Falling out of disfavor

(T1) In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State, « whoever in secret rides in the Ruler’s coach shall have his feet cut off. » Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia’s mother fell ill. Somebody, hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night. Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler’s order rode in the Ruler’s coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded his act as worthy, saying: « How dutiful he is! For his mother’s sake he even forgot that he was committing a crime making him liable to lose his feet. » Another day, when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: « You love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach. »

When the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the Ruler said: « This fellow once rode in my coach under pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten peach. » The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and later found guilty because his master’s love turned into hate.

Han Fei Tse_Liao Ch. XII Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion

The Mechanics of disfavor

Parallelism

brilliant colors > love > language of love > brillant life
faded colors > disgrace > language of hate > death

Western Rhetoric: Paradiastole, in Orientation Reversal

As we know, all lovers boast of their choice. The chatterer [is] good-humored, and the silent one maintains her virtuous modesty (Molière, [The Misanthrope], 1666[2])

(What is presented as) the true strongly negative description of a person as a chatterbox or a stupid person contrasts with how she appears to her lover, good-humored or maintaining her virtuously modest.

The language of the lover and that of the ex-lover
The mechanism of Mi Tzŭ’s disfavor: “When the color of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened.” And he spoke a completely different language, putting the ex-favorite at risk.

The Controversial Approach in the Western Argumentation 

Western argumentation is “controversial”. It is based on the fact that it is possible for two honest speakers who are committed to their words and actions to develop, on a given topic, two well-constructed, well-informed, plausible, and relatively reasonable discourses that nevertheless lead to incompatible conclusions (visions, opinions, etc.), thus producing an argumentative question.

Western argumentation, can be defined as a mixed cognitive and linguistic activity, the systematic study of which developed from Aristotle, based mainly on data provided by judicial discourse, speeches made in court, deliberative discourse, assembly speeches, and the epidictic episodes that enter into these discourses. To these classical genres, have been added the genre of religious discourse, advertising discourse.

These discourses are prototypical of what the Western tradition understands by argumentation. It is in these dialogical, openly argumentative contexts that the argumentative phenomena are most clearly present and are therefore easier to study, where the concepts and methods specific to them are most productive.

This does not, of course, prevent argumentation from occurring in other contexts; if we define it, for example, as the implementation of an effort to persuade, then it becomes a universal property of human speech.

Furthermore, we know that the intension of a concept (its definitional content) decreases as its extension increases (it is applied to objects that do not belong to its fundamental domain). The perpetual generalization of a concept to new objects leads to a dilution of its meaning, as we have seen with the concept of structure.

« The agent is not the weigher but the arm of the balance itself”

The third party as the balancing power

In the Western model, the metaphor of the arm of the scales is appropriate for describing the role of the Third Party and, specifically, that of the Judge [2] (Plantin 2021, Argumentative Roles).

However, for the scales to stabilize and clearly indicate a trend, two conditions must be met: first, that “knowledge has been attained,” and second, that there is sufficient time for orientations and inclinations to organize themselves, which presupposes that the decision is not extremely urgent.

The arguer as the arm of the balance

A.C. Graham, in his book Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989), notes that Confucian philosophy has much to say about the problems of choice and action, and that it knows how to circumvent the pitfalls of alternatives:

Confucius is of course very much concerned with choice in the most general sense of the word, as settling after due consideration on a particular course of action,

If you don’t say “What shall I do about it, what shall I do about it ?” there is nothing I can do about you (Analects_GRAHAM 1989 15/16)

But choice in this general sense does not necessarily imply even the posing of alternatives. It might be the contemplation of one’s situation, and the examples of the sages in similar situations until inclination spontaneously settles in a certain direction. (Graham 1989, p. 27) [1]

The overriding imperative is to learn and arrive at knowledge; once you know, orientations towards action may be left to take care of itself as confused inclinations sort themselves out. To apply the metaphor of weighing which Confucius does not use, the agent is not the weigher but the arm of the balance itself. (op. cit, p. 28)

***

A PROGRAM

The arguer as the arm of the balance is a telling model-metaphor, and as such, an excellent « alternative to the Toulmin’s model of argument« , predominant, if not exclusive in the Western world.
The position of this  model-metaphor vis-à-vis the Toulmin’s model remains to be established.

