{"id":5080,"date":"2021-10-21T13:19:07","date_gmt":"2021-10-21T11:19:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5080"},"modified":"2025-06-14T16:21:30","modified_gmt":"2025-06-14T14:21:30","slug":"juridical-arguments-three-collections-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/juridical-arguments-three-collections-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Juridical Arguments: Three Collections"},"content":{"rendered":"

LEGAL ARGUMENTS<\/span><\/h1>\n

Legal scholars consider legal arguments<\/em> to be the most fundamental argument schemes in their field. These arguments form the basis of \u201clegal logic<\/em>\u201d (Perelman, Logique jJuridique<\/em>, 1979). They are significant to the general theory of argumentation because they demonstrate the explicit and controlled application in the field of law of general principles currently found in ordinary argumentation. This is the perspective from which they are presented here.
\nCicero’s Topica<\/em> is perhaps the first essay to compile a list of historically significant legal principles of inference that are historically significant in all the classical fields of argumentation study, see Interpretation <\/a><\/span><\/span>2<\/a>; Collection 2<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These legal arguments govern the interpretation of legal texts and their application to concrete cases. They enable the application of a legal text to a case, by potentially extending its meaning and legal force. Given a fact f<\/strong> that is subject to legal evaluation based on a code (legal, religious, etc.), the judge can usually associate f<\/strong> with a category M<\/strong> mentioned in the code in order to apply the legal provisions concerning M <\/strong>to f<\/strong>. In other cases, category M<\/strong> must be interpreted as applying to case H. In such cases, the judge creates the law rather than applying it.
\nHowever, the code may not contain a category, N, to the case at hand, h. In this case, category N must be interpreted so that it also applies to h. In such cases, the judge produces the law rather than simply applying it.<\/p>\n

The process of interpretation is not limited to the legal field. It applies to a problematic proposition P<\/strong> belonging to a body of statements, a code, a rule, or a sacred text that is accepted by a community of interpreters or believers. The derivation of an interpretation IP<\/sub><\/strong>\u00a0 from a passage P<\/strong>, {P, IP<\/sub>}<\/strong> obeys the same rules and principles as the argumentative derivation of a conclusion C<\/strong> from an argument A<\/strong>, {A, CA<\/sub>}<\/strong>. An interpretation is constructed a contrario, by analogy, and so on.<\/p>\n

The limit of interpretation is set by the principle that \u201cwhat is clear must not be interpreted.\u201d This principle establishes the existence of a literal meaning, based on grammatical data. For instance, if a Syldavian presidential election requires voters to be 18 years old, and a Syldavian national, then only those who meet both criteria will be allowed to vote. There is nothing to interpret.<\/p>\n

1. Three Collections of Legal Argumentation Schemes<\/span><\/h2>\n

Legal argumentation specialists compile lists of argument schemes that are particularly important in law. Lists provided by Kalinowski and Tarello are often included in the general framework of argumentation studies (Perelman 1979, Feteris 1999, Vannier 2001). We have also included the list from by lawoutlines.com<\/em>[1]<\/a> (no author’s name). These three lists extensively use Latin terminology.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u2002Kalinowski<\/strong> (1965) lists eleven argument schemes:<\/span><\/p>\n