18/5.2

The Annals of Lu Buwei
18, 5/2 – At the meeting at Kongxiong, Qin and Zhao joined together in a treaty, which said, “From this time forward, Zhao will support Qin in whatever Qin desires to do, and Qin will support Zhao in whatever Zhao desires to do.” Shortly thereafter Qin raised an army to attack Wei and Zhao wished to rescue the latter. The king of Qin was displeased and sent a man to reprimand the king o f Zhao. “Our treaty says, ’Zhao will support Q in in whatever Q in desires to do, and Q in will support Zhao in whatever Zhao desires to do. Qin now desires to attack Wei, and Zhao on account of this wishes to assist Wei. This is contrary to our treaty.”

The king of Zhao reported this to the Lord of Pingyuan, who told Gongsun Long. Gongsun Long said, “You too may send out an emissary to reprimand the king of Qin, saying, ‘It is Zhao’s desire to assist Wei, but now the King of Qin alone refuses to support Zhao. This is contrary to our treaty.”

Gongsun Long rétorque exactement le même reproche.
Il va falloir s’appesantir un peu sur les détails de rédaction du traité. Un point singulier qui neutralise le traité, comme Deng Xi neutralise la loi.
Les deux arguments sont strictements équivalents  les deux parties sont à égalité stricte.
(isosthénie). Blocage.
Il va falloir s’appesantir un peu sur les détails de rédaction du traité. Un point singulier qui neutralise le traité, comme Deng Xi neutralise la loi.

The a fortiori argument scheme is a clear example of a cross-cultural interpretive – argumentative rule.

Greco-Latin Tradition

In the Greco-Latin tradition all collections of argument schemes throughout the history of Western argumentation mention the a fortiori rule. Aristotle illustrates this rule via the following examples:

If even the gods are not omniscient, then certainly human beings are certainly not.
(Rhet, II, 23, 1397b15, RR, p. 359)
A man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbors […] for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbors (ibid.).

The second argument can be used in the following situation. Somebody was assaulted. Who is guilty? We know that someone in the victim’s neighborhood committed violence against his own father. The a fortiori argument casts suspicion upon the person who has already committed more severely prohibited forms of violence. The conclusion is that the police should question him.

Muslim Legal Argumentation

In Muslim legal argumentation, the bi-l-awla argument corresponds exactly to the a fortiori argument. The issue is addressed in the Quran (Surah 17, verse 24), dealing with the respect that a child owes to his parents:

Do not make “pfff!” to them!

The prohibition refers to a minimal impolite retort of a child shrugging off or reluctantly obeying the words of his parents, puffing out a sigh of exaspera­tion. The a fortiori principle extends this prohibition to all disrespectful behavior: “since it is forbidden even to say “pfff!” to one’s parents, it is all the more forbid­den to say harsh words to them, bully or hit them”.
The prohibition takes its support on the lowest point on the scale, the epsilon of disrespect. Commentators have noted that an a fortiori argument can be a form of semantic deduction (Khallâf [1942], p. 216).

Talmudic Exegesis

The rules of Talmudic exegesis have been established by various authors following Hillel (1^st century CE). The entry “Hermeneutics” in the Encyclopædia Judaïca, enumerates the thirteen interpretive rules of Rabbi Ishmael.
The first rule is qal va-homer, “how much more”, which goes from the “minor” (qal) to the “major” (homer) a fortiori. (Jacobs & Derovan 2007, p. 25).

This rule helps to determine what is lawful and what is not, for example it establishes the conditions under which the Easter sacrifice, Pesach, should be offered. The Bible asks that Pesach be offered at Easter. Some actions are forbidden on the Sabbath, so what is one to do when Pesach coincides with the Sabbath? The calculation a fortiori gives the answer: the Olat Tamid sacrifice (“daily burnt-offering” [1]) is offered daily, including on the Shabbat. Pesach is more important than Tamid (proof: if one does not respect Tamid, one does not incur penalties; if one does not respect Pesach, the sanctions are severe). Since not cele­brating Pesach is more serious than not cele­brating Tamid, and Tamid is lawful when Easter falls on the day of Shabbat, it is therefore a fortiori lawful to sacrifice Pesach when Easter falls on Sabbath.
The reasoning can be expressed as a rhetorical syllogism:

Problem: the Pesach sacrifice must be offered on Passover.
Some actions are forbidden on Shabbat
Question: What should we do when Passover coincides with Shabbat?

