{"id":5489,"date":"2021-10-24T08:30:52","date_gmt":"2021-10-24T06:30:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5489"},"modified":"2025-05-11T18:22:25","modified_gmt":"2025-05-11T16:22:25","slug":"schematization-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/schematization-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Schematization"},"content":{"rendered":"

SCHEMATIZATION<\/span><\/h1>\n

The study of schematizations is the defining goal of the natural logic<\/strong> developed by Jean-Blaise Grize, a student and later collaborator of Jean Piaget at the Research Center on Genetic Epistemology<\/em> in Geneva.
\nThis logic is called \u201cnatural\u201d in contrast to formal logic: on the one hand, it is a \u201clogic of objects\u201d (1996: 82) and a \u201clogic of subjects\u201d (Grize 1996: 96); on the other hand, it involves thinking processes that leave \u201ctraces\u201d in natural discourse.<\/p>\n

In Grize’s view, an argument is not necessarily a set of statements organized according to the layout proposed by Toulmin. The impact of an argument and its rationality are not tied to a particular way of speaking or to the use of such and such specific \u00ab\u00a0discursive techniques\u00a0\u00bb, as suggested by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. Any utterance<\/span>, any coherent sequence of utterances<\/span>, whether it is considered descriptive, narrative, or argumentative, is indeed argumentative.<\/strong>
\nAccording to Grize, discourse is essentially argumentative, which means that all utterances frame the situation according to the point of view of the arguer, in order to produce\u00a0 a significant, synthetic signification of the situation, a \u00ab\u00a0schematization,\u00a0\u00bb i.e., an argument. .<\/p>\n

\u201cScheme\u201d here has a completely different meaning from \u201cargument scheme\u201d, which, in Grize\u2019s vocabulary, would be called \u201creasoned organization\u201d, corresponding to the second-level phenomenon of sentence combination<\/em>, whereas schematization is a first-level phenomenon, that of sentence production<\/em>.<\/p>\n

According to Grize’s favorite metaphor, to argue is to \u00ab\u00a0let the audience see\u00a0\u00bb a situation as \u00ab\u00a0spotlighted\u00a0\u00bb by the speaker. Since all speech casts some subjective light on the world, argumentation is inherent in speech.<\/p>\n

In Perelman\u2019s terms, this operation consists in giving \u201cpresence<\/strong>\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0to an object<\/span> (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, [1958], p. 116). This presentification of an object, in both Grize and Perelman, corresponds to what classical rhetoric calls ekphrasis, energeia, hypothyposis<\/em>. Such figures have the hypnotic power to make the audience hallucinate a rhetorical reality in place of reality. If argumentation is the expression of a point of view, schematization is its counterpart, the cognitive vision attached to that point of view.<\/p>\n

Grize defines his natural logic in relation to formal logic:<\/p>\n

in addition to\u00a0 a logic of form, a formal logic, it is possible to imagine a \u201clogic of content\u201d, that is, a logic that takes into account the processes of thinking, the development and interconnection of these contents.<\/span>
\nFormal logic based on propositions considers the relations between concepts, while natural logic proposes the construction and interconnection of concepts. (Grize 1996, p. 80)<\/span><\/p>\n

This \u201clogic of content\u201d<\/span> may remind us of Toulmin’s \u201csubstantial logic\u201d, see layout of argument.<\/a> But, unlike Toulmin, who characterizes argumentation as an arrangement of statements without discussing their internal structure, Grize believes that argumentation begins with the basic operations that produce the statement itself.<\/p>\n

This concept fits with a vision of argumentation as representation and storytelling, as a coherent and detailed account of the world.<\/span> This may be of some comfort to all students who are discouraged by the difficulty of making dense account of extended texts or interactions in terms of argument schemes, even when these are supplemented by an extensive repertoire of figures of speech.<\/p>\n

If persuasion is defined as shifting the partner’s representations, and, accordingly, his or her behavior, then any informative statement, such as \u201cIt is 8 a.m.<\/em>\u201d is argumentative. If the addressee has to catch the 7:55 train and is enjoying a last cup of coffee, thinking it is a quarter to 8, then, the information will dramatically change his vision of the immediate future. Natural logic is also a theory of generalized persuasion, in that it simply \u201c\u00a0\u00bbilluminates\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0 the relevant aspects of reality\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Schematization, a Step-by-step Process of Meaning Construction
\n<\/span><\/h1>\n

Argumentation is traditionally defined as a combination of utterances. Natural Logic studies argumentation as a cognitive process evidenced in natural discourse, and manifested at every stage of discourse production, from the first elaboration of an idea to the combination of utterances, which is only the final stage of the argumentative process.<\/span> Schematization corresponds to a representation embodied in a complex discursive unit,<\/p>\n

