{"id":4868,"date":"2021-10-20T09:44:09","date_gmt":"2021-10-20T07:44:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4868"},"modified":"2025-04-01T11:48:02","modified_gmt":"2025-04-01T09:48:02","slug":"demonstration-and-argumentation-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/demonstration-and-argumentation-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Demonstration and Argumentation"},"content":{"rendered":"

DEMONSTRATION AND ARGUMENTATION<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

To demonstrate<\/em> comes from the Latin demonstrare<\/em> \u201cto show, to point out\u201d. The verbs to demonstrate<\/em> and to show<\/em> verbs are synonymous in some contexts: \u201cIn what follows, I’ll show<\/em> (= demonstrate<\/em>) that\u2026\u00a0\u00bb.
\nIn ordinary life, people make demonstrations of friendship, solidarity, affection\u2026<\/em> they make an exhibition, a show<\/em> of their feelings, as they give proofs of love<\/em>.The word demonstration<\/em>, even in its most abstract uses, keeps a link with the visual and pictorial; if a proof involves touching<\/em> with the finger, a demonstration shows<\/em>. Argumentation<\/em> has no such metaphorical background.<\/p>\n

In rhetoric<\/strong>, the word demonstration<\/em> is used with two completely different meanings, in addition to the meaning of \u201cproof\u201d:
\n\u2014\u00a0A demonstration<\/em> is a vivid representation<\/strong> of an event or a state of affairs as a picture, for an audience or a reader, who is put in the position of witness of the represented event. This figure is also called evidence<\/em> or hypotyposis<\/em> (Lausberg [1960], \u00a7 810).
\n\u2014The demonstrative genre<\/em> <\/strong>is another name for the epideictic or panegyric or laudatory genre, together with the deliberative and judicial genres (Lausberg [1960], \u00a7 239).<\/p>\n

Demonstration is often opposed to argumentation as defining two different cultures without contact and communication, the world of science<\/em> vs. the world of human affairs<\/em>, the world of truth<\/em> vs. that of opinion<\/em>. This popular opposition is often taken as a defining characteristic of argumentation. However, its content and actual scope, the precise relations between argumentation and demonstration, should be considered as an essential issue for the development of argumentation studies.<\/p>\n

1. The hypothetico-deductive demonstration, the ideal of proof?<\/span><\/h2>\n

In logic, a demonstration is a discourse that proceeds from axioms<\/em> to a theorem<\/em>, according to specified rules of deduction. The construction of a demonstrative sequence is guided by intentionality, since it aims at a stopping point, a remarkable, detachable result, the theorem.<\/p>\n

A proof is formalized when it can be presented as a mathematical demonstration. Formal proof<\/em> is seen as characteristic of science as pure calculus<\/em>, and is sometimes seen as the ideal of proof. This view contrasts with science as a description of reality<\/em> (geography, zoology), or as a combination of calculation, observation and experiment<\/em> (physics, chemistry).<\/p>\n

In the sciences, a demonstration is a discourse, based on true propositions: (true by hypothesis; or as a result of observations or experiments carried out according to a validated protocol; or as a result obtained from previous demonstrations), and leading to a new, stable, true, proposition. Such a proposition marks a step forward in the field, and is likely to guide further developments in research.<\/p>\n

Scientific practice involves many non-formal linguistic, cognitive or material operations, other than demonstration. Such operations might include grasping a situation, formulating a\u00a0 problem, or a hypothesis, setting up an experiment, manipulating the objects and instruments, selecting, observing and describing the relevant data, making quantitative measurements and related calculations, checking the results, imagining new experiences, drawing conclusions, preparing the results for oral communication and publication, responding to the colleagues’ objections, revising the claims, and so on. We could add to this all the professional argumentative situations in which researchers have to apply for new funding, write or evaluate a research project or to recruit a new colleague. These argumentative operations require the coordinated management of technical, mathematical and natural languages, including a variety of semiotic media, figures, tables, schemes and diagrams. Natural language argumentation plays a key role in all these mixed activities.<\/p>\n

