{"id":6638,"date":"2021-11-12T12:16:36","date_gmt":"2021-11-12T11:16:36","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/probable-plausible-true\/"},"modified":"2025-05-11T10:32:42","modified_gmt":"2025-05-11T08:32:42","slug":"probable-plausible-true","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/probable-plausible-true\/","title":{"rendered":"Probable, Plausible, True"},"content":{"rendered":"

PROBABLE, LIKELY, TRUE<\/span><\/h1>\n

1. Probable: Truth and Manipulation <\/span><\/h2>\n

1.1 Probable<\/em> as presumptive, credible, believable, plausible
\n<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

The word probable<\/em> has the following synonyms:<\/p>\n

believable, credible, creditable, likely, plausible, presumptive <\/em>(MW, Probable<\/em>)<\/p>\n

This synonymy is based on a group of common semantic lines. The following four are adapted from the definitions of MW, as a guide to the semantics of the entire \u00ab\u00a0probable\u00a0\u00bb family.<\/p>\n

1. Something (s.) defined in relation to things themselves<\/strong> (ad rem)<\/em>;\u00a0<\/span> \u00ab\u00a0supported by evidence strong enough to establish presumption but not proof\u201d but awaiting confirmation<\/span>.
\n<\/strong><\/span>2. S. that can be acted upon.
\n<\/strong>3. S consistent with past experience<\/strong>.
\n<\/span>4. S. that has public support<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Let’s tentatively take the claim \u00ab\u00a0X is probable<\/em>\u201d with the following description. Something is said to be \u201cprobable\u201d when it is supported by good reasons, good enough to win public approval and to be acted upon. However, the speaker is aware of possible objections or rebuttals, and is still looking for confirmation and correction, so he should have a Plan B in his pocket. Probably<\/em> does not refer to a stopping point, but to a stage in an ongoing investigation or action, that builds consensus in a group, related with past experience and future action.
\nThe following commentary tries to capture the linguistic orientations, sometimes incompatible, of the concept of probable <\/em>as plausible, credible, creditable, verisimilar, truthful… <\/em>as used in everyday arguments that irreducibly deal with language-made truth<\/em>.<\/p>\n

1.2 Probable as believable<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/span><\/h2>\n

Verisimilar<\/em><\/strong> is not mentioned among the synonyms of probable <\/em>in MW, but probable<\/em> is the defining synonym of verisimilar<\/em> as \u201chaving the appearance of truth. Verisimilar<\/em> introduces the key feature of similitude<\/em>, that is structural analogy. In fact, it can actually be connected to the four previous semantic lines plausible<\/em> marks the transition from probable<\/em> to verisimilar<\/em>.
\nSimilitude<\/em> occurs when probable<\/em> is said not of an isolated assertion, but in relation to a worldview see analogical thinking<\/a>
\nVerisimilar<\/em> is related to the visual arts by its second meaning, \u201cdepicting realism\u201d (MW). It is said of a literary fiction or a pictorial style.<\/p>\n

A witness is said to be credible<\/em><\/strong> as a person and as a narrator; she is a storyteller, who describes a situation. In order to be understood and\u00a0 to be credible this speech must necessarily conform to the linguistic laws of narration<\/span>: this is the point where the probable<\/em> and the plausible<\/em>, the verisimilitude,<\/em> meet.<\/p>\n

From the point of view of its content, a story, an assertion, a representation of a state of affairs… is plausible<\/em><\/strong> if it is judged to be in conformity with common sense and reasonable thinking<\/span>. From the point of view of its structure, a conclusion is plausible if it conforms to the laws of the discursive genre that stereotypes real things or events of the same kind.
\nThe liar must obey such rules of plausibility. The judgment of verisimilitude-truthfulness is refuted under the strategic imperative that \u00ab\u00a0the true is not always truthful<\/em>\u201d:<\/p>\n

The enemy is unlikely to attack through the swamps.<\/span>
\nIt is unlikely that a mother would kill her children (Medea)<\/span>
\nIt is likely that one would kill out of jealousy; jealousy is a likely motive.<\/span><\/p>\n

