{"id":5136,"date":"2021-10-21T15:11:08","date_gmt":"2021-10-21T13:11:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5136"},"modified":"2025-06-07T16:35:37","modified_gmt":"2025-06-07T14:35:37","slug":"metaphor-analogy-model","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/metaphor-analogy-model\/","title":{"rendered":"Metaphor, Analogy, Model"},"content":{"rendered":"

METAPHOR, ANALOGY, MODEL<\/span><\/h1>\n

In Ancient Greek, \u2018metaphor\u2019 means \u2018transfer.\u00a0\u00bb In the Poetics <\/em>(1457b), <\/em>Aristotle defines metaphor as \u2018the application to a thing of a name foreign to it. In the Poetics\u00a0<\/em> Aristotle defines metaphor as \u00ab\u00a0the application to a thing of a name foreign to it by a change from genus to species, from species to genus, from genus to species, or according to a relationship of analogy\u00a0\u00bb (1457b). This definition actually encompasses the field of tropes or figures of words, see metonymy.<\/a> In this sense, the metaphor is indeed the \u2018queen of figures.\u2019<\/p>\n

Metaphors can be defined by the following features and perspectives.
\n(a) Metaphor is a matter of discourse<\/strong>.
\n<\/span>(b) A metaphor occurs when a reality is designated by a ‘strange’ term<\/strong> in a discourse. The term is strange because it does not fit into the isotopy of the discourse in which it appears.
\n<\/span>(c) The receiver is surprised<\/strong> and tries to make sense of the term.
\n<\/span>(d) They find an interpretation based on analogy<\/strong> that makes sense and introduces a new perspective on the subject under discussion.
\n<\/span>(e) From an argumentative point of view, the metaphor is successful if it provides \u00a0a cognitive benefit<\/strong> to the receiver.<\/span><\/p>\n

From a rhetorical point of view, the metaphor is valued as a cryptic analogy, whose meaning is left to the audience to decipher. The main difference between a metaphor and an analogy is that an analogy keeps the two domains it relates to separate and distinct, while a metaphor tends to conflate them.<\/p>\n

1. Metaphor on trial<\/span><\/h2>\n

In his Rhetoric<\/em>, Aristotle considers metaphor to be the most effective instrument of persuasion in ordinary discourse. However, from the perspective of an anti-rhetorical theory of argumentation, metaphor is highly misleading. But metaphor is also a powerful cognitive tool for building representations, and better understanding complex situations. Metaphor applies the language of a model, i.e. the Resource domain (the metaphorical term) to an actual situation, the Problematic domain, to which the (sometimes missing) \u00ab\u00a0metaphorized\u00a0\u00bb term belongs, see structural<\/a> analogy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

If metaphor is defined as a figure<\/a>, and figures are defined as ornaments, then metaphor is misleading in all its dimensions, see. fallacy<\/a>; ornamental fallacy<\/a>. The metaphorical statement is false: \u201cThe voter is a calf<\/em>\u201d said Charles de Gaulle. but the voter<\/em> (proper, literal term) is not a calf<\/em> (figurative, metaphorical term) the voter is a human being. Metaphor systematically commits a category mistake<\/em>. It can also be accused of creating ambiguity<\/em>, because it introduces a parasitic level of meaning: the figurative meaning, which runs parallel to the proper, standard meaning.<\/p>\n

The metaphor creates a surprise and introduces an emotion (ad passiones <\/em>fallacy); it entertains the audience (ad populum <\/em>fallacy), thus sacrificing docere <\/em>(teaching information) to placere <\/em>(pleasure). It transforms the rational arguer into an actor (ad ludicrum<\/em> fallacy). Therefore metaphor is the discursive distractor<\/em> par excellence<\/em>, leading the audience down on a false path, and confusing the honest literalist in his search for truth, see relevance<\/a>; red herring<\/a>; resumption of discourse<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Therefore, metaphor is, and should be, banished from serious argumentative discourse, as well as from scientific language. It can only be helpful if it is reformulated as a comparison (Ortony 1979, p. 191). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that metaphor is active and welcome in stimulating creativity and facilitating the transmission and popularization of science and science education.<\/p>\n