2. Two distinct fields: What we know, what we do<\/span><\/h2>\n

Argumentation is concerned with what is to be believed, with the question of proof and demonstration, but goes beyond this. The exploratory function of argumentation extends beyond its epistemic role, to the practical<\/em> discussion (internal or external) of what,\u00a0 would be the most sensible next step given one’s current interests. One might ask for example, \u201cshould I apply for this or that job, buy this or that car, ignore or accept offers of negotiation<\/em>\u201d. And human affairs go even further, beyond the realm of practical decisions; generally speaking, argumentative situations arise as soon as any kind of choice is possible. Thus, argumentative situations can arise in relation to antagonistic feelings<\/em>, to what is really worthy of admiration or love, see Emotions.<\/a> In these areas the language of proof and demonstration does not make sense, whereas the language of argument does.<\/p>\n

One might think that in the case of certain matters involving true beliefs and accurate scientific predictions, doubt is provisional<\/em>, and that any doubt will be removed in the light of scientific progress. However, when considering situations involving human agents, however, doubt is an essential<\/em> component. In such situations, it is often impossible to remove doubt completely, and it is legitimate to ask what would have happened if …<\/p>\n

We turn to argumentation when the data are incomplete or of poor quality and the assumptions and laws are imperfectly defined; the conclusions are, therefore, subject to a constant principle of revision. As the last resort, we turn to the question of time: an argument is a bet. Combined with urgency and occasion, argumentation is a time-limited process, in contrast to the unlimited time afforded to the philosophical or scientific demonstration. There are essential differences in the modus operandi of argumentation and demonstration, in their fields of application and in the nature of the problems to which they can be applied.<\/p>\n

When it operates in the field of knowledge, argumentation has an exploratory<\/em> and creative<\/em> function that goes beyond its demonstrative<\/em> and critical<\/em> function, see Abduction<\/a>. Argumentation generates hypotheses, opens discussions and triggers the critical process of verification and revision.<\/p>\n

Demonstration is by definition related to a domain; argumentation can combine heterogeneous evidence<\/em>. Argumentation is the art of hierarchizing not only values<\/a>,<\/sup><\/em>, but also types of evidence and articulating levels of demonstrations. If one wants to explore the possibilities and economic interests of a major environmental management project, such as, the construction of a canal between the Green and the Yellow Oceans, for example, then the technical evidence, solutions and objections of geologists, economists and ecologists must be articulated and confronted with those of neighbors, citizens, investors and politicians. Negotiation will take place in the face of calculations and technical evidence each as unique as the next, and argumentation in natural language will have to fully exercise its synthetical function.<\/p>\n

3. Argumentation-proof and argumentation-demonstration:
\nThe legacy<\/span><\/h2>\n

Several theories of otherwise very different orientations come together in order to oppose argumentation to demonstration. Historically, the notions of demonstration and argumentation inherited by the Western tradition were developed in ancient Greece. Demonstration<\/em> in science and mathematics (Archimedes, Euclid) was constructed without reference to argumentation<\/em> in social affairs. According to Lloyd, Aristotle elucidated \u201cthe explicit concept of rigorous proof\u201d ([1990], p. 77) in a scientific context where four types of argument were currently in use:<\/p>\n

The first of these is arguments in the legal and political domains, the second those in early Greek cosmology and medicine, the third mathematics in pre-Aristotelian period, and the fourth deductive arguments in philosophy. The first two relate primarily, to informal, the second pair to rigorous proof. (Ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

The unity of the disciplines of proof can be shown by the examining their vocabulary:<\/p>\n

The same vocabulary, not only of evidence, examination, judgment, but also proof, appears also outside the specifically legal or political domain, notably in a variety of contexts in early Greek speculative thought. Both cosmology and medicine, and some extended passages from the Hippocratic Corpus merit particular attention.\u00a0(Id<\/em>., p. 78)<\/span><\/p>\n

