{"id":4967,"date":"2021-10-20T16:18:13","date_gmt":"2021-10-20T14:18:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4967"},"modified":"2025-07-02T18:04:54","modified_gmt":"2025-07-02T16:04:54","slug":"fallacies-ii-aristotles-foundational-lis","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/fallacies-ii-aristotles-foundational-lis\/","title":{"rendered":"Fallacies 2: Aristotle’s Foundational List"},"content":{"rendered":"

FALLACIES 2: ARISTOTLE’S FOUNDATIONAL LIST<\/span><\/h1>\n

Argumentation studies are related to two Aristotelian sources, on the one hand, the rhetorical and dialectical theories in Rhetoric<\/em> and Topics<\/em>, and on the other hand, the critical analysis of fallacious sequences (fallacies, apparent enthymemes) in Prior Analytics<\/em>, Rhetoric<\/em> and primarily\u00a0 Sophistical Refutations<\/em> (Woods 2014). The latter forms the basis of the \u201cstandard treatment of the fallacies\u201d as reconstructed by Hamblin (Fallacies<\/em>, 1970).<\/p>\n

Definitions from the Sophistical Refutations<\/em> are used in all works dealing with fallacious arguments. The title, Sophistical Refutations<\/em>, is ambiguous. First, according to the classic joke, it is not \u2018an adequate description of the contents of the book\u2019,i.e., a set of refutations<\/em> that would be sophistical. <\/em>The book analyzes and rejects the refutations as practiced by the Sophists.<\/p>\n

Aristotle distinguishes between two types of paralogisms. He defines first paralogisms that \u201cdepend on the language used\u201d, and second, paralogisms that are \u201cindependent of language\u201d (SR<\/em>, 4). The \u201clanguage\u201d referred to is the language used in a dialogue, as practiced by dialecticians or sophists.<\/p>\n

The Rhetoric<\/em> lists ten \u201clines of argument that form the spurious enthymemes\u201d (Rhet<\/em>, ii, 24, 1400b35-01a5, RR 379), which are clearly related to language. Note that the parallelism between enthymeme and false enthymeme may lead us to believe that the preceding enthymemes, as listed in Rhet<\/em>., II, 23 are valid, but this is not the case, see collections 2<\/a>; expression<\/a>.<\/p>\n

1. The Fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

The six linguistic fallacies of Aristotle are listed in the first column of the following table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Six fallacies \u201cdependent on language<\/em>\u201d or \u201cverbal fallacies<\/em>\u201d (lat. in dictione<\/em>\u2009<\/em>)<\/strong>
\nRS 4<\/em> (=165b-167a)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

1.\u2002Homonymy<\/td>\nLat.\u00a0\u00e6quivocatio; ambiguity<\/em>, equivocation \u2014 <\/em>see ambiguity<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2.\u00a0Amphiboly<\/td>\nGr. [amphibolia<\/em>]\u2002<\/em>\u2014\u2002see ambiguity<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3. Composition<\/td>\nLat. fallacia compositionis, composition of words
\n<\/em>\u2014 see composition and division<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4.\u00a0Division of words<\/td>\nLat. fallacia divisionis<\/em>, see composition and division<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5.\u00a0Accent<\/td>\nLat. fallacia accentis<\/em>\u2009<\/em>; wrong accent<\/em> \u2014 see ambiguity<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6.\u00a0Form of expression<\/td>\nLat. fallacia figur\u00e6 dictionis, misleading expression \u2014 <\/em>see. expression<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

This terminology may seem obscure, but its purpose is perfectly clear. It establishes the basic principles of a \u00ab\u00a0logical grammar for argumentation\u00a0\u00bb by critiquing of language and discourse. This grammar supports the production of reasoned texts and speeches that anticipate their criticism.<\/p>\n

The seven fallacies considered \u201cindependent from language\u201d, are listed in the first column of the following table.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\n