Influencing the interlocutor is to try to modify his or her representations, by emphasizing some aspects of things, concealing others, proposing new ones, and all this by using appropriate schematization. (Grize 1990, p. 40)<\/span><\/p>\n

Argumentation does not appear to be a chain of statements in a discourse. It emerges progressively at every stage of the production of the utterance, from the first operation of apprehension of content to the construction of a meaningful and therefore \u201creasoned\u201d discourse. Any statement, any coherent succession of statements, whether or not it is traditionaly considered to be argumentative, narrative, or descriptive \u2026 , is indeed argumentative to the extent that it constructs a unique point of view, that is a \u201cschematization\u201d. This conception leads to reconsider all information as argumentation, tending to liken discursive meaning to argumentation, S. Argumentation (I)<\/a>; Argumentation (II)<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Grize defines Natural Logic as \u201cthe study of logical-discursive operations that make it possible to construct and reconstruct a schematization\u201d (1990, p. 65); \u201cIts task is to account for the operations of thought allowing a speaker to construct objects and to predicate upon them at will\u201d (1982, p. 222).
\nThe concept of schematization defined as a \u201c[discursive representation], oriented towards an addressee, of what the author conceives or imagines of a certain reality\u201d (1996, p. 50), \u201cof what it is all about\u201d (1990, p. 29). A schematization is a discourse that focuses the listener\u2019s attention upon a \u201cmicro-universe\u201d given as \u201can accurate reflection of reality\u201d (id<\/em>., p. 36), which constructs or \u201cstructures\u201d (id<\/em>., p. 35) a synthetic, coherent, stable meaning. The purpose of schematization is \u201cto show<\/em> something to someone\u201d (Grize 1996, p. 50; my emphasis); \u201cto schematize […] is a semiotic act: it is to give to see<\/em><\/strong>\u201d (id<\/em>., p. 37; my emphasis). The object of Natural Logic is the study of the operations constructing such images.
\nThe functioning of schematization is particularly clear in classical argumentative situations, when a discourse directly confronts a counter-discourse; the same reality is given two antagonistic descriptions:<\/p>\n

S1 \u2014\u00a0These replacement workers, you will pay them with <\/em>the strikers’ money!<\/span>
\nS2 \u2014\u00a0Not the strikers’ money, <\/em>the taxpayers’ money.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Operations constructing a schematization<\/span><\/h1>\n

Natural Logic postulates the existence of \u201cprimitive notions\u201d, of a pre-linguistic nature (Grize 1996, p. 82), linked with the culture and the activities of the speakers. These pre-notions are the place of \u201ccultural pre-constructions\u201d, i.e., received ideas and current, accepted ways of doing things. The language \u201csemantizes\u201d these primitive notions turning them into \u201cobjects of thought\u201d associated with words (Grize 1996, 83).
\nSchematization operations are anchored in these \u201cprimitive notions\u201d (id.<\/em>, p. 67) and are constructed by a series of operations; \u201cprimitive notions\u201d are actually noted by words between brackets. The following sequence is formed of the primitive image and fuzzy notions \/fuzzy\/ and \/image\/:<\/p>\n

It\u2019s unfortunate that the edge of the image is blurry, and it needs to be corrected. (Ibid<\/em>.)<\/span><\/p>\n

This construction follows these steps:<\/p>\n

These different linguistic-cognitive operations can be likened to the vision of language and mind developed by the philosophy of traditional logic, S. Logic<\/a>.<\/p>\n

(a)\u00a0Apprehension of content by the mind;<\/span>
\n(b)\u00a0Predication, constituting unasserted propositions;<\/span>
\n(c)\u00a0Judgment, expressed in an assertion, which can be true or false;<\/span>
\n(d) Concatenation of judgments, i.e. discourse construction.<\/span><\/p>\n

The aim of this approach is to emphasize that all operations relevant to the genesis of the utterance have an argumentative import. Argumentation is as much a sentence construction<\/em> process as a sentence connection<\/em> process.<\/p>\n

3. Shoring<\/span><\/h2>\n

The concept of shoring developed in Natural Logic is defined as,<\/p>\n

a discursive function consisting, for a given segment of speech (whose dimension can vary from a simple statement to a group of statements having a certain functional homogeneity), to accredit, to make more likely, to reinforce, etc. the content asserted in another segment of the same discourse. (Apoth\u00e9loz & Mi\u00e9ville 1989, p. 70)<\/span><\/p>\n

