{"id":4772,"date":"2021-10-18T12:14:39","date_gmt":"2021-10-18T10:14:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4772"},"modified":"2025-03-30T14:36:46","modified_gmt":"2025-03-30T12:36:46","slug":"collections-iv-contemporary-innovations-and-structurations-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/collections-iv-contemporary-innovations-and-structurations-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections (4)\u00a0: Contemporary Innovations and Structurations"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: center;\"><span style=\"font-size: 14pt; color: #ff0000;\"><strong>COLLECTION 4: CONTEMPORARY INNOVATIONS<br \/>\nAND STRUCTURATIONS<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n<h1><span style=\"color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;\">1. Cha\u00efm Perelman &amp; Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, <em>A Treatise on Argumentation<\/em> \u2014 <em>The New Rhetoric<\/em>, 1958<\/span><\/h1>\n<p>In <em>The<\/em> <em>New Rhetoric \u2014\u00a0A Treatise on Argumentation<\/em> (1958), Perelman &amp; Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in <em>The Rhetorical Empire<\/em> [<em>L&rsquo;Empire Rh\u00e9torique<\/em>, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential elements of the 1958 typology, and makes some significant simplifications. In <em>Juridical Logic<\/em> [<em>Logique Juridique<\/em>, 1979] he presents a specific set of<a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/juridical-arguments-three-collections-e\/\"> legal arguments<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #800000; font-size: 12pt;\">1.1 The typology of the <em>Treatise<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>According to Conley, the <em>Treatise<\/em> contains \u201cmore than eighty different forms of argument, and illuminating remarks on more than sixty-five figures\u201d (1984, p. 180-181), and contrasts these achievements with \u201cToulmin&rsquo;s renegade logic\u201d (<em>ibid<\/em>.).<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cForms of argumentation\u201d are described in the third part of the <em>Treatise<\/em>, entitled \u201cTechniques of argumentation\u201d. They are presented as a set of \u201c<em>association techniques<\/em>\u201d, (Chap. 1 to 3), along with two other kinds of techniques, the \u201c<em>technique<\/em> <em>of dissociation<\/em>\u201d (Chap. 4), and the \u201cInteraction of arguments\u201d (Chap. 5). The latter chapter presents a number of <em>dispositional techniques<\/em>, and discusses the relative persuasive effects of different arrangements of arguments in a speech, i.e questions of classical \u201c<em>dispositio<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #800000; font-size: 12pt;\">1.2 The association techniques<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>The <em>association techniques<\/em> correspond to the classical argument schemes. They are classified under three categories:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Chap. 1. Quasi-logical arguments<br \/>\nChap. 2. Arguments based on the structure of reality<br \/>\nChap. 3. The relations establishing the structure of reality<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #003300;\"><em>\u201cQuasi-logical arguments\u201d (\u00a746-59)<\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>This category lists arguments which \u201clay claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics\u201d (p. 192); this definition should be brought closer to the definition of a fallacious argument as \u201cone that <em>seems to be valid<\/em> but <em>is not<\/em> so.\u201d (Hamblin 1970, p. 12), see. <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/fallacies-i-contemporary-approaches-e\/\">Fallacies (1)<\/a>. The category includes the following argument schemes:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>46-49 Contradiction and incompatibility<\/li>\n<li>50\u00a0Identity and definition<\/li>\n<li>51\u00a0Analyticity, analysis and tautology<\/li>\n<li>52\u00a0The rule of justice<\/li>\n<li>53\u00a0Arguments of reciprocity<\/li>\n<li>54 Arguments by transitivity<\/li>\n<li>55 Inclusions of the part in the whole<\/li>\n<li>56\u00a0Division of the whole into its parts<\/li>\n<li>57\u00a0Arguments by comparison<\/li>\n<li>58\u00a0Argumentation by sacrifice<\/li>\n<li>59\u00a0Probabilities<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In <em>The Rhetorical Empire<\/em>, the chapter on \u201cQuasi-Logical Arguments\u201d essentially recapitulates the class as presented in the <em>Treatise.<\/em><\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #003300;\"><em>\u201cArguments based on the structure of reality\u201d (\u00a760-77)<\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>From a linguistic point of view, he broad label \u201cargument based on the structure of reality\u201d can be interpreted as referring to arguments that exploit <em>syntagmatic<\/em>, or <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/metonymy-synecdoche\/\"><em>metonymic<\/em><\/a> relations. Indeed, this category lists arguments \u201calleged to be in agreement with the very nature of things\u201d (p. 191); these arguments \u201cmake use of [the structure of reality] to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote\u201d (p. 261). The \u201ccausal link\u201d and the \u201crelation of succession\u201d are fundamental to this category.