Data: We know that 1) the Tamid offering must be celebrated on Shabbat, and 2) Not celebrating Pesach is worse than not celebrating the Tamid offering.
Argumentation: Topos of the opposites on (2):
Celebrating Pesach is more important than celebrating Tamid.
This, combined with (1), leads to the conclusion:

Conclusion: Pesach can be celebrated when Easter coincides with Shabbat.

Chinese Tradition

Confucius, The Analects. Bk 11, §12. Trans. Robert Eno [3]

Ji Lu asked about serving the spirits. The Master said, “While you are yet not able to serve men, how could you be able to serve the spirits?”
“May I ask about death?”
“When you do not yet understand life, how could you understand death?”

Han Fei Tzu, “Precautions within the palace”.  Trans. Burton Watson [4]

Thus, the actor Shih aided Lady Li to bring about the death of Shen-sheng and to set Hsi-ch’i on the throne.¹ Now, if someone as close to the ruler as his own consort, and as dear to him as his own son, still cannot be trusted, then obviously no one else is to be trusted either.
¹ Lady Li and Hsi-ch’i “forced Shen-sheng to commit suicide in 656 BC”. “Hsi-ch’i (…) succeeded to the throne in 651 BC” (Burton Watson’s note to the text)

UNIVERSAL PERSPECTIVE

A fortiori can therefore be considered a good candidate for universality. This is not surprising, since it is based on scalarity and comparison, which are found in all languages.

See A fortiori, Comparison, Argument scales – Laws of discourse,

This example is taken from Mengzi’s (Mencius, Meng Ke) discussion with Gaozi (Kao Tzu) [1] as reported in Mengzi’s text.
The discussion focuses on two fundamental concepts of Confucianism: human nature and righteousness. Gaozi attempts to clarify these concepts by drawing an analogy with the willow tree, which is used to make cups and bowls. Mencius strongly rejects this analogy, which he considers inadequate.
For our current purposes we will limit ourselves to two translations, those of Robert Eno and Dim Cheuk Lau, namely Mencius_Eno and Mencius_Lau (our presentation and numbering).

This is clearly a dialectical exchange between two philosophers. Gaozi puts forward an analogy, made explicit by the construction ‘A is like B‘, to illustrate his conception of human nature.
Both translations use the same expression, ‘human nature’ (1a), to refer to the topic of the debate. The problem posed by Gaozi concerns the emergence of a complex capacity, which is referred to using the following terms (the ‘>’ sign indicates that these terms are part of a chain corresponding to the same object of discourse): [4]

This is clearly a dialectical exchange between two philosophers. Gaozi puts forward an analogy, made explicit by the construction ‘A is like B’, to illustrate his conception of human nature.
Both translations use the same expression, ‘human nature’ (1a), to refer to the topic of the debate. The problem discussed by Gaozi concerns the emergence of a complex capacity, which is referred to using the following terms. The ‘>‘ sign indicates that these terms are part of a chain corresponding to the same object of discourse [5])

Les deux traductions utilisent la même expression, human nature (1a) pour désigner le thème général du débat. Le problème posé par Gaozi concerne l’émergence d’une capacité complexe désignée par les termes suivants. [4] e signe “>” indique que les termes entrent dans la chaîne dont l’ensemble correspond à un même objet de discours),[2]

Mencius does not comment on the concept under discussion, but only on the analogy used by Gaozi. He develops the analogy by focusing on the nature of the transformation undergone by the willow to become a bowl and cup

To describe this process, Gaozi uses the abstract predicate ‘making C from/out of W’, which has no definite argumentative orientation, in both translations. The text continues with a question from Mencius.