Pragmatic argumentation<\/a> through positive or negative consequences is based on plausibility, as in a realistic novel; It can be seen, as the development of a plausible causal fiction<\/em><\/strong>. Plausibility is judged not so much by examining the case according to the reality\u00a0 of the facts, as by its intuitive conformity to certain narrative conventions and stereotypes of action.
\nThe concrete investigation that leads to a justified belief that things went this way<\/em> may be difficult and inconclusive; the intuition of normality is sufficient to conclude that they probably<\/em> went the other way.<\/p>\n

1.3 The Probable-Believable <\/em>as an Instrument of Manipulation<\/span>
\n<\/em><\/h2>\n

On such a basis, one can construct a very plausible account of events, perfectly possible, but having absolutely nothing to do with what really happened. The implication is \u00ab\u00a0it is conceivable, therefore it is\u00a0\u00bb.
\nThe construction of a possible world in which plausible events take place is a matter of fictional coherence. The worlds of conspiracy and manipulation are such worlds. The possible is thus seen as a generator of an \u00ab\u00a0alternative reality\u00a0\u00bb that is more real and convincing, because it is much more exciting than the \u00ab\u00a0real reality\u00a0\u00bb, for some. The struggle between these two realities can remain undecided, at least for a while.
\nThis will to live in the fictional world makes it possible to allows to avoid or to refute a scrupulous investigation.<\/p>\n

During the \u00ab\u00a0Night of the Long Knives\u00a0\u00bb (June 30, 1934) and the days that followed, the Nazi SS massacred the Nazi SA\u00a0 branch of the Nazi organisation, led by R\u00f6hm, who was himself a victim of the massacre, as well as a number of Catholic or conservative opponents of Hitler’s regime. The leftist opponents had already been eliminated.<\/span>
\nHitler’s explanation for these massacres was the existence of an SA plot against Hitler<\/em>. It is indeed possible for a clique close to power to plot against the men in power who belong to that same clique; history is full of famous examples, and Piso’s conspiracy against Nero can serve as a precedent. The explanation is quite convincing. But historians have shown that R\u00f6hm never<\/em> plotted against Hitler; the story was a typical manipulative lie.<\/a><\/span>
\nBut can we say that Hitler’s so-called \u00ab\u00a0extraordinary\u00a0\u00bb powers\u00a0 of<\/em> persuasion\u00a0<\/em> forced the transition from the possible to the true? The explanatory fiction was accepted not only because it was after all possible, and therefore plausible, but, above all, because it was imposed on the public by the propaganda and violence of the Nazi militias at work during those crucial weeks, the public enthusiasm manifesting the support of some and concealing the terror of others.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Truth and the Predicate \u201c\u2014 Is True<\/em>\u201d<\/span><\/h1>\n

The predicates \u201c- is true<\/em>\u201d and \u201c- is false<\/em>\u201d apply to a proposition or to the corresponding judgment<\/em>, i.e., to the logical proposition expressing its content. Truth is \u201cthe adequacy between the thing and the intelligence\u201d (Thomas Aquinas, Summa<\/em>, Part. 1, Quest. 16, Art. 1), which can be interpreted as, \u201cthe adequacy between the thing and its representation\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Tarski’s famous definition of truth, \u201c\u2018the snow is white<\/em>\u2019 is true if and only if the snow<\/span> is white\u201d (Tarski [1935]). Note that the proposition \u201csnow is white<\/em>\u201d comes from Aristotle (Top.<\/em>, 11, 105a), who considers it as a prototypical statement that does not deserve a dialectical discussion because it is clearly true, so it is impossible to problematize, see dialectic<\/a>; conditions of discussion<\/a>.
\nFor Tarski, the concept of truth can be strictly defined only in a formal language only:<\/p>\n

With respect to [colloquial language] not only does the definition of truth seems impossible, but even the consistent use of this concept in conformity with the laws of logic. [1935], p. 153).<\/p>\n

