{"id":4897,"date":"2021-10-20T10:56:56","date_gmt":"2021-10-20T08:56:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4897"},"modified":"2025-04-02T09:00:46","modified_gmt":"2025-04-02T07:00:46","slug":"dialectic-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/dialectic-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Dialectic"},"content":{"rendered":"

DIALECTICS<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Dialectic<\/em> and dialogue<\/em> have the same Greek etymology dia-<\/em> + legein, dia-<\/em> \u201cthrough\u201d, legein<\/em> \u201cto say\u201d. The prefix dia-<\/em> is different from the prefix di<\/em>– which means \u201ctwo\u201d. Etymologically, a dialogue is not a two-person conversation (which could be called a dilogue<\/em>). The condition is not on the number of participants, but on discourse circulation. However, the historical notion of dialectic<\/em> does refer to a two-partner dialogue.<\/span><\/p>\n

1. The ancient dialectical method<\/span><\/h1>\n

Aristotelian dialectic is a dialogical method used to resolve problems of the form \u00ab\u00a0P<\/strong> or not P<\/strong>?\u00a0\u00bb, such as \u00ab\u00a0is it good to be rich or not?\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>, by eliminating one of the options, in a standardized question-answer interaction using dialectical syllogisms.<\/p>\n

Dialectic is a philosophical tool used in the a priori search for the definition of fundamental concepts. In this function of clarifying first principles, it has been replaced by axiomatization.<\/p>\n

1.1\u00a0Dialectical reasoning<\/span><\/h3>\n

As \u00ab\u00a0mathematical science\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0rhetorical argument\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0dialectical reasoning\u00a0\u00bb proceeds by syllogism and induction (Aristotle, Post. An.<\/em>, I, 1). While scientific syllogistic deduction proceeds from \u00ab\u00a0true and primary\u00a0\u00bb premises, dialectic uses generally accepted premises (Top<\/em>. I, 1), or simple \u201copinions\u201d, endoxon<\/em>:<\/p>\n

Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall\u2028 be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about\u2028every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. (Ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

The word endoxa<\/em> translates as \u201cprobable premises\u201d or as \u201caccepted ideas\u201d. The strict deduction rules of the syllogism are replaced by argument schemes.<\/p>\n

D\u2019apr\u00e8s les Seconds analytiques<\/em>, le raisonnement dialectique \u00ab [prend] les pr\u00e9misses comme comprises par l\u2019adversaire \u00bb (Aristote, S. A.<\/em>, i, 1, 5 ; p. 2). Le jeu se d\u00e9roule enti\u00e8rement dans le syst\u00e8me de croyance du R\u00e9pondant<\/em>, il a pour fonction de tester la coh\u00e9rence de ce syst\u00e8me, V.\u00a0Ad hominem<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

1.2\u00a0Dialectical game<\/span><\/h2>\n

The dialectical game is played by two partners, the Respondent<\/em> and the Questioner<\/em> (Brunschwig 1967, p. 29). It is a limited interaction governed by strict rules, which proceeds by questions and answers, with a winner and a loser.<\/p>\n

\u2014 The Respondent first chooses to assert P<\/strong> or not P<\/strong>.
\n\u2014 The Questioner must refute the proposition that the Respondent has chosen to support, by means of total questions (yes<\/em> or no <\/em>questions).<\/p>\n

Based on these answers, the Questioner attempts to make the Respondent to admit a statement which contradicts his original assertion. If the Questioner succeeds, then he wins the dialectical game; if he or she fails, the Respondent will win.<\/p>\n

Dialectical refutation by contradictory consequences<\/b> has the following form:<\/p>\n