Two translations of Gongsun Long White Horse discourse
— Chinese Text Project (CTP) translation = White Horse_CTP
— Forke translation = White Horse_FORKE

White horse discourse_CTP

1[A]: Can it be that a white horse is not a horse?
2[B]: It can.

3[A]: How so?
4[B]: « Horse » is how the shape is named; « white » is how the color is named. That which names color does not name shape. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

5[A]: Having a white horse cannot be said to be having no horses. Is not that which cannot be said to be having no horses a horse? Having a white horse is having a horse; how can a white one not be a horse?

6[B]: Requesting a horse, a brown or a black horse may arrive; requesting a white horse, a brown or a black horse will not arrive. By making a white horse the same as a horse, what is requested [in these two cases] is the same. If what is requested is the same, then a white horse is no different to a horse; if what is requested is no different, then how is it that in one case brown and black horses are acceptable, and in the other they are not? Acceptable and unacceptable are clearly in opposition to each other. Thus brown and black horses are also one in that one can reply that there is a horse, yet one cannot reply that there is a white horse. It is clear indeed that a white horse is not a horse.

7[A]: If a horse with color is not a horse, then since there are no colorless horses in the world, can it be that there are no horses in the world?

8[B]: A horse necessarily has color; thus there are white horses. If one makes horses have no color, then there are merely horses – how can one pick out a white horse? Thus that which is white is not a horse. A white horse is horse and white, horse and white horse. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

9[A]: A horse not yet with white is a horse, and white not yet with a horse is white. Combining horse with white, it is together named a « white horse ». This is to use an uncombined name for a combined thing, and is inadmissible. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse » is inadmissible.

10[B]: Taking their being white horses as there being horses, as calling there being white horses there being brown horses – is this admissible?

11[A]: No.

12[B]: Taking their being horses as different to there being brown horses, is to take brown horses as different to horses. Taking brown horses to be different to horses, is to take it that brown horses are not horses. To take brown horses as not horses, and yet take white horses as being horses, is to have the flying in a pond and the inner and outer coffins in different places: a contradictory claim and misuse of statements as there is under heaven!

13[A]: Having white horses cannot be called having no horses, this is what is meant by the separation of white. Not separating it, having white horses cannot be said to be having horses. Thus the reason why it is taken as having horses, is merely that « horses » are taken as « having horses », and « having white horses » is not « having horses ». Thus on your taking it as having horses, one cannot call a horse a horse.

14[B]: White does not fix what is white, this can be put aside. « White horse » speaks of white fixing what is white. That which fixes what is white is not white. « Horse » does not pick or exclude color, thus a brown or black horse can be brought. « White horse » does pick or exclude color; brown and black horses are excluded by color, thus only a white horse can be brought. That which does not exclude is not that which does exclude. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

White Horse_FORKE

1— Is it possible that a white horse is no horse
— Yes.

3 How ?
4 A horse denotes a shape, white a colour. Describing a colour one does not describe a shape, therefore I say that a white horse is no horse.

5. There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, can the existence of the horse be denied?There being a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse; how can whiteness bring about the non-existence of a horse ?

6. When a horse is required, yellow and black ones can all be brought, but when a white horse is wanted, there is no room for yellow and black ones. Now let a white horse be a horse ! It is but one kind of hose required. Then, one of those required, a white horse would not be different from a horse. Those required do not differ. Would then yellow and black ones meet the requirement or not ? In so far as they would meet the requirement or not, they would evidently exclude each other. Yellow as well as black horses are each one kind ; they correspond to a call for a horse, but not to a call for a white horse. Hence it results that a white horse cannot be a horse.

7. — A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth ! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth?

8 A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth?
9. Horses of course have colour, therefore there are white horses. If horses had no colour there would be merely horses. But how can we single out white horses, for whiteness is no horse? A white horse is a horse and whiteness. Such being the case, I hold that a white horse is no horse’.

Kung-sun Lung’s paradoxical claim:

Kung-sun Lung was a dialectician who lived at the time of the Six Kingdoms. He wrote a treatise on “Hard and White” and, to illustrate his theory, said that a white horse is not a horse. To show that a white horse is not a horse, he said that « white » is that by which one names the color and horse that by which one names the form. The color is not the form, and the form is not the color.
Huan T’an_Pokora  “New Treatise”. Fragment 135A, p. 124.

