\n

These works probably have no particular historical significance, but they certainly give an idea of the terminology of the seventeenth century, which clearly resembles the Ciceronian system, see Collections (2)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

As the title suggests, Bossuet’s Logic<\/em> functions as a pedagogical guide to everyday argumentation<\/em>: \u2018Dauphin\u2019 was the title given to the heir to the French kingdom.<\/p>\n

Table:<\/strong><\/em>
\n\u2014 First column, Bossuet, 1677
\n\u2014 Second column, Dupleix, 1607<\/p>\n

The order of the lines is Bossuet’s. For ease of reading, Dupleix’s order of has been changed, so that the same types of arguments are on the same line; the numbering corresponds to the order in Dupleix’s typology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Bossuet, 1677<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n

Dupleix, <\/strong>1607<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1. Etymology<\/td>\n3. Etymology<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2. Conjugates<\/td>\n4. Conjugata<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3. Definition<\/td>\n1. Definition<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4. Division<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5. Genus<\/td>\n5. Genus and Species<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6. Species<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
7. Property<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
8. Accident<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
9. Resemblance<\/p>\n

10. Dissemblance<\/td>\n

6. Similitude,<\/p>\n

7. Dissimilitude<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

11. Cause<\/td>\n13. Cause<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
12. Effects<\/td>\n14. Effects<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
13. What comes before1<\/sup><\/td>\n10. Antecedents1<\/sup><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
14. What accompanies1<\/sup><\/td>\n9.\u00a0Adjuncts or conjuncts1<\/sup><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
15. What follows1<\/sup><\/td>\n11. Consequents1<\/sup><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
16. Contraries<\/td>\n8. Contraries<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
17. A repugnantibus<\/em>3<\/sup><\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n12. Repugnants<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
18. All and parts2<\/sup><\/td>\n2.\u00a0Enumeration of the parts2<\/sup><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
19. Comparison<\/td>\n15. Comparison with things bigger, equal and smaller<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
20. Example, or Induction<\/td>\n\n

\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

(1<\/sup>) S. Circumstances<\/a><\/p>\n

(2<\/sup>) Bossuet’s topic n\u00b018 (here, topic = topos, arg. scheme), \u201cenumeration of the parts\u201d is akin to the topic of definition. For example, what is a \u201cgood captain\u201d is defined by enumerating his relevant qualities: brave, wise, etc. Dupleix’s topic n\u00b02, \u201call and parts\u201d is more related to composition and division<\/p>\n

(3<\/sup>) Dupleix’s topic n\u00b012, from \u201crepugnants\u201d refers to predication: \u201cstone\u201d and \u201cman\u201d are repugnant<\/em> because \u201c\u00a0\u2014 be a stone<\/em>\u201d cannot be said of man \u2014<\/em> whereas Bossuet’s topic n\u00b017, \u201ca repugnantibus<\/em>\u201d, refers to a kind of ad hominem<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Both typologies prioritize arguments that exploit the resources that contribute to the definition of a word or a concept,\u00a0with a view to the future use of this definition in syllogistic reasoning. This enumeration of the core set of arguments is followed by the usual enumeration of argument schemes based on causality, analogy, comparison, peripheral circumstances, opposites and induction. This set will reappear under a new reorganization in the New Rhetoric<\/em>.<\/p>\n

2. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding<\/em> (1690)<\/span>
\nWilhelm Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding<\/em> (1765)<\/span><\/h1>\n

In An Essay concerning Human Understanding<\/em> John Locke briefly mentions \u201cfour sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasoning with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition\u201d (IV, 17, \u201cOf Reason\u201d, \u00a7 19-22; p. 410). These four arguments are:<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0ad verecundiam<\/em>, S. Ethos<\/a>; \u2028Modesty<\/a>; Authority<\/a>.<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0ad ignorantiam<\/em>, S. Ignorance<\/a>.<\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0ad hominem,<\/em> S. Ad hominem<\/em>.<\/a><\/span>
\n\u2014\u00a0ad judicium<\/em>, S. Matter<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

In his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding<\/em>, Leibniz comments on this list, and qualifies Locke’s abrupt and general condemnation by taking into consideration the circumstances; see the above mentioned entries. In addition, Leibniz adds a new kind of argument, the argument ad vertiginem<\/em>, S. Vertigo<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This short list has nothing to do with the previous Ciceronian ones; its purpose is to contrast the first three fallacious arguments with the last one, the only one that \u201cbrings true instruction and advances us in our way to knowledge\u201d (op. cit.<\/em>, p. 411). Mathematics and experimental sciences are introduced under the heading ad judicium<\/em>. Contrary to the classical typologies, these arguments are not associated with a logic itself based on a natural ontology, but rather with the requirements of the scientific method, S. Fallacy<\/a>. We are thus entering a new argumentative world.<\/p>\n

3. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of fallacies<\/em> (1824) see<\/strong> Political<\/strong> Arguments<\/a>. <\/span><\/h3>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

COLLECTION 3: TRADITION AND MODERNITY 1. Scipion Dupleix, Logic, or the Art of Speaking and Thinking (1607) Jacques-B\u00e9nigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin (1677) These works probably have no particular historical significance, but they certainly give an idea of the terminology of the seventeenth century, which clearly resembles the Ciceronian system, see Collections (2). As […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4770","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4770","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4770"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4770\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13878,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4770\/revisions\/13878"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4770"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4770"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4770"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}