Topos des contraires
“si A est B, alors neg-A est [neg-B]”

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Wang Chong (27-97 CE)

De quatre interdits
68, 1 Les gens se conforment communément à quatre interdits. Le premier commande de ne pas construire d’annexe à l’ouest de la maison. On estime que cela porte malheur et peut être fatal. […]

68, 2 Bâtir une aile aile à l’ouest porterait malheur : cela signifie-t-il que démolir une telle annexe, ou en construire une à l’est, soit au contraire source de chance ?

[1] Wang Chong, De quatre interdits. Discussions critiques. Trad. du chinois, présenté et annoté par Nicolas Zuffery. Paris, Gallimard, 1997, p. 200-201. Wang Chong a vécu de 27 à 97 (environ).

Affirmation à réfuter : “[construire une aile à l’ouest]  porte malheur »
Cette affirmation admet deux paires de contraires, opposant respectivement le prédicat « porter malheur” à
1) action opposée (démolir)  en un même lieu (l’ouest)
2) même action (construire) en un autre lieu (l’est)

construire une aile	à l’ouest	porte malheur
démolir une aile	à l’ouest	porte bonheur
construire une aile	à l’est	porte bonheur

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***

Han Fei Tse

Punishment of error does not avoid the great ministers, reward for good does not overlook commoners
Han Fei Tzi, Section 6, “On having standards”; quoted and translated by A. C. Graham, 1989; 2 ed. 1991, p. 277.

The linguistic paralelism serves the topos of the opposites

punishment [of error]	does not avoid	great ministers
reward [for good	does not overlook	commoners

———

[Les épouses] souhaitent ardemment la mort du roi. Ce qui me le fait croire ? Les épouses n’ont aucun lien de sang avec le souverain, aussi ne lui sont-elles chères que tant qu’elles sont désirables. Et du proverbe qui dit fort justement “À mère aimée, fils chéri” on peut déduire la réciproque “À mère délaissée, fils méprisé”.

Les précautions contre les siens.[2]

mère aimée (de son époux]	(alors)	fils aimé (de son père)
mère délaissé (par son époux)	(alors)	fils délaissé (par son père)

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***

Lu Hsieh (ca. 465–522 CE)
XXXV, Linguistic parallelism (Li-tz’u) (p. 251)

Crime: when in doubt, then deem it light. Merit: when in doubt, then deem it heavy

The linguistic paralelism serves the topos of the opposites

crime	deem	light
merit	deem	heavy

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***

Liji – Book of Rites
Chap. 1. Elements of Propriety. P. 1.

You should know the weakness of the man you loved and know the strength of the man you hated.

Liji – On Propriety [ Social and Individual Behavior]. Compiled by Dai Sheng.
Translated by Luo Zhiye.

Looking for a good counsellor

1) From a substantial definition of a good counsellor; on the basis of the defining properties of “good counsellor”; i.e. looking for a man with such and such qualities (experience, reputation, success in the advice he gave before, etc; S. Criticism of expert discourse.

2) Révélation, inspiration
• r. par vision de la personne (en rêve), qu’ensuite on cherche et on reconnaît
• r. par le nom

3) révélation par déchiffrement du nom dans le rébus du monde

Il leva en dignité Fong-heou, Li-mou, Tch’ang-sien et Ta hong et les chargea de gouverner le peuple
Se-ma Ts’ien_Chavannes, Mémoires Historiques, T. 1, p. 12).

(130) Les noms de Fong-heou et de Li-mou ont donné lieu à une légende que Hoang-fou Mi rapporte dans son Ti wang che ki:
Hoang-ti aurait vu en rêve un grand vent qui balayait toute la poussière, puis un homme qui tenait un arc énorme et gardait les brebis; il en conclut que le ciel lui désignait ainsi les noms de ceux qu’il devait prendre pour conseillers; en effet vent se dit fong — et poussière se dit keou; en retranchant de ce dernier caractère la clef qui se trouve à gauche, on obtient exactement le nom de Fong-heou; d’autre part, l’arc énorme suggère l’idée de force, li, et le fait de garder les moutons suggère l’idée de berger, mou; on obtient ainsi le nom de Li-mou. Hoang-ti n’eut pas de cesse qu’il n’eût trouvé deux hommes répondant à ces noms.
Se-ma Ts’ien, Mémoires Historiques, T. 1, note 130

Criticism of argument

Mencius :
What people dislike about intelligence
What one dislike in the clever

4B.26 Mencius said, “When people speak of ‘nature,’ they refer only to our primitive being, and that is moved only by profit. What they dislike about intelligence is that it forces its way. If intelligence acted as Yu did in guiding the rivers, then they would not dislike it. When Yu guided the rivers, he followed their spontaneous courses. If intelligence also followed its spontaneous course, it would be great wisdom indeed. Heaven is high and the stars are distant, but if we seek after their primitive being, we can sit and predict the solstices for a thousand years.”

