{"id":5147,"date":"2021-10-21T16:31:46","date_gmt":"2021-10-21T14:31:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5147"},"modified":"2025-06-04T15:59:07","modified_gmt":"2025-06-04T13:59:07","slug":"5147-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/5147-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Modesty"},"content":{"rendered":"

Appeal to MODESTY:<\/span><\/strong><\/span>
\nAD VERECUNDIAM\u00a0<\/em><\/span>
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

1. The argument <\/span>ad verecundiam<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

\u00ab\u00a0Verecundia<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb means \u00ab\u00a0modesty\u00a0\u00bb or \u00ab\u00a0humility.\u00a0\u00bb The Latin term \u00ab\u00a0argumentum ad verecundiam<\/em>,\u00a0\u00bb translates as \u00ab\u00a0argument from<\/em>, or appeal to modesty<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0.
\nThis argument is used by someone who bows before the speech and the good reasons offered by a person whom they consider superior. It typically ratifies an act of submission to the ethos.
\nThe ad verecundiam<\/em> argument is the interactional correlate<\/em> of an appeal to authority, not an appeal to authority. Note that, in the following key passage, Locke refers to ad verecundiam<\/em> as arising from a fear of violating \u201cmodesty\u201d.<\/p>\n

The first [fallacious argument<\/em>]<\/strong> <\/span>is to allege the opinion of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority<\/span>.
\nWhen men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others<\/span> to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it.
\n<\/span>This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much pride,<\/span> when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission<\/span> by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion<\/span> against the current stream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence<\/span> in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam<\/em>. (Locke [1690], p. 410).<\/span><\/p>\n

This argument is fallacious:<\/p>\n

It argues not another man\u2019s opinion to be right because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. [Locke, 1690], p. 411).<\/span><\/p>\n

Similarly, topic #11 of the Rhetoric<\/em> argues \u201cfrom a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter\u201d. Such a precedent-setting judgment must have been made by an authority, one of \u201cthose whose judgment it is not possible to contradict\u201d (Aristotle, Rhet<\/em>., II, 23, 12; F. 309), that is to say, \u201cit would be disgraceful<\/em><\/strong> to contradict him<\/span>\u201d (ibid<\/em>.; my italics), be he a father, a god, a teacher or a wise man. Courtesy is argumentatively oriented in favor of the submission to the status quo.<\/p>\n

2. Authority or Pusillanimity? Ad Verecundiam<\/em>, or Misplaced Modesty<\/span><\/h1>\n

Locke describes an interaction, in which one partner \u201calleges\u201d an authoritative opinion. The qualities that give an opinion authority have either a social source (\u201cparts, learning, eminency, power,<\/em>dignity<\/em>\u201d) or an intellectual source (\u201clearning<\/em>, approved author,<\/em> learned doctor<\/em>\u00a0approved writer<\/em>\u201d), see ethos<\/a>. Such sources do have a legitimizing power, see dialectic<\/a>. Note that religious authorities are not mentionned.<\/p>\n

It must be emphasized that Locke is not censoring the expression of, or the reference to authoritative opinions in the first round of speech; rather the critizing the unquestioning acceptance of such an authority. The problem does not lie in the appeal to authority in the first round, but rather in the fear of an aggressive third round that prohibits criticism of this authority.
\nThe condemnation ad verecundiam<\/em> protests the censorship of this second round by an internal impulse of modesty, and the feeling of one’s own inadequacy (however legitimate iy may be!). This censorship is a preventive reaction to a potential threat from a third round that aims to silence objectiond addressed to the authority. The third round itself does not address the substance of the objection to the second round (through an argument ad judicium<\/em>, see matter<\/a>.) It merely substitutes a negative evaluation of the person who holds it\u2013<\/em>an personal attack<\/a> ;that wouls invoke \u201ca breach of modesty<\/em>, too much pride<\/em>, insolence<\/em>, impudence<\/em>\u201d, i.e., a maneuver of intimidation, see \u00a0respect<\/a>. The problem then is not in the authoritative first round, but in the inhibiting foreboding of an aggressive third round. As the label \u201cargument ad verecundiam<\/em>\u201d indicates, the fallacy is committed by the interlocutor, the overly modest person who does not object for fear of making a scene. This is a fallacy of cowardice or spinelessness; not primarily a fallacy of authority. Verecundia<\/em> is the (misplaced sense of) shame that prevents one from saying out loud what one is thinking. It is a betrayal of our duty to truth.<\/p>\n

4. Justified modesty<\/span><\/h2>\n

When it comes to authority itself, the problem is twofold. In the first round, participant S1_1<\/strong> has \u201calleged\u201d an authoritative opinion, which may be a perfecty reasonable move. Suppose that in a second round, S2<\/strong> can overcome his ad verecundiam<\/em> inhibition and express his dissenting opinion quite freely. If, in a third round, S1_2<\/strong> silences S2_1′<\/strong>s remarks in the name of authority, while at the same time criticizing his opponent for his boldness and pride then S1<\/strong> is arguing from authority, which is certainly a fallacious move.
\nSome situations, however,are embarrassing. If S1<\/strong> quotes Einstein in his (Einstein’s) area of expertise, and S1<\/strong> has a good background in physics and S2<\/strong> has none, then a humble lay speaker S2<\/strong> would be wise to ask for more explanation before voicing his doubts. If not, S1_2<\/strong> could legitimately give in to an , authoritative exasperation.<\/p>\n

3. A fallacy in dialogue<\/span><\/h2>\n

The problem of authority is thus recast as one of authoritarian interaction, i.e.,\u00a0 a dialogue in which a claim of authority is expressed in the first speech turn, and exploited in the third turn to silence the objections, considering that the quoted authority gives the caster the power to end the discussion. This use of authority is in a direct contrast to the use of authority in a dialectical game. The problem does not lie so much in the quoting of authority as in the possibility of contradicting authority. Modesty, respect, concern not to cause the other to lose face, rules of politeness<\/a>, preference for agreement are all intellectual inhibitors. All these constraints define a typically anti-dialectical<\/em> situation, see Dialectic<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Authority is accepted as a fact, the problem lies in the possibility of questioning that authority . Authority is deceptive only when it claims to escape from dialogue, to silence its opponent, and not to answer his counter-discourse. The conclusion is that what is deceptive or not, is a dialogue<\/em> move. It is impossible to say whether a statement like \u201cThe Master said it!<\/em>\u201d is fallacious or not; it all depends on the position of the statement in the dialogue. If it is an opening statement, it is not misleading. If it is a closing statement, intended to silence the critic, it is.<\/p>\n

\n[1] Latin \u201cargumentum ad verecundiam<\/em>\u201d lat. verecundia<\/em> \u201cmodesty, humility\u201d.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Appeal to MODESTY: AD VERECUNDIAM\u00a0 1. The argument ad verecundiam \u00ab\u00a0Verecundia\u00a0\u00bb means \u00ab\u00a0modesty\u00a0\u00bb or \u00ab\u00a0humility.\u00a0\u00bb The Latin term \u00ab\u00a0argumentum ad verecundiam,\u00a0\u00bb translates as \u00ab\u00a0argument from, or appeal to modesty\u00ab\u00a0. This argument is used by someone who bows before the speech and the good reasons offered by a person whom they consider superior. It typically ratifies […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5147","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5147","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5147"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5147\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5925,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5147\/revisions\/5925"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5147"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5147"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5147"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}