SCHEME of argument, or TOPOS

1. Argument scheme

An argumentat scheme (argumentation scheme, topos) is a discursive formula, a generic statement that functions as an argument rule, an inferring license.
Concrete argumentations, or enthymemes correspond to its actualization in specific passages. They stand in an occurrence/type relation with the corresponding topos.

The concept of an argumentation scheme (argument scheme) captures the specificity of the minimal concatenation of two statements (S1, S2) that make up an argumentation (Arg, Concl). An argumentation scheme is essentially a specific kind of sentence connection, a special case of textual coherence and cohesion; that is to say, a general discursive inferential scheme that links an argument to a conclusion.

In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the topoi (place; pl. topoi), i.e., argumentation schemes, are expressed as such general statements, which can sometimes be formulated as proverbs or maxims. The saying, “if you can do the hard things, you can do the easy things as well” corresponds to the “from the greatest to the least” (a maiori ad minus) branch of the a fortiori scheme.
Typical formulas, such as those proposed by Bentham’s “let us wait a little, the moment is not favorable” are also complete and perfectly adequate expressions of an argumentation scheme. see legal arguments: three collections. This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, see a fortiori.

The characteristic indefinite components (subject, predicate) of the scheme, can also be expressed as variables. For example, the schema a fortiori  can be written as (according to Ryan 1984):

If <P is O> is more likely (more probable, recommendable…) than <E is O>,
and <P is O> is false (not plausible, not recommendable)
then <E is O> is false (not plausible, not recommendable).

The scheme is embodied in the following argumentation:

If teachers do not know everything, students know even less

In the same style, the schema of the opposites is written as follows:

If <A is B>, then <not-A is not-B>.

Derived argumentation:

If I was of no use to you in my life, at least my death will be of use to you.

Such formulations should not be taken as some kind of “logical or semantic deep structure” of the schema. Their undoubted benefit is to clarify the reference of general terms.

2. Example: The Argument scheme on waste

Identifying a scheme in a text is a key moment in argument analysis. But this identification is not easy, because the main semantic components of the scheme can be distributed in the text. Experts will say that they know a scheme when they see one; but, in any case, a check is necessary.

The reconstruction can proceed along the following basic lines:

— First, an explicit definition of the topic is needed.
— Second, the passage must be clearly delimited.
— And finally, one must show how the scheme can be projected onto the passage; that is, one must establish a point-to-point correspondence between the scheme and the passage under analysis. Essentially, these connections consist of the linguistic operations of equivalence and close reformulation and synonymy.

This method can be illustrated by the case of the argument from waste, as defined and illustrated in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca.

— The schema:

The argument from waste consists in saying that, as one has already begun a task and made sacrifices, which would be wasted if the enterprise were given up, one should continue in the same direction. ([1958], p. 279)

— First derived concrete argumentation:

this is the justification given by the banker who continues to lend to his insolvent debtor in the hope of getting him back on his feet again in the long run. (Id., p. 279)

— Linguistic operation associating the argument with the scheme

1st column, italics: the actual argumentation itself
3rd column, bold the topos
2nd column, the correspondence between argumentation and topos

(*) Interpretation by the topos of the opposites

The second enthymeme is more complicated:

This is one of the reasons which, according to Saint Theresa, prompt a person to pray, even in a period of ‘dryness’. [1] One would give up, she says, if it were not “that one remembers that it gives delight and pleasure to the Lord of the garden, that one is careful not to throw away all the service rendered, and that one remembers the benefit one hopes to derive from the great effort of dipping the pail often into the well and drawing it up empty”. (Id., p. 279)

— Linguistic operations associating the argument to the scheme (same conventions):

 (¹) Traditional mystical metaphor for “no increase in faith” = no spiritual benefit.

3. Naming argument schemes

Argument schemes are named according to their form or their content.

3.1 By their specific domain and semantic content

Some famous arguments are named according to their precise content.

— The third man argument is an objection made by Aristotle to the Platonic theory of intelligible forms, as opposed to individuals. According to this objection, the Platonic theory implies an infinite regression. It can be seen as an argument from vertigo.

— The argument against miracles: The probability that the dead person was resurrected is less than the probability that the witness is mistaken; so we may reasonably doubt that the dead person was resurrected (Hume, 1748, §86 “Of Miracles”). This formally refers to a hierarchy of probabilities, and can be represented on an argumentative scale.

— The ontological argument infers the existence of God from the a priori notion of a perfect being, see a priori; definition.

3.2 According to their form and content

See Collections (2): From Aristotle to Boethius
Collections (3): Modernity and tradition
Collections (4): Contemporaty innovations and structurations

On the use of Latin words and expressions, see ab arguments, a/ad — e/ ex — 

3.3 Oriented labels

Usually, the label that designates an argument specifies a form and/or content: the argument refers to the consequences (ad consequentiam), to authority (ab auctoritate), to the consistency of human beliefs (ad hominem), to emotion (ad passionem) or to some particular emotion (ad odium). The speaker can admit, without inconsistency, losing face and invalidating the argument he has just used, that he is arguing by the consequences, ad hominem, ex datis, from a religious belief (ad fidem), or possibly from the number, ad numerum. These arguments can be evaluated in a second, normative, stage.

Some other arguments involving the arguer are denoted by oriented labels. An argument cannot be labeled an appeal to stupidity, to superstition or fancy without invalidating it; given the current view of emotion as antagonistic to reason, to label  a passage as containing an appeal to emotion, from ad passiones to ad odium, amounts to a rejection of the argument. Such labels contain a built-in evaluation; there is some confusion between the levels of description and evaluation.
An appeal to faith is judged to be fallacious or not, depending on whether one shares the speaker’s faith or not. In such cases, the theoretical language is biased, and normative action becomes ideological.

4. Typologies of Argumentation Schemes

A general typology of argumentation schemes is an organized collection of argumentation schemes. Collections of argumentation schemes are locally constituted as:

— The set of arguments used locally by a particular speaker, in a particular discussion, see collections, 1 to 4.
— The set of arguments attached to a question, see  script.

5. Argument schemes in discourse

The concept of the argument schema anchors the study of argumentation in the material reality of speech and discourse. The ability to identify an argument from authority, a pragmatic argument, etc. is an essential skill for the production, interpretation and criticism of argumentative discourse, see tagging.

Some works, such as the Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica or texts such as Montesquieu’s “On the Enslavement of the Negroes” can be described as dense and dry sequences of arguments. Other texts are more fluid, and hardly seem reducible to circumscribed segments that could plausibly be described as the occurrence of an argumentation scheme.

Schemes are underdetermined by linguistic expression; there may be several plausible analyses of the same segment of text, some of which invalidate the argument, some of which do not. This uncertainty should not be automatically be taken as an indicator of the poor quality of argument or  analysis. Contextual considerations and the nature of the particular editing of the passage play a crucial role in this regard.

An argumentative text or interaction can be compared to a natural meadow, where the most beautiful flowers correspond to canonical argument schemes. But it is also necessary to ask what the dense plant tissue around these flowers is made of. For this purpose, interaction analysis, discourse analysis and textual linguistics serve as crucial analytical tools, that must be adapted to the specifics of argumentation analysis. The “schema approach” is part of a broader perspective that begins with the attitude towards the other’s discourses, the kind of argumentative situation they frame, the determination of general argumentative strategies, considering a whole range of semiotic phenomena. At the micro level, it is necessary not only to focus on their coordination but also to consider the operations that produce the statements: a good grammar book and a good dictionary are essential if one want to construct a good argumentative analysis, see argumentative question; indicator.