A FORTIORI argument
Lat. a fortiori ratione, “for a stronger reason”.
Ratio, “reason”; fortis, “strong”, fortior “stronger”.
The argument a fortiori applies in two directions:
(1) “From bigger to smaller” (Lat. a maiori ad minus). This formula allows inferences from more to less:
The hook can hold a load of up to 20kg, so it can support 10kg.
If someone is capable of killing someone, then, they are capable of striking someone.
Other expressions to the same effect: “for a stronger reaso;, “all the more reason to/for”: “those who can do hard things can readily do easy ones”, etc.
(2) “From smaller to bigger” (Lat. a minori ad maius). This formula rejects inferences from less to more:
The hook cannot hold a load greater than 20kg, so it certainly cannot support a 30 kg burden.
If one has no right to strike, then one has no right to kill.
Other expression to the same effect: “still / much / even less”, etc.
This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, for example as a consolation discourse:
The idea that “death should spare young people” is more acceptable (more normal) than “death should spare the elderly”. And you know that many young people have died around you. Therefore, accept death.
This form underlies the statement “others died much younger”, which is said to comfort the living for the death of an elderly relative.
1. A fortiori, a Transcultural Topos
The a fortiori argument scheme is a clear example of a cross-cultural interpretive – argumentative rule.
1.1 Greco-Latin Tradition
In the Greco-Latin tradition all collections of argument schemes throughout the history of Western argumentation mention the a fortiori rule. Aristotle illustrates this rule via the following examples:
If even the gods are not omniscient, then certainly human beings are certainly not. (Rhet, II, 23, 1397b15, RR, p. 359)
A man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbors […] for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbors (ibid.).
The second argument can be used in the following situation. Somebody was assaulted. Who is guilty? We know that someone in the victim’s neighborhood committed violence against his own father. The a fortiori argument casts suspicion upon the person who has already committed more severely prohibited forms of violence. The conclusion is that the police should question him.
1.1 Muslim Legal Argumentation
In Muslim legal argumentation, the bi-l-awla argument corresponds exactly to the a fortiori argument. The issue is addressed in the Quran (Surah 17, verse 24), dealing with the respect that a child owes to his parents:
Do not make “pfff!” to them!
The prohibition refers to a minimal impolite retort of a child shrugging off or reluctantly obeying the words of his parents, puffing out a sigh of exasperation. The a fortiori principle extends this prohibition to all disrespectful behavior: “since it is forbidden even to say “pfff!” to one’s parents, it is all the more forbidden to say harsh words to them, bully or hit them”.
The prohibition takes its support on the lowest point on the scale, the epsilon of disrespect. Commentators have noted that an a fortiori argument can be a form of semantic deduction (Khallâf [1942], p. 216).
1.3 Talmudic Exegesis
The rules of Talmudic exegesis have been established by various authors following Hillel (1st century CE). The entry “Hermeneutics” in the Encyclopædia Judaïca, enumerates the thirteen interpretive rules of Rabbi Ishmael.
The first rule is qal va-homer, “how much more”, which goes from the “minor” (qal) to the “major” (homer) a fortiori. (Jacobs & Derovan 2007, p. 25).
This rule helps to determine what is lawful and what is not, for example it establishes the conditions under which the Easter sacrifice, Pesach, should be offered. The Bible asks that Pesach be offered at Easter. Some actions are forbidden on the Sabbath, so what is one to do when Pesach coincides with the Sabbath? The calculation a fortiori gives the answer: the Olat Tamid sacrifice (“daily burnt-offering” [1]) is offered daily, including on the Shabbat. Pesach is more important than Tamid (proof: if one does not respect Tamid, one does not incur penalties; if one does not respect Pesach, the sanctions are severe). Since not celebrating Pesach is more serious than not celebrating Tamid, and Tamid is lawful when Easter falls on the day of Shabbat, it is therefore a fortiori lawful to sacrifice Pesach when Easter falls on Sabbath.
The reasoning can be expressed as a rhetorical syllogism:
Problem: the Pesach sacrifice must be offered on Passover.
Some actions are forbidden on Shabbat
Question: What should we do when Passover coincides with Shabbat?
Data: We know that 1) the Tamid offering must be celebrated on Shabbat, and 2) Not celebrating Pesach is worse than not celebrating the Tamid offering.