4B.26 Yu is the legendary sage founder of the Xia Dynasty, who was originally a figure in a flood myth. His method of draining the great flood was to dredge he riverbeds, rather than to dig new channels for their flow.

4B.26 Mencius said, ‘In its arguments about human nature, all the world does is offer reasons. It is for reasons to make for ease of argument. What one dislike in the clever is that their arguments are continued. If the clever could be like Yü guiding the flood waters, then there would be nothing in them to dislike. In guiding the flood waters, Yü did so with the greatest of ease. If the clever could also argue with the greatest of ease, then great indeed would cleverness be. In spite of the heighth of the heavens and the distance of the heavenly bodies, if one seeks the reasons, one can calculate the solstices of a thousand year without stirring from one’s seat.

Mencius_Eno BOOK 6, GAOZI

6B.1 A man from Ren asked Wuluzi, “Which is more important, ritual or food?”
“Ritual is more important,” said Wuluzi.
“Which is more important, sex or ritual?”
“Ritual is more important.”
“What if you would starve to death if you insisted on ritual, but you could get food if you didn’t. Would you still have to abide by ritual? What if by skipping the ritual groom’s visit to receive the bride you could take a wife [1], but otherwise you could not? Would you still insist on the groom’s ritual visit?”

Wuluzi was unable to reply, and the next day he went to Zou to consult with Mencius.

Mencius said, “What’s difficult about this? And inch long wood chip could measure higher than a building if we hold its tip up above and ignore the difference in what is below. When we say that gold is heavier than feathers, we don’t mean a buckle’s worth of gold and a cartload of feathers! If you compare the extremity of need for food with a minor ritual, it’s not just food that can seem more weighty. If you compare the extremity of need for joining of the sexes with a minor ritual, it’s not just sex that can seem more weighty.

“Go back and respond to him like this: ‘What if you could get food you need only by twisting your elder brother’s arm – would you twist it? What if you could get a wife only by climbing over your neighbor’s east wall and dragging his daughter off – would you do it?’”

Note Eno
II. “Balancing”: the art of rule violation
The two passages  [6B1 and 6B2] in this section focus on a notion closely related to timeliness – when are we
licensed to violate rules? Confucian texts grant the junzi who is truly at the level of sage full
violation to do so, but do not want to grant that authority to everyone. After all, li are rules, and if they are not important, what basis is left for a ritualist tradition like Confucianism?

https://chinatxt.sitehost.iu.edu/Thought/Mengzi5.pdf

***

Two dilemma, to test Wuluzi dialectical capacities and / his adherence to li, and determination to follow the rule

A or B?  (or = W)
1) no food or no ritual (in general)
2) no sex or no Ritual = sex at the price of a violation of the ritual of the groom’s visit no food
Food => no ritual

“The ritual groom’s visit to receive the bride” [1] An essential part of the wedding ceremony, that is an important ritual
Suppose that ritual will be sacrified to human needs

2) Mencius distinguishes beetween major and minor forms of ritual, and reformulates the opposition in relation with two major forms of ritual.

• Two violent acts
— twisting your elder brother’s arm
— climbing over your neighbor’s east wall and dragging his daughter off –

Suppose that in this case the consensus would on rejecting the condition

A Fact-Based Refutation

Unkindness
Dêng Hsi Tse (c.546-501 BCE)

1. Heaven is not kind to man, the ruler is not kind to his people, the father to his son, the elder to the younger brother. Why do I say so?

Because Heaven cannot remove disastrous epidemics, nor keep those alive who are cut off in their prime, nor always grant a long life to good people. That is unkindness to the people.
Whenever people break holes through walls, and rob or deceive others, and lead them astray, want is at the root of all these offences, and poverty their main spring. Albeit; yet the ruler takes the law, and punishes the culprits. That is unkindness to the people.
Yao and Shun swayed the Empire, whereas Tan Chu and Shang Chün continued simple citizens. That is unkindness to sons.
The duke of Chou put Kuan and Ts’ai to death, that is unkindness to younger brothers.

