{"id":4973,"date":"2021-10-20T16:38:39","date_gmt":"2021-10-20T14:38:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=4973"},"modified":"2025-07-03T15:33:01","modified_gmt":"2025-07-03T13:33:01","slug":"fallacies-iv-a-moral-and-anthropological-perspective-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/fallacies-iv-a-moral-and-anthropological-perspective-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Fallacies 4: A Moral and Anthropological Perspective"},"content":{"rendered":"

FALLACY 4:<\/strong><\/span>
\n A MORAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking<\/em> (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, \u201cOf the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms<\/em>\u201d,addresses the Aristotelian fallacies. Chap. XX, \u201cOf the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary Discourse<\/em>\u201d redefines the concept of fallacious reasoning<\/em> as a moral and anthropological issue concerning fallacious discourse and discussion<\/em>.<\/p>\n

1. The Aristotelian Fallacies<\/span><\/h2>\n

The list of \u201cways of evil reasoning that we call sophisms\u201d combines Aristotelian linguistic and nonlinguistic fallacies, see fallacies 3<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The linguistic fallacies are grouped under two headings. The list does not mention the fallacy of many questions, and adds two new types of fallacies independent of language: \u201cincomplete enumeration\u201d, and \u201cdefective induction.\u201d<\/p>\n

2. On Bad Reasonings in Civil Life<\/span><\/h2>\n

Chapter XX \u201cOf the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary discourse<\/em>\u201d is much more original. It consists of two parts:<\/p>\n

1) Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion.<\/span>
\n2) Of the false reasonings which arise from objects themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n

These sophisms and bad reasoning no longer reflect logical or scientific concerns, and are not related to dialectics. Based on a thorough and hypercritical description of the of the discussants’ concrete behavior, the chapter emphasizes the difficulty of reaching a successful conclusion in a debate and demonstrates how deceptive and fruitless disputes can be when the truth is at stake. Rather than appealing to follow the rules of debate, the conclusion makes an ascetic appeal for the moral reformation of the disputants.
\nNote that the religious and philosophical disputes over Jansenism and Cartesianism form the backdrop of the disillusioned discussions mentioned in this chapter.<\/p>\n

The various sophisms and bad reasoning will be designated by an expression taken from their definition below.<\/p>\n

2.1\u00a0\u201cOf the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n

(1) \u201cTo take our interest as the motive for believing a thing.\u201d<\/strong> The first of the causes that determine belief is the spirit of belonging to \u201csome nation, or profession, or institution\u201d (Ibid<\/em>., p. 268). Beliefs are not determined by truth and reality, but by the social position of the believer. The disputant borrows his beliefs from the group in which he finds \u201chis interest\u201d and his identity.<\/p>\n

(2) \u201c[The]\u00a0delusions of the heart\u201d<\/strong> (Id<\/em>., p. 269). This sophism expresses the ad passiones<\/em> fallacies of love and hate (ad amicitiam<\/em>, ad amorem <\/em>and ad odium<\/em>). It is a variant of the pathetic<\/a> argument:<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u2018I love him, therefore, he is the cleverest man in the world; I hate him; therefore, he is nobody.’<\/em>\u00a0(Ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

(3) Those \u201cwho never distinguish their authority from reason\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

They decide everything by a very general and convenient principle, which is, that they are right, that they know the truth; from which it is not difficult to infer that those who are of their opinion are deceived, \u2014 in fact, the conclusion is necessary. (Ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

The self-centered person claims to know the truth with immediate certainty, in both the profane and sacred realms, whereas it would require a demonstration, see authority<\/a>; modesty<\/a>.
\nThis can be read as a criticism of the Cartesian criterion of truth, as clear and distinct ideas. Interest and self-love determine clarity and distinctness better than truth does.<\/p>\n

(4) \u201cThe clever man[‘s]\u201d sophism<\/strong> is related to the preceding one:<\/p>\n

\u2018<\/strong>If this were so, I should not be a clever man<\/strong>; now, I am a clever man; therefore, it is not so<\/em>.\u2019 (Id<\/em>., p.\u2009270)<\/span><\/p>\n

Enthymemes:<\/p>\n

\u2018What<\/em>,\u2019 said they, \u2018if the blood circulates, [\u2026] if nature does not abhor a vacuum [\u2026] \u2014\u00a0I have been ignorant of many important things in anatomy and in physics. These things, therefore, cannot be<\/em>\u2019. \u2009(Ibid<\/em>).<\/span><\/p>\n

This is another fallacy ad passiones<\/em>, the fallacy of pride, ad superbiam<\/em>.<\/p>\n

These first four \u201csophisms\u201d are not really sophisms since as they deceive both themselves and others. Nor are they properly called fallacies since as they are neither public reasoning nor propositional arguments. Their premises remain unspoken and perhaps even unconscious:<\/p>\n