Peter asserts \u201cS <\/i><\/b>is <\/i>P<\/i><\/b>\u201d.<\/span>
\nOn the one hand, S possesses <\/i><\/b>the Q <\/i><\/b> attribute, <\/i><\/b> the doxa says so and the adversary admits it.<\/span>
\nOn the other hand, P possesses <\/i><\/b> non-Q<\/i><\/b> attributes.
\n<\/i>If S were <\/b> P<\/b>, it would have to possess the non-Q<\/i><\/b> attribute.
\n<\/i>So Peter is saying incompatible things about S<\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Peter holds that power is a good.<\/span>
\nBut everyone agrees that power corrupts.<\/span>
\nCorruption is evil.<\/span>
\nGood is incompatible with evil.<\/span>
\nTo be good, power would have to exclude corruption.<\/span><\/p>\n

Or again: you say that so-and-so is a super champion; you admit, like everyone else, that a super champion doesn’t dope; but so-and-so does dope, so he’s not a super champion.<\/p>\n

You<\/span> contradicts what you say with the consequences of what you say: You assert <\/i>opposites<\/i><\/a> about the same being (he does drugs and he’s a super champion<\/em>): This form of refutation, used in philosophical dialectical exchange, is at the root of ordinary refutation.<\/p>\n

From a linguistic point of view<\/b>, the art lies in the construction of non-P<\/b>. In fact, what is said by the proposer is something like S is X <\/i>; his opponent constructs X as <\/i> non-P<\/i>, through a series of argumentative paraphrases, V. Contraries<\/a>; Absurd.<\/p>\n

1.3 Dialectical discussion and social authority<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/h2>\n

To be worthy of a dialectical debate, the proposition discussed in a dialectical debate is an endoxon, that is to say, it must be endorsed by some social or intellectual authority; in other words, it must be an endoxon<\/em><\/p>\n

Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by philosophers, i.e., either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these. <\/span>(Top.<\/em>, 10)<\/span><\/p>\n

This authority of opinion is not an all-or-nothing question. It is derived from the authority of different social groups, according to a gradation that goes from the quantitative to the qualitative, from the opinion of humankind (universal consensus) to the authority of \u201cenlightened opinion\u201d to that of an illustrious person, see Doxa<\/a>.
\nThe Aristotelian continuum values different orders of endoxa. We are far from the vision of the doxa as clich\u00e9 or stereotype as \u201cready to think\u201d, or, just as mechanically, \u201cready to denounce\u201d. Endoxa are opinions worth of discussing ; they enter in the definition of what a thesis is:\u00a0 A thesis<\/em> is \u00ab\u00a0a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n

The philosopher must be eminent, \u201cfor to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men\u2019s usual opinions would be silly\u201d (Aristotle, Top<\/em>., I, 11). In other words, \u201cif it were the first comer who emitted paradoxes, it would be absurd to pay attention to it\u201d (Aristotle, Top<\/em>., Brunschwig, I, 1, 100b20, p.17). The authority that frames the debate is clearly socially referenced as such.<\/p>\n

It is noteworthy that it is the plurality<\/em> and competition<\/em> between authorities \u2014 and not the appeal<\/em> to authority \u2014 that is placed at the center of intellectual debate. Authority is invoked not to close the discussion but rather to open it. To say that a proposal is supported by an authority is not to say that it is true, but to say that it deserves discussion.<\/p>\n

2. The scholastic dispute<\/span><\/h2>\n

The scholastic dispute (disputatio<\/em>) corresponds to the medieval practice of a dialectical game. It is an instrument of research and teaching, based on a specific substantive question, as proposed by a master. At the end of the discussion, the master proposes a solution and refutes the arguments against it (Weijers 1999).<\/p>\n

3. The revival of dialectic<\/span><\/h2>\n

The ancient dialectical method, which had been in decline since the Renaissance (Ong 1958), was reconstructed in the second half of the twentieth century within the framework of logical dialog games. It has been brought to the forefront of argumentation studies by the Pragma-Dialectic and by the Informal Logic programs. The Pragma-Dialectic program of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1996, etc.) is a \u201cNew Dialectic\u201d, a counterpart of Perelman’s \u201cNew Rhetoric\u201d (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 1996 \u201cLa Nouvelle Dialectique\u201d [\u201cThe New Dialectic\u201d]). In the Informal Logic framework, the study of \u201clogical dialogue games\u201d has been developed by Douglas Walton (Walton 1984; Walton 1998, The New Dialectic<\/em>).<\/p>\n