In both translations, Mencius essentially adopts the willow’s point of view. Mencius_Lau uses the word ‘mutilate’, which has a negative connotation. The expression ‘mutilating the willow to make a bowl and a cup‘ thus highlights the negative nature of the transformation undergone by the willow. This completely changes the perspective on the operation.
With ‘hack’, Mengzi_Eno adds the sensation of a sharp instrument, which is perfectly consistent with the idea of mutilation: ‘hack W into C‘.
Based on the analogy proposed by Gaozi himself, Mengzi_Eno transfers the operation to humans (a process marked by ‘then‘ in Mencius_Lau).

We conclude that both translations clearly develop an argument by analogy, which is rejected by the opponent who finds fault with the analogy by pointing out a flaw in its structure.
Consequently, this case can be used for all practical purposes in argumentation, under either translation.
The only reservation concerns the status of the concepts on which the analogy is based (righteousness, dutifulness, humanity and morality), which are beyond the scope of this discussion.

[1] Mengzi_Eno and Mencius_Lau refer respectively to Eno’s and Lau’s translation of Mengzi’s work.
Mengzi is the pinyin transcription of the author’s name, Latinized as Mencius (-372, – 289).
Mencius = Mengzi = Meng Ke (-372, – 289).
Gaozi = Kao-tzu = Gao Buhai), circa 420-350 BCE.
More information in Wikipedia.

[2] For the concepts of discourse object and schematization used here, see Plantin Chr., Dictionary of argumentation.

diverging

Falling out of disfavor

(T1) In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State, « whoever in secret rides in the Ruler’s coach shall have his feet cut off. » Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia’s mother fell ill. Somebody, hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night. Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler’s order rode in the Ruler’s coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded his act as worthy, saying: « How dutiful he is! For his mother’s sake he even forgot that he was committing a crime making him liable to lose his feet. » Another day, when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: « You love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach. »

When the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the Ruler said: « This fellow once rode in my coach under pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten peach. » The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and later found guilty because his master’s love turned into hate.

Han Fei Tse_Liao Ch. XII Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion

The Mechanics of disfavor

Parallelism

brilliant colors > love > language of love > brillant life
faded colors > disgrace > language of hate > death

Western Rhetoric: Paradiastole, in Orientation Reversal

As we know, all lovers boast of their choice. The chatterer [is] good-humored, and the silent one maintains her virtuous modesty (Molière, [The Misanthrope], 1666[2])

(What is presented as) the true strongly negative description of a person as a chatterbox or a stupid person contrasts with how she appears to her lover, good-humored or maintaining her virtuously modest.

The language of the lover and that of the ex-lover
The mechanism of Mi Tzŭ’s disfavor: “When the color of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened.” And he spoke a completely different language, putting the ex-favorite at risk.

The Controversial Approach in the Western Argumentation 

Western argumentation is “controversial”. It is based on the fact that it is possible for two honest speakers who are committed to their words and actions to develop, on a given topic, two well-constructed, well-informed, plausible, and relatively reasonable discourses that nevertheless lead to incompatible conclusions (visions, opinions, etc.), thus producing an argumentative question.

Western argumentation, can be defined as a mixed cognitive and linguistic activity, the systematic study of which developed from Aristotle, based mainly on data provided by judicial discourse, speeches made in court, deliberative discourse, assembly speeches, and the epidictic episodes that enter into these discourses. To these classical genres, have been added the genre of religious discourse, advertising discourse.

These discourses are prototypical of what the Western tradition understands by argumentation. It is in these dialogical, openly argumentative contexts that the argumentative phenomena are most clearly present and are therefore easier to study, where the concepts and methods specific to them are most productive.

This does not, of course, prevent argumentation from occurring in other contexts; if we define it, for example, as the implementation of an effort to persuade, then it becomes a universal property of human speech.

