{"id":4936,"date":"2021-10-20T14:14:42","date_gmt":"2021-10-20T12:14:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4936"},"modified":"2025-07-07T10:55:32","modified_gmt":"2025-07-07T08:55:32","slug":"example-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/example-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Example"},"content":{"rendered":"

EXAMPLE<\/span><\/h1>\n

The word example<\/em> has two main meanings:<\/p>\n

1) Example-1: An element of a category of cases or events<\/span> that are grouped under the same definition, law or principle. Such an item can help to identify new members of the category, and serve to establish, clarify and explain the definition, law or principle it embodies.<\/p>\n

2) Example-2:\u00a0 A way of being or doing that is worthy of imitation<\/span>, such as setting an example, leading by example, being an example <\/em>or being a role model for the community<\/em>.
\nAn exemplary person perfectly synthesizes and embodies the highest moral and professional norms and practices, with whom one can identify.<\/p>\n

In addition to the specific forms of argumentation described below, the following forms of argumentation are related to the example: see exemplum<\/em><\/a>; imitation<\/a>; ab exemplo<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

1. The Example in the Aristotelian Rhetorical System<\/span><\/h1>\n

In one version of the Aristotelian rhetorical system<\/span>,\u00a0induction<\/em><\/a><\/strong> and\u00a0syllogisms<\/em><\/a> are the instruments of scientific discourse, while\u00a0example<\/em><\/strong> and the enthymemes<\/em><\/a>\u00a0are their counterparts in rhetorical discourse (Rhet<\/em>, II, 20, 1393a20-25, RR p. 335). There are different kinds of examples:<\/p>\n

[Argument by example] has two varieties; one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker. Of the latter there are again two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable. (Id<\/em>., 1393a25-30; RR p. 357-358)<\/p>\n

The place of examples in a table of rhetorical devices is as follows:<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Comparison<\/span> <\/strong><\/h3>\n

Aristotle gives as an example of a \u201cparable\u201d, an analogy<\/em><\/a> drawn from the teachings of Socrates. This parable condemns the practice of drawing lots for magistrates, since one would not \u201cuse the lot to select a helmsman from the crew of a ship\u201d (Rhet<\/em>., II, 20, 1393b5, RR, p. 335); see metaphor<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Fable<\/span> <\/strong><\/h3>\n

Aristotle gives as an example the fable of the horse that wanted revenge on the stag, and thus became a slave to man. This fable applies to the saviors of the fatherland who quickly became tyrants (Rhet<\/em>, II, 20, 1393a5-25, RR p. 337). as a genre of rhetoric and literature,
\nFables, like portraits (see ethos<\/a>) are genres of rhetoric and literature that have existed since the time of Aesop (620\u2013564 BCE) and continue to this day.<\/p>\n

A modern version of the fables could be anecdotes. \u00ab\u00a0iPhone owners are obnoxious. Recently I went camping…<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb The anecdote then develops, highlighting the terrible behavior of one<\/em> iPhone user and generalizing it to all iPhone users. In Aristotelian terms, this is an argument based on a real past fact, elaborated as a truth-telling narrative, see precedent<\/a>.
\nOther characteristics of anecdotes such as their educational function and conversational entertainment value, and the roles of storyteller and audience bring them closer to tales or fables.
\nOn a strictly argumentative level, anecdotes are difficult to contradict and nearly impossible to refute directly, except with another decisive anecdote, tale or fable, and the quasi impossibility of refuting them directly, except with another decisive anecdote, tale, or fable.<\/p>\n

These characteristics suggest that anecdotes have inherited some of the forms and functions\u00a0 of tales and fables.<\/p>\n

Actual past facts<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The argument from an example based on real past facts<\/span> is illustrated by two historical events, that lead to the conclusion that \u201cwe must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not allow Egypt to be subjugated,\u00a0\u00bb given two past experiences that were unfavorable to the Greeks:<\/p>\n

For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. And Xerxes again did not attack us until he had seized Egypt, but once he had seized it, he did cross.
\n(Rhet<\/em>., II, 20, 1393a30-b5, RR p. 335) – Darius, 522-486 BCE; Xerxes, 486 \u00e0 465 BCE. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

This is an example of strategic observation closely linked to a specific geographical situation. It can be considered as an historical precedent<\/a>, that functions like a judicial one. Specialists in the field must rule on a case:
\nWhat should we do when the Persian army enters Egypt? or:<\/em> now that they are in Egypt?
\nWhat does the presence of the Persian army in Egypt mean? What will they do next?<\/p>\n