In Aristotle’s work, persuasive<\/em> rhetorical argumentation is characterized by its differences from valid<\/em> logical demonstration (and probable<\/em> dialectical deduction). Since then, argumentation has been conventionally associated with logical demonstration, to argumentation-demonstration<\/em>, rather than to argumentation-proof<\/em> such as exemplified in the practices of scientists, practitioners, historians, police investigators, etc. Argumentation is most closely associated with these practices, because of its non-formal nature and its relation to practical action. For example, the essential concept of the argumentative question is derived not from a logical<\/em> concept, but from the medical<\/em> descriptive concept of stasis<\/a>, that is a state in which physiological fluids are blocked, and, metaphorically collaborative speech and action are suspended.<\/p>\n

This non-operational opposition between demonstration and argumentation, which now functions as a commonplace, has been considerably reformulated and strengthened by the New Rhetoric, as well as by the non-referentialist positions of the theory of Argumentation within Language.<\/p>\n

4. Demonstration versus argumentation?<\/span><\/h2>\n

Demonstration and logical proof are classically opposed to argumentation on the basis of their premises and modes of inference. But it goes much deeper than that. Natural language and discourse are inherently subjective<\/em>, i.e. self- and we-related, focused on the \u201chere\u201d and \u201cnow\u201d, see Subjectivity<\/a>. Words allow for synonymy, homonymy and polysemy; their meaning depends on context. Syntactic constructions need to be interpreted. Discourse is figurative. Meaning and reference are negotiated and managed through principles of relevance. These processes are stigmatized as inherently \u201cvague and elastic\u201d; but the polymorphism of language should also be praised for its adaptability to new situations and its capacity to change the rules<\/p>\n

On a more general level, it should be noted, first, that there is no reason to favor elementary logical demonstration over other scientific activities, of which it is certainly a prominent member. Secondly, oppositions only make sense only if the opposed fields are comparable. Experimentation, mathematics, computerization, have moved apart the techno-sciences worlds, and it makes little sense to compare an article in a scientific journal publishing cutting-edge research with arguments developed in a newspaper column..<\/p>\n

4.1 The New Rhetoric<\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise<\/em> has constructed a powerful, autonomous concept of argument on the one hand, by excluding emotion from the field of argument, and on the other by pitting argumentation against demonstration. The purpose of the Treatise <\/em>is to circumscribe an autonomous discursive domain, in which speech develops cut off from demonstration and emotion. In the very words of the Treatise<\/em>, the pair argumentation \/ demonstration functions as an \u201cantithetical pair\u201d (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 422.), whose terms are the subject of a genuine \u201cbreaking of links\u201d or \u201cdissociation\u201d (ibid. <\/em>p. 411 sq.). Systematically, the Treatise<\/em> opposes argumentation to demonstration, as can be seen in every occurrence of the word demonstration<\/em> mentioned in the index. This strategy, is a cornerstone of the Treatise<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The fundamental question of the difference between the language of argumentation, natural language and the language of demonstration, formal language, is not addressed.<\/span> In the Treatise<\/em>, the form of demonstration as opposed to argumentation is taken in a particular discipline, formal logic, which would be prototypical of demonstration as the inaccessible ideal of argumentation. This hardened and simplistic image of demonstration encourages the antagonism between argument and demonstration, and leads to the exclusion\u00a0 from the Treatise<\/em> of all that concerns sciences :<\/p>\n

We seek here to construct such a theory [of argumentation]\u00a0by analyzing the methods of proof used in the human sciences, law and philosophy. We shall examine arguments put forwards by advertisers in their newspapers, politicians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings, judges in decisions, and philosophers in treatises ([1958], p. 10)<\/span><\/p>\n