Does it work?

Kung-sun Lung often argued that “a white horse is not a horse”. People could not agree with this. Later, when riding a white horse, he wished to pass through the frontier pass without a warrant or a passport. But the frontier official would not accept his explanations, for it is hard for empty words to defeat reality.
Huan T’an_Pokora Ibid.. Fragment 135B, p. 124.

That kind of argument is all the fashion these days:

There are now people who doubt everything. They say that the oyster is not a bivalve, that two time five is not ten.
Huan T’an_Pokora Ibid.. Fragment 135B, p. 124.

Ba Jin 1904-2005.  Jia, « Family », 1933.

Two days later […] the revision of the articles for the next issue of the magazine took place. The youngest attended as usual. When he arrived, Such as smile read aloud a police proclamation forbidding women to wear their hair short. The young man was already familiar with it; it was said to be the work of a blossoming talent (1) of the ancient dynasty. The content, simplistic, and even the form, not very correct, aroused the gaiety of all the listeners at each sentence.
— This is really making fun of people! What does he mean? exclaimed Such as smile, while throwing the sheet on the ground.
— We could publish this masterpiece in the next issue under the heading « Let’s laugh a bit », proposed Reserve of benevolence.
— Bravo! applauded the girl.
All approved. Such as grace added that it would be good to attach a scathing refutation.

(1) Official title of the ancient dynasties, generally translated by the term: bachelor.

Translation from the French, Pa Kin, Famille. Translated in French from Chinese by Li Tche-houa and Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979. Chap. 29. 

In French: Pa Kin, Famille. Traduit du chinois par Li Tche-houa et Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979. Chap. 29.

Le surlendemain […eut lieu la révision des articles pour le n°8. Le cadet y assista comme d’habitude. Á son arrivée, Telle que Sourire lisait à haute voix une proclamation de la police interdisant aux femmes de porter les cheveux courts. Le jeune homme la connaissait déjà; elle était, disait-on, l’œuvre d’un talent en fleur (¹) de l’ancienne dynastie. Le fond, simpliste, et la forme même, peu correcte, suscitaient à chaque phrase la gaieté de tous les auditeurs.
— C’est vraiment se moquer des gens! Que veut-il dire? s’écria Telle que sourire en jetant la feuille à terre.
— On pourrait publier ce chef-d’œuvre dans le prochain numéro sous la rubrique « Histoire de rire”, proposa Réserve de bienveillance.
— Bravo ! applaudit la jeune fille.
Tous approuvèrent. Telle que grâce ajouta qu’il serait bon de joindre une réfutation cinglante.

(¹) Titre officiel des anciennes dynasties, traduit généralement par le terme : bachelier.

1. Falling out of favor: The Reversal of Discourse Orientation

Han Fei Tse_Liao
Therefore, if you talk about great men to him, he thinks you are intimating his defects. If you talk about small men to him, he thinks you are showing off your superiority. If you discuss an object of his love, he thinks you are expecting a special favor from him. If you discuss an object of his hate, he thinks you are testing his temper. If you simplify your discussion, he thinks you are unwise and will spurn you. If your discussion is lucidly wayward and extensively refined, he thinks you are superficial and flippant. If you omit details and present generalizations only, he thinks you are cowardly and incomplete. If you trace the principles of facts and use wide illustrations, he thinks you are rustic and arrogant. These are difficulties in the way of persuasion, which every persuader should know.
Han Fei Tse_Liao Ch. XII Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion, p. 78-79

In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State, « whoever in secret rides in the Ruler’s coach shall have his feet cut off. » Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia’s mother fell ill. Somebody, hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night. Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler’s order rode in the Ruler’s coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded his act as worthy, saying: « How dutiful he is! For his mother’s sake he even forgot that he was committing a crime making him liable to lose his feet. » Another day, when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: « You love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach. »

When the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the Ruler said: « This fellow once rode in my coach under pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten peach. » The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and later found guilty because his master’s love turned into hate.

Id., p. 80.

 ♦

 … et dangereux
Le monarque stupide peut mettre à mort son  conseiller; « tranformé en hachis, il marine dans la saumure ».