<\/p>\n<p>Arguments within this category include:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>61-63\u00a0\u201cCausal link\u201d, \u201cPragmatic argument\u201d<\/li>\n<li>63-73 discuss arguments in which the person is considered to be a causal agent, such as:\n<ul>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>64-68 \u201cEnds and means\u201d, among which:<\/li>\n<li>65 \u201cArgument of waste\u201d<\/li>\n<li>66 \u201cThe Argument of direction\u201d<\/li>\n<li>68-73 \u201cThe Person and his acts\u201d, including:<\/li>\n<li>70 \u201cArgument from authority\u201d<\/li>\n<li>73 \u201cThe Group and its members\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>74-75 extend the notion of \u201crelation of coexistence\u201d to:<\/li>\n<li>74 \u201cAct and essence\u201d<\/li>\n<li>75 \u201cThe symbolic relation\u201d<\/li>\n<li>76-77 present \u201cmore complex\u201d, second level arguments:<\/li>\n<li>74 \u201cDouble hierarchy\u201d<\/li>\n<li>75 \u201cDifferences of degree and of order\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><em>The<\/em> <em>Rhetorical Empire<\/em>, Chapter VIII, recapitulates the same class of <em>arguments based on the structure of reality<\/em> under different groupings:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">\u2014\u00a0Relations of succession<br \/>\n\u2014\u00a0Relations of coexistence<br \/>\n\u2014\u00a0The Symbolic relation, the double hierarchy argument, argument about the differences of order.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #003300;\"><em>\u201cRelations establishing the structure of reality\u201d \u00a778-88<\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>The inclusive label \u201cRelations establishing the structure of reality\u201d could be interpreted as referring to a set of arguments that exploit <em>paradigmatic<\/em> or <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/metaphor-analogy-model\/\"><em>metaphorical<\/em><\/a>\u00a0relations. This category of relations is defined on the basis of two of its prototypical members, arguments from \u201cthe particular case\u201d, and \u201carguments by analogy\u201d. The following argument schemes come under this category:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ul>\n<li>78 \u201cArgumentation by example\u201d<\/li>\n<li>79 \u201cIllustration\u201d<\/li>\n<li>80-81\u00a0\u201cModel and anti-model\u201d<\/li>\n<li>82-87, On analogy<\/li>\n<li>87-88, On metaphor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In the <em>Rhetorical Empire<\/em>, the title \u201cestablishing the structure of reality\u201d\u00a0is not retained; its contents are grouped under two distinct chapters:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Chap. IX, Arguments by example, illustration and model<br \/>\nChap. X, Analogy and metaphor<\/p>\n<p>This can be construed as a waiver of the distinction between arguments \u201c<em>establishing<\/em>\u201d the structure of reality, and those \u201c<em>based on<\/em>\u201d the structure of reality.<\/p>\n<p>It might, however, also be argued that this couple of concepts does not characterize causal arguments in opposition to analogical ones, but indeed applies to <em>both<\/em> argument schemes. The successful use of an argument \u201c<em>based on<\/em>\u201d authority, for example, presupposes that the invoked authority has been previously \u201c<em>established<\/em>\u201d. This distinction is especially helpful in the case of arguments from <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/authoritye\/\">authority<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/definition-iii-argumentations-based-on-a-definition\/\">definition<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/causality-e\/\">causality<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/analogy-iii-structural-analogy\/\">analogy<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\"><em><span style=\"color: #800000;\">1.3 The dissociation techniques<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>The basic difference between <em>association<\/em> and <em>dissociation<\/em> techniques is that the former operates on <strong><em>judgments<\/em><\/strong>; they \u201cestablish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote\u201d\u00a0(p. 261); they correspond to argument schemes. In contrast, <em>dissociation<\/em> techniques operate on \u201c<strong><em>concepts<\/em><\/strong>\u201d (p. 411; my emphasis): \u201c[they] are mainly characterized by the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted language than at moving towards a new formulation\u201d (p. 191-192), see <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/dissociation-e\/\">Dissociation<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/distinguo-e\/\"><em>Distinguo<\/em><\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/definition-iv-persuasive-definition-e\/\">Persuasive Definition<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The two terms of the opposition association \/ dissociation are thus of a very different nature.<\/p>\n<h1><span style=\"color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;\">2. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, <em>An introduction to reasoning<\/em> (1984)\u2028<\/span><\/h1>\n<p>Toulmin, Rieke, Janik consider nine \u00abforms of reasoning\u00bb \u00abmost frequently to be met with in practical situations (1984, p. 147-155; p. 155).<\/p>\n<table style=\"border-collapse: collapse; width: 86.4%; height: 122px;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td style=\"width: 42.7778%; text-align: left;\">1. analogy<br \/>\n2. generalization<br \/>\n3. sign<br \/>\n4. cause<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 57.2222%;\">5. authority<br \/>\n6. dilemma<br \/>\n7 classification<br \/>\n8. opposites<br \/>\n9. degree<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>In the argument from degree, \u00ab the different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another \u00bb (id., p. 155)<\/p>\n<p>Like the following one, this restricted group of argumentative schemes has a family resemblance with the classical lists derived from Cicero, see <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/collections-ii-from-aristotle-to-boethius-e\/\">Collections 2.<\/a><br \/>\nThey are good candidate for universality.<\/p>\n<h1><span style=\"color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;\">3. Kienpointner, <em>Alltagslogik<\/em> [Everyday Logic] 1992.<\/span><\/h1>\n<p>Kienpointner (1992, p.\u2009231-402) synthetizes six contemporary typologies (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958]\u2009; Toulmin, Rieke, Janik 1984\u2009; Govier 1987; Schellens 1987; van Eemeren, Kruiger 1987; Benoit, Lindsey 1987), summarized in the following table (1992, p.\u2009246):<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">3.1 Rule-using argument schemes<\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\"><em>Classificatory Schemes<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 120px;\">Definition<br \/>\nGenus &#8211; Species<br \/>\nPart &#8211; Whole<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\"><em>Comparison Schemes<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 120px;\">Equivalence<br \/>\nResemblance<br \/>\nDifference<br \/>\n<em>A fortiori<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\"><em>Opposition Schemes<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 120px;\">Contradictories<br \/>\nContraries<br \/>\nRelative terms<br \/>\nIncompatibility<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 80px;\"><em>Causal Schemes<\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 120px;\">Cause \u2013 Effect<br \/>\nConsequences<br \/>\nReason<br \/>\nMeans &#8211; End<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #800000;\">3.2\u00a0Rule-establishing argument schemes<\/span><\/h2>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Argumentation by example<br \/>\nInductive argument<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">3.3 Other schemes<\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Argument by example, illustrative argument<br \/>\nArg. by analogy<br \/>\nArg. by authority<\/p>\n<h1><span style=\"color: #0000ff; font-size: 12pt;\">4.\u2002Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, <em>Argumentation Schemes<\/em>,\u00a02008.<\/span><\/h1>\n<p>Walton, Reed and Macagno present an extensive and exhaustive survey including \u201ca user\u2019s compendium of argumentation schemes\u201d (2008, pp.\u2009308-346).<\/p>\n<p>The schemes are consistently referred to as <em>argument<\/em> schemes, with the exception of (19), (20), (21), which are referred to as <em>argumentation <\/em>from values, from sacrifice, from the group and its members.<\/p>\n<p>The following list mentions only the main schemes; they may include subtypes.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(1) Authorities: position, expertise, testimony, number (p. 309-314)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li>Argument from position to know<\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from expert opinion<\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from witness testimony<\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from popular opinion, <em>ad populum<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from popular practice.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Arguments (4) are based on what people generally believe, whereas arguments (5) are based on what people generally do.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(2) Example, analogy (p. 315-316)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"6\">\n<li>Argument from example<\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from analogy<\/li>\n<li>Practical reasoning from analogy<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Arguments (7) concern beliefs; arguments (8) concern ways of doing things.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(3) Composition and division (p. 316-317)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"9\">\n<li>Argument from composition<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from division<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(4 ) Negation, opposition (p. 317-318)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"11\">\n<li>Arg. from opposition (contradictory, contrary, converse, incompatible)<\/li>\n<li>Rhetorical argument from opposition<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Negation-based argumentation schemes may or may not be logically valid or not; they are often not well defined.