{"id":4912,"date":"2021-10-20T12:05:15","date_gmt":"2021-10-20T10:05:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4912"},"modified":"2025-07-13T13:39:21","modified_gmt":"2025-07-13T11:39:21","slug":"ethos-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/ethos-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Ethos"},"content":{"rendered":"

ETHOS<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. The Word Ethos<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

The word ethos<\/em> is borrowed from the ancient Greek word \u1f26\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 (\u0113thos). It has two meanings:<\/p>\n

I. In plural form<\/em>\u00a0Abode, familiar places, dwelling. Speaking of animals:<\/em> cowshed, stable, den, nest. […]<\/span>
\nII.<\/em> Usual character, hence<\/em> custom, usage; the manner of being or habit of a person, his character; […] by extension<\/em>, mores (manners). (Bailly, [ethos<\/em>])<\/span><\/p>\n

In rhetoric, ethos<\/em> refers to \u201cthe moral impression (made by an orator)\u201d (ibid<\/em>.).<\/p>\n

In Latin rhetoric, ethos<\/em> translates to mores<\/em>, \u00ab\u00a0manners,\u00a0\u00bb or sensus,<\/em> \u00ab\u00a0common sense\u00a0\u00bb. For Quintilian, ethos<\/em> \u201cmanners\u201d and pathos<\/em> \u201cpassions\u201d are subcategories of feeling<\/em> [adfectus<\/em>]:<\/p>\n

Of feelings [adfectus<\/em>] as we are taught by the old writers, there are two kinds, the first of which the Greeks included under the term \u03c0\u1f71\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 (pathos), which we rightly and literally translate by the word \u201cpassion\u201d [adfectus<\/em>]. The other, to which they give the name \u1f26\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 (\u0113thos), for which, in my opinion, the Roman language has no equivalent, is rendered by mores, \u201cmanners\u201d; hence that part of philosophy, which the Greeks call \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f75 (\u0113thik\u0113), is called moralis<\/em>. (IO<\/em>, VI, 2, 8)<\/span><\/p>\n

The same ethos \/ pathos opposition can also be translated in Latin as sensus<\/em> \/ dolor.<\/em><\/p>\n

Sensus<\/em> is one of those vague terms by which Latin tries to express what Greek rhetoric calls [ethos]. […] It is different from dolor<\/em>, which corresponds to [pathos] (Cicero, De Or.<\/em> III, 25, 96). (Courbaud, note 2 to Cicero, De Or.<\/em>, II, XLIII, 184; p. 80)<\/span><\/p>\n

The noun sensus<\/em> basically refers to physical<\/em> perception, also to \u201can intellectual<\/em> way of seeing things\u201d, as well as a moral<\/em> perception of situations in terms of right and wrong, a \u201cmoral sense\u201d (after Gaffiot, Sensus<\/em>). Therefore, having sensus<\/em> is having good perceptive, analytical and moral faculties.
\nSensus<\/em> also refers to sensus communis<\/em>, \u201ccommon sense\u201d, which is the ability to synthesize information in accordance with what people consider to be \u201c[sound and prudent]\u201d (MW, Common sense<\/em>). The good orator is a man of common sense with a capacity for synthesis.<\/span><\/p>\n

The English nouns ethos<\/em>, ethics<\/em>, ethopoeia <\/em>and ethology<\/em> are borrowed and adapted from the Greek.<\/p>\n

\u2014 The noun ethos<\/em><\/strong> is used in rhetoric. The corresponding adjective is ethotic<\/strong>, not to be confused with ethics<\/em>, see below<\/span>
\n\u2014 Ethology<\/strong><\/em> is the science of animal behavior in their natural environment, see above, meaning (I).<\/span>
\n\u2014 The noun ethopoeia<\/em><\/strong> is used in rhetoric, and literary theory, and refers to the genre \u00ab\u00a0moral and psychological portrait.\u00a0\u00bb<\/span>
\n\u2014 Ethics<\/em><\/strong> is the part of philosophy that deals with morality and values.
\n<\/span><\/p>\n

In rhetoric, the notion of ethos<\/em> refers to the fact that the speaker is projected into the discourse and has partial control over that projection. Discourse ethics<\/em> refers to an internal moral authority that controls the discourse. The ethotic<\/em> dimension of rhetorical discourse can be seen as a discursive projection of ego ideals, while the ethical<\/em> dimension would be a discursive projection of the superego imperatives.<\/p>\n