Argumentation: Topos of the opposites on (2):
Celebrating Pesach is more important than celebrating Tamid.
This, combined with (1), leads to the conclusion:
Conclusion: Pesach can be celebrated when Easter coincides with Shabbat.
1.4 Chinese Tradition [1]
Confucius, The Analects. Bk 11, §12. Trans. Robert Eno [3]
Ji Lu asked about serving the spirits. The Master said, “While you are yet not able to serve men, how could you be able to serve the spirits?”
“May I ask about death?”
“When you do not yet understand life, how could you understand death?”
Han Fei Tzu, “Precautions within the palace”. Trans. Burton Watson [4]
Thus, the actor Shih aided Lady Li to bring about the death of Shen-sheng and to set Hsi-ch’i on the throne.1 Now, if someone as close to the ruler as his own consort, and as dear to him as his own son, still cannot be trusted, then obviously no one else is to be trusted either.
1 Lady Li and Hsi-ch’i “forced Shen-sheng to commit suicide in 656 BC”. “Hsi-ch’i (…) succeeded to the throne in 651 BC” (Burton Watson’s note to the text)
A fortiori can therefore be considered a good candidate for universality.
2. Nature of Gradation
The application of the a fortiori rule presupposes both that the related facts fall within a certain category and that they are hierarchically positioned within this category. This gradation may follow very different principles:
— Objective gradation: “He can hardly go from his bed to the window, and you would like to take him shopping downtown?”
— Socio-semantic gradation: “Even grandparents sometimes make big mistakes, so their grandchildren…”
— Gradation based on the authority of the sacred book: “The Pesach sacrifice is more important than the Tamid sacrifice”.
When there is a consensus on the gradation, ratified by the dictionary, the argumentative or interpretive deductions is purely semantic, s. definition.
In the “Argumentation within Language” theory (Ducrot 1973) the concept of a graduated category is represented as an argumentative scale; the a fortiori rule is an argumentative operator on such scales.
3. A fortiori in Paragon Scales
Some of these scales are topped by an ultimate individual, the paragon, the most excellent specimen of the category. The absolute degree of category is established in terms of comparability with the paragon: “sly as a fox”. These paragon scales are effective in rejecting a complaint: “You say that what happens to you is unjust. That’s true. But consider that Christ is the Innocent one par excellence. Now, you are not Christ, and Christ accepted an unjust death. You must therefore accept this injustice.”
An episode of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Paco, a somewhat turbulent villager, turns himself in after the war, at the request of Mosén Millán, a priest. Mosén Millán assures him that he will be convicted but his life will be saved. Paco surrenders, and now he and his companions are to be shot.
— Why do you want to kill me? What did I do? We didn’t kill anyone! Tell them I’ve done nothing wrong. You know very well that I’m innocent, that we’re all innocent.
—Yes, my son. You are all innocent. But what can I do?
— They want to kill me because I fought back at Pardinas; OK, but the other two did nothing wrong.
Pedro clung to the cassock of Mosén Millán, and repeated: “They did nothing, and they are going to kill them. They did nothing.” Moved to tears, Mosén Millán said to him:
— Sometimes, my son, God allows the death of an innocent. He allowed it for his own son, who was more innocent than the three of you.
Upon hearing these words, Paco was paralyzed and speechless. The priest said nothing either.
Ramón J. Sender [Requiem for a Spanish Peasant] [1953][4]
[1] After https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tamid (11-08-2017)
[2] « An infinitely rich and varied textual record attests [that] argumentation, persuasion and contention were key elements in a wide array of activities central to the concerns of state and society in China throughout its history.”Martin Hofmann, Joachim Kurtz, and Ari Daniel Levine, 2020. Toward a History of Argumentative Practice in Late Imperial China. In Hofmann, M. Kurz J. Levine A.D. (Eds). Powerful Arguments: Standards of Validity in Late Imperial China. Brill, Leiden. [3] Confucius, The Analects. An Online Teaching Translation. R. Eno 2015 (Version 2.21) http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-2015).pdf [3] Han Fei Tzu. Basic Writings. Section 17, “Precautions within the Palace”. Translated by Burton Watson. New York, London, Columbia University Press, 1964. P. 84-85.
[4] Ramón J. Sender [1953] = (1981). Requiem por un Campesino Español. Barcelona: Destinolibro, 7th ed. Pp. 100-101.