{"id":5278,"date":"2021-10-22T15:41:40","date_gmt":"2021-10-22T13:41:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5278"},"modified":"2025-05-31T07:42:49","modified_gmt":"2025-05-31T05:42:49","slug":"orientation-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/orientation-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Orientation"},"content":{"rendered":"

ORIENTATION<\/span><\/h1>\n

The concept of orientation<\/em> (argumentative orientation, oriented statement or expression), combined with the correlative concept of argumentative scale<\/em><\/a> (Ducrot 1972), is fundamental to the theory of argumentation within language (Awl theory). This theory was developed by Oswald Ducrot and Jean-Claude Anscombre (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, Ducrot 1988, Anscombre 1995a, 1995b, etc.).
\nIn this entry, the term discourse<\/em> refers exclusively to (polyphonic<\/em>) monologue<\/em>, not dialogue or interaction.<\/p>\n

The following equivalences may be helpful in grasping the general concept of meaning as argument<\/em>, or the orientation<\/em> of a statement E1<\/strong> toward a subsequent statement E2<\/strong>, that has the status of a conclusion.<\/p>\n

He said E1<\/strong>. What does that mean?<\/span>
\nHe says E1<\/strong> from the perspective of E2.
\n<\/strong>The reason for saying E1<\/strong>\u00a0 is E2.
\n<\/strong>The meaning of E1<\/strong> is E2.
\n<\/strong>E1<\/strong>, that is to say, E2.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1. But <\/em>and the Grammar of Orientation<\/span><\/h2>\n

The conjunction but<\/em><\/strong>, has played a central role in constructing a grammar for argumentation. The privileged construction chosen for analyzing this conjunction is schematized as \u201cE1<\/strong> but E2<\/strong>\u201d, for example:<\/p>\n

The restaurant is good, but expensive.<\/span><\/p>\n

The basic observations are as follows: E1<\/strong> and E2<\/strong> are true (the restaurant is good and<\/em> expensive). But<\/em> <\/strong>refers to an opposition that is not between the predicates \u201cto be good<\/em>\u2019 and \u201cto be expensive<\/em>\u201d: one knows that \u201ceverything good is expensive<\/em>\u201d, and tends to think that all expensive restaurants are necessarily good. The opposition lies in the conclusions<\/em> drawn from E1<\/strong> and E2<\/strong>, which both function as arguments.<\/em> If the restaurant is good, then, let’s eat there.<\/em> If it’s expensive, let\u2019s go somewhere else. <\/em>The final decision is based on the latter argument, E2<\/strong>.
\nThe conjunction but<\/em><\/strong> here articulates two statements that lead to contradictory conclusions, and the conclusion derived from the second argument is retained.<\/p>\n

Connectives provide guidance for interpreting the utterances they articulate. They instruct the listener to infer and reconstruct from the left context E1<\/strong> a proposition C<\/strong> in opposition to another one, not-C<\/strong>, that can be inferred from<\/span> E2<\/strong>).<\/span> It is up to the listener to reconstruct an argumentative opposition.
\nIn the context of dialogical argumentation, these \u201cinstructions\u201d themselves fall within the scope of an argumentative question, and influence the reconstruction of the conclusions derived from E1<\/strong> and E2<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The previous but<\/em><\/strong> comes under a question like \u201cWhy not try this restaurant?<\/em>\u201d. If the question were \u201cWhich restaurant should we buy to make the best investment?<\/em>\u201d, the interpretation would be different: \u201cThis restaurant is good<\/em> (= \u201cdelivers outstanding financial performance\u201d) but it is expensive<\/em> (to buy)\u201d. The inferred, implicit conclusion would be \u201cso, let’s invest our money somewhere else.<\/em>\u201d<\/span> The argumentative question that structures the text creates the field of relevance and provides the interpretive constraints.<\/p>\n

These questions and their corresponding conclusions-answers are said to be \u201cimplicit\u201d only insofar as the data supporting the analysis of but<\/em><\/strong> are generally limited to a pair of statements. The analyst may legitimately posit that her intuition can provide a plausible context. However, to the extent that argument analysis is seen as a discursive-cognitive matter, rather than a linguistic-semantic one, this authentic context can facilitate the task and introduce new issues.<\/p>\n