Such moral control is central to the rhetorical definition of an orator as a vir bonus dicendi peritus\u2013<\/em>a good man who can speak in public. While contemporary theory of argumentation refers to the critique of discourse as rational<\/em><\/strong> control, classical rhetoric\u00a0refers to moral<\/i><\/strong> control of discourse.<\/p>\n

2. The Ethos of the Arguer<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/h2>\n

Ethotic strategies refer to the various ways in which speakers present themselves during their own oral performances. This is true for all professional speakers, including lawyers, teachers, priests, and politicians (Goffman, 1956).
\nSpeech professionals primarily act through speech, so their linguistic ethos<\/strong> is of paramount importance. However, linguistic ethos is also an important component of the professional ethos<\/strong> of many other professionals, such as salespeople, tour guides, and bartenders.
\nFor example, the professional ethos of a traditional waiter\u00a0 combines the art of suggesting the perfect cocktail for the occasion, with the skill of joining and leaving a customer’s conversation.<\/p>\n

Aristotle discusses ethos in two passages of his Rhetoric<\/em>. First, he describes the proper<\/em> <\/strong>ethos<\/strong>, <\/em>that is, the ethos of the orator as a kind of self-fiction which constitutes the construction of the persona that the orator intends to present to the public, albeit half-consciously.
\nSecond, he describes\u00a0the audience’s ethos<\/em><\/strong>, as the synthesis of information about the specific audience the orator will address, see beliefs of the audience<\/a>.<\/p>\n

2.1 Aristotle: The Combined Effect of Discourse and Reputation<\/span><\/h2>\n

In the Aristotelian system, ethos<\/em> is one of the three main levers of persuasion, the others are logos<\/em><\/a>\u00a0and pathos<\/em><\/a>. The Rhetoric<\/em> asserts the primacy of ethos over logos: \u201cThe character of the speaker may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion\u201d (Rhet.<\/em>, I, 2, 1356a10; RR, p. 106). Ethos<\/em> is introduced as follows:<\/p>\n

Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him to be credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speakers contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. (Rhet.<\/em>, I, 2, 1356a1-15; RR, p. 107)<\/span><\/p>\n

The speaker’s ethos is the result of a discursive strategy that establishes a sense of confidence with the audience. This confidence is based on three components:<\/p>\n

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character \u2014 the three namely, that induce us to believe a thing, apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. (Rhet<\/em>., II, 1, 1378a; RR, p. 245).<\/span><\/p>\n

Good sense is phronesis<\/em>, that is to say, \u201cprudence\u201d; good moral character is arete<\/em>, \u201cvirtue\u201d; and good will is eunoia<\/em>, or benevolence, \u201cgood will\u201d. The arguer has persuasive authority<\/strong> because he is (or appears to be) wise, honest, and on the side of the audience.<\/strong> No less than pathos, ethos has a pathemic structure; ethotic authority combines expertise, morality and benevolence into a unique sense of trust<\/em><\/strong><\/span>, the perfect persuasive combination.<\/p>\n

These qualities are all that is necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers. (Rhet<\/em>., II, 1, 1378a15; Freese, p. 171)<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the verb to appear<\/em> (and not to be<\/em>) seems suspicious. Rhetoric is always suspected of providing incompetents, the wicked, and crooks with the means to deceive their partners. As Groucho Marx said, \u201cSincerity \u2014 If you can fake that, you’ve got it made.<\/em>\u201d
\nEven the most skilled, able and truthful arguer however, is subject to the \u201cparadox of the actor\u201d, that is, they can be suspected of faking their claimed skills, virtues, and intentions. Therefore, they must not only be sincere and true but also appear<\/em> to be so<\/strong>. The arts of appearance are no less necessary for honest people than for scoundrels.<\/p>\n

According to this definition, the Aristotelian ethos establishes identification based on a shared sense of community. Disruptive rhetoric establishes another ethotic position, as an influential minority group. \u201cWe are different from all of you… We bring a new world… yes, your sages call it madness<\/em>\u201d, see strategy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The text of the Rhetoric<\/em> is somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, ethotic persuasion \u201cshould be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak.\u201d In line with the classical doctrine of technical and non-technical evidence, this amounts to an outright rejection of non-technical ethos<\/em> (the speaker’s character before<\/em> the speech) in favor of technical ethos<\/em> (uniquely produced by what the speaker actually says).<\/span> However, the next sentence prioritizes the speaker’s reputation over technical ethos, probably because both play a role in actual discourse, as Ruelle’s translation suggests: \u201cIt is necessary, moreover, that this result should be obtained by the force of the discourse and not merely by<\/em> a preference favorable to the speaker<\/span>\u201d (Aristotle, Rhet<\/em>. Ruelle, emphasis added).<\/p>\n