En effet, pour juste que soit votre jugement, pour sensés que soient vos arguments, seront-ils pour autant entendus ? Et ne peut-on craindre d’être au mieux calomnié et mis à mort?
Wou Tse Hsiu eut la tête tranchée malgré son astuce, l’éloquence de Confucius ne lui évita pas d’être assiégé à K’ouang . […] Était-ce parce que ces personnages manquaient de vertu ? Nullement, mais leurs maîtres n’étaient pas des monarques éclairés.

Le marquis de Yi fut rôti, celui de Kouei salé et séché ; le prince Pi-kan eut le cœur arraché ; Mei Po transformé en hachis, marina dans la saumure ; Kouan Yi-wou fut emprisonné, Tchao Ki dut s’enfuit à Tch’en, Po-li tse mendia sur les chemins

Mencius, “If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’”

2B.8 Shen Tong asked Mencius in private confidence, “Do you think Yan ought to be attacked?”

Mencius said, “Yes. Zikuai had no authority to give Yan away, and Zizhi had no authority to receive it from Zikuai. Let’s say there was a gentleman here whom you liked; what if you, without consulting the King, privately granted to him your court rank and salary, and he accepted them without any commission from the King? What difference is there in the case of Yan?”

The armies of Qi attacked Yan, and someone said to Mencius, “Is it true that you urged Qi to attack Yan?”

“Never!” said Mencius. “Shen Tong asked whether Yan ought to be attacked and I said yes, in response to his question. Then they went off and attacked Yan! If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’ I would have replied, ‘He who acts as the agent of Tian should attack Yan.’

“Let’s say there were a murderer here, and someone asked, ‘Should this man be executed?’ I would say yes. If he asked, ‘Who should execute him?’ I would reply, ‘The Chief Judge should execute him.’

“As it is, this is simply one Yan attacking another Yan. Why would I ever urge such a thing?”

2B.8 We return here to events surrounding Qi’s invasion of Yan in 314 (see 1B.10-11). Mencius is reported in a different early text to have given his approval of the invasion of Yan by Qi, and here the Mencius seems at pains to explain that this is not so. Note how it is specified that the courtier Shen Tong visited Mencius in an unofficial capacity.

The background events in Yan are that the ruler, Zikuai, abdicated to his minister, Zizhi, prompting Zikuai’s son – the original heir to the throne – to initiate a civil war.

Deux questions

Stase sur l’acte : Question1:  — Y a-t-il eu meurtre? OUI
[— le meurtrier doit être puni = exécuté]

Stase sur l’agent Question2:  — Qui doit prendre en charge l’exécution?

Dictionnaire, Composition et division

L’exemple suivant est emprunté au drame de Sophocle Électre : Clytemnestre tue son mari, Agamemnon. Oreste, leur fils, tue Clytemnestre pour venger son père. Mais avait-il le droit légal et moral de tuer sa mère ?

Il est juste que celle qui a tué son mari meure, et il est juste aussi, assurément que le fils venge son père ; ces deux actions ont donc été accomplies justement ; mais peut-être que, réunies, elles cessent d’être justes. (Rhét., II, 24,1401a35-b5 ; p. 407).

Réunir les deux actions signifie qu’elles n’en font plus qu’une. Oreste soutient que cette composition est licite :

Composition : X est juste et Y est juste => X et Y sont justes
(X) “venger son père” est juste et “ (Y) exécuter la femme qui a tué son mari” est juste

Or si “venger son père” est juste, “tuer sa mère” est un crime. Pour les accusateurs d’Oreste, le fait qu’il soit le fils de Clytemnestre bloque la composition, car il n’est pas possible de composer une action vertueuse et une action criminelle. La stase dramatique se noue autour de l’argument de la composition.

Cette technique de décomposition d’une action douteuse en une suite d’actes louables, ou au moins innocents est argumentativement très productive : voler, ce n’est jamais que prendre le sac qui se trouve là, le déplacer ailleurs et négliger de le remettre à la même place. La division bloque l’évaluation globale.

What Is Shun's Awful Family Doing in the Mencius?