Furthermore, we know that the intension of a concept (its definitional content) decreases as its extension increases (it is applied to objects that do not belong to its fundamental domain). The perpetual generalization of a concept to new objects leads to a dilution of its meaning, as we have seen with the concept of structure.

« The agent is not the weigher but the arm of the balance itself”

The third party as the balancing power

In the Western model, the metaphor of the arm of the scales is appropriate for describing the role of the Third Party and, specifically, that of the Judge [2] (Plantin 2021, Argumentative Roles).

However, for the scales to stabilize and clearly indicate a trend, two conditions must be met: first, that “knowledge has been attained,” and second, that there is sufficient time for orientations and inclinations to organize themselves, which presupposes that the decision is not extremely urgent.

The arguer as the arm of the balance

A.C. Graham, in his book Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989), notes that Confucian philosophy has much to say about the problems of choice and action, and that it knows how to circumvent the pitfalls of alternatives:

Confucius is of course very much concerned with choice in the most general sense of the word, as settling after due consideration on a particular course of action,

If you don’t say “What shall I do about it, what shall I do about it ?” there is nothing I can do about you (Analects_GRAHAM 1989 15/16)

But choice in this general sense does not necessarily imply even the posing of alternatives. It might be the contemplation of one’s situation, and the examples of the sages in similar situations until inclination spontaneously settles in a certain direction. (Graham 1989, p. 27) [1]

The overriding imperative is to learn and arrive at knowledge; once you know, orientations towards action may be left to take care of itself as confused inclinations sort themselves out. To apply the metaphor of weighing which Confucius does not use, the agent is not the weigher but the arm of the balance itself. (op. cit, p. 28)

***

A PROGRAM

The arguer as the arm of the balance is a telling model-metaphor, and as such, an excellent « alternative to the Toulmin’s model of argument« , predominant, if not exclusive in the Western world.
The position of this  model-metaphor vis-à-vis the Toulmin’s model remains to be established.

Two translations of Gongsun Long White Horse discourse
— Chinese Text Project (CTP) translation = White Horse_CTP
— Forke translation = White Horse_FORKE

White horse discourse_CTP

1[A]: Can it be that a white horse is not a horse?
2[B]: It can.

3[A]: How so?
4[B]: « Horse » is how the shape is named; « white » is how the color is named. That which names color does not name shape. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

5[A]: Having a white horse cannot be said to be having no horses. Is not that which cannot be said to be having no horses a horse? Having a white horse is having a horse; how can a white one not be a horse?

6[B]: Requesting a horse, a brown or a black horse may arrive; requesting a white horse, a brown or a black horse will not arrive. By making a white horse the same as a horse, what is requested [in these two cases] is the same. If what is requested is the same, then a white horse is no different to a horse; if what is requested is no different, then how is it that in one case brown and black horses are acceptable, and in the other they are not? Acceptable and unacceptable are clearly in opposition to each other. Thus brown and black horses are also one in that one can reply that there is a horse, yet one cannot reply that there is a white horse. It is clear indeed that a white horse is not a horse.

7[A]: If a horse with color is not a horse, then since there are no colorless horses in the world, can it be that there are no horses in the world?

8[B]: A horse necessarily has color; thus there are white horses. If one makes horses have no color, then there are merely horses – how can one pick out a white horse? Thus that which is white is not a horse. A white horse is horse and white, horse and white horse. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

9[A]: A horse not yet with white is a horse, and white not yet with a horse is white. Combining horse with white, it is together named a « white horse ». This is to use an uncombined name for a combined thing, and is inadmissible. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse » is inadmissible.

10[B]: Taking their being white horses as there being horses, as calling there being white horses there being brown horses – is this admissible?

11[A]: No.

12[B]: Taking their being horses as different to there being brown horses, is to take brown horses as different to horses. Taking brown horses to be different to horses, is to take it that brown horses are not horses. To take brown horses as not horses, and yet take white horses as being horses, is to have the flying in a pond and the inner and outer coffins in different places: a contradictory claim and misuse of statements as there is under heaven!