2. Metaphor, the Ultimate Weapon of Persuasion?<\/span><\/h1>\n

Persuasion, pistis<\/em>, is produced in three ways \u201c(1) by working on the emotions of the judges themselves, (2) by giving them the right impression of the character of the speaker, or (3) by proving the truth of the statements made\u201d (Aristotle, Rhet.<\/em>, 1403b10; RR p. 397), in the latter case, persuasion arises \u201cfrom the facts themselves\u201d (ibid<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Ideally, the issue should be discussed based on facts and evidence: \u201cwe ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore should matter except the proof of those facts\u201d (ibid<\/em> 1404a1; RR p. 399). But ordinary people are not that perfect. \u201cOwing to the defects of our hearers\u201d, and of our \u201cpolitical institutions\u201d, \u201cthe arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance\u201d in public discourse and education-but not in science: \u201cNobody uses fine language when teaching geometry\u201d (1404a1-10,<\/em> RR. p. 399).<\/p>\n

Fine language is therefore the most effective tool of persuasion. Persuasion by emotion (pathos) and image (ethos) is produced, orally, by the \u201coratorical action\u201d, and in writing, by the stylistic arrangement of facts, \u201cbecause speeches of the written or literary kind owe more to their diction than to their thought\u201d (1404a15; p. 401). Metaphor is the supreme tool of written discourse \u201cboth in poetry and in prose\u201d. It \u201cgives style clearness, charm and distinction as nothing else can\u201d (1405a1-10;<\/em> RR, p. 405). The conclusion is clear: Metaphor is the ultimate weapon of persuasion. It is the art of \u201c[hiding one\u2019s] purpose successfully\u201d (1404b20;<\/em> RR,<\/em> p. 403), and charming the audience, see, logos, ethos, pathos.<\/a><\/p>\n

Contemporary approaches to metaphor agree consider that metaphor derives this power from its intrinsic element of surprise<\/em>, which results from perceiving an anomaly in the discourse, a rupture, an inconsistency, an incongruity, or a logical contradiction\u2013in short, a discursive coup, that delights the audience. Since pleasure cannot be refuted, metaphor is considered virtually inaccessible to refutation. In reality, it is: see below, \u00a74<\/p>\n

3. Metaphor and Interpretive Cooperation<\/span><\/h1>\n

By using a metaphor, the speaker openly seeks the audience’s interpretive cooperation. By doing so, the speaker reinforces the importance of prior agreements. Note that the same functional explanation is given for the derivation of enthymemes from underlying syllogisms.In both cases, the enthymematic or metaphorical condensation’s argumentative function (i.e., its effectiveness and persuasiveness) is to activate the audience, see enthymeme \u00a75.<\/a>n<\/p>\n

This analysis assumes that the nonargumentative metaphorical language, or the nonelliptical syllogism would be transparent, or less complex than the metaphorical language, and that their direct interpretation would not require the same degree of cooperation from the audience. This assumption is not self-evident.<\/p>\n

4. Metaphor as Analogy<\/span><\/h1>\n

Metaphor provides clever solutions to the riddle of metaphor.<\/p>\n

Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a work of the imagination. So too, understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
\n(Davidson 1978, p. 29)<\/span><\/p>\n

In The Interpretation of Dreams<\/em> (1900) Freud defines dreamwork as the process by which the latent<\/em> content of a dream is covered by its manifest<\/em> content, through displacement, distortion, condensation and symbolism. The metaphor \u201cmetaphor \/ dreamwork\u201d is difficult to reject, even though it commits the fallacy of trying to go ad obscurum per obscurius<\/em>, that is, of trying to illuminate the dark (metaphor) by the darker (dreamwork).<\/p>\n

Metaphor is a model, (Black 1962), and an imperialist one at that, that urging one to identify the \u00ab\u00a0metaphorized\u00a0\u00bb reality within the metaphorical world.<\/p>\n

L1 \u2014\u00a0We should do something about the economy.
\n<\/em>L2 \u2014 The \u201ceconomy-casino\u201d you mean?
\n<\/em>L1 \u2014 <\/span>Oh yes! All these addicted traders should be banned from the market!<\/span> <\/em><\/p>\n

The reconstructed analogy is \u201cas addicted gamblers are banned from casinos.<\/em>\u201d<\/p>\n

Saying that \u201cthe voter is a calf<\/em>\u201d means saying that \u201cthe voter is hesitant, weak and can be manipulated like a calf<\/em>\u201d, where calves are the stereotypical animal that combines these characteristics. This metaphor opens up new perspectives, and legitimizes a new set of inferences about voters. If voters are categorized as calves, then they can be made to behave in ways that are contrary to their interests. For example, they can be led to a more or less metaphorical slaughterhouse.<\/p>\n