2. Linguistic Constraints on the {Argument, Conclusion} Sequence<\/span><\/h1>\n

Like the classical approaches, the Awl theory considers argumentation as essentially a combination of statements, \u201cargument + conclusion.\u201d The crucial difference lies in the concept of the link that authorizes the \u201cstep\u201d from argument to conclusion, i.e., the argument scheme. Discourse coherence is attributed to a semantic principle, a \u00ab\u00a0topos\u00a0\u00bb<\/a> which is defined as a purely semantic link\u00a0 that connects the predicate of the argument to the predicate of the conclusion.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ducrot defines \u201cthe argumentative value of a word\u201d as \u201cthe orientation that this word gives to the discourse\u201d<\/span> (Ducrot 1988, p. 51). The linguistic meaning of the word <\/strong><\/span>smart<\/em><\/span><\/strong> lies in the orientation<\/em> it gives to a statement, i.e., the constraints it imposes on subsequent discourse. It does not lie in its descriptive value of a capacity measured by the intellectual quotient of the person concerned. For example:<\/p>\n

1. Peter is smart, he will solve this problem.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is opposed to the incoherent chain:<\/p>\n

1′. * Peter is smart, he will not be able to solve this problem.<\/span><\/p>\n

Argumentation (1) is indeed convincing, because its conclusion, \u201csolving problems<\/em>\u201d belongs to the set of predicates semantically correlated with \u201cbeing smart.<\/em>\u201d<\/span> A set of pre-established conclusions is already given in the semantic definition of the predicate of the argument. In other words, the problem is entirely linguistic (lexical), not cognitive. The dictionary is the \u00ab\u00a0place\u00a0\u00bb to look for arguments.<\/p>\n

The two argumentative morphemes, little<\/em> \/ a little<\/em> <\/strong>give opposite<\/em> argumentative orientations to the statement they modify, see orienting words<\/a>:<\/strong><\/p>\n

He has taken a little food, he is getting better<\/span>
\nHe has taken little food, he is getting worse.<\/span><\/p>\n

Building on these intuitions, Ducrot defines the argumentative orientation of a statement<\/em> (or its argumentative value<\/em>)\u00a0<\/strong> as \u201cthe set of possibilities or impossibilities of discursive continuation determined by its use\u201d<\/span> (ibid.<\/em>).<\/p>\n

The argumentative orientation of a statement S1<\/strong> is defined as the selection that statement S1<\/strong> makes from the class of statements S2<\/strong> that can follow it in a grammatically well-formed discourse. In the same field, in theory, any statement S2 <\/strong>can follow a first statement S1<\/strong>, as both are independent linguistic units. However, according to the Awl theory, the use of the first statement S1<\/strong> introduces constraints that impose certain properties on the second statement S2<\/strong>; that is, it excludes some continuations and favors others.<\/p>\n

These linguistic constraints imposed by the argument on the conclusion are particularly visible in quasi-analytical sequences, such as \u201cThis proposal is absurd, so it must be rejected.<\/em>\u201d<\/span> By the very meaning of the words, saying that a proposition is absurd<\/em>, is saying that it must be rejected<\/em>. This apparent conclusion is a pseudo-conclusion, because it merely expresses the definition of the word absurd<\/em>, \u201cwhich should not exist\u201d as the dictionary attests.<\/p>\n

[Speaking of a manifestation of human activity such as speech, judgment, belief, behavior, or action<\/em>] That which is manifestly and immediately felt to be contrary to reason or common sense. Sometimes almost synonymous with the impossible in the sense of \u201cthat which cannot or should not exist<\/em>\u201d (TLFi<\/em>, [Absurd<\/em>]).<\/span><\/p>\n

In a famous yet objectionable formula, Roland Barthes wrote that \u201clanguage is neither reactionary nor progressive; language is quite simply fascist; for fascism does not prevent speech, it compels speech\u201d ([1977], p. 366). Barthes’s perspective is certainly different from Ducrot’s. Nevertheless, according to Ducrot, the argument grammatically \u00ab\u00a0compels the conclusion. Playing with words, one might say that the inference is compulsive. This is common argumentative experience, in ordinary language, hearing the argument is enough to guess the conclusion.<\/p>\n

Ducrot’s theory is based on the linguistic observation that every state statement, regardless of its informational content, specifies its possible continuations and excludes others. This impossibility is not due to informational reasons, but to semantic and grammatical reasons.<\/span> There are semantic constraints on the construction of discourse.<\/p>\n

At the sentence level, this idea is expressed through the syntactic concept of selection restriction (linguistic constraints on the type of well-formed expression (E2<\/strong>, conclusion) that can follow a given well-formed expression (E1<\/strong>).
\nIn its non-metaphorical use, the statement \u201cPluto barks<\/em>\u201d implies that Pluto is a dog. Taken literally, barking<\/em> carries with it a selection restriction of that determines the class of entities<\/em> that can be its subject.
\nSimilarly, at the discourse level, E1<\/strong> restricts the class of the statements E2<\/strong> that can follow it. An argumentation is a pair of statements (E1<\/strong>, E2<\/strong>), such that E2<\/strong>, the conclusion<\/em>, respects the orientation conditions imposed by E1<\/strong>, the argument<\/em>.<\/p>\n