From these examples, which may be multiplied, we see that there is no such thing as kindness.

Dêng Hsi Tse  1 — Unkindness — Chinese Texts in English

Deng Xi = Dêng Hsi = Têng Hsi

Preliminary:  What meaning should we give to (un)kindness?

In the current formula, kind is a mere softener in a request to do a small favour for the speaker:
“Would you be so kind as to…”. « That’s not kind!” is a reproach to a child who is behaving badly, or, more generally, to someone who has done something slightly wrong. This meaning is not productive in the context we are considering.
Generosity is one of the first synonyms for kindness. In Descartes’ analysis of passions and virtues, generosity is defined by  self-respect and free will, which regulate the attitude towards oneself and others. We take kindness in this cartesian sense, as a cardinal moral virtue implying consideration and care for oneself and others.
We will take (un)kindness with this general meaning, who possibly reminds Confucius’ dao, as characterized in the Analects, 4.15:

The Master said, “Shen, a single thread runs through my dao.”
Master Zeng said, “Yes.”
The Master went out, and the other disciples asked, “What did he mean?”
Master Zeng said, “The Master’s dao is nothing other than loyalty and reciprocity.”

Seen as a moral imperative, kindness is not refuted by the fact that, volens nolens, everyone can be unkind once in their life. It only shows that virtue is difficult.
If Kindness is seen as the organising moral virtue, the text refers broadly to human moral nature. But is there such a thing? Chinese philosophers argue extensively on this point.

Unkindness in the four basic relationships

Kindness is a relational virtue. In this passage, Deng Hsi considers four cases, four  kinds of relationships (Heaven to people — Ruler to people — Father to son — Brother to younger brother), and considers them one by one.

The classical Confucian set of « five fundamental relationships” groups together the relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend, that is social relations and and family relations. [1] Deng Hsi’s list adds to this classical set the relationship between Heaven and man; Heaven rules the universe, and therefore human destiny. The “fundamental relationships” are five, but they are of the same nature: they are derived adaptations of the Ruler-Subject relationship. The corresponding society is sex segregated, male-dominated, patriarchal and despotic,

DengHsi’s refutation step by step destroys the idea of is kindness as a cosmological virtue, making all the more radical his critique of kindness as ruling interhuman social and family life.

1. Heaven cannot remove disastrous epidemics, nor keep those alive who are cut off in their prime, nor always grant a long life to good people. That is unkindness to the people.
The refutation is based on prototypical examples of the human condition

2. Ruler — Whenever people break holes through walls, and rob or deceive others, and lead them astray, want is at the root of all these offences, and poverty their main spring.
Punishment may be justified,  but robbery is fully justified by poverty, and punish poverty is a systemic unjustice. Deng Hsi doesn’t base his refutation on the fact that judges can misjudge, or be corrupt. Social unkindness takes precedence over human unkindness.

3. Sons — Yao and Shun swayed the Empire, whereas Tan Chu and Shang Chün continued simple citizens.
According to Chinese mythology and traditional Chinese historiography, Yao and Shun are the last of the legendary emperors.
Yao disinherited his son Tan Chu [Danzhu], and entrusted the empire to Shun.
Shun dishinherited his son Chang Chun [Shangju], and entrusted the empire to Yu the Great, the founder of the Xia dynasty

Yao and Shun are mentioned in the Book of documents.[Shujing]. Arguments based on data from the Shujing are indisputable. As such, Yao and Shun they serve as models for their infallible capacity to make the right decision in all circumstances, both politically and morally.
In this case, their decision not to leave the kingdom to their respective sons and legitimate heirs is justified by the ineptitude of their heirs. But these legitimate heirs are no less prejudiced by the raison d’état.
The fact that the best kings commit “justified unkindness” while remaining model kings makes the argument a fortiori unndisputable.
It is also possible to consider that model kings are role models in politics, but none the less unkind. In that case, the question they had to decide should be considered as paradoxical.

4. Brothers — The Duke of Chou put Kuan and Ts’ai to death
The Duke of Zhou (Chou) is the founder of the Zhou dynasty, regent king of Zhou for his young brother. His brothers Kuan [Guanshu Xian]  and  Ts’ai [Caishu Du] rebelled  against him, and the double fratricide, direct and indirect,  was the conclusion of  “The three Guards rebellion” (c. 1042-1039 BCE).  The whole drama is told by R. Eno here.