No reference is made to any kind of scientific activity.<\/strong> Argumentation concerns only human affairs only, and demonstration concerns only mathematics and science. The gap between \u201cthe two cultures\u201d (Snow, 1961) is thus at the very foundation of argumentation as a discipline.<\/p>\n

4.2 The Argumentation within Language theory<\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n

This theory argues that the argumentative orientation<\/a> is an essential feature of the semantic level of language, and concludes that it is impossible to develop arguments as good reasons in discourse and interaction. Consider the following passage:<\/p>\n

It has often been remarked that discourses concerning everyday life cannot achieve \u201cdemonstrations\u201d in the logical sense of the word. Already Aristotle noted that the necessary demonstration of the syllogism contrasts with the incomplete and only probable argumentation of the enthymeme. Perelman, Grize, Eggs insisted on this idea. At first I thought that I was merely following this tradition, and that my only originality lay in pointing out to\u00a0 the nature of language the necessity of substituting argumentation for demonstration. I thought that the words of language were the cause or the sign of the fundamentally rhetorical, or, as we said, the \u201cargumentative\u201d, character of discourse. But now I am led to say much more. Not only do words not permit demonstration, but they do not permit that degraded form of demonstration which would be argumentation. Argumentation is only a dream of discourse, and our theory should rather be called \u00ab\u00a0the theory of non-argumentation\u201d (Ducrot 1993, p. 234).<\/span><\/p>\n

Argumentation is in language, not in discourse. Since Ducrot’s structuralist framework reduces the order of speech to that of language (Saussurian langue<\/em>), it is quite coherent to deny any specific principle of organization to reasoned discourse.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

5. How to argue the (non-)demonstrative character of argumentation?<\/span><\/h2>\n

The refutation of the possible demonstrative nature of ordinary discourse is threatened by skeptical paradoxes and is subject to self-refutation. It is difficult to argue about the argumentative or non-argumentative character of natural language discourse, while using natural language discourse.<\/p>\n

Interaction studies have taught us a great deal about what everyday discourse can achieve. Short, local inferences are developed in sequences that combine language and action into operational conclusions.. We define, categorize, articulate causes and effects, make analogies,\u00a0 all of which are more or less inadequate, but all of which are open to criticism and correction. Sometimes, these result in satisfaction for all i.nvolved<\/p>\n

WIth a few conventions and adjustments, more sophisticated episodes or reasoning\u00a0 can be developed in ordinary language. If the syllogism constitutes an example of a necessary demonstration, since the syllogism consists of a sequence of utterances in natural language, words at least allow syllogistic demonstration. Figures and arithmetic are not entirely foreign to natural language, which also allows for some correct geometrical conclusions, so that the tenon fits the mortise exactly. Not only a logic, but also an everyday geometry, arithmetic, physics\u2026 underpin linguistic practices, and no metaphysical deficiency prevents them from drawing correct conclusions, as the following little calculation shows:<\/p>\n

The Abb\u00e9 du Chaila was one of the main architects of the repression of the Protestants in the C\u00e9vennes, in the south of France. His assassination was at the origin of the Camisards\u2019 war, in the 18th century.
\n<\/em>The date of birth of the future abbot of Chaila remains a mystery, due to the disappearance of the parish registers. It must have been at the beginning of 1648. In fact, Fran\u00e7ois’s parents, Balthazar de Langlade and Francoise d’Apchier, were married on the 9 April 1643 and had eight boys and two girls in ten years, at a rate of one child per year. Fran\u00e7ois being the fifth child of the family was thus born in 1648, the four previous brothers having been born in 1644, 1645, 1646 and 1647.<\/span>
\nRobert Poujol, [The Abb\u00e9 du Chaila (1648-1702)<\/em>], 2001[1]<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Any claim about the (non-)demonstrative character of argumentation in general is difficult to assess, regardless of the prestige of the authorities supporting it. Arguments from natural signs, case-by-case arguments cannot be treated as appeals to authority or arguments by analogy. Ordinary argumentative discourse can combine quite heterogeneous types of argument and fields of evidence, including technical and scientific episodes. One can argue properly in natural language; sometimes, some truth emerges from legal and historical debates if they are properly framed and managed; and argumentation plays a role in the learning of science.<\/p>\n

