{"id":7396,"date":"2022-01-19T14:49:39","date_gmt":"2022-01-19T13:49:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/?p=7396"},"modified":"2025-08-12T18:08:30","modified_gmt":"2025-08-12T16:08:30","slug":"ad-judicium-eng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/ad-judicium-eng\/","title":{"rendered":"Ad judicium"},"content":{"rendered":"

AD JUDICIUM<\/em> Argument<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n

From the Latin judicium<\/em>, meaning \u201clegal action; judgment; capacity to judge.\u201d<\/p>\n

1. Ad judicium<\/em>, the only \u201cinstructive\u201d argument<\/span><\/h2>\n

In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding<\/em> (1690), John Locke contrasts the ad judicium<\/em> argument, which he considers valid, with other types of argument,\u00a0 that he holds to be fallacious: the arguments ad ignorantiam<\/em><\/a>, ad hominem<\/em><\/a> and ad verecundiam (Lat. verecundia, <\/em>modesty<\/a>); see collections 2.<\/a><\/p>\n

The argument ad judicium<\/em> is defined as:<\/p>\n

The using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium<\/em>. This alone of all the four types of arguments, brings true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. (Locke [1690], Vol. 2, pp. 411)<\/p>\n

The following explanation shows that this validity is derived not only from the activity of judgment but also from \u201cthe things themselves\u201d:<\/p>\n

[Truth] must come from proofs and arguments, and from light arising from the nature of things themselves. (Id., <\/em>pp. 411-412).<\/p>\n

Thus, the ad judicium<\/em> reasoning is based on \u00ab\u00a0the foundations of knowledge or probability\u00a0\u00bb, that is, scientific criteria, and develops an object-based knowledge. In any case, this mode of reasoning excludes the passions and distrusts the speech, see ornament and argument<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Strictly speaking, ad judicium<\/em> is not an argument scheme in itself, but rather encompasses the entire scientific methodology. It follows from Locke\u2019s definitions, that the correct argumentation for social questions and human projects is the name of scientific method when applied to social questions and human projects.<\/p>\n

Ad ignorantiam<\/em>, ad hominem <\/em>and ad verecundiam<\/em> arguments also appeal to judgment, or at least to calculations based on the speaker’s knowledge. Ad ignorantiam<\/em> is based on an evaluation of the pros and cons of competing claims.\u00a0 \u00a0Ad hominem<\/em> appeals to consistency, while ad verecundiam<\/em> is based on a feeling of personal modesty or inadequacy, which may or may not be well-founded. Nevertheless, these arguments are considered fallacious because they are subjective<\/em><\/a>. Subjective here does not mean \u201carbitrary\u201d, but rather non-universal, <\/em>and context-dependent<\/em>, taking into account the circumstances of the discourse situation and the speaker’s transient state of knowledge.
\nThis conception of argument is the antithesis of what Grize calls \u00ab\u00a0a logic of subjects\u00a0\u00bb, see schematization<\/a><\/p>\n

2. Ad judicium<\/em>, a polysemic label<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Various non-equivalent, definitions are attached to the ad judicium<\/em> label. This can be somewhat confusing.<\/p>\n

(1)<\/strong> Perhaps referring to Locke, Whately thinks that the label ad judicium<\/em> designates \u201cmost likely the same thing\u201d as the ad rem<\/em> argument<\/strong> ([1832], p. 170), i.e., an argument to the matter, or to the thing itself<\/em>. This identification is based on Locke’s belief that true knowledge is derived \u201cfrom the nature of things themselves\u201d (see above).
\nIn this case the terminology would simply be redundant, which is relatively harmless.<\/p>\n

(2)<\/strong> A dictionary of theology defines ad judicium<\/em> as: \u201can argument that appeals to common sense and general opinion<\/strong> to support a position\u201d[1]<\/a>. This definition is quite different, and completely opposed to Locke\u2019s perspective, if we consider his positions on rhetoric, see ornamental fallacy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

(3)<\/strong> Bentham uses the term ad judicium<\/em> to refer to several fallacies of confusion<\/strong> (Bentham [1824]), see\u00a0 political arguments: two collections.<\/a><\/p>\n

The terminological and conceptual field covered by the label ad judicium<\/em> can thus be arranged as follows:
\n\u2014 In Locke’s sense, it is scientific reasoning, based on things.
\n\u2014 In Whately’s sense, it is an argument on the merits of the case similar to ad rem.<\/em>
\n\u2014 In theology, it is an argument based on the consensus of nations.
\n\u2014 In Bentham’s sense, the ad judicium<\/em> fallacies are maneuvers that obstruct sound judgment.<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

AD JUDICIUM Argument From the Latin judicium, meaning \u201clegal action; judgment; capacity to judge.\u201d 1. Ad judicium, the only \u201cinstructive\u201d argument In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke contrasts the ad judicium argument, which he considers valid, with other types of argument,\u00a0 that he holds to be fallacious: the arguments ad ignorantiam, ad […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7396","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-non-classe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7396","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7396"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7396\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14674,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7396\/revisions\/14674"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7396"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7396"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/icar.cnrs.fr\/dicoplantin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7396"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}