On a par with Yao and Shun, who preceded him by a millennium, the Duke of Zhou is a traditional Chinese model, for the role he played in establishing of the Zhou dynasty.
The argument is similar to the previous one.

The four sources capable to be kind are actually severely unkind, hence the  conclusion that, factually, there is nothing like “systemic kindness” under Heaven.

“There is nothing like kindness”

Qualifying the facts

The legal qualification of a fact is the process by which jurists attach the legal name and the corresponding legal category to a  fact that they have to judge.

Along the same lines, Deng Hsi characterises facts facts he considers to be a case of unkindness. These facts can be considered as systemic, they imply the whole organization of the society, and not just one of its isolated component. These systemic facts are:

— Plagues, mortality
— Punishment of the all thieves, even they are poor. 
— The rule of succession to the throne, and choice of one person, necessarily to the prejudice of others. This is the condition for any choice.
— Punishment of the leaders of a rebellion, even if they are the brothers of the sovereign.

All these very different cases are « unkindnesses”. The unkindness does not lie in the specificity of the events considered, but in their systemic aspect, for example in the fact that the father has the possibility of disinheriting their son, and this possibility is unkind.

Composing the arguments : the global claim

Taken together, the four arguments culminate in the claim that “there is no such thing as kindness”. Let’s consider three possible interpretations of this claim.

— Refuting of the universal claim that « [The world] is kind”
Deng Hsi’s argument can be seen as the refutation of an implicit factual assertion, “Heaven and People are kind to each another”. Such a claim is grossly false, as is “Heaven and People are unkind to each another”, i. e. « people and Heaven are wolves to people”.

— Refuting a prejudice: “[The world] is generally kind”
The refuted claim is better considered as a popular belief, “Heaven and People can be /are generally kind”. Such a belief underlies appeals to pity, prayers and sacrifices. However, the full expression of this belief includes a realistic counterpart, « But they don’t have to be”.

— Destruction of the very concept of kindness; “There is nothing like kindness”
The concept of kindness is fallacious. It follows that it cannot be used in a philosophical system, let alone as one of its fundamental concepts.

_______________
[1] Keith N. KNAPP, 2009. Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues Sāngāng Wŭcháng 三 纲 五 常 . In Linsung Chen, Berkshire Encyclopedia of China.
https://chinaconnectu.com/wp-content/pdf/ThreeFundamentalBondsandFiveConstantVirtues.pdf

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Seuls les spécialistes de la langue chinoise ancienne peuvent comprendre et analyser les raisonnements proposés dans les textes chinois classiques.
Le lecteur de traductions reste avec les raisonnements tels qu’ils sont traduits.

Certaines traductions ne sont pas, ou pas tout à fait, directement compréhensibles pour le profane ;  d’autres sont claires et équivalentes ;  d’autres encore sont claires, mais pas équivalentes.
Les discussions de Mencius avec Kao Tzu (= Gaotzi = Kao Tzeu) peuvent illustrer ces différentes situations. Elles sont disponibles au moins dans les quatre traductions suivantes.

Mencius. Trans., Introd. and Notes by D. C. Lau. Penguin Classics.  ©1970, 2003,

Mencius, An online teaching translation with introduction, notes and glossary  by Robert Eno, Version 1.0 2016. http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mencius (Eno-2016).pdf

Œuvres de Meng Tzeu. Les quatre livres, IV. Traduit par Séraphin Couvreur (1835-1919), © 1895. Mise en mode texte par Pierre Palpant, www.chineancienne.fr.

Angus Charles Graham. 1989. Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical argument in ancient China. La Salle, Illinois, Open Court.

1. Une discussion traductions équivalentes
Impression( fallacieuse?) de comprendre le raisonnement

Mencius_Lau
VI A 1. Kao Tzu said, ‘Human nature is like the ch’i willow. Dutifulness is like cups and bowls. To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow’.
‘Can you,’ said Mencius, ‘make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow? Or must you mutilate the willow before you can make it into cups and bowls? If you have to mutilate the willow to make it into cups and bowls, must you then also mutilate a man to make him moral? Surely it will be these words of yours men in the world will follow in bringing disaster upon morality’ (fin du §)
Mencius. Trans., Introd. and Notes by D. C. Lau.  ©1970, 2003, Penguin Classics, p.