Seven fallacies \u201cindependent of language\u201d, <\/strong>RS <\/em>4 (=166b-168b)
\n(Lat.\u00a0extra dictionem<\/em>\u2009<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

1.\u00a0\u201cAccident\u201d<\/td>\nLat. fallacia accidentis <\/em>\u2014 see accident<\/a>; definition<\/a>; categorization<\/a>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2. \u2009\u201cThe use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with some qualification of respect or place, or time, or relation.\u201d<\/td>\nLat.\u00a0a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter<\/em> \u2014 see circumstances<\/a>; distinguo<\/em><\/a>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
3. \u201cThat which depends upon ignorance of what \u2018refutation\u2019 is.\u201d<\/td>\nLat. ignoratio elenchi<\/em>; misconception of refutation<\/em>; evasion of the question <\/em>\u2014 see question<\/a>; relevance<\/a>; resumption of speech<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
4. \u201cThat which depends upon the consequent\u201d<\/td>\nLat. fallacia consequentis <\/em>\u2014 see implication<\/a>; causality<\/a>.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
5. \u201cThat which depends upon assuming the original conclusion.\u201d<\/td>\nLat. petitio principii<\/em>\u2009<\/em>; assumption of the original point<\/em>; begging the question<\/em> \u2014 see vicious circle<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
6. \u201cStating as cause what is not the cause.\u201d<\/td>\nLat. non causa pro causa<\/em>, non cause as cause<\/em>
\n\u2014 see cause-effect<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
7. \u201cThe making of more than one question into one.\u201d<\/td>\nLat.\u00a0fallacia<\/em> qu\u00e6stionis multiplicis<\/em>, many questions; complex question<\/em> \u2014 see many questions<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

These fallacies are actually methodological mistakes.<\/p>\n

2. Fallacies, Inferences and Dialectical Games<\/span><\/h2>\n

In contemporary terminology, an invalid inference is commonly\u00a0 called a fallacy. According to Hintikka, the Aristotelian concept of fallacy refers to something invalid, but not to an invalid inference:<\/p>\n

The error in thinking that the traditional fallacies are faulty inferences is what I propose to dub \u201cthe fallacy of fallacies\u201d. It is the fallacy whose recognition will, I hope, put a stop to the traditional literature on so-called fallacies. (1987, p. 211)<\/span><\/p>\n

In other words, a fallacy cannot be defined simply as, \u201ca fallacious argument.\u201d Only some, but not all fallacies can be \u201cthought of as mistaken logical or conceptual inferences\u201d (ibid<\/em>.). Hintikka considers a fallacy to be essentially a move that violates a rule in a dialectical game. He defines dialectical games as \u201cinformation-seeking questioning processes (interrogative games)\u201d (ibid<\/em>.). In this sense, the concept of fallacy has been adopted in the pragma-dialectical theory.<\/p>\n

Linguistic fallacies examine the conditions that a proposition must satisfy in order to qualify as a premise in a correct syllogistic inference. The fallacy of accident<\/em> is the consequence of an error in the methodology of definition. The fallacy of misconception of refutation<\/em> reflects a poor understanding of the issues involved in the discussion. Asking many questions<\/em> is also a forbidden move in dialectical games, where problems must be serialized to avoid implicit agreements. These different cases clearly demonstrate the non-inferential nature of the fallacies, and their links to rule-based dialogical games, in the latter two cases.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

FALLACIES 2: ARISTOTLE’S FOUNDATIONAL LIST Argumentation studies are related to two Aristotelian sources, on the one hand, the rhetorical and dialectical theories in Rhetoric and Topics, and on the other hand, the critical analysis of fallacious sequences (fallacies, apparent enthymemes) in Prior Analytics, Rhetoric and primarily\u00a0 Sophistical Refutations (Woods 2014). The latter forms the basis […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4967","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4967","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4967"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4967\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14564,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4967\/revisions\/14564"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4967"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4967"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4967"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}