{"id":5064,"date":"2021-10-21T11:29:05","date_gmt":"2021-10-21T09:29:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5064"},"modified":"2025-06-18T10:52:09","modified_gmt":"2025-06-18T08:52:09","slug":"interpretation-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/interpretation-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Interpretation"},"content":{"rendered":"

INTERPRETATION as Argument<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

The concept of interpretation is ambiguous.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 In general<\/strong>, it refers to<\/span> the process of understanding complex texts, see interpretation, exegesis, hermeneutics<\/a>.<\/span>
\n\u2014 In rhetorical argumentation<\/strong>, the word interpretation<\/em> may refer to:<\/span><\/p>\n

1. A particular kind of stasis<\/strong>.<\/span>
\n2. A figure of repetition<\/strong>.<\/span>
\n3. An argument scheme<\/strong>, see motives and reasons<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Stasis of interpretation<\/span><\/h2>\n

In the theory of stasis, the stasis of interpretation<\/em><\/a> corresponds to a specific case of contradiction between the parties, the \u00ab\u00a0legal question.\u00a0\u00bb In court, or, more generally, whenever a debate is based on a written text, and especially on a normative rule, an\u00a0 \u201cinterpretation issue \u201d arises when the two parties base their conclusions on different readings of the text. For example, one party,\u00a0 may base their argument on the letter<\/em> of the law, while the other argues from its spirit.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Figure of repetition<\/span><\/h2>\n

As a figure of discourse, interpretation consists in duplicating a first term by immediately following it with a quasi-synonymous term that is more easily understood.
\nIn the sequence \u201cTerm1<\/sub><\/strong>, Term2<\/sub><\/strong>\u201d, T2<\/sub> interprets<\/em><\/strong> T1<\/sub><\/strong>, meaning it explains <\/em>or clarifies<\/em> T1<\/sub><\/strong>‘s meaning.<\/span>
\nT2 <\/sub><\/strong>may be a common-language equivalent of a technical term \u00a0T1<\/sub><\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n

We found marasmius oreades<\/em>, I mean, Scotch bonnets<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The interpretation may be applied to a word or an entire phrase and retain its argumentative orientation. :<\/span><\/p>\n

The President announced a policy of controlling spending, a \u201csober state\u201d policy.<\/p>\n

However, an opponent’s interpretation may reverse the argumentative orientation of T1<\/sub><\/strong>:<\/span><\/p>\n

The president announced a policy of controlling spending\u2014that is, a policy of austerity<\/p>\n

This change is marked by the introduction of a reformulating<\/em> connective (one could say an interpretive <\/em>connective) such as \u00ab\u00a0in other words,<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0, \u00ab\u00a0i.e.,<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb \u00ab\u00a0that is to say\u00a0\u00bb, <\/em>\u00ab\u00a0which means that.<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Refutation by Interpretation<\/span><\/h2>\n

The Treatise on Argumentation<\/em> classifies \u00ab\u00a0interpretatio<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb as a \u201cfigure of choice\u201d, and offers an example from Marcus Annaeus Seneca, (also known as Seneca the Elder<\/em>, or the Rhetorician (-54, +39)). Seneca the Elder is the author of the Controversiae<\/em>, a collection of legal cases, that were debated by various rhetoricians of his time, in an oratorical contest.<\/span><\/p>\n

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s example is taken from the first case in the collection ([1958] p. 233), in which a group of expert orators debates the ingenious story of a son who feeds his uncle despite his father’s prohibition. When the tables turn, the father is in trouble, and the son is now feeding his father in spite of his uncle’s prohibition<\/em>. Thus, the unfortunate son is exiled twice, for the same reason, first by his father, and then by his uncle. <\/span><\/p>\n

The following passage reports the words of the lawyers who addressed the father on behalf of the son<\/span>. First speak the lawyer, Fuscus Arellius, followed by Cestius.<\/span><\/p>\n

The two lawyers’ arguments align. Fuscus Arellius argues that the father may have given his command reluctantly. Cestius then \u00ab\u00a0goes further\u00a0\u00bb, attributing to the father an intention contrary to his words<\/em>, \u201cYou wanted it and you still want it toda<\/em>y.<\/em>\u201d
\nPerelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca view this as an \u00ab\u00a0argumentative figure or a stylistic figure depending on its effect on the audience\u00a0\u00bb ([1958], p. 172), see figure<\/a>.
\nThe lawyers’ words are clearly argumentative. First, they introduce a stasis, a question about the nature (the qualification<\/em>) of the act under investigation: \u201cYou wanted me to disobey you. So, don’t punish me, but congratulate me for fulfilling your secret wish!<\/em>\u201d. Second, they implement the \u00ab\u00a0private will versus.<\/em> public will\u00a0\u00bb scheme by substituting the private, sincere, will, for the publicly affirmed will, made under social pressure, see motives<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. Refutation Through Interpretation vs.<\/em> Performative Analysis<\/span><\/h2>\n