We will admit that ordinary language about human affairs can use some local, practical and satisfactorily defined concept of truth. The statements \u201c- is true<\/em>\u201d or \u201c- is false<\/em>\u201d are said of a statement that refers to an event or a state of affairs by a description that constitutes the meaning of the statement; this meaning is a linguistic construct, based on the common understanding that the statement must be relevant<\/a> to the current discussion and action (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Ordinary language is not transparent; the true statement depends not only on reality, but also on the linguistic system that generates it, and on the current constraints of s relevance.<\/p>\n

Disputability<\/strong> is a characteristic of the statements \u201cthis is true, you are right<\/em>\u201d, \u201cthis is false, you are wrong, you are lying<\/em>\u201d. Truth is then a synthetic positive property attached to argumentation as such. Truth judgments oscillate between the argumentative pole of justification<\/em>, and the pole of perceptual or intellectual self-evidence<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Argumentation is sometimes criticized for its alleged inability to express and communicate truth. A distinction must be made here between epistemic<\/em> arguments and practical<\/em> arguments. In the former case, the argument serves to reduce the uncertainty surrounding a claim. In the latter case, the argument seeks to develop a line of action from true or possible facts, combined with a set of values \u200b\u200band preferences.<\/p>\n

From the point of view of argumentation in dialogue, truth is a provisional property attributed to a statement that has survived a critical examination, conducted with a method appropriate to the circumstances, within interested and competent groups, on the basis of data whose quality and completeness have been assessed. As a construction, a truth judgment of truth can be adjusted as more and better information becomes available, or as the critical method improves, see default reasoning.<\/a><\/p>\n

3. The Platonic Dramatization:
\nEssential Truth<\/em> vs. Manipulative Social Persuasion<\/em><\/span><\/h1>\n

In argumentative rhetoric, the question of the probable-likely<\/em> appears under two opposing views, either as an arbitrary social representation accepted in place of an absent truth<\/em>, or as an approach<\/em> to truth.<\/p>\n

In Plato’s Phaedrus<\/em>, Socrates defines rhetoric as \u201ca way of guiding the soul\u201d:<\/p>\n

Socrates<\/em>: Well, then, isn’t the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in private? Isn’t it one and the same art whether its subject is great or small, and no more to be held in esteem \u2014 if it is followed correctly \u2014 when its questions are serious or when they are trivial? Or what have you heard about all this? (Plato, Phaedrus<\/em>, 261a; CW<\/em> p. 537)<\/span><\/p>\n

This psychagogy <\/em>(\u201cart of guiding the soul\u201d, probably stripped of its religious function of evoking the souls of the dead, but not of its magical connotations, immediately expresses the control<\/em> function attributed to rhetorical persuasion, \u201cthe need for souls\u201d, that motivates religious proselytism.<\/p>\n

Socrates dramatizes the problem of truth by radicalizing the opposition of the plausible-persuasive to the true:<\/p>\n

Socrates<\/em>: [\u2026] No one in a law court, you see, cares at all about the truth of such matters. They only care about what is convincing. This is called \u201cthe likely\u201d, and that is what a man who intends to speak according to art should concentrate on. (Id.<\/em>, 261a; CW p. 549)<\/span><\/p>\n

And the proper way to guide souls is postponed until we know the truth about the nature of all things:<\/p>\n

Socrates<\/em>: First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible. Second, you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to the extent that its nature allows it to be used that way, either in order to teach or in order to persuade. This is the whole point of the argument we have been making. (Id<\/em>., 277b-c; CW p. 554)<\/span><\/p>\n

The probable-likely is \u201clike\u201d the true. But in order to say that a representation, a story is plausible, or similar to what is or was true, we must know<\/em> what is or was true. Socrates’ position is strong, because it is based on the impossibility of saying in any meaningful way \u201cA<\/strong> looks like<\/em> B<\/strong>\u201d, \u201cPeter looks like Paul<\/em>\u201d if you do not know either B<\/strong> or Paul.<\/p>\n

Having found the truth, one can speak truthfully and live in the truth. The rhetoric adapted to this situation will no longer be a rhetoric of persuasion but a pedagogy of truth. According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,<\/p>\n

when Plato dreams, in his Phaedrus<\/em>, of a rhetoric which would be worthy of the philosopher, what he recommends is a technique capable of convincing the gods themselves (Plato, Phaedrus<\/em>, 273c)\u201d. ([1958], p. 7).<\/p>\n