To answer these questions, specialists first look for similar cases in the past. In this case, they found two similar cases. While this is not enough to establish a mechanical law, it is sufficient to suggest a strategic response, \u00ab\u00a0they will cross the sea to Europe<\/em>\u201d, and the correlative decision of action: \u00ab\u00a0let’s prepare for war<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0.<\/p>\n

2. Generalizing from an <\/span>Example<\/span><\/h2>\n

2.1 Example-Based Law-Like Generalizations<\/u><\/span><\/h3>\n

A generalization can be made from a random item (lambda-example), whether idiosyncratic or generic.<\/p>\n

2.1.1 Generalization from a random idiosyncratic example<\/u><\/em><\/span><\/h4>\n

The argument from example is a generalization (induction) based on a single specific case. It takes an observation made about an individual, and generalizes it to all individuals of the same class (or bearing the same name):<\/p>\n

This butterfly is blue, so (all) butterflies are blue.<\/span><\/p>\n

In logic, from \u00ab\u00a0this B<\/strong> is P<\/strong>\u00ab\u00a0, one can only infer \u201csome<\/em> B<\/strong> are P<\/strong>\u201d. The generalization on the basis of a single specific case, i.e., \u00ab\u00a0from particular this<\/em> to universal all<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0, corresponds to the converse of the instantiation of a universal proposiiculartion, \u00ab\u00a0from universal all<\/em> to particular this\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> which is valid; if \u201call<\/em> I<\/strong> are P\u00a0\u00bb<\/strong> then \u201cthis <\/em>I<\/strong> is P<\/strong>\u201d.<\/p>\n

This swan is white, that’s okay, since (all) swans are white.<\/span><\/p>\n

An argument by example is generally considered as a type of hasty generalization or induction<\/a> based on a single case. It can also be a case of two-term reasoning<\/a>.<\/p>\n

2.1.2 Scientific Generalization on a Generic Example or Ecthesis<\/u><\/em><\/span><\/h3>\n

A generic example<\/em> is a being that clearly manifes all the properties of its genus. It is a prototype of the class, and its best embodiment, see category<\/a>; intra-categorical analogy<\/a>. The argument from the generic example is based on such a specimen and leads to conclusions about a given genus (i.e., all the individuals belonging to that genus):<\/p>\n

A generic example demonstrates the reasons for the validity of a proposition by performing operations or transformations on a given concrete object, that is considered not in and of itself, but as a characteristic representative of a class. (Balacheff 1999, p. 207).<\/p>\n

This process is also known as ecthesis<\/em>, which is defined as<\/p>\n

A technique of demonstration used especially in Euclidean geometry, in which a theorem is proven, by reasoning on a singular figure. Your inference is correct if it does not mention the characteristics peculiar to the drawn figure, but only those characteristics that it shares with all the figures of its kind (Vax 1982, Ecth\u00e8se<\/em>)<\/p>\n

2.1.3 Generic example or idiosyncratic individual?<\/em><\/u><\/strong><\/span><\/h4>\n

The argument by example is a legitimate extrapolation when it is based on a generic feature. For instance, if you ask how many wings a bird can have, observing any bird will lead you to the correct answer. However, asking what the average weight of a pigeon is, and then observing any pigeon to find the answer is absurd: \u00ab\u00a0This \u03bb-pigeon weighs 322 g, so the average weight of a pigeon is 322 g.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n

Since in many cases, it is not known beforehand whether the studied characteristic is essential or random, this distinction is used as an argumentative resource. The proponent argues that the generalization is valid because it is based on an essential property. The opponent argues that the property is accidental and cannot be generalized see classification<\/a>; accident<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The remains of a single animal belonging to an unknown extinct species can provide a great deal of knowledge about that species;\u00a0 however, the specific conditions of the individual animal considered must be duly recognized. The case of the Neanderthal man is an example of this.<\/p>\n

1. Scientists’ views of Neanderthals have changed over time. (From G. Burenhult, \u00ab\u00a0[Towards Homo Sapiens]\u00a0\u00bb, 1994 [1]<\/a>)<\/span>
\nMore specifically: Are the Neanderthals our ancestors or are they a different species?<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

2. First answer: The Neanderthal man belongs to our species. \u00ab\u00a0<\/em>It has long seemed obvious that the physical appearance of Neanderthals \u2014 and especially those living in Europe \u2014 was very different from ours.\u201d However, \u201cdespite these physical differences, Neanderthals have long been regarded as direct ancestors of modern humans\u00a0\u00bb (id<\/em>., p. 66).<\/span><\/p>\n