I’m a Syldavian, Syldavians are always right, therefore, I’m right.<\/span>
\nI’m right, therefore my opponent is wrong.<\/span>
\nI hate him; therefore, he is a nobody.<\/span>
\nI know everything, therefore what I don’t know must be wrong.<\/span>
\nInterests, inflated egos and passions, are epistemological obstacles ingrained in human nature.<\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter XIX reiterates the classical belief that training in argumentation requires a thorough knowledge of language and logic.
\nChapter XX adds that the arguer must first work on himself in order to avoid sophisms (1)-(4).
\nThey must also avoid the pitfalls of argumentative interactions, corresponding to sophisms (5) through (9). The following subset complements the first moral and psychological subset with factual observations of experienced arguers’ interactional behavior.<\/p>\n

(5) \u201cThose who are in the right, and those who are in the wrong, with almost the same language make the same complaints and attribute to each other the same vices\u201d<\/strong> (Id<\/em>., p.\u2009271). This empirical observation leads to a recommendation for the wise and thoughtful, about how to properly advocate the truth in a controversy.<\/p>\n

First recommendation,<\/em> to the debaters: Do not begin a debate until you have \u201c[thoroughly established] the truth and justice of the cause you are asserting.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Only after these rules have been applied can one move on to a meta-discussion of the opponent’s poor argumentative tactics. Of course, this presupposes\u00a0 that one can decide whether the rules have been correctly applied.<\/p>\n

(6)\u201cThe spirit of contradiction\u201d,<\/strong> is a \u00ab\u00a0malignant and envious disposition\u00a0\u00bb:<\/p>\n

\u201cSomeone else said such a thing; it is therefore false. I did not write that book; it is, therefore, a bad one<\/em>\u201d. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so common amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it. (p.\u2009272)<\/p>\n

(7) \u201cThe spirit of debate\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. (p. 277),<\/p>\n

Observations (6) and (7) have a clear connection with the sin of contentio<\/em>, see fallacies as sins of the tongue.<\/a>
\nFrom the observation that \u201cspeaking of ourselves, and the things that concern us\u201d can \u201cexcite envy and jealousy\u201d, comes a new recommendation: When defending the truth, one should minimize self-exposure. The arguer should \u201cseek, by hiding in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse\u201d (p.\u2009273).<\/p>\n

(8) \u201cThe Complaisant\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

For as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. (p. 278)<\/p>\n

This sophism of accepting without examining, or at least of refusing to take a position, corresponds exactly to\u00a0Locke’s ad verecundiam<\/em> fallacy, see modesty<\/a>. It is different from yet related to the guilty character alluded to in (7): those who \u201cin the midst of [the discussion] become obstinate and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty to avoid contention\u201d (p. 277), see modesty<\/a>; contempt<\/a>.<\/p>\n

(9) \u201cThe determination to defend our opinion\u201d leads us to<\/p>\n

no longer to consider whether the reasons we employ are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit everyone. (p.\u2009279).<\/span><\/p>\n

The section concludes with a\u00a0 final recommendation<\/em>:<\/p>\n

To have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with so much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mislead us. (p. 276)<\/span><\/p>\n

As noted in (5), each discussant will claim to be doing exactly that. The attempt to expose the sophism seems to be doomed from the start, as if we are condemned in a conflictual dialogue in which we will never know who is telling the truth.<\/p>\n

2.2\u00a0\u201cOf the false reasoning which arise from objects themselves\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n

This section focuses on the following points:<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0There is only a small margin between truth and error;<\/strong> see above, (5):<\/p>\n

In the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection (p. 277)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Rash induction also applies to human affairs<\/strong>; see above \u00a71, \u201cincomplete enumeration\u201d, and \u201cdefective induction\u201d:<\/p>\n

[Men] judge rashly of the truth of things from some authority insufficient to assure them of it, or by deciding the inward essence by the outward manner. (p. 284)<\/span><\/p>\n

Decisions are made on the basis of \u201cexterior and foreign marks\u201d (ibid<\/em>.), i.e., peripheral arguments.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0\u201cWe rarely avoid judging purposes by the event\u201d,<\/strong> a very pertinent point.<\/p>\n

If somebody succeeds, he had carefully planned his deeds; if he fails, he miscalculated. (p. 283)<\/span><\/p>\n

No distinction is made between \u201cthe fortunate and the wise\u201d (Ibid<\/em>).<\/p>\n

\u2014 For \u201cpompous eloquence\u201d,<\/strong> see verbiage<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

FALLACY 4: A MORAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, \u201cOf the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms\u201d,addresses the Aristotelian fallacies. Chap. XX, \u201cOf the bad reasonings […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4973","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4973","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4973"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4973\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14566,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4973\/revisions\/14566"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4973"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4973"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4973"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}