Mencius_Eno
6A1 Gaozi said, “Human nature is like the willow tree and righteousness is like cups and bowls. Drawing humanity and right from human nature is like making cups and bowls from willow wood.”
Mencius said, “Can you make cups and bowls from willow wood by following its natural grain or is it only after you have hacked the willow wood that you can make a cup or bowl? If you must hack the willow to make cups and bowls from it, must you hack people in order to make them humane and righteous? Your words will surely lead the people of the world to destroy humanity and right.”

On the term “human nature,” see the Glossary.

In this and the following passage, Mencius counters Gaozi’s arguments from analogy by finding a weakness in the analogy.

Mencius_Couvreur
VI.I.1. p.557
Kao tzeu dit — La nature peut être comparée à l’osier, et la justice (cette disposition qui nous porte à traiter les hommes et les choses comme il convient) peut être comparée à une coupe ou à une autre écuelle d’osier. La nature humaine reçoit les dispositions à la bienfaisance et à la justice, comme l’osier reçoit la forme d’une coupe ou d’une autre écuelle.
Meng tzeu dit : — Pouvez-vous faire une coupe ou une autre écuelle avec de l’osier sans contrarier les tendances de sa nature ? Vous ne le pouvez; vous devez couper et maltraiter l’osier. Si vous coupez et maltraitez l’osier pour en faire une écuelle, irez- vous aussi léser et maltraiter la nature humaine pour lui donner des dispositions à la bienfaisance et à la justice ? S’il est une doctrine capable de porter les hommes à rejeter comme nuisibles la bienveillance et la justice, c’est certainement la vôtre.

Mencius_Graham
Kao-tzu said : ‘Our nature is like the willow, the right is like cups and bowls. Making the benevolent and the right out of man’s nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow.”
‘Are you able’, said Mencius, by  ‘following the willow’s nature to make cups and bowls out of it? Isn’t it rather that to make cups and bowls out of it you have to violate the willow? If you violate the willow to make cups and bowls out of it, do you also violate man to make the benevolent and the right out of him?  I suggest  that if anything can lead the people of the world to think of the benevolent and the right as misfortunes it is this saying of yours’
Grahan, A. C., p. 120.

The nature of the willow is to grow into a flourishing tree and it is violated when we chop and carve the wood into the shape which suits our purposes. Kao-tzu’s analogy does have a direction of growth, and morality is against nature. But then Kao-tzu’s own example tells against him : nature would be not neutral but bad. Neither for Kao-tzu nor for Mencius is this a thinkable — what incentive would there be to moral behaviour? Although it was to become one with Hsun-Tzu in the next century (id.)
Grahan, A. C Disputers of the Tao. p. 120.

2. Une discussion, plusieurs traductions, parfois divergentes :
Incertaines lueurs

Mencius_Lau (©1970, 2003)

6A3. Kao Tzu said “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’. ”
‘Is that’, said Mencius, the same as ‘ white is what is meant by “white” ?’
‘Yes’
‘Is the whiteness of white feathers the same as the whiteness of white snow and the whiteness of white snow the same as the whiteness of white jade?’
‘Yes’
‘In that case, is the nature of a hound the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?’ (end of §3)
Mencius. Trans., Introd. and Notes by D. C. Lau.  ©1970, 2003, Penguin Classi

Mencius_Couvreur (1895)

3. Kao tzeu dit : — La nature n’est autre chose que la vie.
   Meng tzeu dit : — La nature doit-elle être appelée vie comme tout objet blanc est appelé blanc ?

— Oui répondit Kao tzeu.

— La blancheur d’une plume blanche, dit Meng tzeu est-elle la même que celle de la neige ; et la blancheur de la neige, la même que celle d’une perle blanche ?

— Oui répondit Kao tzeu.

— Alors, dit Meng tzeu, la nature du chien est la même que celle du bœuf et la nature du bœuf la même que celle de l’homme. (fin du §3)
Œuvres de Meng Tzeu. Trad. et notes par S. Couvreur. Cité d’après www.chineancienne.fr. p. 180

Mencius_Eno (2016)

Gaotzi said “The term ‘nature’ simply means ‘inborn’ ”
Mencius said, “Do you mean that ‘nature’ means ‘inborn’ as ‘white’ means ‘white’?
“Precisely” ‘
“As the white of white feathers is the white of snow and the white of snow is the white of white jade?’
“Yes’“Then the nature of a hound would be the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox would be the same as the nature of a man’s?’ (end of §3)

Note Eno à 6A.3 :
This passage turns on wordplay. The term for the “nature” of a living thing is xing 性, which was cognate in sound and form with the word sheng 生, which meant “life, alive, inborn.” In Mencius’s time, the graph 生 could stand for either word. While Gaozi clearly wishes to make a substantive claim about how the term xing should be defined, Mencius reduces this to a lexical analogy to the word “white” (bai 白):

生 = 生 :: 白 = 白

Gaozi should have rejected the proposed analogy.