13[A]: Having white horses cannot be called having no horses, this is what is meant by the separation of white. Not separating it, having white horses cannot be said to be having horses. Thus the reason why it is taken as having horses, is merely that « horses » are taken as « having horses », and « having white horses » is not « having horses ». Thus on your taking it as having horses, one cannot call a horse a horse.

14[B]: White does not fix what is white, this can be put aside. « White horse » speaks of white fixing what is white. That which fixes what is white is not white. « Horse » does not pick or exclude color, thus a brown or black horse can be brought. « White horse » does pick or exclude color; brown and black horses are excluded by color, thus only a white horse can be brought. That which does not exclude is not that which does exclude. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

White Horse_FORKE

1— Is it possible that a white horse is no horse
— Yes.

3 How ?
4 A horse denotes a shape, white a colour. Describing a colour one does not describe a shape, therefore I say that a white horse is no horse.

5. There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, can the existence of the horse be denied?There being a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse; how can whiteness bring about the non-existence of a horse ?

6. When a horse is required, yellow and black ones can all be brought, but when a white horse is wanted, there is no room for yellow and black ones. Now let a white horse be a horse ! It is but one kind of hose required. Then, one of those required, a white horse would not be different from a horse. Those required do not differ. Would then yellow and black ones meet the requirement or not ? In so far as they would meet the requirement or not, they would evidently exclude each other. Yellow as well as black horses are each one kind ; they correspond to a call for a horse, but not to a call for a white horse. Hence it results that a white horse cannot be a horse.

7. — A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth ! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth?

8 A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth?
9. Horses of course have colour, therefore there are white horses. If horses had no colour there would be merely horses. But how can we single out white horses, for whiteness is no horse? A white horse is a horse and whiteness. Such being the case, I hold that a white horse is no horse’.

Kung-sun Lung’s paradoxical claim:

Kung-sun Lung was a dialectician who lived at the time of the Six Kingdoms. He wrote a treatise on “Hard and White” and, to illustrate his theory, said that a white horse is not a horse. To show that a white horse is not a horse, he said that « white » is that by which one names the color and horse that by which one names the form. The color is not the form, and the form is not the color.
Huan T’an_Pokora  “New Treatise”. Fragment 135A, p. 124.

Does it work?

Kung-sun Lung often argued that “a white horse is not a horse”. People could not agree with this. Later, when riding a white horse, he wished to pass through the frontier pass without a warrant or a passport. But the frontier official would not accept his explanations, for it is hard for empty words to defeat reality.
Huan T’an_Pokora Ibid.. Fragment 135B, p. 124.

That kind of argument is all the fashion these days:

There are now people who doubt everything. They say that the oyster is not a bivalve, that two time five is not ten.
Huan T’an_Pokora Ibid.. Fragment 135B, p. 124.

Ba Jin 1904-2005.  Jia, « Family », 1933.

Two days later […] the revision of the articles for the next issue of the magazine took place. The youngest attended as usual. When he arrived, Such as smile read aloud a police proclamation forbidding women to wear their hair short. The young man was already familiar with it; it was said to be the work of a blossoming talent (1) of the ancient dynasty. The content, simplistic, and even the form, not very correct, aroused the gaiety of all the listeners at each sentence.
— This is really making fun of people! What does he mean? exclaimed Such as smile, while throwing the sheet on the ground.
— We could publish this masterpiece in the next issue under the heading « Let’s laugh a bit », proposed Reserve of benevolence.
— Bravo! applauded the girl.
All approved. Such as grace added that it would be good to attach a scathing refutation.

(1) Official title of the ancient dynasties, generally translated by the term: bachelor.

Translation from the French, Pa Kin, Famille. Translated in French from Chinese by Li Tche-houa and Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979. Chap. 29. 

In French: Pa Kin, Famille. Traduit du chinois par Li Tche-houa et Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979. Chap. 29.