Second answer: Neanderthals are a different species. <\/em>\u00ab\u00a0According to the work of the French paleontologist Marcellin Boule these differences were considered too great;\u00a0\u00bb (id<\/em>., p. 67), and the Neanderthal man was considered a different species.<\/span>
\nThe Neanderthal of Marcellin Boule:<\/em> \u00ab\u00a0Starting in 1911, the paleoanthropologist Marcellin Boule published a detailed study of the Neanderthal skeleton. He created an image that has conditioned the popular perception of Neanderthals for more than thirty years. His interpretations were strongly influenced by ideas of his time about these extinct hominids. Boule described them as a kind of savage and brutal cave men, who dragged their feet and were unable to walk upright.\u00a0\u00bb<\/span>
\n\u201cMarcellin Boule described a Neanderthal with a flattened skull, a curved spine (similar to that of a gorilla), semi-flexible lower limbs and large divergent big toes. This description aligns with the ideas of the time about human evolution\u201d (Wikipedia, Marcellin Boule<\/em>).<\/span><\/p>\n

4. However, this Neanderthal was severely handicapped. <\/em>\u00ab\u00a0In 1913, Marcellin Boule exaggerated the differences between Neanderthals and modern humans.\u00a0 He did not realize that the skeleton he studied \u2014 the \u201cOld Man of the Chapelle aux Saints\u201d (in Corr\u00e8ze, France) \u2014 was deformed by arthritis, as demonstrated by W. Strauss and A. J. Cave in 1952\u201d (id<\/em>., p. 67).<\/span>
\n\u201cJ.-L. Heim describes the subject as severely disabled. The individual suffered from a left hip deformity (epiphysiolysis or rather trauma), a crushed toe, severe arthritis in the cervical vertebrae, a broken rib, and narrowed spinal nerve channels. (Wikipedia, id<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

5. Conclusion: Our Cousins, the Neanderthals:<\/em> \u201cToday Neanderthals are now considered our cousins \u200b\u200brather than as our ancestors, even though they resemble us in many ways\u201d (ibid<\/em>.).<\/span><\/p>\n

In short, a generic <\/em>example can serve as the basis for an abductive generalization<\/em>, that leads to a rule or regularity concerning a class of cases or individuals. The specificity of individual cases must be specified.<\/p>\n

2.2 Argument from the Example<\/span><\/h3>\n

An illustrative <\/em>example<\/span> <\/strong>is an example chosen to help understand a concept or law, by providing an instance of it:<\/p>\n

A migratory bird is a bird that\u00a0 … For example, the swallow …<\/span><\/p>\n

Furthermore, if the chosen example is (presented as) typical of the phenomenon, the time-consuming and precarious work of examining a large number of cases becomes unnecessary. In this sense, providing an argument in defense of a general statement simply means finding a clear case to which it applies correctly.
\nAt the very least, the illustrative example shows that the conclusion is not undermined by the first example that comes to mind (see infra, \u00a7 6).
\nWhen a school essay proposes a maxim for commentary and criticism, the basic argument is to provide an example that clarifies the meaning of the maxim and justifies the maxim’s meaning. This is why the argument from example is considered as the basic form of argument from a pedagogical point of view.<\/span><\/p>\n

The illustrative example can also be used as an epideictic amplification and persuasion technique.<\/p>\n

Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule, the role of illustration is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement, show the import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its presence to the consciousness. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 357)<\/span><\/p>\n

2.3 Test Case Example and Refutation by the Counter-Example (arg. in contrarium<\/em>)<\/span><\/h3>\n

An example does not establish a law, but is theoretically sufficient to refute a generalization. The test case<\/em> example (or counterexample)<\/strong> is functionnaly different from the illustrative example. It is introduced as an objection to a theory. Then, the proponent must demonstrate that the general principle he is advocating can successfully apply to the case in question.
\nThe argument by counterexample is the standard method of refuting universal propositions \u201call As<\/strong> are Bs<\/strong><\/em>\u201d. This law is refuted by showing an A<\/strong> that is not a B<\/strong>, a strategy is perfectly operative in ordinary argument.
\nHowever, the counterexample attack can be neutralized by appealing to exceptional cases, as opposed to default ones. The proponent acknowledges that the law admits exceptions.
\nNonetheless, theories as mental constructions are not directly refuted by facts, see refutation by facts<\/a>.<\/p>\n