A metaphor draws its argumentative power from an analogy that is pushed to identification.<\/span> A structural analogy explicitly<\/em> brings two domains together, while respecting their specificities. The domains are confronted, not assimilated. A metaphor makes the comparison implicit, negates the metaphorized domain, and assimilates\u00a0 it to the metaphorical one. This is why reconstructing of the analogy underlying a metaphorical expression betrays the metaphor: it splits apart what the metaphor has united. For example, in Peter is a lion,<\/em> the language referring to human beings is replaced by the language referring to lions. We are not far from the hyper-unified coherent Renaissance world where everything reflects in everything else, see analogical thinking<\/a>.<\/p>\n

5. Jumping from analogy to identity?<\/span><\/h1>\n

Analogy can be defined as a partial identity. The question of deep underlying identity, despite immediately recognizable differences plays an essential role here.<\/p>\n

Snowdrifts are like corrugated iron.<\/span>
\nSnowdrifts are like dunes.<\/span><\/p>\n

The syntactic structures of these two statements are identical, both propose the image of \u201cwaves\u201d to the interlocutor, and both share the key semantic feature of \u00ab\u00a0waving.\u00a0\u00bb But the second comparison is deeper and opens the way to a theory. It introduces a proportional analogy:<\/p>\n

snow : snowdrift :: sand : dune<\/p>\n

This analogy suggests that the wind acts similarly on snow particles and sand grains. This analogy help students construct a physical-mathematical model covering both phenomena (taking into account the differences between sand grains and snowflakes, and their respective laws of agglomeration). Starting with two seemingly different phenomena\u2013one can know what a dune is without knowing what a snowdrift is, and vice versa\u2013we arrive at the problem of a unifying abstract representation. Can the same physical model account for both phenomena.
\nEstablishing an analogy is the first step toward affirming a deep identity. This shift, from explanatory analogy<\/em> to identity<\/em> is central to a class of arguments about analogy that considers metaphor, not only as a model but also as the essence of the metaphorized phenomenon.<\/p>\n

6. Mole Rats \u201cSocieties\u201d, Human Society: Metaphor or Identity?<\/span><\/h1>\n

The thesis <\/strong>\u2013 <\/span>The following texts and information are taken from S. Braude and E. Lacey, \u201cA Revolutionary Monarchy: The Society of Mole Rats<\/em>\u201d[2]<\/a>. Mole rats are mammals, specifically hairless rats, that live in \u201cgroups\u201d or \u201ccommunities\u201d (the difference is significant). They exhibit behaviors similar to those observed in social insects, such as ants or bees. However, this behavior has never been observed in mammals. Hairless mole rats are thus the first mammals with this kind of \u201csocial behavior.\u201d
\nWhen we speak of \u00ab\u00a0social behavior\u00a0\u00bb or \u00ab\u00a0community\u00a0\u00bb, are we using a simple analogical-metaphorical lexicon, for a pedagogical presentation, or an explanatory metaphor? Are we engaged in describing these newly identified animal behaviors in terms of existing human societal structures? As in the case of the dunes and snowdrifts, are we suggesting, that these social phenomena may well have the same foundations, in this case biological? Do human societies obey the same biological laws as the \u201csocieties\u201d of mole rats? Are we on the way to a sociobiological theory of human societies? Have we stealthily moved from metaphorical language to identification?
\nThis is a strategy of \u201cslippery metaphor.\u201d Note that this strategy reverses the Target \/ Resource relationship. Being closer to nature, mole rats, formerly the Target<\/em>, are now a model<\/em> for studying of human society, formerly the Resource<\/em>.<\/p>\n

A criticism: the words used betray a deep assimilation \u2013 <\/strong>To reject this assimilation, the opponent first lists the terms coming from the Resource field, the human social lexicon:<\/p>\n

The phrase \u201cdivision of labor<\/em>\u201d appears four times; as do the word \u201ctask<\/em>\u201d and \u201cresponsible<\/em>\u201d. The phrase \u201cthey take care of<\/em>\u201d appears once, as do the term \u201ccooperation<\/em>\u201d and \u201csubordinate.<\/em>\u201d The term \u201csexual status<\/em>\u201d is used three times to refer to the animal’s reproductive status. (G. Lepape, [Research]<\/em>, 1992)<\/span><\/p>\n

A reply<\/strong> \u2013 In response to this criticism, the authors of the article limit the identification of human societies with animal groups.<\/p>\n

G. Lepape also claims that our language makes unfair comparisons by attributing common behavioral traits to mole rats and social insects. This claim surprises us, especially when he writes, \u201cThe similarities [between hairless mole rats and social insects] are treated as true homologies<\/em>.\u201d Our paper is clear on this point: we believe that the behavior of hairless mole rats and eusocial[3]<\/a> insects shows striking similarities. <\/span>However, we do not see how the language used to describe these similarities suggests that a common origin of these animals constitutes the evolutionary basis of these similarities.
\nBraude & Lacey, ibid.<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The danger here is that we might be tempted to forget that we are dealing with an analogy, which is \u201cnever more compelling than when it is abolished and ceases to be perceived as an analogy. Becoming invisible, it merges with the order of things.\u201d (Gadoffre 1980, p. 6)<\/p>\n

