{"id":5315,"date":"2021-10-22T18:43:02","date_gmt":"2021-10-22T16:43:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5315"},"modified":"2025-05-09T09:24:35","modified_gmt":"2025-05-09T07:24:35","slug":"paradoxes-of-argumentation-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/paradoxes-of-argumentation-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Paradoxes of argumentation"},"content":{"rendered":"

PARADOXES OF ARGUMENTATION and REFUTATION<\/span><\/h2>\n

1. Paradoxes of argumentation<\/span><\/h2>\n

1.1 Producing an argumentative question legitimates all the answers<\/span><\/h3>\n

Should there be a \u201cscientific and public debate\u201d about whether there were gas chambers in Nazi Germany? This is exactly what the revisionist Roger Garaudy has demanded: the organization of a debate would legitimize the different positions taken in this debate.<\/p>\n

Roger Garaudy has persistent doubts about the existence of gas chambers
\n<\/em>Later in the book, Roger Garaudy refers to Shoah<\/em>, the film by Claude Lanzmann, which he considers a \u201cstinker\u201d. \u2018You talk about<\/em> \u201cShoah business\u201d, you say that this film only brings testimonies without demonstrations. This is a way of saying that the gas chambers do not exist<\/em>\u2019, the president [of the court] suggested. \u2018Certainly not<\/em>\u2019 Roger Garaudy protests: As long as there is no scientific and public debate on the subject, doubts are allowed<\/em>\u2019. (Le Monde<\/em>, January 11-12 1998, p. 7)<\/span><\/p>\n

Here, Garaudy takes the position of the third party<\/em>. He might even say that the president is arguing fallaciously from ignorance – to say that P<\/strong> is not proven is not say that non-P <\/strong>is proven. The refutation must consider the contextual knowledge: here the claim is false<\/em>, because the historical and scientific work has been done and published and the libraries stay open late into the night. We are exactly in the situation of the Aristotelian indisputability<\/em>, see conditions of Discussion.<\/a><\/p>\n

1.2 Arguing for P weakens P<\/span><\/h3>\n

Arguing for P weakens P, first of all because<\/span> of the reasons that justify the discourse against the argumentative personalities<\/em>, which is often the same as the discourse against the <\/em>debate<\/a>. This discourse unfolds as follows:<\/p>\n

People don’t accept living in doubt, not to being committed to a cause, not knowing, not having an opinion on everything, not challenging the other’s opinion. They are ready to argue for or against all and anything and everything. They enjoy disputes, and are inherently incapable of arguing, as the Port-Royal philosophers show. Arguments are only substitutes for fights or playground games, they always produce more heat than light. Querulousness is a disease. The will to be right, to attack and to defend is the transparent mask of the will to power. Our most entrenched opinions are not based on argument, but on our reptilian brain mechanisms, we don’t argue, we just reformulate our opinions, etc.<\/span><\/p>\n

Second, arguing for P<\/strong> weakens P<\/strong> because argument-based knowledge is inferential, i.e., indirect<\/em> knowledge. Indirect knowledge is often considered inferior to direct<\/em> knowledge is expressed in a simple, clear statement of fact, especially to direct, revelation-based religious knowledge, see self-evidence.<\/a> Newman expressed this idea with particular force, first in the epigraph to his Grammar of Assent<\/em> (1870), taken from St. Ambrose, \u00ab\u00a0It did not please God to save his people by dialectic\u00a0\u00bb, and further:<\/p>\n

Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion.
\nNo one, I say, will die for his own calculations[1]<\/a>: he dies for realities. (p. 73) [1]<\/span><\/p>\n

To most men, argument makes the point in hand only more doubtful, and considerably less impressive. (Id<\/em>., p. 74)<\/p>\n

Along the same lines, Thomas Aquinas, when discussing the question of \u201cwhether one should argue with unbelievers in public,<\/em>\u201d considers the following objection to an affirmative answer:<\/p>\n

Objection 3:<\/em> Disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore, one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith. (ST<\/em>,<\/span> Part 2, 2, Quest 10, Art 7)<\/span><\/p>\n