3. Meaning as Intention<\/span><\/h1>\n

The AwL theory rejects the notions of meaning as adequacy to reality, whether logical (theories of truth conditions) or analogical (theories of prototypes). The AwL theory is based on a quasi-spatial conception of meaning as \u00ab\u00a0sense\u00a0\u00bb <\/em>as \u00ab\u00a0direction\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0way\u00a0\u00bb.\u00a0 in a given context, what the statement S1<\/strong> (and the speaker) publicly means<\/em>, is the conclusion S2<\/strong> to which the statement is directed. The art of argumentation here is the art of managing transitions in discourse.<\/p>\n

The relationship \u201cargument S1<\/strong> – conclusion S2<\/strong>\u201d is reinterpreted from a language production perspective (French perspective \u00e9nonciative<\/em>) where the meaning of the argument is contained in and revealed by the next statement. Understanding what is meant by the statement \u201cNice weather today<\/em>!\u201d does not involve developing a corresponding mental image or cognitive scheme, but rather grasping the speaker’s intention such as \u201cLet\u2019s go to the beach.<\/em>\u201d This is well expressed in the Chinese proverb, \u201cWhen the wise man points to the stars, the fool looks at the finger<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

The meaning of S1<\/strong> is S2<\/strong>. Meaning is defined as the final cause<\/em> of the speech act. Thus, the Awl theory updates a terminology that refers to the conclusion<\/em> of a syllogism as its intention<\/em><\/span>. This reflects the fact that a reformulation connector such as \u00ab\u00a0that is to say\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> can introduce a conclusion:<\/p>\n

L1: \u00a0 \u2014 This restaurant is expensive<\/em>.<\/span>
\nL2: \u00a0 \u2014 <\/span>That means \/ you mean \/ in other words\/ you don’t want us to go there?<\/span> <\/em><\/p>\n

The Awl theory has developed in three main directions, argumentative expressions<\/em>, or orienting<\/em>\u00a0words; connectives as argumentative indicators<\/em><\/a>; and the concept of semantic topos<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

4. Some Consequences<\/span><\/h2>\n

4.1 Reason in Discourse<\/span><\/h2>\n

Tarski claims that it is impossible to develop a coherent concept of truth<\/a> within ordinary language. In Ducrot’s vision of argumentation, the question of the validity<\/em> of an argument is reinterpreted as grammatical<\/em> validity. An argumentation is valid if the conclusion is grammatically consistent<\/em> with its premises (i.e., if it obeys the constraints imposed by the argument).
\nTherefore, the rationality and reasonableness<\/em> associated with the argumentative derivation is merely an unsubstantial reflection of routine discursive concatenation of meanings, or, as Ducrot says, a mere \u201cillusion\u201d, see demonstration<\/a>. This is consistent with the structuralist project of reducing the order of discourse to that of language (Saussure’s langue<\/em>). Ordinary discourse is seen as incapable to expressing truth and reality. It follows that, according to the AwL theory, discourse is denied any rational or reasonable capacity.<\/p>\n

4.2 Redefining Homonymy and Synonymy<\/span><\/h2>\n

Since the AwL theory is based exclusively on the concept of orientation, and not on quantitative data or measures, it follows that if the same segment S <\/strong>can be followed by the segment Sa<\/strong> and by the segment Sb<\/strong> which contradicts Sa<\/strong>, then S does not have the same meaning in these two occurrences<\/strong>.<\/span> Since we can say \u201cit\u2019s hot<\/em> (S)<\/strong>, let\u2019s stay at home<\/em> (Sa)<\/strong>\u201d as well as \u201cit\u2019s hot<\/em> (S)<\/strong>, let\u2019s go for a walk<\/em> (Sb)<\/strong>\u201d we have to admit that the two occurrences of the statement S<\/strong> \u201c[are] not about the same heat in both cases\u201d<\/span> (Ducrot 1988, p. 55). This is a new definition of homonymy.
\nBy analogous considerations, Anscombre concludes that there are two verbs to buy<\/em>,<\/span> one corresponding to the senses of \u201cthe more expensive, the more I buy<\/em>\u201d and the other \u201cthe less expensive, the more I buy<\/em>\u201d (Anscombre 1995, p. 45).<\/p>\n

Conversely, we can assume an equivalence between statements that select the same conclusion: if the same segment S<\/strong> is preceded, in a first occurrence by the segment Sa<\/strong>, and in a second occurrence by a different segment Sb<\/strong>, then Sa<\/strong> and Sb<\/strong> have the same meaning, because they serve the same intention<\/em>: \u201cit\u2019s hot <\/em>(Sa<\/strong>), I’ll stay at home <\/em>(S<\/strong>)\u201d vs. \u201cI have work<\/em> (Sb<\/strong>), I’ll<\/em> stay at home<\/em> (S<\/strong>)\u201d. This is a new definition of synonymy<\/em>, with respect to the same conclusion<\/span>.<\/p>\n