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(5) Alternative (p. 318-319)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"13\">\n<li>Arg. from alternatives<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>This scheme concludes by eliminating a member of an alternative because of the requirement of the other member. It corresponds to a case-by-case argument between two cases.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(6) Classification (p. 319-320)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"14\">\n<li>Arg. from verbal classification<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\u201cfor all <strong>x<\/strong>, if <strong>x<\/strong> has property <strong>F<\/strong>, then <strong>x<\/strong> can be classified as having property <strong>G<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The set <strong>F<\/strong> is contained in the set <strong>G<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"15\">\n<li>Arg. from definition to verbal classification<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>If an individual <strong><em>a<\/em><\/strong> is defined (categorized) as a <strong>D<\/strong>, and if <strong>D<\/strong>s in general have property <strong>P<\/strong>, then <strong><em>a<\/em><\/strong> has property <strong>P<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"16\">\n<li>Arg. from vagueness of a verbal classification<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from arbitrariness of a verbal classification<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Schemes 16. and 17. conclude with the rejection of an argument as \u201ctoo vague\u201d or \u201ctoo arbitrarily defined\u201d in some aspects. These cases can also be seen as an application of Grice&rsquo;s <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/cooperative-principle-e\/\">cooperative principle<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(7) Persons, values, actions and sacrifice (p. 321-327)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"18\">\n<li>Argument from interaction of act and person<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from\u00a0values<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from sacrifice<\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from the group and its members<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>These schemes consider a group whose members are said to share a quality <strong>Q<\/strong>, and attribute that quality to each member of the group. A member of a racist group can legitimately be assumed to be racist.<\/p>\n<p>Not all the characteristics of its members can be composed and attributed to the group as such; a large set is not necessarily composed of large elements.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"22\">\n<li>Practical reasoning<\/li>\n<li>Two-person practical reasoning<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>If you have an end, then you must accept the means and steps necessary to attain it.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"24\">\n<li>Argument from waste<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from sunk costs<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Pages 10-11 (<em>id.<\/em>) consider as synonyms the labels <em>argument from waste<\/em>, (with reference to Perelman &amp; Olbrechts-Tyteca), and <em>argument from sunk costs<\/em>. Nevertheless, they are discussed here as two separate entries.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(8) Ignorance (p. 327-328)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"26\">\n<li>Arg. from ignorance<\/li>\n<li>Epistemic argument from ignorance<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>This argument covers the case \u201c<em>if it were true, the newspapers would surely be talking about it<\/em>\u201d (<em>id<\/em>., p. 99)<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(9) Cause, effect; abduction; consequence (p. 328-333)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"28\">\n<li>Argument from cause to effect<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from correlation to cause<\/li>\n<li>Argument from sign<\/li>\n<li>Abductive argumentation scheme<\/li>\n<li>Argument from evidence to a hypothesis<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from\u00a0consequences<\/li>\n<li>Pragmatic argument from alternatives<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Scheme (34) is a special case of (33), the choice is between doing\/not doing something and suffering\/not suffering negative consequences.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(10) Arguments from threat, fear, danger (p. 333-335)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"35\">\n<li>Argument from threat<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from fear appeal<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from danger appeal<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Schemes (35), (36), (37) schematize different fear strategies.