Arguments develop from a question; they are reflected in counter-arguments, attested or conceivable. This explains the existence of the paradoxes of argumentation: each position casts doubt on the other. This explains why the first step in the process of legitimizing a new position is to open a debate about it<\/em> and, to do this, one must first find some opponents.<\/p>\n

2. Paradoxes of refutation<\/span><\/h2>\n

2.1 The absence of refutation strengthens the opposing position (even if that position is insignificant or absurd)<\/span><\/h2>\n

It is much better to be criticized than to be ignored. Being at the center of a polemic can be an ideal and comfortable position. Finding someone who will make an argument that contradicts your own is an argumentative strategy that gives initial legitimacy to a point of view. The refutation creates a question where there was none, and that question, by feedback, legitimizes all the speeches that answer it. The proponent is weak<\/em> because he or she bears the burden of proof, but strong<\/em> because he or she creates a question.<\/p>\n

The historian P. Vidal-Naquet describes this argumentative trap in the case of the negationist discourse, as follows,<\/p>\n

I hesitated for a long time before writing these pages about the alleged revisionism, about a book whose editors tell us without laughing that, \u201cFaurisson’s arguments are serious. They must be answered<\/em>\u201d. The reasons for not<\/em> speaking were many, but of unequal value. […] In the end, was not the answer to recognize the idea that there was indeed a debate, and to publicize a man who is passionately hungry for it? […]<\/span>
\nThis last objection that is actually the most serious. […] It is also true that to attempt a debate would be to admit the inadmissible argument of the two \u201chistorical schools<\/em>\u201d, the \u201crevisionist<\/em>\u201d and the \u201cexterminationist<\/em>\u201d. There would be, as an October 1980 pamphlet put it, \u201cadvocates of the existence of homicidal gas chambers<\/em>\u201d and the others, just as there are advocates of a high chronology and of a low chronology for the tyrants of Corinth. […]<\/span>
\nFrom the day that R. Faurisson, a duly qualified academic, a professor at a leading university, was first allowed to write for the first time in Le Monde<\/em>1<\/sup>, even if it was immediately refuted, the question ceased to be marginal. This became central a central question, and those who had no direct knowledge of the events in question, especially young people, had the right to ask whether some people were trying to hide something from them. Hence the decision of Les Temps modernes<\/em>1<\/sup> and by Esprit<\/em>1<\/sup> to answer.<\/span>
\nBut how to answer, since the discussion is impossible? We must discuss [Fausrisson] like a sophist, that is to say, with a man who resembles the one who speaks the truth, and whose arguments must be dismantled, piece by piece, in order to expose the pretense.<\/span>
\nPierre Vidal-Naquet, [A Paper Eichmann<\/em>], 1987.[2]<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

2.2. Weak or inconclusive refutations strengthen the position they attack<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

According to the law of weakness<\/em>,<\/a> a weak argument for a conclusion is an argument for the opposite conclusion. Symmetrically, a weak refutation of a thesis strengthens this thesis.<\/p>\n

G\u00e9rard Chauvy is on trial for slandering Raymond and Lucie Aubrac, two leaders of the French Resistance against the Nazis.
\n<\/em>He cited a letter written by Klaus Barbie in which he described them as members of the Resistance turned into double agents.<\/span>
\nG\u00e9rard Chauvy, who claims to have discovered Klaus Barbie’s memoirs in 1991, was the first to publish these sixty pages, which, until then, had been \u201ccirculating under cover\u201d, by reproducing them in extenso<\/em> in the appendices of his work. Does he share this thesis, as the civil party claims? Are his apparent reservations about this memoir just another maneuver to accredit it? <\/em>In any case, this document is at the center of the debate. (Le Monde<\/em>, February 7, 1998, p. 10; my emphasis).<\/span><\/p>\n

