Argument SCALE – LAWS OF DISCOURSE
The correlative concepts of argument scale and laws of discourse are developed in Ducrot (1973).
An argument scale (French “échelle argumentative”), more precisely “argument1 scale”, deals strictly with argument1 “good reason” or premise for a conclusion, not with argument2, “dispute”, see to argue.
1.Argument Class, Argument Scale
An argument class is defined as follows:
A speaker places two statements p and p’ in the argument class determined by an utterance r if he regards p and p’ as arguments for r. (Ducrot [1973], p. 17)
S: — Your great-grandmother spent time in The Two Maggots, she dressed in black, she read Simone de Beauvoir, she was a real existentialist!
S presents three arguments leading to the conclusion “she was a real existentialist” (a popular philosophy of the mid-twentieth century). These arguments correspond to characteristics borrowed from the stereotype of what existentialists are and do, see categorization.
The term argument class refers to an unordered and non-hierarchical set of elements. The speaker may present his arguments in whatever order he deems most appropriate. There is no reason to think that “spending time at The Two Maggots” (an existentialist café in Paris) is considered by S to be a stronger or weaker argument than “reading Simone de Beauvoir”.
Two utterances p and q belong to the same argument scale (for a given speaker in a given situation)
“if the speaker considers
1) that p and q belong to the argument class of r; that is, that they are both arguments for the same conclusion r;
2) that one of these arguments is stronger than the other” (Ducrot, [1973], p. 18).
The following scale represents a situation in which q is stronger than p for the conclusion r:
The situation in which the speaker believes that “reading Simone de Beauvoir” is a stronger argument than “spending time in The Two Maggots” for the conclusion “to be a true existentialist” is represented by the following scale:
Relative scale, absolute scale
Scales in which the strength of the arguments p and q is determined solely by the speaker, are called relative scales.
Scales in which the gradation is objectively determined are called absolute scales, for example the scale of cold:
2. Laws of discourse
Argument scales are governed by four laws: The law of lowering [French Loi d’abaissement], the law of negation, the law of inversion, and the law of weakness.
2.1 Lowering law
The lowering law is a semantic law about negation. According to this law:
In many cases, (descriptive) negation is equivalent to less than (Id, p.31).
Negation is asymmetrical; it excludes not just one point on the argument scale, but the whole zone including the denied argument and all potentially stronger arguments. The denial of an argument which is positioned at a higher point on a given scale implies the affirmation of the lower argument, left untouched by the negation.
Let’s consider the argumentative question “Should we invite him to our poker game?” under the assumption that “we ourselves are a group of decent poker players.
In such a context, “he is not a good poker player” means, “he is a poor poker player”, not “he is a first-class poker player”.
This is true for descriptive negation.The statement “he is not a good poker player, he is a first class poker player” (emphasis on good and first class) involves a very special form of negation, « metalinguistic negation » in which a previous statement is denied, see denying. The stronger argument is necessarily expressed, while the weaker argument remains implicit in the unmarked use of negation.
2.2 The law of weakness
According to this law, « if a proposition p is fundamentally an argument for r, and if, on the other hand, under certain conditions (especially contextual conditions) are met, it appears to be a weak argument (for r), then it becomes an argument for not-r » (Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, p. 66):
He’s a good hunter: he killed two pigeons last year
In particular, the weak argument must be presented in isolation, and not in conjunction with conclusive arguments. Grice’s principle of exhaustiveness can also account for this fact: an isolated weak argument will be interpreted not only as weak weak (inferred from the contextual knowledge), but also as the best possible (pragmatic inference from the assertion), which leads to the rejection of the attached conclusion, and consequently, in a binary situation, as a good reason to go for the opposite conclusion, see cooperation.
From an interactional point of view, presenting a weak argument can also serve a positive purpose, by opening up a discussion and clarifying the participants positions.
2.3 Law of negation (or topos of the opposites)
The law of negation states that,
if p is an argument for r, then not-p is an argument for not-r (Ducrot 1973, p. 27).
If “the weather is nice” is an argument for “let’s go for a walk”, then “the weather is not nice” is an argument for “let’s stay home”.
This law corresponds to the argument by the opposite (corresponding to the paralogism of the negation of the antecedent).
The following example combines the law of weakness with the law of negation; a weak argument for a conclusion is reversed as a strong argument for the opposite conclusion:
Following the Second Iraq War, which began in 2003, Saddam Hussein, former President of the Republic of Iraq, was tried and executed in 2006. Some commentators felt that the trial had not been conducted fairly, and considered that the trial was not fair, and that it was so rigged that even Human Rights Watch, the largest arm of the US human rights industry, had to condemn it as a total masquerade.
Tariq Ali, [A Well-Orchestrated Lynching], 2007[1].
According to the author, the Association Human Rights Watch generally approves decisions in the interests of the United States. Thus, the fact that they approve the verdict is a weak argument for the conclusionconcluding that “the verdict is fair”. In this case, the fact that even the organization has condemned the decision (as have individuals or organizations more inclined to criticize the United States) is a strong argument for the conclusion that the verdict is unfair.
Conversely, a weak refutation of r strengthens r. This strategy falls within the general framework of the paradoxes of argumentation.
2.4 Law of inversion
According to this law,
If p’ is stronger than p with respect to r, then not-p is stronger than not-p’ with respect to not-r. (Ducrot 1973, p. 239; 1980, p. 27)
— “Leo has a bachelor’s degree” and “Leo has a master’s degree” are two arguments for “Leo is a qualified person, he can teach mathematics”.
— “Leo has a master’s degree” is a stronger argument for this conclusion than “Leo has a bachelor’s degree” for this same degree.
Under normal circumstances, we might say:
Leo has the bachelor’s degree and even a master’s degree, he is fully qualified to teach mathematics.
The indicator even 1) indicates that the passage to which it belongs is argumentative;
2) marks that the statement it modifies is stronger than the other argument(s) contextually available for the conclusion defended in that passage.
You can say, “He has a thesis, and even a bachelor’s degree”, but with some irony about the value of diplomas. If you want to argue against Leo, to show that he is not sufficiently qualified, you will say:
Leo has no master’s degree, not even a bachelor’s degree, he is not qualified to teach mathematics.
The negation turns the weakest argument for qualification into the strongest argument for the lack of qualification.
Argument scales can express the argument a fortiori:
He doesn’t have a bachelor’s degree, a fortiori he doesn’t have a master’s degree.
[1] Tariq Ali, Un Lynchage bien orchestré [A well-orchestrated lynching]. Afrique-Asie, February 2007.