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"38\">\n<li>Arg. from need for help<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from distress<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(11) Commitments, ethos, <em>ad hominem<\/em> (p. 335-339)<\/span><\/h3>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">40.\u2002Arg. from commitment<br \/>\n41.\u2002Ethotic argument<br \/>\n42.\u2002Generic <em>ad hominem<br \/>\n43. <\/em>Pragmatic inconsistency<br \/>\n44. Argument from inconsistent commitment<br \/>\n45. Circumstantial <em>ad hominem<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Scheme (44) distinguishes between <em>committed<\/em> and <em>not really <\/em>so.<\/p>\n<p>Schemes (43) and (45) express forms of contradiction between personal commitments and actions.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"46\">\n<li>Argument from bias<\/li>\n<li>Bias <em>ad hominem<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Patterns (46) and (47) are closely related. According to (46), the argument from bias says: \u201c<strong><em>L<\/em><\/strong><em> is biased, so the conclusions are suspect<\/em>\u201d. According to (47), the \u201cbias <em>ad hominem<\/em>\u201d: \u201c<strong>L<\/strong> is biased, so I do not trust him\u201d. Biases are relative to a domain, but it is convenient to consider that the whole personality is biased; <strong>L<\/strong> has a \u201cfalse mind\u201d.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(12) Gradualism; slippery slope (p. 339-341)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"48\">\n<li>Argument from gradualism<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The comments (<em>id<\/em>. p. 114-115), show that this scheme can be compared to the slippery slope forms, (49) to (53). It expresses the <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/sorite-e\/\">sorite<\/a> paradox, also mentioned in (52): \u201c<em>If you remove a grain from a pile of grains, you always have a pile; if you remove another grain, you still have a pile &#8230; up to what extent?<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"49\">\n<li>Slippery slope argument<\/li>\n<li>Precedent slippery slope argument<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The slippery slope argument is used to oppose an exception, on the grounds that the exception would open a line of precedent leading to something unacceptable.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"51\">\n<li>Sorites slippery slope argument<\/li>\n<li>Verbal slippery slope argument<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The slippery slope argument is used to reject the attribution of a property to an object on the grounds that this property is transmitted by contiguity up to an object that obviously does not or should not possess it. This is a variant of the argument to the absurd, based on a demonstration by recurrence.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"53\">\n<li>Full slippery slope argument<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(13) Rules, exceptions, precedent (p. 342-345)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"54\">\n<li>Argument for constitutive-rule claim<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Scheme (54) refers to rules of language (synonymy) and to principles of categorization in institutionally codified languages (\u201c<em>D<\/em> counts as <em>W<\/em>\u201d).<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"55\">\n<li>Arg. from rules<\/li>\n<li>Arg. for an exceptional case<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from precedent<\/li>\n<li>Arg.\u00a0from plea for excuse<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>When faced with an exceptional case, the usual rule\u00a0 may be waived (56) or modified (57). Excuses and extenuating circumstances may suspend the rule.<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #800000;\">(14) Perception, memory (345-346)<\/span><\/h3>\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol>\n<li style=\"list-style-type: none;\">\n<ol start=\"59\">\n<li>Arg. from perception<\/li>\n<li>Arg. from memory<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Schemes (59), (60) argue that one can reasonably believe in a given fact on the basis of the perception or memory of this fact.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>COLLECTION 4: CONTEMPORARY INNOVATIONS AND STRUCTURATIONS 1. Cha\u00efm Perelman &amp; Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, A Treatise on Argumentation \u2014 The New Rhetoric, 1958 In The New Rhetoric \u2014\u00a0A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), Perelman &amp; Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in The Rhetorical Empire [L&rsquo;Empire Rh\u00e9torique, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4772","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4772","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4772"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4772\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13866,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4772\/revisions\/13866"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4772"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4772"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4772"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}