{"id":5693,"date":"2021-10-25T13:16:07","date_gmt":"2021-10-25T11:16:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=5693"},"modified":"2025-05-01T14:53:03","modified_gmt":"2025-05-01T12:53:03","slug":"technical-and-non-technical-evidence-e","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/technical-and-non-technical-evidence-e\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cTechnical\u201d and \u201cNon-Technical\u201d Evidence"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00ab\u00a0TECHNICAL\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0NON-TECHNICAL\u00a0\u00bb Evidence<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. The opposition \u201ctechnical\u201d \/ \u201cnon-technical\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n

Aristotle distinguishes between two instruments of persuasion<\/a>, or rhetorical proof (pistis<\/em>):<\/p>\n

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset – witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principle of rhetoric.
\n(Rhet.<\/em>, I, 2; RR, p. 105)<\/span><\/p>\n

Rhetoric is a technique<\/em>, a \u201ctechne\u201d, i.e. \u00ab\u00a0a process that strives for perfection, and that occurs through the conscious action of a human being\u00a0\u00bb (Lausberg [1960] \u00a71). Therefore, rhetorical proofs are called technical<\/em> proofs (or artificial<\/em> proofs), as opposed to non-rhetorical, or non-technical proofs (Lausberg [1960], \u00a7\u00a0351-426).<\/p>\n

The distinction is made in relation to the legal situation.
\n– <\/strong>\u201cTechnical\u201d evidence<\/strong> is discursive, oratorical evidence as means of pressure on the audience (the judge).<\/span>
\n– \u201cNon-technical\u201d evidence<\/strong> is evidence in the modern sense of the word<\/span>. It corresponds to the facts presented to the court, the \u201cgiven\u201d material facts that the orator cannot manipulate, such as the public testimony of witnesses or the contracts signed between the two parties. The language of the contracts and the discourse of the witnesses is considered to be free of rhetoric<\/em>, at least in its basic formulation, while the language of the orator is rhetorical<\/em>, i.e., endowed with an autonomous power of persuasion, capable of challenging, if necessary, material evidence, see pathos<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The technical\/non-technical<\/em> distinction can be applied to the three components of rhetorical action:<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Technical logos<\/em><\/strong><\/span> is defined by the use of topoi, signs, etc.; non-technical<\/em> logos is defined by the parallel intervention of witnesses, contracts, etc.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Technical ethos<\/em><\/strong><\/span> is a speech product, the self-made image<\/span> of the orator embedded in the discourse (Amossy 1999); non-technical ethos is the other-made image<\/span> of the orator, something like his or her reputation, which can run counter to the first.<\/p>\n

\u2014\u00a0Technical pathos<\/em><\/strong><\/span> is the strategic<\/span> communication of emotion, while non-technical pathos corresponds to the spontaneous<\/span> communication of emotion, see emotion<\/a>.<\/p>\n

2. A Now Misleading Terminology?<\/span><\/h2>\n

First and foremost, this terminology is now obscure and counterintuitive<\/strong>, incompatible with the contemporary use of the word \u201ctechnical\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cNon-technical\u201d evidence<\/em> is simply evidence<\/em> <\/strong><\/span>in the ordinary contemporary sense of the word.
\nAll the elements called \u201cnon-technical\u201d are the raw material submitted to the court. They may be practically sufficient to settle the issue definitively, but \u201c[they] very often require to be supported or overthrown with the utmost force of eloquence\u201d (Quintilian I. O., V, 2, 2). In other words, the orator must interpret the testimonies, the contents of the contract, the confessions, in order to transform this raw material into data, that is, to lead it to a conclusion in favor of the party he represents. Thus, \u201cnon-technical evidence\u201d is not free of language and rhetoric.<\/span>
\n<\/strong>The distinction is closely related to legal situations, but argumentation too in general develops in everyday semi-technical discourse and presents mixed kinds of evidence.
\nFor these reasons, and to emphasize the terminological difficulties the terms \u201ctechnical\u201d and \u201cnon-technical\u201d, when used in their traditional rhetorical sense, are placed in quotation marks throughout this book.<\/p>\n

The opposition has a distinctly structuralist character, redefining emotion, character, and situation as nonreferential discursive objects<\/a>. This position has proved fruitful but it has its limits. At issue is the definition of the object of argumentation studies: should it be purely discursive data<\/em><\/strong>, <\/span>and we will consider only purely linguistic phenomena, or should it be contextualized interactional discourse<\/strong><\/em>, <\/span>taking into account the situation and the ongoing collaborative actions?<\/p>\n

3. \u201cNon-Technical\u201d Evidence<\/span><\/h2>\n

3.1 What is \u201cnon-technical\u201d evidence?<\/span><\/h2>\n

The \u201cnon-technical\u201d evidence is the material, the factual elements that are presented to the court. They define the issue that structures the debate, and may include elements such as, \u201cwitnesses, examinations, and the like are things that decide on the subject that is before the judges\u201d (Quintilian, IO<\/em>, V, 11, 44). They may receive a secondary rhetorical treatment, but their existence is beyond the reach of the rhetorician.<\/p>\n

The list of \u00ab\u00a0non-technical\u00a0\u00bb proofs varies somewhat. Aristotle counts as non-technical, \u201cwitnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on.\u201d (Rhet<\/em>, op. cit.<\/em> supra). Quintilian counts as non-technical \u201cpresentiments, public reports, evidence obtained by torture, writings, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses, with which the greater part of forensic pleading is wholly concerned. (IO<\/em>, V, 1, 2). Traditional lists include the following elements.<\/p>\n