The terms Proponent<\/em> and Opponent<\/em> used to refer to the central partners in an argumentative situation, are borrowed from this dialectical theory. Unlike the Proponent of a substantial proposition in an argumentative situation, the Respondent in the dialectical game does not have to provide a positive proof of his claim, but simply has to avoid being led into a self-contradiction.<\/p>\n

Continuing of a general definition of dialectic as, \u201cthe practice of reasoned dialogue, [the art] of argument by questions and answers\u201d (Brunschwig 1967, p. 10), one can consider that the conversational process is \u201cdialectical\u201d insofar as 1) it relates to a specific and mutually agreed problem; 2) it is played out between equal partners, 3) it is driven by the search for the truth,\u00a0 justice or the common good; 4) the speech circulates freely between the partners, yet\u00a0 5) it respects explicitly established rules.<\/p>\n

4. Aristotelian dialectic and Hegelian dialectic<\/span><\/h2>\n

Unlike Aristotelian dialectic, Hegelian dialectic does not proceed by eliminating<\/em> the false, but by synthesizing<\/em> of the antagonistic positions. The original opposition is not resolved but abolished and transcended. Aristotelian dialectic is based on the principle of non-contradiction, whereas Hegelian dialectic tends toward something \u201cbeyond\u201d contradiction.<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, going beyond contradiction should not mean that a speaker can engage in an inconsistent discourse:<\/p>\n

[HL] claims that \u201csince the world is torn by contradictions, only dialectic (which admits the contradiction) makes it possible to consider it as a whole and to find out its meaning and direction\u201d. In other words, since the world is contradiction, the idea of \u200b\u200bthe world must be contradictory. The idea of \u200b\u200ba thing must be of the same nature as this thing: The idea of \u200b\u200bblue must be blue.<\/span>
\nJulien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals<\/em>, [1927][1]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

5. Rhetoric and ancient dialectic<\/span><\/h2>\n

The use of syllogistic deduction is the hallmark of science <\/em>; dialectics is <\/strong>legislative<\/strong><\/em>, serving to discuss a priori <\/em>foundations that will serve as premises for scientific deduction; rhetoric has an <\/strong>executive <\/strong><\/em> function <\/strong>: it deals with current, public affairs, involving law, politics and, with the development of Christianity, religious belief.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2013 According to their ancient definitions, dialectic and rhetoric are the two arts of discourse.<\/strong> Argumentative rhetoric is \u201cthe counterpart of dialectic\u201d (Aristotle, Rhet<\/em>, I).<\/p>\n

\u2013 Dialectic is a technique of discussion<\/em> between two partners<\/strong>, based on (short) questions <\/strong><\/em>and <\/strong>answers<\/strong><\/em>. The object of rhetoric is long and continuous monological<\/strong><\/em> speech <\/strong> addressed to an audience<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\u2013Dialectic deals with philosophical<\/strong><\/em> theses .<\/em> Rhetoric is concerned with specific social <\/strong><\/em>or <\/strong>political<\/strong><\/em> issues.<\/p>\n

\u2013 Rhetoric and dialectic use the same foundations of inference,topoi<\/strong>, applied to plausible statements, <\/strong>endoxa<\/strong><\/em>, components of a doxa<\/em><\/a>,<\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/a> Quoted after Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs<\/em>. Excerpt from the Preface to the 1946 edition. Paris: Grasset, 1975. P. 63.y<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

DIALECTICS Dialectic and dialogue have the same Greek etymology dia- + legein, dia- \u201cthrough\u201d, legein \u201cto say\u201d. The prefix dia- is different from the prefix di– which means \u201ctwo\u201d. Etymologically, a dialogue is not a two-person conversation (which could be called a dilogue). The condition is not on the number of participants, but on discourse […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4897","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4897","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4897"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4897\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13917,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4897\/revisions\/13917"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4897"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4897"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4897"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}