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Mencius_Graham (©1989, 1991)

Kao-tzu said : ‘it is life (sheng) that is meant by “nature” (hsing)’
‘Is life meant by “nature” ’, said Mencius, ‘as white is meant by “white” ’ ?
‘It is’
“Is the white of white feathers like the white of white snow, the white of white snow  like the white of  white jade?’
‘It is’
‘Then is the dog’s nature like the ox’s nature, the ox’s nature like man’s nature ?
Grahan, A. C Disputers of the Tao. p. 119.

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 Brouillons

Mencius_Eno

Autrement dit :

(I) Gaozi

性 (la nature) = (se définit comme) = 生 l’inné

(II) Mencius

白 de la neige = 白 de la perle

(III) reformule sophistiquement (en vertu de leur paronymie) : 

生 du chien = 生 de l’homme

life, alive, inborn se dit de l’homme comme du chien. 

=> Oui, et alors? 

 

_____________________________________________

Mencius_Lau

3. Kao Tzu said “That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’. ”

‘Is that’, said Mencius, the same as ‘ white is what is meant by “white” ?’

‘Yes’

‘Is the whiteness of white feathers the same as the whiteness of white snow and the whiteness of white snow the same as the whiteness of white jade?’

‘Yes’

‘In that case, is the nature of a hound the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a man?’

(end of §3)

 

(I) Gaozi propose une définition de ‘nature’.

That which is inborn is what is meant by ‘nature’.

“The term ‘nature’ simply means ‘inborn’

 

Traduction Couvreur:

La nature n’est autre chose que la vie.

C’est bien une définition de la nature :

Le bonheur n’est autre chose que la vertu

Prédication d’une essence.

Mais je ne comprends pas le sens de l’équivalence nature = vie.

 

(II) Mencius demande si, et Gaozi confirme que :

white is what is meant by “white”

Ce qui n’est pas une définition de blanc. On ne définit pas (le signifiant) blanc comme

ce que veut dire “blanc”, c’est blanc.

“blanc” ça veut dire blanc.

Sauf dans des échanges tendus :

(je te rappelle que) demain ça veut dire demain

 

_____________________________________________

Mencius demande si, et Gaozi confirme que :

the whiteness of white feathers [is] the same as the whiteness of white snow and the whiteness of white snow the same as the whiteness of white jade (Lau)

the white of white feathers is the white of snow and the white of snow is the white of  white jade (Eno)

La blancheur d’une plume blanche, [est] la même que celle de la neige ; et la blancheur de la neige, la même que celle d’une perle blanche (Couvreur)

 

OK, blanc est un accident ; la plume est dite blanche comme la neige, la perle, le jade.

Prédication d’un accident

_____________________________________________

Then,  the nature of a hound would be the same as the nature of an ox and the nature of an ox would be the same as the nature of a man’s?

la nature est l’inné comme la plume est blanche”

(l’essence) comme (l’accident)

Aristote marche bien.

Mencius, 4th Century BC, The Small Child and the Well

2A.6 — Why do I say that all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others? Well, imagine now a person who, all of a sudden, sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well. Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay. This feeling would not be something he summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents. He would not purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors. Nor would he feel this way because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

“By imagining this situation we can see that one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person. Moreover, anyone who lacks the sense of shame cannot be a person; anyone who lacks a sense of deference cannot not be a person; anyone who lacks a sense of right and wrong cannot not be a person.

“The sense of commiseration is the seed of humanity, the sense of shame is the seed of righteousness, the sense of deference is the seed of ritual, and the sense of right and wrong is the seed of wisdom. Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs. To possess such seeds and yet claim to be unable to call them forth is to rob oneself; and for a person to claim that his ruler is incapable of such moral feelings is to rob his ruler.
(Mencius_ENO 2A6)

 

This thought experiment is critical in the Mencius, and for it to be understood, emphasis must be placed on the suddenness of the encounter, and the fact that Mencius is making a claim about the way all people would react, not about what action they would take.
The idea that certain moral senses are essential to personhood is also explicit in 6A.6, which serves as a companion passage to this one.

