{"id":5498,"date":"2021-10-24T09:03:24","date_gmt":"2021-10-24T07:03:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5498"},"modified":"2025-04-23T15:45:57","modified_gmt":"2025-04-23T13:45:57","slug":"rules-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/rules-e\/","title":{"rendered":"Rules"},"content":{"rendered":"

RULES<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

Arguments can be approached on the basis of very different systems of rules.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014 Rules that express observational regularities<\/strong>.<\/span>
\n\u2014 Rules expressing norms, imperatives<\/strong>, which are instrumental in evaluating arguments.<\/span>
\n\u2014 Rules as advice on how to do things well<\/strong>, how to convince a person to believe or to do something.<\/span><\/p>\n

1. General Rules of Interaction<\/span><\/h2>\n

1.1 Rules of interaction <\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Argumentative interactions in natural language follow the various systems of rules proposed for interaction in general, so for example, the rule of justification of non-preferred sequences is applied:<\/span><\/p>\n

A dispreferred second part is a second part of an adjacency pair that consists of a response to the first part that is generally to be avoided, and which is likely to be marked by such features as delays, prefaces and accounts. (SIL<\/em>, Dispreferred second part)<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

1.2 P<\/strong>rinciple<\/strong> of Cooperation<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

The principle of cooperation<\/a> expresses not only what the participants actually do (observational regularity), but also what is reasonable for them to do (rational regularity).<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

1.3 Principle of Civility<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

The rules of linguistic politeness<\/a> regulate conversation based on the concepts of face<\/em> and territory<\/em>. In ordinary conversation, these rules can inhibit the development of arguments. The overriding concern for maintaining relationships can make it difficult for disagreements to be expressed and developed.<\/span><\/p>\n

1.4 Sins of Language <\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

The Christian theological tradition has developed a set of rules for controlling the discourse. Violation of any of these rules is stigmatized as a \u00ab\u00a0sin of the tongue<\/a>\u00a0\u00bb (Casagrande & Vecchio 1991).<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Rules Specific to Argumentative Speech<\/span><\/h2>\n

2.1 Rules of place<\/span> <\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Specific rules are attached to specific argumentative venues<\/em>. For example, parliamentary rules apply in parliament; tribunal proceedings, or classroom interactions develop according to their own specific codes and regulatory conventions, see forum<\/a>. These rules are established according to a sui generis<\/em> procedure and are applied by the competent authorities having authority in the particular place. These rules frame the kind of local rationality<\/strong> that characterizes the \u201cgenius loci\u201d, the spirit of the place.<\/span><\/p>\n

In such places, the rules determine the subjects to be discussed, the procedures that will lead to a legitimate decision and conclusion, and the persons qualified to speak; they regulate the right to speak, the amount of speech, and the order of speaking. These rules may, for example prohibit overlapping and interruptions.<\/span><\/p>\n

2.2 \u201cThe Rules of Honorable Controversy\u201d <\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n

Levi Hedge presents the following seven \u201cRules for Honorable Controversy\u201d in his Elements of Logick <\/em>(1838):<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 1. The terms, in which the question in debate is expressed, and the precise point at issue, should be so clearly defined<\/span>, that there could be no misunderstanding respecting them.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 2. The parties should mutually consider each other, as standing on a footing of equality<\/span> in respect to the subject in debate. Each should regard the other as possessing equal talents, knowledge, and desire for truth, with himself; and that it is possible therefore that he may be in the wrong and his adversary in the right.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 3. All expressions which are unmeaning or without effect<\/span> in regard to the subject in debate should be strictly avoided.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 4. Personal reflections<\/span> on an adversary should in no instance be indulged.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 5. No one has a right to accuse his adversary of indirect motives<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 6. The consequences of any doctrine are not to be charged on him who maintains it, unless he expressly avows them<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rule 7. As truth, and not victory<\/span>, is the professed object of controversy, whatever proofs may be advanced, on either side, should be examined with fairness and candor; and any attempt to ensnare an adversary by the arts of sophistry, or to lessen the force of his reasoning, by wit, caviling, or ridicule, is a violation of the rules of honorable controversy.
\n(Hedge, 1838, pp. 159-162)<\/span><\/p>\n