Warp, Weft, and Way

Chinese and Comparative Philosophy 中國哲學與比較哲學

Take 2B/8 as an example. In Qi, Shen Tong asks Mencius whether Yan should be invaded, and he says it should. The text insists that Shen wasn’t acting in an official capacity, but of course it only does that because it’s obvious that Mencius’s answer will be passed on. Indeed, Qi invades Yan and the invasion is a brutal mess. Questioned about this, Mencius insists that he only said that Yan should be invaded, he didn’t say anything about who should do the invading. (Imagine—of course I mean remember—someone in early 2003 saying that Iraq should be invaded, and then after the fact complaining that George Bush hadn’t been the one to do it.)

2B/8 isn’t in the Mencius because of any philosophical point it makes. Even the passages where the Mencius uses the invasion of Yan to present the Mencian fantasy of a true king (whose armies are welcomed with rice and wine wherever they invade) aren’t there just to present that view (1B/11). Mencius’s involvement in the invasion of Yan left him with an image problem, and these passages are attempts to address that problem. Mencius still comes off as a coward and a liar, but I guess that’s better than leaving the criticisms unanswered.

My suggestion is that the stories about Shun’s awful family, or at least 5A/2–3, are there for the same sort of reason. There was a mythology surrounding Shun, and that mythology was not under the control of pious moralists such as the authors of the Mencius. As a consequence, elements creeped into the mythology that would make pious moralists extremely nervous—elements such as Shun’s predilection for putting up with murderers in his family

The following text is an extract from Discourses on Salt and Iron, a compilation of a debate held at the imperial court in 81bce, by Huan K’uan, translated by Esson M. Gale. [1] China had been unified a century and a half earlier by Emperor Qín Shǐhuáng, who was overthrown by the First Han Dynasty in 206bce.
In the debate, the Lord Grand Secretary is pitted against a group of sixty Confucian scholars on ssues of ieconomic and social policy  issues, with the focus being on the Grand Secretary’s policy of establishing state monopolies on salt and iron.
The dispute took place in the presence of the emperor.

1. The Lord Grand Secretary speaks first

a. The Lord Grand Secretary: Formerly when the Lord of Shang was Chancellor of Ch’in he pursued in internal affairs the policy of putting the laws and regulations on a firm basis, of making punishments and penalties harsh and severe, and of ordering government and education. In this no mercy was shown to the criminals and the cheats. In his external policy he managed to obtain profits of a hundred fold and collected taxes on mountains and
marshes. The state became rich, the people, strong; weapons and implements were kept ready, complete in every detail, and grain-stores had a surplus.

b. As a result of these measures he was able to wage war on enemy countries, to conquer foreign states, to annex new lands, and to extend wide his territories, without overtaxing the people for the support of the army. Thus he could draw constantly upon the resources of the people and the people would not even notice it; he could extend the territory of Ch’in to include all west of the Yellow River and the people bore no hardships on this account.

c. The profits derived from the salt and iron monopolies serve to relieve the needs of the people in emergencies and to provide sufficient funds for the upkeep of military forces. These measures emphasize conservation and storing up in order to provide for times of scarcity and want. The beneficiaries are many; the State profits thereby and no harm is caused to the masses. Where are those hardships of the common people which cause you so much worry?

The Grand Secretary uses a pragmatic argument based on the positive consequences.
As a determinant of action, the pragmatic argument is a universal anthropological principle that is integral to human activity. We sow in order to reap, and we reap in order to eat. If an action will have positive consequences, then we should perform it; if the consequences of an action are beneficial, then this action was right, and we are justiifed in pursuing it.
In §a The Grand Secretary first recalls the harsh policies inaugurated by Shang Yang (c.390–338bce), a former minister of the State of Ch’in. He claims that this policy was successful in both internal affairs (§a, profit of  a hundredfold) and external affairs (§b, extension of the territory), and presents himself as his continuator.
In §c, the Grand Secretary claims that the salt and iron policy he has initiated is beneficial to the state and neutral for the people (it does not harm the masses).

The floor is now with the literati.

