{"id":5491,"date":"2021-10-24T08:37:37","date_gmt":"2021-10-24T06:37:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5491"},"modified":"2025-04-27T12:31:35","modified_gmt":"2025-04-27T10:31:35","slug":"scheme-argument-scheme-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/scheme-argument-scheme-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Scheme: Argumentation scheme"},"content":{"rendered":"

SCHEME of argument, or TOPOS<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. Argument scheme<\/span>
\n<\/span><\/h1>\n

An argumentat scheme<\/strong><\/em> (argumentation scheme, topos<\/em>) is a discursive formula, a generic statement that functions as an argument rule, <\/em>an inferring license.
\nConcrete argumentations<\/em>, or enthymemes<\/em> correspond to its actualization<\/span> in specific passages. They stand in an occurrence\/type relation<\/span> with the corresponding topos.<\/p>\n

The concept of an argumentation scheme<\/em> (argument scheme<\/em>) captures the specificity of the minimal concatenation of two statements (S1, S2) that make up an argumentation (Arg, Concl). An argumentation scheme is essentially a specific kind of sentence connection, a special case of textual coherence and cohesion; that is to say, a general discursive inferential scheme<\/em> that links an argument to a conclusion.<\/p>\n

In Aristotle’s Rhetoric<\/em>, the topoi (place; pl. topoi), i.e., argumentation schemes, are expressed as such general statements, which can sometimes be formulated as proverbs or maxims. The saying, \u201cif you can do the hard things, you can do the easy things as well<\/em>\u201d corresponds to the \u201cfrom the greatest to the least\u201d (a maiori ad minus<\/em>) branch of the a fortiori<\/em> scheme.
\nTypical formulas, such as those proposed by Bentham’s \u201clet us wait a little, the moment is not favorable<\/em>\u201d are also complete and perfectly adequate expressions of an argumentation scheme. see legal arguments: three collections<\/a>. This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, see a fortiori<\/em>.<\/a><\/p>\n

The characteristic indefinite components (subject, predicate) of the scheme, can also be expressed as variables. For example, the schema a fortiori<\/em><\/a>\u00a0 can be written as (according to Ryan 1984):<\/p>\n

If <P is O<\/strong>> is more likely (more probable, recommendable…) than <E is O<\/strong>>,<\/span>
\nand <P is O<\/strong>> is false (not plausible, not recommendable)<\/span>
\nthen <E is O<\/strong>> is false (not plausible, not recommendable).<\/span><\/p>\n

The scheme is embodied in the following argumentation:<\/p>\n

If teachers do not know everything, students know even less<\/span><\/p>\n

In the same style, the schema of the opposites is written as follows:<\/p>\n

If <A is B<\/strong>>, then <not-A is not-B<\/strong>>.<\/p>\n

Derived argumentation:<\/p>\n

If I was of no use to you in my life, at least my death will be of use to you.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such formulations should not be taken as some kind of \u201clogical or semantic deep structure\u201d of the schema. Their undoubted benefit is to clarify the reference of general terms.<\/p>\n

2. Example: The Argument scheme on waste<\/span><\/h1>\n

Identifying a scheme in a text is a key moment in argument analysis. But this identification is not easy, because the main semantic components of the scheme can be distributed in the text. Experts will say that they know a scheme when they see one; but, in any case, a check is necessary.<\/p>\n

The reconstruction can proceed along the following basic lines:<\/p>\n

\u2014 First, an explicit definition<\/strong> of the topic is needed.
\n\u2014 Second, the passage must be clearly delimited<\/strong>.
\n\u2014 And finally, one must show how the scheme can be projected onto the passage<\/strong>; that is, one must establish a point-to-point correspondence between the scheme and the passage under analysis. Essentially, these connections consist of the linguistic operations of equivalence and close reformulation and synonymy.<\/p>\n

\u2014 The schema:<\/p>\n

The argument from waste consists in saying that, as one has already begun a task and made sacrifices, which would be wasted if the enterprise were given up, one should continue in the same direction.<\/strong> ([1958],\u00a0p. 279)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 First derived concrete argumentation:<\/p>\n

this is the justification given by the banker who continues to lend to his insolvent debtor in the hope of getting him back on his feet again in the long run.<\/strong> (Id<\/em>., p. 279)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 Linguistic operation associating the argument with the scheme<\/p>\n

1st column, italics:<\/em> the actual argumentation itself
\n<\/em>3rd column, bold<\/em> the topos
\n2nd column, the correspondence between argumentation and topos<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

(*) Interpretation by the topos of the opposites<\/p>\n

The second enthymeme is more complicated:<\/p>\n

This is one of the reasons which, according to Saint Theresa, prompt a person to pray, even in a period of \u2018dryness\u2019. [1] One would give up, she says, if it were not \u201cthat one remembers that it gives delight and pleasure to the Lord of the garden, that one is careful not to throw away all the service rendered, and that one remembers the benefit one hopes to derive from the great effort of dipping the pail often into the well and drawing it up empty<\/em>\u201d. (Id<\/em>., p. 279)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Linguistic operations associating the argument to the scheme (same conventions):<\/p>\n

\"\"\u00a0<\/strong>(1<\/sup>) Traditional mystical metaphor for \u201cno increase in faith\u201d = no spiritual benefit.<\/p>\n

