{"id":5121,"date":"2021-10-21T14:33:39","date_gmt":"2021-10-21T12:33:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5121"},"modified":"2025-06-11T17:43:00","modified_gmt":"2025-06-11T15:43:00","slug":"logos-ethos-pathos-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/logos-ethos-pathos-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Logos &#8211; Ethos \u2013 Pathos"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: center;\"><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">LOGOS -ETHOS &#8211; PATHOS<\/span><\/h1>\n<p>Knowledge-oriented theories of argumentation focus on phenomena related to the <em>objects<\/em> of debate in order to construct an accurate shared representation of the world. These phenomena include such as\u00a0 categorizations and placement in causal and analogical networks. These theories are based on restoring and reinforcing language&rsquo;s representational capacities. For example they recommend well-constructed definitions, and univocal use of words and sentences.<br \/>\nStrategically constructing and managing <em>people and their <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/emotion-e\/\">emotions<\/a><\/em> is essential to orienting rhetorical discourse toward persuasion and action. The goals is to make people think, feel and act. Accomplished action is the only criterion of successful <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/persuasion-eng\/\">persuasion.<\/a> Otherwise, persuasion would be unduly reduced to creating or strengthening intellectual adherence to a thesis, see<a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/argumentation-i-definition-eng\/\"> argumentation 1, definitions<\/a>. A rhetorical judge is not persuaded unless he rules in favor of the persuader.<\/p>\n<p>The connections between <strong>beliefs and actions<\/strong> are unclear, see <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/motives-and-reasons-e\/\">motives and reasons<\/a>. For example, is said that a congressman once replied to someone trying to persuade him to change his mind, <em>\u00ab\u00a0You can certainly change my mind, but you won&rsquo;t change my vote.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> This joke highlights the crucial difference between the determinants of mental representation and those of action.<\/p>\n<p>Rhetorical technique enumerates <strong>three instruments of persuasion<\/strong> (<em>pistis<\/em>), which are derived repectively from logos, <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/ethos-e\/\">ethos<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/5306-2\/\">pathos<\/a>. These instruments, sometimes called \u00ab\u00a0proofs\u00a0\u00bb, are used by the speaker to create belief and guide the will to determine action. The first instrument, logos, \u00a0is based on the proofs, real or apparent, given by the text of the speech itself. The second instrument, ethos, depends on the speaker&rsquo;s talent and character. The third instrument, pathos, depends on the speaker&rsquo;s ability to evoke an emotional response from the audience. (<em>Rhet.<\/em>, I, 2, 1356a1; RR, p. 105).<\/p>\n<p><strong>All three forms depend on discourse.<\/strong> \u00ab\u00a0<em>Logo-ic\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> evidence is purely discursive, while <em>ethotic<\/em> and <em>pathemic<\/em> evidence are both discursive and para-discursive. These three types of evidence are assimilated by the trinity of \u00ab\u00a0logos ethos, pathos,\u00a0\u00bb , leading to the definition of rhetorical evidence as any sign, whether verbal or nonverbal, that can induce belief<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Cicero and later rhetorical catechisms assign three goals to the speaker engaged in the persuasion process:\u00a0 The speaker must <em>prove<\/em> (<em>probare<\/em>), <em>please<\/em> (<em>conciliare<\/em>), and <em>move<\/em> (<em>movere<\/em>) (<em>De Or.<\/em>, II, XXVII, p. 114).<br \/>\n\u2014 First <em><strong>teach the audience<\/strong>. <\/em>This is the \u00ab\u00a0<em>logo-ic<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb way to persuade: the speech must inform, narrate and argue. This approach takes an <em>intellectual<\/em> stance on persuasion, focusing on <em>evidence<\/em> and <em>deduction<\/em>.<br \/>\n\u2014 However, <strong>information and argumentation<\/strong> can be undermined by the audience&rsquo;s boredom and incomprehension. Therefore, the audience must be given a substitute for intellectual mastery, of the case: <strong><em>trust<\/em><\/strong>. <strong>Ethos<\/strong> plays a key role in building trust between the speaker and audience\u2013\u201c<em>Maybe you don&rsquo;t quite understand what I say, but you can trust me<\/em>\u201d.<br \/>\n\u2014 Neither logos nor ethos have the power to trigger \u201cacting out\u201d, hence the recourse to <strong>pathos<\/strong>. Seeing the good is not enough; wanting it is also necessary. The physical <strong>emotional tension<\/strong> produced by a speech, is considered the most powerful determinant of the will and action.<\/p>\n<p>Evidence based on logos is considered to be \u00ab\u00a0logical\u201d and objective. It is the only type of evidence that can serve as evidence in the proper sense of the word. First, it satisfies the propositional condition for argumentation to some extent. This condition states that evidence must be expressed in an identifiable statement, that can be evaluated independently of the conclusion is supports.\u00a0 Thus, it is open to refutation. In contrast, pathemic and ethotic evidence are expressed indirectly, through subtle channels, and are not easily accessible to explicit, verbal refutation.<br \/>\nClassical texts emphasize the practical superiority of the ethotic and pathemic evidence over logo-ic evidence. Aristotle asserts the primacy of ethos, \u00ab\u00a0the character of the speaker may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion\u00a0\u00bb (<em>Rhet.<\/em>, I, 2, 1356a10; RR, p. 106), while also warning against the overly effective use of the pathos. Cicero and Quintilian virtually assimilate ethos to pathos, in order to affirm the ultimate supremacy of emotion, and s<a href=\"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/subjectivity-e-2\/\">ubjectivty<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>LOGOS -ETHOS &#8211; PATHOS Knowledge-oriented theories of argumentation focus on phenomena related to the objects of debate in order to construct an accurate shared representation of the world. These phenomena include such as\u00a0 categorizations and placement in causal and analogical networks. These theories are based on restoring and reinforcing language&rsquo;s representational capacities. For example they [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5121","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5121","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5121"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5121\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14352,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5121\/revisions\/14352"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5121"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5121"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5121"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}