The literati utterly reject the positive consequences alluded to by the Grand Secretary, at the point of implicitly accusing him of lying.

d. The Literati: At the time of Wên Ti was there not no profit from salt and iron and was not the nation prosperous? Now we have this system and the people are in dire circumstances. We fail yet to see how profitabe is this « profit » [of which you speak], but we see clearly the harm it does. Profit, moreover, does not fall from Heaven, nor does it spring forth from the Earth; it is derived entirely from the people. To call it hundredfold is a mistake in judgment similar to that of the simpleton who wore his furcoat inside out while carrying wood, hoping to save the fur and not realizing that the hide was being ruined.
e. Now, an abundant crop of prunes will cause a decline for the year immediately following; the new grain ripens. at the expense of the old. For Heaven and Earth do not become full at the same time: so much more is this the case with human activities! Profit in one place involves diminution elsewhere just as yin and yang do not radiate at the same time and day and night alternate in length.
f. When Shang Yang introduced his harsh laws and increased his « profit », the people of Ch’in could not endure life and among themselves wept for Duke Hsiao. When Wu Ch’i increased the army and engaged in a series of conquests, the people of Ch’u were grievously disturbed and among themselves they shed tears for King Tao. After their death Ch’u’s position became more precarious every day, and Ch’in grew weaker and weaker. So resentment increased with the growth of « profit », and sorrows multiplied with the extension of territory. Where is all that « inexhaustible profit to use without the people noticing it, and the territory extended to include all west of the Yellow River without the people suffering from it? »
g. At the present time, as the Government uses in the management of internal affairs Shang Yang’s system of registration and abroad Wu Ch’i’s methods of war, travellers are harassed on the road and the residents are suffering from want in their homes, while old women cry bitterly and grieving maidens moan. Even if we, the Literati, try not to worry, we cannot help it.
[End of the discourse of the literati]

(§d) — The literatis first argument is that are alternative policies to those enacted by the Grand Secretary. At the time of Wên Ti, was there not no profit from salt and iron and was not the nation prosperous?  (§d).
— Introduction of the literati leitmotif: « People are in dire circumstances; »
— The literati explicitly and utterly reject the positive consequences claimed by the Grand Secretary, thereby implicitly accusing him of lying.
The Confucians claim that profit cannot be neutral. ‘Profit does not fall from Heaven’ (§d), meaning painless spontaneous and autonomous generation of profit does not exist.
– Speaking of hundredfold profit (§d) is a gross and ridiculous mistake, similar to that of a simpleton (§d).

(§e) Moreover, the Grand Secretary’s pretensions  go against the basic law of nature. According to the Confucian literati « profit in one place involves diminution elsewhere, just as yin and yang do not radiate at the same time » (§e). Thus, profit and pain are a zero-sum game.  Remember that, carried away by his eloquence, the Grand Secretary, assumes that it is possible to bring good into the world without bringing evil (§c).
Therefore, pragmatic argumentation is flawed  in both its practical consequences and in its very concept.
Western pragmatic argumentation assumes that the recommended action is positive overall and will improve the world, despite minor negative side effects. The literati reject this moderate position, they argue that the so-called negative side effects balance the touted main effect.

(§f) rejects the alleged positive, painless benefits attributed to Shan Yang policies.

(§g):  The same applies to the policy implemented by his follower, the Lord Grand Secretary.

The profits of some are inseparable from the losses of others. Like the natural world, the human world, functions according to a principle of balance; the good that happens here is correlated with the evil that happens elsewhere.

Huán Kuān (compiler), Discourses on Salt and Iron – A debate on  state control of commerce and Industry in Ancient China. Chapters I–XXVIII. Translated from the Chinese of HuanK’uan with introduction and notes by Esson M. Gale. Original Publishers: E.J. Brill 1934. Reprinted by  Che’ng Wen Publishing Company.

Teng Hsi_FORKE
Teng Hsi Tse, I. Unkindness, § 11

(11)  […] To say that honour is not like disgrace is no correct statement, and to pretend that obtaining is not like losing no true saying. Not advancing one goes back; not enjoying one’s self, one is sad; not being present, one is absent. This is what common people always think.

The true sage changes all these ten predicates into one³².

The great dialecticians distinguish between actions in general, and embrace all the things of the world. They choose what is good, and reject what is bad. They do what must be done in the right moment, and thus become successful and virtuous.

The small dialecticians are otherwise. They distinguish between words and establish heterogeneous principles. With their words they hit each other, and crush one another by their actions. They do not let people know what is of importance. There is no other reason for this than their own shallow knowledge.

The ideal man³³, on the other hand, takes all the things together and joins them, combines all the different ways and uses them. The five flavours, he discerns in his mouth, before he has tasted them. The five virtues, though residing in his body, are nevertheless extended to others. There is no certain direction which he follows. He rejects justice before the eyes. Measures to suppress disorder, he does not take. He is contented, having no desires; serene, for he takes everything easy. His devices are unfailing, his perspicacity enters into the smallest minutiae.