Finally, \u201cif segment S1<\/strong> only makes sense in the context of segment S2<\/strong>, then the sequence S1<\/strong> + S2<\/strong> constitutes a single utterance\u201d, a single linguistic unit (Ducrot 1988: 51). One could probably go a step further, and consider that they form a single sign<\/em>, with S1<\/strong> functioning as a signifier of S2<\/strong>. This conclusion reduces the proper \u201corder of discourse\u201d to that of the utterance, even of the sign<\/em>.<\/p>\n

5. Orientation and Inferential License<\/span><\/h2>\n

Ducrot contrasts his \u201csemantic\u201d point of view with what he calls the \u201ctraditional or naive\u201d view of argumentation (Ducrot 1988, pp. 72-76), without referencing specific authors. Let’s consider Toulmin\u2019s layout of argument<\/a>.
\n– Argumentation is essentially a pair of statements (S1<\/strong>, S2<\/strong>), that have the status of argument and conclusion respectively.
\n-Each statement has an autonomous meaning, and refers to a distinct specific fact, that can be evaluated independently.
\n– There is a relation of implication\u2013a physical or social extra-linguistic law\u2013between these two facts (Ducrot 1988, p. 75).<\/p>\n

This concept of argumentation can be schematized as follows: Curved arrows, going from the discourse level to the reality level, enact the referring process.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

This conception may be \u201cnaive\u201d in that it assumes that language is a transparent, inert medium\u2013a pure mirror of reality. This is not the case for natural languages (R\u00e9canati 1979). Such conditions are only met by controlled languages \u200b\u200bsuch as scientific languages, in relation to realities that they construct<\/em> as much as they refer <\/em>to them.<\/p>\n

The Awl theory emphasizes the strength of purely linguistic constraints. The orientation of a statement is precisely its ability to project its meaning not only onto<\/em>, but also as<\/em> the following statement. Thus, that what appears to be \u201cthe conclusion\u201d is merely a reformulation of the \u201cargument\u201d<\/span>. For the Awl theory, discourse is an arguing machine, that systematically commits the fallacy of the vicious<\/em>\u00a0circle<\/em><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n

In sum, the AwL theory opposes ancient and neoclassical theories and practices of argumentation, as a semantic theory of language oppose theories and techniques of conscious discursive planning, that would operate according to referential data and principles. Logical theories evaluate argumentative discourse and declare it is valid or fallacious. For semantic theory, an argumentation can only be evaluated at the grammatical level, as acceptable or unacceptable, that is, as a coherent or incoherent discourse. According to this theory, the persuasiveness of an argument depends entirely on language. To reject an argument is to break the thread of the ideal discourse.
\nThis position redefines the notion of argumentation, Anscombre thus speaks of argumentation \u201cin our sense<\/span>\u201d (1995b, p.16).<\/p>\n

6. Natural reasoning combines semantic inference with cognitive inferences<\/span><\/h2>\n

The transition from argument to conclusion may be based on a natural or a social law, or on a semantic coupling of the argument and conclusion. These two types of inferences are currently intertwined in ordinary discourse.<\/p>\n

You speak about the birth of the gods (1). Then, you say that at one time the gods did not exist; so, you deny their existence (2). This is blasphemy and punishable by law. Accordingly, you will be punished (3) a pari<\/em>, according to the law that punishes those who speak of the death of the gods.<\/span><\/p>\n

First, a semantic law deduces (2) from (1), see inference<\/a>. Second, a social law, which is not primarily concerned with linguistic data, but with social data, proceeds on from (2) to (3). The punishment is finally determined by an a pari<\/em> adjustment.
\nSocial law can be naturalized by integrating the meaning of the words:<\/p>\n

You are an impious man, impiety is punishable by death, so you must die.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is difficult to tell to what extent the very meaning of the word impious<\/em> has integrated the law \u201cimpiety is punished with death.<\/em>\u201d
\nNonetheless, the link with social reality is clear. if I want to reform the law, I’m not engaged in semantic reform, see definition<\/a>; layout<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

ORIENTATION The concept of orientation (argumentative orientation, oriented statement or expression), combined with the correlative concept of argumentative scale (Ducrot 1972), is fundamental to the theory of argumentation within language (Awl theory). This theory was developed by Oswald Ducrot and Jean-Claude Anscombre (Anscombre & Ducrot 1983, Ducrot 1988, Anscombre 1995a, 1995b, etc.). In this entry, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5278","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5278","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5278"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5278\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14314,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5278\/revisions\/14314"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5278"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5278"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5278"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}