7. Against metaphors<\/span><\/h2>\n

Politicians [are] catering to a public that doesn’t understand the rationale for deficit spending, that tends to think of the government budget via analogies with family finances.<\/span>
\nWhen John Boehner, the Republican leader, opposed US stimulus plans on the grounds that \u201cAmerican families are tightening their belt, but they don’t see the government tightening its belt<\/em>\u201d, economists cringed at the stupidity. But within a few months the very same line was showing up in Barack Obama’s speeches [\u2026]. Similarly, the Labour Party [\u2026]\u2028(The Guardian<\/em> 04-29-2015)[3]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

The \u201cstupidity\u00a0\u00bb lies in the inference that \u00ab\u00a0families are tightening their belts, SO the state must tighten its belt<\/em>.\u201d We can reconstruct the justification principle of this argument as a metaphor:<\/p>\n

A state, a nation, a country is a family.<\/span><\/p>\n

You could also think of it as a kind of composition:<\/p>\n

The state is made up of families, families tighten their belts, the state must tighten its belt.<\/span><\/p>\n

In any case, the \u201cstate, family<\/em>\u201d metaphor has deep roots. It is based on the etymology of the word economy<\/em>, which comes from the Greek oikonomia, <\/em>meaning \u201chousehold management.\u201d This metaphor is evident in the praise of leaders as \u201cfather of the nation,\u201d and \u201cfounding father.\u201d<\/p>\n

Krugman considers that politicians \u00ab\u00a0cater\u00a0\u00bb to a public \u00ab\u00a0that doesn’t understand,\u00a0\u00bb by providing what they want, desire, or find amusing. Thus politicians must use metaphors, however stupid <\/em>they may be,<\/em> to adapt to their audience. This is indeed what Aristotle said, see above.<\/p>\n

Happy<\/em> metaphors serve to charm the audience, but the existence of unhappy<\/em> metaphors must also be acknowledged. Upon hearing such a metaphor, the audience does not<\/em> feel \u201ccharmed\u201d; rather they show no pleasure, but \u201ccringe at the stupidity\u201d, displaying their disgust and embarrassment through their faces and bodies\u201d (after MW, Cringe<\/em>). This is exactly how metaphors can be refuted as metaphors. <\/em><\/p>\n

Then, in a second step, one can address the substantive content, i.e., the de-metaphorized claim that \u00ab\u00a0in times of economic crisis, the state must turn to austerity.\u00a0\u00bb Krugman conducts this substantive refutation in the semi-technical language of economics, combining a priori refutation (theoretical unfoundedness<\/em>), falsification (contradicted<\/em> predictions<\/em>) and pragmatic refutation (failed<\/em> policies<\/em>).
\nHowever, a second metaphor remains: Words such as restriction<\/em> and austerity<\/em>, have a clearly negative orientation. The expression \u201ctightening one’s belt<\/em>\u201d, associated with successful dieting, weight loss and slimness, has a strong positive visual, orientation, that is inaccessible to refutation.<\/p>\n

\n

[2]<\/a> Braude, S. & Lacey E. (1989). Une monarchie r\u00e9volutionnaire: la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 des rats-taupes. La Recherche<\/em> [Research], <\/em>a journal of general scientific information] July-August 1989. Comments by G. Le Pape, and reply by the authors in the same magazine, Oct. 1992.<\/span><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> \u201cLiving in a cooperative group in which usually one female and several males are reproductively active and the non-breeding individuals care for the young or protect and provide for the group eusocial<\/em> termites, ants, and naked mole rats\u201d (MW, Eusocial<\/em>)<\/span><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> www.theguardian.com\/business\/ng-interactive\/2015\/apr\/29\/the-austerity-delusion<\/u> (15-08-16)<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

METAPHOR, ANALOGY, MODEL In Ancient Greek, \u2018metaphor\u2019 means \u2018transfer.\u00a0\u00bb In the Poetics (1457b), Aristotle defines metaphor as \u2018the application to a thing of a name foreign to it. In the Poetics\u00a0 Aristotle defines metaphor as \u00ab\u00a0the application to a thing of a name foreign to it by a change from genus to species, from species […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5136","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5136","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5136"}],"version-history":[{"count":22,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5136\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5921,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5136\/revisions\/5921"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5136"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5136"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5136"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}