\n

2.2 The Challenge of Ethos<\/span><\/h2>\n

Ethos is the public presentation of one’s best possible self, in order to influence the audience. Critical theories of argumentation focus on the subject matter of the debate and protect the participants by keeping their personalities out of the dispute, when they are irrelevant. They distinguish between the charisma<\/em> of the speaker, which they reject on principle for exerting an irrational influence, and the exercise of the authority<\/em> legitimately associated with his specific competencies.<\/p>\n

Ethos and personal<\/em>\u00a0attacks<\/em> <\/a>on the opponent are the two sides of the same discursive coin, as politeness<\/em><\/a>\u00a0theory <\/em>shows. Displaying ethos enables speakers to leverage their personal attributes to lend credibility to their viewpoint. Conversely, attacking an opponent personally, allows a speaker to use that opponent to refute or discredit their point of view. In both cases, the discourse evades the substance of the issue and becomes a discussion about the participants, either to discredit or to accredit their positions.<\/p>\n

From a critical perspective which postulates that only explicit arguments about the matter<\/a> itself are relevant and potentially valid, there can be no such thing like an ethotic argument because it does not meet ithe propositional requirement. Due to its implicit and global nature, ethotic authority cannot be challenged by any refutation of the matter itself. Accordingly, the opponent may be tempted to counterattack with an ad personam <\/em>argument.<\/em><\/p>\n

In a face-to-face situation, the ethotic grip establishes an asymmetrical relationship framing the interactional relationship as a high \/ low opposition, and humiliating the opponent into the low position, in order to inhibit free criticism, see modesty<\/a>. From a critical point of view, then, the ethotic yoke must be shaken off, as a preliminary to any constructive discussion. First, the charismatic facets of ethos are rejected outright, as irrelevant and deceptive. Second, an explicit component is extracted from a synthetic form of ethos, the argument from authority. <\/em>This argument satisfies the condition of propositionality and is open to criticism. The authority is then integrated as peripheral evidence, and treated within the appropriate critical framework.<\/p>\n

3. Ethos and Discursive Identities<\/span><\/h1>\n

Contemporary and ancient discussions of ethos both address the widely recognized fact that language divides the speaker into multiple discursive roles<\/a>. Ethos<\/em> is a central concept that connects argumentation studies with linguistic studies of subjectivity in language (Benveniste 1958) and literary studies in narratology which confront author<\/em> and narrator,<\/em> real<\/em> and implicit<\/em> readers.<\/p>\n

Like all discourse, argumentative discourse articulates three elements that form identity, ethos<\/em> strictly speaking, reputation <\/em>and self-portrayal<\/em>. The ethotic effect of discourse is the result of these three forces.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Ethos\u00a0 itself<\/strong> \u2014 <\/em>Ducrot integrates the notion of ethos into the general theory of polyphonic discourse: \u201cEthos is attached to the speaker as such: the character attributed to them as the source of the utterance, makes the utterance acceptable or not\u201d (Ducrot 1984, p. 200). In Goffman’s terminology, ethos is attributed to the figure<\/em>, see roles<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Explicit self-presentation<\/em> <\/strong>\u2014 Ducrot introduces explicit self-presentation as a second, intra-discursive element, \u201cWhat the orator could explicitly say about himself\u201d (1984, p. 201). The arguer may paint her own portrait, \u201cI raised my three children myself<\/em>\u201d but these self-portraits differ from what can be revealed indirectly through the discourse. Having a Syldavian accent is different from saying, \u201cYes, I have an accent and I’m proud of it.<\/em>\u201d In an argumentative situation, participants systematically value themselves and their actions in order to establish\u00a0 their legitimacy. The demands of this situation override the principles of linguistic politeness<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

Fame, Reputation<\/em><\/strong> \u2014<\/em> Some social actors are well-known people, who have a reputation, prestige, and perhaps even charisma, whether positive or negative. This established image is what Amossu calls the \u201cprior\u201d, or the \u201cpreliminary\u201d ethos.<\/p>\n