Pour décrire l’argumentation développée dans le texte de Mencius (exemple 2.2), nous utiliserons une méthode dérivée de celle qu’utilise Grize pour les opérations argumentatives construisant les objets de discours.

L’argumentation positive

(i) Situation
La situation envisagée par Mencius décrit schématiquement un fait sans doute rare mais possible :

Imagine now a person who, all of a sudden, sees a small child on the verge of falling down into a well.

Cette situation décrit une scène et rapporte une perception, sans la lier à aucune action. Le destinataire peut se projeter dans cette situation. Mencius en dérive une thèse, en deux étapes.

On peut sans doute imaginer une expérience, portant non pas sur un individu particulier ni sur l’humanité entière, qui prendrait pour base non pas les réactions à une situation réelle, mais à une situation représentée

(ii) Attribution d’un état mental accompagnant  nécessairement la perception de la scène primitive :

Any such person would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay.

Cette dérivation est fondée sur une intuition, un sentiment d’évidence ou de révélation intérieure, accessible par introspection.

Cette conclusion serait balayée par l’hypothèse cartésienne du Malin Génie.
L’introspection fournit une conclusion en première personne : “I would experience…”.
Mencius ne dit pas  que l’enfant était sauvable, ni que la personne émue “se précipiterait pour sauver l’enfant”. L’interprétation est compatible avec “se sauverait effrayé / par peur d’être pris dans une sale affaire”.

(iii) Opérations argumentatives: Spécification, Re-catégorisation, Généralisation

Cette conclusion d’abord catégorisée comme une “experience”, est ensuite re-catégorisée, ou précisée  comme a moral sense, un sentiment moral :

all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others

Sur le plan de la disposition textuelle, l’objet de discours ainsi développé correspond à la suite :

a sudden sense of fright and dismay … [an experience] …a moral sense… dismayed commiseration

Ici, le moteur argumentatif n’est pas l’inférence mais des opérations de spécification et de re-catégorisation. Sur le plan conceptuel, par abstraction croissante on a :

 [an experience] > specified as a sudden sense of fright and dismay
> re-categorized  as a specifc moral sense, dismayed commiseration

Cette dérivation s’accompagne de deux généralisations portant sur l’être visé par  ce sentiment moral, et sur l’autre sur la situation, globalement  d’un risque individuel de souffrance à la souffrance de tous

a small child	> généralisation >	others
on the verge of falling down into a well	> généralisation >	sufferings

(iv) Cette conclusion est testée par application du topos des contraires

all people possess within them a moral sense that cannot bear the suffering of others
one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person.

{Humans] would experience a sudden sense of fright and dismay, soit H would experience F
— par application du topos des contraires : non-H would experience non-F
en d’autres termes, one who lacked a sense of dismayed commiseration in such a case simply could not be a person.

(v) Sur-exploitation
Une troisième étape introduite par “moreover” affirme l’existence de quatre sentiments moraux définissant l’être humain : la généralisation est portée par une analogie :

humanity, righteousness, ritual, right and wrong.
Everyone possesses these four moral senses just as they possess their four limbs

Objections et réfutation

La nature argumentative du texte est  attestée par la mention d’objections possibles (prolepse), de nature utilitariste :

— something he summoned up in order to establish good relations with the child’s parents.
— purposefully feel this way in order to win the praise of their friends and neighbors
— because the screams of the child would be unpleasant.

Ces objections sont rejetées, non pas discutées et réfutées.
Elles sont exploitées par une argumentation implicite ad ignorantiam – cas par cas: on ne peut pas imaginer d’autres ressorts à l’action secourable.

On peut opposer à la conclusion de Mencius la thèse de Xunzi (3e siècle av. JC) selon laquelle “Human nature is bad”

Human nature is bad. Their goodness is a matter of deliberate effort. […] They are born with feelings of hate and dislike with them. Xunzi, Chap 25, Human Nature is bad, p. 248.