Notes Forke

Note 32 — The true sage does not care the least for honour and disgrace, obtaining or losing and all these contraries, which play such an important role in the world. To him they are all one and the same.

Note 33 — The bad dialecticians and controversialists multiply distinctions and differences, which exist but in their imagination, the great dialecticians distinguish only between some few general principles. The ideal man, i.e., the mystic does mot make any distinctions at all. He has no fixed purpose, but instinctively always hits the right and knows things, which others do not understand after long study.

Alfred Forke 1901.The Chinese Sophists 1901. Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXXIV, Changhai, 1901, p. 1-100.
Cité d’après Les classiques des sciences sociales, Chicoutimi, Québec, p. 58.

https://classiques.uqam.ca/classiques/forke_alfred/the_chinese_sophists/forke_sophists.pdf

Mencius_ENO 
“‘A true worthy tills the soil beside his people, cooking his own meals as he orders the state.’”

3A.4 A man named Xu Xing came to Teng from Chu, preaching the doctrines of the Sublime Farmer. He marched through the court gate and announced to Duke Wen, “I, a distant stranger, have heard that Your Highness is practicing humane governance, and I wish to receive a dwelling place here that I may become one of your common subjects.”
Duke Wen provided him a place. His several dozen followers all wore clothes of coarse hemp and eked out a living by weaving sandals and mats.

[…] Chen Xiang came to Teng from Song with his brother Xin, both bearing ploughs upon their backs. Chen Xiang said, “I have heard that Your Highness is [59] practicing the governance of sages. This makes you a sage as well, and it is my wish to become the common subject of a sage.”

Then Chen Xiang met Xu Xing and was delighted. He discarded all he had learned before and took Xu Xing as his teacher. When he met Mencius, he spoke to him of Xu Xing’s teachings. “The lord of Teng is certainly a worthy ruler. Still, he has yet to hear the Dao. A true worthy tills the soil beside his people, cooking his own meals as he orders the state. Now, Teng has granary stores and treasure vaults; this shows that the Duke treats his people with harshness in order to nurture his own person. How could this be worthy?”

Mencius said, “Does Master Xu only eat what he himself has planted?”
“Yes.”

“Does he only wear clothes that he himself has sewn?”
“No,” said Chen Xiang. “He wears hemp.”

“Does he wear a cap?”
“Yes.”

“What kind?”
“It is of plain silk.”

“He weaves it himself?”
“No, he traded some grain as barter for it.”

“Why doesn’t Master Xu weave it himself?”
“It would interfere with his farm work.”

“Does he cook with pots and steamers and work his land with an iron ploughshare?”
“Yes.”

“Does he make these things himself?”
“No, he trades grain to get such things.”

“Then to trade grain for implements cannot be treating the potter and smith with harshness, and when the potter and smith exchange their wares for grain, neither is that treating the farmer harshly. But why does not Master Xu work as a potter and smith so that he will be able to get from within his own home everything that he needs? Why does he enter into this welter of exchanges with various craftsmen? Doesn’t he begrudge all this bother?”

“No one,” said Chen Xiang, “could undertake the work of all craftsmen and be a farmer besides!”

“Well, then, is ruling the world the only occupation that one can undertake while farming? There are affairs of great men and affairs of ordinary men. If it were necessary for each individual first to make all the implements of his work before using them, it would simply march the world down the road to exhaustion.
“For this reason, it is said, ‘Some labor with their minds, some labor with their strength.’ Those who labor with their minds bring order to those who labor with their strength, and those who labor with their strength are ordered by those who labor with their minds. Those who are put in order by others feed people, and those who order people are fed by others. This is a universal principle throughout the world. […]

The Divine Farmer Shennong is a deity of Chinese folk religion venerated as a culture hero. Shennong has taught the Chinese their practice of agriculture ainsi que l’usage des herbes médicinales. (Wikipedia)
In the third century BCE, during times of political crisis and expansionism and wars among Chinese kingdoms, Shennong received new myths about his status as an ideal prehistoric ruler who valued laborers and farmers and « ruled without ministers, laws or punishments. » (Wikipedia)