We shall therefore call this preliminary image, that is, the image that the audience has of the speaker before the speech, the preliminary ethos<\/span>, as opposed to ethos (or oratory ethos), which is entirely discursive. […] The preliminary ethos develops based on the speaker’s role in society, including his institutional functions, status and power, as well as the collective representation or stereotype of his person.
\nIndeed, the image projected by the speaker integrates prior social and individual data, that necessarily play a role in the interaction and contribute significantly to the power of his speech. (Amossy 1999b, p.\u200970; Maingueneau 1999)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cPre-discursive\u201d does not mean \u201clanguage-free.\u201d Reputations are based on both discourse and action. Ethos can be said to be pre-discursive only in the sense of \u201cpreceding a particular speech act.\u201d
\nPublic relations agencies can construct, manage and repair the image of people and commercial products (Benoit 1995, etc.).<\/p>\n

The operating and control systems of these different layers of identity are very different, and each layer can conflict with the other two.
\nReputation <\/em>is a sociohistorical construct, that can be managed and controlled socially.
\nA person’s self-perception of their reputation may differ from how their audience perceives them, resulting in global inconsistency.<\/p>\n

Self-presentation<\/em> is an explicit, declarative and controlled activity\u2013an \u201cargumentation of the self\u201d as it is properly called.<\/p>\n

Ethos formation <\/em>is an continuous speech activity. All speech, whether spontaneous or elaborated, contains subjective features. This fact is transparent to the participants. Speakers know their conversation partners know that at least some of these features will be interpreted as clues to their identity, through standard arguments from natural signs<\/a>. Therefore, arguers may consciously arrange these subjective features to influence these interpretations according to their intended goals and perspectives.<\/p>\n

The concept of ethos can be used as a descriptive category, relevant to analyzing any form of ordinary discourse (Kallmeyer 1996). The tendency to generalize ethos, which accompanies its naturalization, is typical of modern theories of argumentation such as that of Argumentation within Language and Natural Logic. Argumentative ethos is specifically a category of rhetorical action, a strategic resource<\/em> available to the arguer, and a functional element that can be intentionally elaborated or distorted.<\/p>\n

Inferences about the speaker\u2019s (deep) identity(ies) are based on linguistic and encyclopedic clues. Like all interpretive processes, such inferences are open-ended, the only limitations are those of the interpreter’s imagination. The speaker’s identity lies in the eyes and ears of the audience. Regarding the specificity of ethos, argumentative analysis focuses on the strategic dimension of self-presentation in argumentation. Its reconstruction program, different from the psychoanalytic approach, dovetails with the semiotic and stylistic programs.<\/p>\n

4. Ethos as a stylistic category<\/span><\/h2>\n

\u201cStyle is the person\u201d, and ethos is the style. When searching for a systematic method to study ethos, one encounters the stylistic tradition. Quintilian, for example, emphasizes the effectiveness of a style linked to vocabulary choice, which has a \u201cmajestic\u201d ethotic effect.<\/p>\n

Words derived from antiquity have not only illustrious patrons, but also confer on style a certain majesty [not without charm], for they have the authority of age and, as they have been disused for a time, they bring with them a charm similar to that of novelty. (Quintilian, IO<\/em>, I, 6, 39, slightly modified)<\/span><\/p>\n

The authority of the spoken word is constitutive of the speaker’s ethos. Ethos is constructed from features belonging to each linguistic level, beginning with the voice, which is a powerful vector of attraction or repulsion and including the art of hesitation, repetition, faltering, and so on.
\nEthotic inferences can be drawn from any feature of the argument.<\/p>\n

\u2013\u00a0<\/span>Those who Make concessions are moderate\/weak.<\/span>
\n\u2013\u00a0 \u2013\u2013 don’t make concessions are straight\/sectarian.<\/span>
\n\u2013 \u2013\u2013\u00a0 appeal to authority are conservative\/dogmatic.<\/span>
\n\u2013 \u2013\u2013\u00a0 use pragmatic arguments about causes and consequences are reasonable and realistic\/opportunistic.<\/span>
\n\u2013 \u2013\u2013 rely on the nature of things and their definition are persons of conviction\/conservative.<\/span><\/p>\n

Other lines of argument,such as by absurdity, by analogy, etc.) do not have such clearly associated ethos.<\/p>\n