Le surlendemain […eut lieu la révision des articles pour le n°8. Le cadet y assista comme d’habitude. Á son arrivée, Telle que Sourire lisait à haute voix une proclamation de la police interdisant aux femmes de porter les cheveux courts. Le jeune homme la connaissait déjà; elle était, disait-on, l’œuvre d’un talent en fleur (¹) de l’ancienne dynastie. Le fond, simpliste, et la forme même, peu correcte, suscitaient à chaque phrase la gaieté de tous les auditeurs.
— C’est vraiment se moquer des gens! Que veut-il dire? s’écria Telle que sourire en jetant la feuille à terre.
— On pourrait publier ce chef-d’œuvre dans le prochain numéro sous la rubrique « Histoire de rire”, proposa Réserve de bienveillance.
— Bravo ! applaudit la jeune fille.
Tous approuvèrent. Telle que grâce ajouta qu’il serait bon de joindre une réfutation cinglante.

(¹) Titre officiel des anciennes dynasties, traduit généralement par le terme : bachelier.

1. Falling out of favor: The Reversal of Discourse Orientation

Han Fei Tse_Liao
Therefore, if you talk about great men to him, he thinks you are intimating his defects. If you talk about small men to him, he thinks you are showing off your superiority. If you discuss an object of his love, he thinks you are expecting a special favor from him. If you discuss an object of his hate, he thinks you are testing his temper. If you simplify your discussion, he thinks you are unwise and will spurn you. If your discussion is lucidly wayward and extensively refined, he thinks you are superficial and flippant. If you omit details and present generalizations only, he thinks you are cowardly and incomplete. If you trace the principles of facts and use wide illustrations, he thinks you are rustic and arrogant. These are difficulties in the way of persuasion, which every persuader should know.
Han Fei Tse_Liao Ch. XII Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion, p. 78-79

In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State, « whoever in secret rides in the Ruler’s coach shall have his feet cut off. » Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia’s mother fell ill. Somebody, hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night. Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler’s order rode in the Ruler’s coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded his act as worthy, saying: « How dutiful he is! For his mother’s sake he even forgot that he was committing a crime making him liable to lose his feet. » Another day, when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: « You love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach. »

When the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the Ruler said: « This fellow once rode in my coach under pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten peach. » The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and later found guilty because his master’s love turned into hate.

Id., p. 80.

 ♦

 … et dangereux
Le monarque stupide peut mettre à mort son  conseiller; « tranformé en hachis, il marine dans la saumure ».

En effet, pour juste que soit votre jugement, pour sensés que soient vos arguments, seront-ils pour autant entendus ? Et ne peut-on craindre d’être au mieux calomnié et mis à mort?
Wou Tse Hsiu eut la tête tranchée malgré son astuce, l’éloquence de Confucius ne lui évita pas d’être assiégé à K’ouang . […] Était-ce parce que ces personnages manquaient de vertu ? Nullement, mais leurs maîtres n’étaient pas des monarques éclairés.

Le marquis de Yi fut rôti, celui de Kouei salé et séché ; le prince Pi-kan eut le cœur arraché ; Mei Po transformé en hachis, marina dans la saumure ; Kouan Yi-wou fut emprisonné, Tchao Ki dut s’enfuit à Tch’en, Po-li tse mendia sur les chemins

Mencius, “If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’”

2B.8 Shen Tong asked Mencius in private confidence, “Do you think Yan ought to be attacked?”

Mencius said, “Yes. Zikuai had no authority to give Yan away, and Zizhi had no authority to receive it from Zikuai. Let’s say there was a gentleman here whom you liked; what if you, without consulting the King, privately granted to him your court rank and salary, and he accepted them without any commission from the King? What difference is there in the case of Yan?”

The armies of Qi attacked Yan, and someone said to Mencius, “Is it true that you urged Qi to attack Yan?”

“Never!” said Mencius. “Shen Tong asked whether Yan ought to be attacked and I said yes, in response to his question. Then they went off and attacked Yan! If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’ I would have replied, ‘He who acts as the agent of Tian should attack Yan.’