– Rule 5 corresponds to the accusation of having a hidden motive<\/a>: \u201cYou agree to this proposal not because you approve of it but to please the director<\/em>.<\/span>
\n– Rule 6 is original, and refers to the problem of the hidden agendas, or even of conspiracies, see pragmatic argument<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Disputes can be said to be \u201chonorable\u201d in both the intellectual and social sense. This system reintroduces what is socially acceptable into a situation where the participants do not spontaneously apply the usual rules of cooperation and courtesy. Such considerations join the rhetorical problems\u00a0of appropriateness (prepon<\/em>) and propriety (aptum<\/em>) (Lausberg [1960], \u00a7 1055-1062).<\/span><\/p>\n

In Hedges’ system, social control is the root of the imposition of cooperation. The rules for avoiding the sins of language come from religion. In the pragma-dialectical framework, the system of rules makes use of communicative rationality, in the spirit of Grice, see cooperative principle<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Pragma-Dialectic Rules and the Reconceptualization of Fallacies<\/span><\/h1>\n

These rules define \u201cA Code of Conduct for Reasonable Discussants\u201d (van Eemeren, Grootendorst 2004, p. 190), for partners willing to resolve their disagreement rationally. A fallacy<\/em> is defined as a violation of one of these \u201cTen Commandments for Reasonable Discussants\u201d (id<\/em>., 190-196), see fallacies-1<\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 1, Freedom rule<\/em><\/span>: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or calling standpoints into question<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 2, Obligation to defend rule<\/em><\/span>: Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 3, Standpoint rule<\/span>:<\/em> Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 4, Relevance rule<\/span>:<\/em> Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 5, Unexpressed-premise rule<\/span>:<\/em> Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 6, Starting-point rule<\/em><\/span>: Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 7, Validity rule<\/em><\/span>: Reasoning that in an argumentation is presented as formally conclusive may not be invalid in a logical sense.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 8, Argument scheme rule<\/em><\/span>: Standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by means of appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 9, Concluding rule<\/em><\/span>: Inconclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints, and conclusive defenses of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commandment 10, Language use rule<\/em><\/span>: Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party\u2019s formulations.<\/span><\/p>\n

This system is inspired by the proposals of the Erlangen School for the definition of a rational \u201cortholanguage\u201d, see logics for dialogue<\/a>. In the spirit of Grice, these rules introduce or impose cooperation<\/a> where it would not be spontaneously practiced by the participants. The game is based on the notion of standpoint. It corresponds to a dialectical treatment of the difference of standpoints, in which a proponent affirms his standpoint and responds to the attacks of an opponent who questions it. Rule 9 recalls the goal of the game, which is to resolve the disagreement of opinion either by eliminating the untenable opinion or by eliminating the doubt about a well-reasoned opinion.<\/span><\/p>\n

Such a system of rules considers the validity judgments of the speakers (van Eemeren, Garssen, Meuffels 2009). It is also possible to identify the implicit rules on which speakers base their judgments by observing their practices (Doury 2003, 2006).<\/span><\/p>\n

4. More About Rules<\/span><\/h2>\n

Argumentation-2: Key features and issues<\/a><\/span>
\nDialectic<\/a>
\nParadoxes of argumentation<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Fallacies-1, Contemporary approaches<\/a>
\n<\/span>Fallacies-2, Aristotle’s foundational list<\/a>
\n<\/span>Fallacies-3, From logic and dialectic to science<\/a>
\n<\/span>Fallacies-4, A moral and anthropological perspective<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

RULES Arguments can be approached on the basis of very different systems of rules. \u2014 Rules that express observational regularities. \u2014 Rules expressing norms, imperatives, which are instrumental in evaluating arguments. \u2014 Rules as advice on how to do things well, how to convince a person to believe or to do something. 1. General Rules […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5498","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5498","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5498"}],"version-history":[{"count":26,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5498\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14096,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5498\/revisions\/14096"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5498"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5498"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5498"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}