Hermogenes of Tarsus (160-225 CE) explicitly links ethos and style in his Rhetorical Art. <\/em>Hermogenes argues that discourse can be evaluated based on seven stylistic categories:<\/p>\n

Clarity, grandeur, beauty, vividness, ethos, sincerity and skill (Hermogenes, [RA], 217, 20 – 218, 05; Patillon, 1988, p. 213).<\/span><\/p>\n

Ethos is one of these categories of discourse; in any given speech, there can be a little<\/em> or a lot of ethos<\/em>.<\/strong><\/span>
\nEthos has four components, simplicity,<\/em>\u00a0moderation,<\/em> sincerity <\/em>and severity<\/em>. These qualities are analogous to the qualities of wisdom<\/em>, knowledge<\/em> and benevolence<\/em> that comprise the Aristotelian ethos. Each component is characterized by specific thoughts<\/em>, methods<\/em>, words<\/em>, figures<\/em>, and rhythms<\/em>. c<\/p>\n

Strange as it may sound, sincerity<\/em><\/strong>, the key ethotic element, is a style<\/em><\/strong><\/span>. Sincerity is a linguistic condition attached to the following characteristics.<\/p>\n

\u2014 Emotions<\/em><\/a>, and especially one emotion, indignation<\/em>.<\/span>
\n\u2014 Stringency <\/em>in accusing others or oneself is shown by the use of harsh<\/em> and vehement<\/em> words.<\/span>
\n\u2014 A method of discourse management, especially the balance achieved between what is openly<\/em> discussed and what is left implied<\/em>.<\/span>
\n\u2014 The use of derogatory demonstrative pronouns and figures of speech: apostrophe, and especially figures of embarrassment (reticence, doubt, hesitaton, corrections, interrogations).<\/span>
\n\u2014 Personal comments interrupting speech (after Patillon 1988, pp. 259; p. 261 et seq.)<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, a sincere character<\/em> is not an extralinguistic addition that would be introduced into the discourse from the outside, by a moral exhortation. Rather, it is the product of a discursive strategy<\/a>.
\nAny ethics of discourse should take this into account. Figures of speech in particular, serve to construct the ethos, and are therefore instrumental to argumentation in general. We are very far from a post-Ramusian rhetoric in which where invention is divorced from elocution.<\/p>\n

5. Character of the Audience<\/span><\/h2>\n

After defining tthe orator’ethos in a brief passage of the Rhetoric<\/em>, Aristotle takes a different approach to address the character of the audience.<\/span><\/p>\n

Let us now consider the various types of human character, in relation to the emotions and moral qualities, showing how they correspond to our various ages and fortunes. (Rhet<\/em>, II, 12, 1388b31, RR p. 311).<\/span><\/p>\n

This section describes a series of \u201cideal types\u201d, or human characters classified and characterized according to their social condition, wealth and power (noble, rich, powerful, and fortunate) and age (youthful, mature, old). Here, the word ethos is used in its usual descriptive sense (cf. above, \u00a71).
\nThese \u201cElements of Socio-Psychology for Rhetoricians\u201d conclude with a practical remark:<\/span><\/p>\n

Such are the characters of young men and elderly Men. People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character<\/span>: and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audience. (RT, II, 13, 1390a20-29, RR p. 319)<\/span><\/p>\n

This a passage clearly shows that adaptating to and identifying with the audience is the key to persuasion<\/a>. However, normative theories of argumentation consider this fallacious, because they require that speech must be based on\u00a0truth<\/strong>, not on the specific beliefs<\/a> of a particular audience<\/strong><\/span> (ex datis<\/em><\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n

Compared to the three statuse<\/span>s of the speaker’s ethos (ethos strictly speaking, self-portrayal, reputation), we see that the audience’s character is entirely of the latter kind, that is reputation<\/em>, \u201cyoung people are like that.\u201d Nevertheless, any audience is capable of expressing its rhetorical ethos through its spontaneous reactions to a speech.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ETHOS 1. The Word Ethos The word ethos is borrowed from the ancient Greek word \u1f26\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 (\u0113thos). It has two meanings: I. In plural form\u00a0Abode, familiar places, dwelling. Speaking of animals: cowshed, stable, den, nest. […] II. Usual character, hence custom, usage; the manner of being or habit of a person, his character; […] by […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4912","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4912","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4912"}],"version-history":[{"count":19,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4912\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14612,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4912\/revisions\/14612"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4912"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4912"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4912"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}