In this example, interpretation is an instrument of refutation and defense that opposes an accusation based on a command, that is, on a\u00a0 performative speech act. Austin illustrates his discovery of performativity with an example borrowed from Euripides’s Hippolytus<\/em> of\u00a0 (I, 612). According to Austin, a command, is valid as soon as it is uttered, regardless of the speaker’s intention.<\/span><\/p>\n

Surely the words must be spoken \u2018seriously\u2019 and so as to be taken \u2018seriously\u2019? [\u2026]. But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus<\/em> (1. 612), where Hippolytus says, \u201cmy tongue swore to, but my heart<\/em> (or mind or other backstage artiste) did not<\/em>\u201d. Thus \u201cI promise to…<\/em>\u201d obliges me \u2014\u00a0puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle.
\nIt is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immorality. (Austin, 1962, pp. 9-10)<\/p>\n

Like the son and the father in Seneca’s example, Hippolytus and the nurse, are engaged in highly argumentative interactions. In such situations, semantics, pragmatics, and morality can be discussed and argued. The son acknowledges the facts (he fed his uncle) and pleads not guilty to the charge of disobedience. He claims that the verbal<\/em> command, what the father said<\/em>, did not express the\u00a0the father’s true will<\/em>. This is a typical example of the contradiction Austin describes between what language actually does<\/em> and what goes on in the mind<\/em> of the speaker. <\/span><\/p>\n

However, it should be emphasized that Austin’s binary distinction is based solely on the verbal aspects of language and excludes all paraverbal modalizations of commands<\/strong>, especially those conveyed through facial expressions. Most importantly in the case of Hippolytus, it also excludes the context of the command<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, the question of the prohibition’s validity remains. According to the father and Austin, the prohibition is valid because the father uttered the relevant formula, and the son is guilty of the double Austinian sin of analytic fallacy and moral perversity.
\nHowever, the analysis offered by the Austinian father is questionable. What the father really said is problematic and must be interpreted<\/em> in the context of the speech act. <\/span><\/p>\n

This situation is analogous to that of ironic<\/a> utterances. The addressee hears something incongruous with the context<\/strong>, said by someone who usually speaks seriously. This forces the addressee to interpret<\/em>\u00a0of this puzzling utterance.<\/span><\/strong>
\n<\/span>Similarly, the father has uttered a prohibition that contradicts the natural (doxic) law of brotherly love. The son finds this inconsistent with his father’s true character. Perhaps the father’s verbal utterance was accompanied by a paralinguistic cue, indicating a different intention? Anyway, the son concludes that the command was not given in his father’s true<\/em>, natural<\/em> voice but rather in his social<\/em> voice. Therefore, he must interpret the incongruity.
\nAs Fuscus Arelius argues, the son was justified in feeding his uncle. <\/span><\/p>\n

Deciding that this latter interpretation is \u201cthe correct one\u201d sides with the son and against the father. Deciding that the Austinian interpretation is correct sides with the father against the son. In either case, choosing an analysis means siding with one party or the other.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/a> Translated from the French edition used by Perelman, S\u00e9n\u00e8que le Rh\u00e9teur, Controverses et Suasoires<\/em>. Translated by H. Bornecque. T. 1. Paris: Garnier Fr\u00e8res, 1932, p. 23-24. https:\/\/archive.org\/details\/Controverseset Suasoires.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

INTERPRETATION as Argument The concept of interpretation is ambiguous. \u2014 In general, it refers to the process of understanding complex texts, see interpretation, exegesis, hermeneutics. \u2014 In rhetorical argumentation, the word interpretation may refer to: 1. A particular kind of stasis. 2. A figure of repetition. 3. An argument scheme, see motives and reasons 1. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5064","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5064","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5064"}],"version-history":[{"count":21,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5064\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14395,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5064\/revisions\/14395"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5064"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5064"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5064"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

Arellius Fuscus concludes by suggesting a question: \u2018I thought that, in spite of your prohibition, you wanted your brother to be fed. You seemed to imply as much while delivering your defense, or so I thought<\/em>.\u2019
\nCestius was bolder. He didn’t just say, \u2018I thought you<\/em> wanted it,<\/em>\u2019 but \u2018You wanted it and you still want it today.<\/em>\u2019 He revealed all the reasons that compelled the father to want it so and concluded, \u2018Why are you driving me away? No doubt you are indignant that I have taken your place.<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb
\nSeneca the Elder, or the Rhetorician (54 BC – 39 AD),
\n[Controversies and Suasories<\/em>], (written at the end of his life).[1]<\/a><\/p>\n