This concept corresponds to the classical problematic of argumentation as a composition of statements, a statement-argument supporting a statement-conclusion. To refer to the same phenomenon, Natural Logic also uses the expression \u201creasoned organizations\u201d:<\/p>\n

Many statements are made merely to support, to shore up the information given. This is part of the general process of argumentation, and allows us to envisage more or less extensive blocks of discursive sequences as reasoned organizations<\/em>. (Grize 1990, p. 120)<\/span><\/p>\n

The study of reasoned organizations is an instrument for the study of representations, defined as \u201ca network of articulated contents\u201d (id<\/em>. p. 119-120). It should be emphasized that, for Natural Logic, the reasoning process is not limited to the combination of utterances but includes the whole dynamic process of structuring the utterance, whether it will function as argument or conclusion in a reasoned organization.<\/p>\n

4. Schematization and communication<\/span><\/h1>\n

Schematizations refer to a particular communication situation. They are the product of \u201cthe activity of speech [which] is used to construct objects of thought\u201d (1990, p. 22); these objects being part of a dialogue where they are used \u201cas shared references for interlocutors\u201d (ibid<\/em>.). The communication situation envisioned is intended to be \u201cessentially dialogical in nature\u201d (1990, p. 21), but it is actually analogous to that of rhetorical address. It never considers the possible interactions between the respective schematizations of the participants.<\/p>\n

By [dialogal] I don’t mean the interweaving of two discourses, but the production of a speech between two parties, a speaker [orator] … addressing a listener. Admittedly, in most texts, the listener remains virtual. This, however, does not alter the basic problem: the speaker constructs the speech according to his or her representations of the listener, simply, if the listener is present, he or she can actually say, \u201cI do not agree<\/em>\u201d or, \u201cI do not understand<\/em>\u201d. But if the listener is absent, the speaker must indeed anticipate his or her refusals and misunderstandings. (1982, p. 30)<\/span><\/p>\n

Persuasion is given up, \u201cthe speaker can only propose a schematization to his or her audience, without actually \u2018transmitting\u2019 it\u201d (ibid<\/em>.).<\/p>\n

5. \u201cLogic of Contents\u201d (Grize) and \u201cSubstantial Logic\u201d (Toulmin)<\/span><\/h1>\n

Grize defines his Natural Logic in relation to formal logic:<\/p>\n

Alongside a logic of form, a formal logic, it is possible to envision a \u201clogic of contents\u201d, that is, a logic that takes into account the processes of thought, the development and interconnection of these contents.
\nFormal logic based on propositions takes into account the relations between concepts, while natural logic proposes to\u00a0 the construction and interconnection of notions. (Grize 1996, p. 80)<\/span><\/p>\n

This \u201clogic of contents\u201d may remind us of Toulmin\u2019s \u201csubstantial logic\u201d, see layout of argument.<\/a> But, unlike Toulmin, who characterizes argumentation as an arrangement of statements without discussing their internal structure, Grize considers that argumentation begins with the basic operation that produce the statement itself.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

SCHEMATIZATION The study of schematizations is the defining goal of the natural logic developed by Jean-Blaise Grize, a student and later collaborator of Jean Piaget at the Research Center on Genetic Epistemology in Geneva. This logic is called \u201cnatural\u201d in contrast to formal logic: on the one hand, it is a \u201clogic of objects\u201d (1996: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5489","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5489","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5489"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5489\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14245,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5489\/revisions\/14245"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5489"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5489"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5489"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

(a) The process of discourse construction begins with the selection of relevant primitive notions<\/strong>, to produce the objects of discourse; here \u201cimage<\/em>, edge of the image<\/em>\u201d as well as the predicative pair \u201cto be blurred<\/em>, not to be blurred<\/em>\u201d. The objects thus schematized will evolve with the development of the discourse, S. Object of discourse<\/a>.
\n(b) Then, the operation of characterization produces \u201ccontents of judgments\u201d<\/strong> that is predications, and these are accompanied by modalizations, carried out on the objects of discourse. Here, the content of judgment is, \u201cthat the edge of the image be quite blurry<\/em>\u201d.
\n<\/span>(c) A subject then asserts (positively or negatively) the preddication<\/strong>, and produces a statement, \u201cit is unfortunate that the edge of the image is quite blurry<\/em>\u201d.
\n<\/span>(d) Operations of configuration<\/strong> then connect several utterances and so build a discursive chain, \u201ca reasoned organization\u201d. The preceding statement for example, is connected to another statement, \u201cthis must be corrected<\/em>\u201d, which is produced according to the same mechanism:
\n<\/span>It\u2019s unfortunate that the edge of the image is blurry, and it needs to be corrected<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n