3. Naming argument schemes<\/span><\/h2>\n

Argument schemes are named according to their form or their content.<\/p>\n

3.1 By their specific domain and semantic content <\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Some famous arguments are named according to their precise content.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The third man argument<\/em> is an objection made by Aristotle to the Platonic theory of intelligible forms, as opposed to individuals. According to this objection, the Platonic theory implies an infinite regression. It can be seen as an argument from vertigo<\/em><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0The argument against miracles<\/em>: The probability that the dead person was resurrected is less<\/em> than the probability that the witness is mistaken; so we may reasonably doubt that the dead person was resurrected (Hume, 1748, \u00a786 \u201cOf Miracles\u201d). This formally refers to a hierarchy of probabilities, and can be represented on an argumentative scale<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u2014 The ontological argument<\/em> infers the existence of God from the a priori notion of a perfect being, see a priori<\/em><\/a>; definition<\/a>.<\/p>\n

3.2 According to their form and content<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

See Collections (2): From Aristotle to Boethius<\/a>
\nCollections (3): Modernity and tradition<\/a>
\nCollections (4): Contemporaty innovations and structurations<\/a><\/p>\n

On the use of Latin words and expressions, see ab<\/em> arguments, a\/ad<\/em> \u2014 e\/ ex<\/em> \u2014\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

3.3 Oriented labels <\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Usually, the label that designates an argument specifies a form and\/or content:<\/span> the argument refers to the consequences (ad consequentiam<\/em>), to authority (ab auctoritate<\/em>), to the consistency of human beliefs (ad hominem<\/em>), to emotion (ad passionem<\/em>) or to some particular emotion (ad odium<\/em>). The speaker can admit, without inconsistency, losing face and invalidating the argument he has just used, that he is arguing by the consequences, ad hominem<\/em>, ex datis<\/em>, from a religious belief (ad fidem<\/em>), or possibly from the number, ad numerum<\/em>. These arguments can be evaluated in a second, normative, stage.<\/p>\n

Some other arguments involving the arguer are denoted by oriented labels<\/span>. An argument cannot be labeled an appeal to stupidity<\/em>, to superstition<\/em> or fancy<\/em> without invalidating it; given the current view of emotion as antagonistic to reason, to label\u00a0 a passage as containing an appeal to emotion, from ad passiones<\/em> to ad odium<\/em>, amounts to a rejection of the argument. Such labels contain a built-in evaluation; there is some confusion between the levels of description and evaluation.
\nAn appeal to faith is judged to be fallacious or not, depending on whether one shares the speaker’s faith or not. In such cases, the theoretical language is biased<\/span>, and normative action becomes ideological.<\/p>\n

4. Typologies of Argumentation Schemes<\/span><\/h2>\n

A general typology of argumentation schemes is an organized collection<\/span> of argumentation schemes. Collections of argumentation schemes are locally constituted as:<\/p>\n

\u2014 The set of arguments used locally by a particular speaker, in a particular discussion, see collections<\/a>, 1 to 4.
\n\u2014 The set of arguments attached to a question, see\u00a0 script<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. Argument schemes in discourse<\/span><\/h1>\n

The concept of the argument schema anchors the study of argumentation in the material reality of speech and discourse. The ability to identify an argument from authority, a pragmatic argument, etc. is an essential skill for the production, interpretation and criticism of argumentative discourse, see tagging<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some works, such as the Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica<\/em> or texts such as Montesquieu’s \u201cOn the Enslavement of the Negroes\u201d can be described as dense and dry sequences of arguments. Other texts are more fluid, and hardly seem reducible to circumscribed segments that could plausibly be described as the occurrence of an argumentation scheme.<\/p>\n

Schemes are underdetermined by linguistic expression; there may be several plausible analyses of the same segment of text, some of which invalidate the argument, some of which do not. This uncertainty should not be automatically be taken as an indicator of the poor quality of argument or\u00a0 analysis. Contextual considerations and the nature of the particular editing of the passage play a crucial role in this regard.<\/p>\n

An argumentative text or interaction can be compared to a natural meadow, where the most beautiful flowers correspond to canonical argument schemes. But it is also necessary to ask what the dense plant tissue around these flowers is made of. For this purpose, interaction analysis, discourse analysis and textual linguistics serve as crucial analytical tools, that must be adapted to the specifics of argumentation analysis. The \u201cschema approach\u201d is part of a broader perspective that begins with the attitude towards the other’s discourses, the kind of argumentative situation they frame, the determination of general argumentative strategies, considering a whole range of semiotic phenomena. At the micro level, it is necessary not only to focus on their coordination<\/em> but also to consider the operations that produce<\/em> the statements: a good grammar book and a good dictionary are essential if one want to construct a good argumentative analysis, see argumentative question<\/a>; indicator<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

SCHEME of argument, or TOPOS 1. Argument scheme An argumentat scheme (argumentation scheme, topos) is a discursive formula, a generic statement that functions as an argument rule, an inferring license. Concrete argumentations, or enthymemes correspond to its actualization in specific passages. They stand in an occurrence\/type relation with the corresponding topos. The concept of an […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5491","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5491","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5491"}],"version-history":[{"count":34,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5491\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5493,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5491\/revisions\/5493"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5491"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5491"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5491"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

This method can be illustrated by the case of the argument from waste<\/a>, as defined and illustrated in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca.<\/p>\n