 

WANG CH’UNG (~-27 ~–97)
“Man is a thing […] No thing does not die, how can man be immortal?
(Wang Ch’ung_Graham)

Wang Ch’ung uses a valid syllogism, that combines true propositions to arrive at a sound conclusion, « Humans are beings, no being is immortal, no human is immortal.” In the unfriendly language of traditional logic, this reasoning is described as a syllogism of the fourth figure, said Galenic, and in the Camenes mode: « all H are B; no B is I; therefore no H is I. »
Wang Ch’ung presents this incontrovertible conclusion as a so-called “rhetorical » question, which is a challenge to any opponent (Toulmin, 1958: 97); this introduces a dialectical movement within syllogistic reasoning.

 

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La logique classique se considérait comme la science de la pensée juste, et le syllogisme est au fondement de la logique des propositions, et, symboliquement, son cœur. Si l’humain est un être pensant, la logique définit l’humain. Cette vision de la logique comme “art de penser” s’est totalement transformée avec la mathématisation de la logique, l’apparition des sciences d’observation, des sciences expérimentales, la mathématisation des sciences.

L’argumentation veut se définir par rapport à la logique, particulièrement la logique mathématique.  Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca opposent l’argumentation à la logique, et le syllogisme disparaît de la théorie de l’argumentation.
Le syllogisme classique utilise la théorie des ensembles (voir la méthode d’évaluation par les diagrammes de Venn). L’opération de catégorisation correspond au syllogisme à sujet concret, dont le syllogisme juridique est la forme utilisée dans les disciplines du droit.
Le syllogisme à sujet concret règle l’opération de catégorisation d’un être ou d’un individu, ce qui en fait peut-être l’opération fondamentale du raisonnement ordinaire, mené avec les seules ressources du langage ordinaire

On trouve dans les textes classiques traduits du chinois aussi des exemples explicites de syllogismes classique (§2) comme de syllogismes à sujet concret (§3)

See Arguing without argumentation theory

 

 

Mencius_Eno

1B.6 Mencius addressed King Xuan of Qi. “Suppose a subject of Your Majesty entrusted his wife and children to a friend and traveled south to Chu, and when he returned, his friend had left his wife and child to suffer in cold and hunger. What should this man do?”
The King said, “Discard him as a friend.”

“And what if the Master of the Guard could not keep order among his men, what then?”
“Dismiss him.”

“And what if there were disorder within the borders of the state, what then?
The King turned to his other courtiers and changed the subject.

 

Mencius_Eno

1B.8 King Xuan of Qi asked, “Is it so that Tang banished Jie and that King Wu killed Zhòu?”Mencius replied, “It is so recorded in the histories.”

“Is it permissible, then, for a subject to kill his ruling lord?”
Mencius said, “A man who plunders humanity is called a thief; a man who plunders righteousness is called an outcast. I have heard of the execution of Outcast Zhòu; I have not heard of the execution of a ruling lord Zhòu.”

[CH Piège dialectique]

Un dialogue question / réponses

Une suite de questions du même type, dont la réponse est du même type et fait l’objet d’un consensus et devient évidente.

La dernière de ces questions est toujours du même type, mais par les engagements qu’il a contractés par ses réponses précédentes, doit y apporter une réponse qui met gravement en cause ses intérêts. “c’est vous qui l’avez dit!”

L’interlocuteurs de Mencius, dans les deux cas, est le roi Xuan de Qi. Il est questionneur dans 1B6 et répondant dans 1B8

Magnifique réponse confucéénne de Mencius

Tchouang Tseu (Liou Kia-hway, p. 44)

Si je discute avec toi et que tu l’emportes sur moi, au lieu que je l’emporte sur toi, as-tu nécessairement raison et ai-je nécessairement tort ?
Si je l’emporte sur toi, ai-je nécessairement raison et as-tu nécessairement tort ?

Ou bien l’un de nous deux a raison et l’autre tort ? Ou bien avons nous raisons tous les deux ou tort tous les deux ? Ni toi ni moi ne pouvons le savoir, et un tiers serait tout autant dans l’obscurité. Qui peut en décider sans erreur ?

Si nous interrogeons quelqu’un qui est de ton avis, du fait qu’il est de ton avis, comment peut-il en décider ?
S’il est de mon avis, du fait qu’il est de mon avis, comment peut-il en décider ?
Il en sera de même s’il s’agit de quelqu’un qui est à la fois de ton avis et du mien, ou d’un avis différent de chacun de nous deux. Et alors ni toi ni moi ni un tiers ne peuvent trancher. Faudra-t-il attendre un quatrième?