“Let’s say there were a murderer here, and someone asked, ‘Should this man be executed?’ I would say yes. If he asked, ‘Who should execute him?’ I would reply, ‘The Chief Judge should execute him.’

“As it is, this is simply one Yan attacking another Yan. Why would I ever urge such a thing?”

2B.8 We return here to events surrounding Qi’s invasion of Yan in 314 (see 1B.10-11). Mencius is reported in a different early text to have given his approval of the invasion of Yan by Qi, and here the Mencius seems at pains to explain that this is not so. Note how it is specified that the courtier Shen Tong visited Mencius in an unofficial capacity.

The background events in Yan are that the ruler, Zikuai, abdicated to his minister, Zizhi, prompting Zikuai’s son – the original heir to the throne – to initiate a civil war.

Deux questions

Stase sur l’acte : Question1:  — Y a-t-il eu meurtre? OUI
[— le meurtrier doit être puni = exécuté]

Stase sur l’agent Question2:  — Qui doit prendre en charge l’exécution?

Dictionnaire, Composition et division

L’exemple suivant est emprunté au drame de Sophocle Électre : Clytemnestre tue son mari, Agamemnon. Oreste, leur fils, tue Clytemnestre pour venger son père. Mais avait-il le droit légal et moral de tuer sa mère ?

Il est juste que celle qui a tué son mari meure, et il est juste aussi, assurément que le fils venge son père ; ces deux actions ont donc été accomplies justement ; mais peut-être que, réunies, elles cessent d’être justes. (Rhét., II, 24,1401a35-b5 ; p. 407).

Réunir les deux actions signifie qu’elles n’en font plus qu’une. Oreste soutient que cette composition est licite :

Composition : X est juste et Y est juste => X et Y sont justes
(X) “venger son père” est juste et “ (Y) exécuter la femme qui a tué son mari” est juste

Or si “venger son père” est juste, “tuer sa mère” est un crime. Pour les accusateurs d’Oreste, le fait qu’il soit le fils de Clytemnestre bloque la composition, car il n’est pas possible de composer une action vertueuse et une action criminelle. La stase dramatique se noue autour de l’argument de la composition.

Cette technique de décomposition d’une action douteuse en une suite d’actes louables, ou au moins innocents est argumentativement très productive : voler, ce n’est jamais que prendre le sac qui se trouve là, le déplacer ailleurs et négliger de le remettre à la même place. La division bloque l’évaluation globale.

What Is Shun's Awful Family Doing in the Mencius?

Warp, Weft, and Way

Chinese and Comparative Philosophy 中國哲學與比較哲學

Take 2B/8 as an example. In Qi, Shen Tong asks Mencius whether Yan should be invaded, and he says it should. The text insists that Shen wasn’t acting in an official capacity, but of course it only does that because it’s obvious that Mencius’s answer will be passed on. Indeed, Qi invades Yan and the invasion is a brutal mess. Questioned about this, Mencius insists that he only said that Yan should be invaded, he didn’t say anything about who should do the invading. (Imagine—of course I mean remember—someone in early 2003 saying that Iraq should be invaded, and then after the fact complaining that George Bush hadn’t been the one to do it.)

2B/8 isn’t in the Mencius because of any philosophical point it makes. Even the passages where the Mencius uses the invasion of Yan to present the Mencian fantasy of a true king (whose armies are welcomed with rice and wine wherever they invade) aren’t there just to present that view (1B/11). Mencius’s involvement in the invasion of Yan left him with an image problem, and these passages are attempts to address that problem. Mencius still comes off as a coward and a liar, but I guess that’s better than leaving the criticisms unanswered.

My suggestion is that the stories about Shun’s awful family, or at least 5A/2–3, are there for the same sort of reason. There was a mythology surrounding Shun, and that mythology was not under the control of pious moralists such as the authors of the Mencius. As a consequence, elements creeped into the mythology that would make pious moralists extremely nervous—elements such as Shun’s predilection for putting up with murderers in his family