6. Argumentation in science education<\/span><\/h2>\n

There are other links to be found between argumentation and scientific activities. The golden rule is given by Quine who uses it to construct his formal logic:<\/span><\/p>\n

This course is prompted by an inclination to work directly with ordinary language until there is a clear gain in departing from it. (1980, p. x).<\/span><\/p>\n

By the same token, the teaching and learning of scientific method is necessarily grounded in natural language and everyday argumentation, and departs from it when there is a clear advantage in doing so.
\nScientific proof can be seen both as a finished<\/em> product, impeccably presented in published papers and textbooks; and as a process<\/em>, that leaves room for dialogue, argument correction and development. Argumentation is on the side of the process<\/em>, its claims are in the making.<\/p>\n

This leads to a focus on argumentation as an instrument for science education (Erduran & Jim\u00e9nez-Aleixandre 2007). Scientific \u201cenculturation\u201d in general, debates on socio-scientific issues are now key domains of argumentation studies. These research programs on argumentation in science education and argumentation on socio-scientific issues, emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They now represent a key field of development for argumentation studies.<\/p>\n

The humanities remain largely trapped in a conception of argumentation based on logocentric discourses, in which anything and everything can be claimed. An antagonism has developed from this conception, with \u201clogical demonstration\u201d serving as a convenient antagonist. The repositioning of argumentation as a complex, combinatorial activity that seeks to manage heterogeneous evidence in possibly complex material contexts allows us to distance ourselves from this traditional logocentric exclusivity. Discussions between two mechanics disagreeing about how to repair a faulty engine, or between two students disagreeing about the shape of the rays coming out of the lens are as prototypical of an argumentative situation as any ideological debate.<\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/a> Poujol R. L’ Abb\u00e9 du Chaila (1648-1702)<\/em>. Montpellier: Les Presses du Languedoc, 2001. P. 31.<\/p>\n[2] Arsac Gilbert, Chapiron Gis\u00e8le, Colonna Alain, Germain Gilles, Guichard Yves, Mante Michel 1992\u00a0 Initiation au raisonnement d\u00e9ductif au coll\u00e8ge. Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon
\nBaker M. J. (1996). Argumentation et co-construction des connaissances<\/em>. Interaction et Cognitions 2, 3. 157-191.
\nButy Chr. & Plantin Chr. (2009). Argumenter en Classe de Sciences. Du d\u00e9bat \u00e0 l\u2019Apprentissage<\/em>. Lyon: ENS \u00c9ditions.
\nDe Vries E., Lund K., & Baker M. J. (2002). Computer-mediated epistemic dialogue: explanation and argumentation as vehicles for understanding scientific notions<\/em>. The Journal of the Learning Sciences 11, 1. 63-103.
\nPolo Claire, 2020. Le D\u00e9bat fertile. Explorer une controverse dans l\u2019\u00e9motion <\/em><\/span>Grenoble: Universit\u00e9 Grenoble Alpes \u00c9ditions<\/p>\n

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DEMONSTRATION AND ARGUMENTATION To demonstrate comes from the Latin demonstrare \u201cto show, to point out\u201d. The verbs to demonstrate and to show verbs are synonymous in some contexts: \u201cIn what follows, I’ll show (= demonstrate) that\u2026\u00a0\u00bb. In ordinary life, people make demonstrations of friendship, solidarity, affection\u2026 they make an exhibition, a show of their feelings, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4868","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4868","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4868"}],"version-history":[{"count":15,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4868\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13911,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4868\/revisions\/13911"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4868"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4868"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4868"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}