An inconclusive refutation by a known good arguer strengthens the position under attack. <\/strong>Since the given refutation is taken as the best possible (according to Grice’s maxims), and since it remains inconclusive, the reader will conclude that, \u201csince even such an arguer finds nothing else to say, then, the criticized position must actually be correct<\/em>\u201d, even if this conclusion is ad ignorantiam<\/em>, see counter-argumentation<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u00a0A very special case: argumentation by ironic<\/a> refutation.
\n<\/strong><\/em><\/span>This is the possibility of strategically using a weak and inconclusive refutation to support a position that one cannot openly support. This may be necessary in times of tyranny.
\nThe refutation contains obvious errors that alert the careful reader; there is a contrast between the quality and care of the exposition and the meager character of the rebuttal. Moreover, the refutation is not presented in the author’s usual argumentative style. For example, a good theologian develops in a dialectical and detailed manner, a position condemned by the official authorities of his religion, and refutes it only with arguments drawn from various authorities (which the reader may know are considered questionable), so that the careful reader is led to think that this oddity is strategic. The speech is apparently refuted, only to be better affirmed in reality, the negation then serving to cover the author. This case of indirectness was theorized by Strauss (1953). When a discourse is forbidden under certain historical, social, or religious circumstances, it is still possible to give voice to it, under the guise of its refutation, the negation then serving to protect the speaker from tyrannical authorities.<\/p>\n

This ironic argumentation can be<\/em> dangerous. The authorities are not necessarily naive or uninformed, and they may be well aware of the intended purpose of the pseudo-rebuttal, which will rightly be interpreted as a denial of a belief which is actually held by the speaker: \u201cHow can you so be such an expert on heterodox positions and such a fool when it comes to orthodoxy?<\/em>\u201d.
\nSuch a strategy<\/a>, based on the opacity of the writer’s intentions, presupposes a double argumentative address, the true intentions of which can be grasped only by a careful reader, while they remain unknown to the hasty reader, who appreciates the weak refutation because it can be easily understood, absorbed and repeated.<\/p>\n

2.3 A Strong Refutation can Strengthen the Attacked Position<\/span><\/h3>\n

In 2001, Elisabeth Tessier, a renowned astrologer, successfully defended her doctoral thesis in sociology entitled \u201cEpistemological Situation of Astrology<\/em>\u201d at the Sorbonne University. This thesis was received with great indignation by a large number of academics. Four Nobel laureates and leading academics intervened to deny that it had any scientific value, dismissing it as supporting irrationality and pseudoscience.<\/p>\n

As a result of this intervention, the debate was reframed as follows: on the one hand, the authorities<\/em>, renowned professors and scientists, pitted against a woman<\/em>. Now, a quick peripheral reasoning, supported by the argument of proportionality<\/a>, is enough to conclude that the former are deeply disturbed by this thesis; and the trap of the strong refutation closes on its own initiators: the very prestige of the opponents reinforces the refuted thesis, at least in the eyes of the adepts of peripheral reasoning, and they are many.<\/p>\n

\n[1] \u201cNon in dialectic\u00e0 complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\n

[1b]<\/a> This may be an allusion to Galileo who accepted to publicly recant heliocentrism and the movement of the earth, while privately maintaining the truth: \u201cE pur si muove\u201d (And yet it moves<\/em><\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Pierre Vical-Naquet, Un Eichmann de papier [An Eichman of paper]<\/em>. In Les Assassins de la m\u00e9moire<\/em>. [\u00ab\u00a0The Assassins of Memory\u00a0\u00bb] Paris: La D\u00e9couverte, 1987, p. 11-13. Le Monde<\/em>, a major French newspaper; Les Temps Modernes<\/em>, a journal of philosophy, founded by Jean-Paul Sartre; Esprit<\/em>, a journal of philosophy founded by Emmanuel Mounier.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

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PARADOXES OF ARGUMENTATION and REFUTATION 1. Paradoxes of argumentation 1.1 Producing an argumentative question legitimates all the answers Should there be a \u201cscientific and public debate\u201d about whether there were gas chambers in Nazi Germany? This is exactly what the revisionist Roger Garaudy has demanded: the organization of a debate would legitimize the different positions […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5315","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5315","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5315"}],"version-history":[{"count":22,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5315\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14215,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5315\/revisions\/14215"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5315"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5315"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5315"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}