In the Phaedrus<\/em>, it is not so much a matter of convincing the gods as it is as it is a matter of distracting the rational man from other fellow ordinary men:<\/p>\n

And no one can acquire these abilities without great effort \u2014 a sensible man will make a laborious effort not in order to speak and act among human beings, but so as to be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the god as much as possible. (Plato, Phaedrus<\/em>, 273e; C. W. p. 550)<\/span><\/p>\n

Note that such a conversion involves following a master, not to say a guru; is it so different from following a good speaker that is, \u00ab\u00a0a good man who speaks well\u201d? In any case, Socrates has thus imposed the pathos of inaccessible truth<\/em>, implying that rhetorical discourse is constructed on the basis of the plausible, of verisimilitude, that is, on a pseudo-representation that makes it possible to dispense with truth. In essence, the function of persuasion is attached to argumentative rhetoric as a stigma<\/em> that marks its congenital inability to attain or even\u00a0 approach the truth, the essence and the gods. The probable bears no relation to the true. To live in the world of persuasion is to live in the world of beliefs and opinions, in the \u201ccave\u201d and not in the light of the truth.<\/p>\n

This apparently ineradicable view of rhetorical argumentation is rooted in the anti-democratic and anti-social critique that Socrates addresses to the institutional, political and legal discourses that attempt to deal with the problems of the city.<\/p>\n

4. The Aristotelian De-Dramatization:
\nThe Probable is Oriented Towards the True<\/span><\/h1>\n

The Socratic quest for truth unfolds in this atmosphere of tragic radicalism. Aristotle radically de-dramatizes the whole problem by arguing that elaborated probable opinion and truth are not in conflict but are in fact complementary. This is true for at least four reasons. On the one hand, a first set of three reasons:<\/p>\n

(1) The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that (2) men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and (3) they usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities (Aristotle, Rhet.<\/em>, 1355a 14-15; RR, p. 101; our numbering);<\/span><\/p>\n

Fourth, manipulative rhetoric does not work,<\/p>\n

things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites. (id<\/em>., 1355a20; p. 101)<\/p>\n

A wonderfully optimistic statement. And finally, it is possible to establish an ethical control over speech: \u201cfor we must not make people believe what is bad\u201d (id<\/em>., 1355a30; p. 101).<\/p>\n

\n

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PROBABLE, LIKELY, TRUE 1. Probable: Truth and Manipulation 1.1 Probable as presumptive, credible, believable, plausible The word probable has the following synonyms: believable, credible, creditable, likely, plausible, presumptive (MW, Probable) This synonymy is based on a group of common semantic lines. The following four are adapted from the definitions of MW, as a guide to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6638","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6638","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6638"}],"version-history":[{"count":25,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6638\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14232,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6638\/revisions\/14232"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6638"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6638"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6638"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}

The plausible is thus defined not as any opinion that wears the mask of truth, but as a positive orientation, a first step toward truth, expressed in the form of an endoxon, that must be dialectically tested, see Dialectic<\/a>. It follows that \u00ab\u00a0being convinced of sth.\u00a0\u00bb should be defined simply as a provisional state of the individual in his search for truth, a first step toward a truth in progress.<\/span><\/p>\n

The distinction between the probable as presumptive<\/em> and the probable as verisimilitude<\/em> corresponds to the rhetorical distinction between two kinds of evidence, rhetorical (\u00ab\u00a0technical\u00a0\u00bb) evidence<\/a><\/em> and non-rhetorical (\u00ab\u00a0nontechnical\u00a0\u00bb) evidence<\/em>.
\nInvestigating the realities of the case is the business of specialists in other, non-rhetorical, fields. Rhetorical plausibility ignores the so-called \u201cnon-technical\u201d evidence, that alone allows reality to inform the discourse.
\nRhetorical plausibility is constructed through \u201cproofs\u201d derived from endoxa, that is, widely shared beliefs. This method defines the specialized field of rhetoric, see doxa<\/a>; commonplace<\/a>.<\/p>\n