3. Example 2: \u201cExemplary Examples\u00a0\u00bb<\/span><\/h2>\n

3.1 Paragons, Model\/Antimodel<\/h3>\n

An unspecified example (\u03bb-example) is one element that makes up a category and is defined by its characteristic features. <\/strong>From a linguistic perspective, it is an element currently called by the name<\/strong> of the category.<\/p>\n

Categories are also structured around their prototypical elements<\/strong>,<\/span> see Categorization<\/a>; Analogy (I)<\/a> ; Analogy (II)<\/a>; Precedent<\/a>.
\nIn the social domain at large, a model<\/strong> is an \u00ab\u00a0exemplary example\u00a0\u00bb<\/span>, or a role model for a particular kind of behavior. The members of the category are judged by him. He is worthy of imitation and attracts identification.<\/p>\n

Anti-models<\/strong><\/span> typify negative authority; (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 362).<\/p>\n

Etymologically, a paragon<\/strong><\/span> is a touchstone for gold or silver. Metaphorically speaking, a paragon of virtue is a touchstone of virtue, that is, his behavior is the sole criterion for recognizing and ranking virtuous people. A paragon is\u00a0 the most excellent prototypical element<\/span>.<\/p>\n

The following example is taken from a television program in which contestants are asked questions and the winner is the one who answers the fastest. The question, read slowly, begins with:<\/p>\n

Question: Who is the poe\/t<\/em>
\nAnswer:\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \/Victor Hugo<\/em><\/p>\n

The slash \/ marks the moment when the candidate answers, \u201cVictor Hugo\u201d, without waiting for the question to finish, i.e. the clue that would make it possible to identify the poet: \u00ab\u00a0Who is the poet who wrote of the famous verse<\/em> \u201cTomorrow, at dawn, at the hour when the countryside turns white\u00a0\u00bb?\u00a0 And \u201cVictor Hugo\u201d was indeed the correct answer.
\nThe conclusion is that Victor Hugo is the paragon of poets in France. This suggests that \u201cwho \/ what is the (name of a category<\/em>)\u00a0\u00bb could be used as a test to determine the paragon of the category: \u00ab\u00a0What is the animal? \u2013 The lion.<\/p>\n

The \u201cparagon of anti-models\u201d is Hitler, see authority \u00a76: <\/a>Refutative uses of authority<\/em>.<\/p>\n

3.2 Imitation<\/h3>\n

When an individual uses another person as a model, they are imitating that person, see ethos<\/a>. The choice of a model is not necessarily conscious, whether for a hairstyle or voice intonation. The model is usually unaware of being imitated. This process usually neither expressed linguistically nor clearly argued.<\/span> Rather, it is based on nonverbal mechanisms of social imitation, the ripple effect, identification, empathy and charisma.<\/p>\n

To persuade someone to do something, one can argue by example, citing important people, real or fictional, who have done the same thing. This \u00ab\u00a0argument of exemplary behavior\u00a0\u00bb is a metonymic exemplum, a type of the verbal argument of authority.
\nMore importantly, one can set an example voluntarily<\/em> in order to show and demonstrate to the other what is desired, hoping\u00a0 to set alignment mechanisms in motion. For instance, one might stop smoking in order to encourage a friend to do the same, without giving grand speeches. As parents are reminded, actions speak louder than words, and they are their children’s primary role models.
\nThis strategy of example can be applied to any form of behavior we wish to instill in another person, such as how to eat, speak, or live a dignified life worthy of reward in the afterlife.
\nRather than being a type of argumentation, nonverbal models and examples appear as an alternative to argumentation.<\/span>
\nSeduction and repulsion push a person to conform themselves with a model or distance\u00a0 themselves from an antimodel, see authority<\/a>. They operate differently than verbal arguments. Some kind of persuasion may be involved\u2014a change in belief that correlates with a change in behavior\u2014but not all persuasion comes from argumentation.<\/span>\u00a0See \u00ab\u00a0you too<\/a>!\u00a0\u00bb, consensus<\/a>; ad populum<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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[1]<\/a> G. Burenhult, \u00ab\u00a0Vers Homo Sapiens\u00a0\u00bb [Towards Homo Sapiens]. In Le Premier homme.<\/em> Preface by Y. Coppens, Paris, Bordas, 1994, p. 67.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

EXAMPLE The word example has two main meanings: 1) Example-1: An element of a category of cases or events that are grouped under the same definition, law or principle. Such an item can help to identify new members of the category, and serve to establish, clarify and explain the definition, law or principle it embodies. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4936","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4936","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4936"}],"version-history":[{"count":39,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4936\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14581,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4936\/revisions\/14581"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4936"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4936"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4936"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}