ASSENT

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss the effects of argumentation on the basis of an opposition between to persuade and to convince, the former being a local achievement involving a particular audience, while the latter is a global achievement involving the universal audience. The functional definition of argumentation given at the beginning of the Treatise, however, does not use these terms but speaks of “adherence of minds” and “assent”. In this passage, argumentation is seen as an activity aimed at “inducing or increasing the adherence of the mind” to “theses” that are “presented for its assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 4).

The concept of assent refers to Newman’s Grammar of Assent (1870).

The Stoic theory of knowledge defines assent as a voluntary act of the soul that occurs when the soul receives a true impression; this process implies a pre-established harmony between the will and the mind. “The soul wants truth”, and truth is index sui, its own mark. The mark of the true impression is the assent given to it. The skeptics reject this harmony between true representation and assent; truth is not capable of self-certification, i.e. one can give its assent to false representations.

Suspension or abstention from assent, is the basis of the skeptical method of attaining tranquility (ataraxia):

The skeptical way is called […] aporetic either, as some say, from its being puzzled and questioning about everything or from its being at a loss as to whether to assent or dissent. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines, I, iii)

Assent may be given or withheld by an act of the will:

I think it a very great feat to resist one’s perceptions, to withstand one’s vague opinions, to control one’s inclination to give assent to propositions; […] Carneades performed a Herculean work when, as it had been a wild and formidable monster, he extracted assent, that is to say, vague opinion and rashness from our minds. (Cicero, Ac. II, 34; trans. Yonge, p. 74)

Skepticism characterizes the argumentative situation as a standoff between two equal (isosthenic) and opposing discursive forces, which imposes a suspension of assent, see Force; Stasis.

Common language regards assent as an action. Assent can be given or withheld, just as agreement or authorization can be given or withheld. Rhetorically, the problem of assent complicates the concept of persuasion, by giving the recipient an active role in the process. While people are passively persuaded, they are actively giving their assent. This maintains a balance between the speaker and the audience, as the speaker’s efforts to persuade the audience correspond to the audience’s ability to grant or withhold assent. Withheld assent plays a role in all varieties of rational exchange because it creates a state of doubt that characterizes the third party position, S. Roles.

Assent to a proposition is characterized by varying degrees, as one moves from opinion to belief to knowledge:

— The lowest degree corresponds to opinion, defined as a belief accompanied by an awareness that there are other equally valid opinions.
— The middle degree is that of belief. There are other beliefs, that are not considered false, but less valid than one’s own.
— The strongest degree is that of conviction. The convinced person considers that the proposition to which he or she adheres is true and that opposing arguments are fallacious, perverse or insane.

According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, persuasion produces belief, while conviction produces a generalized belief, that defines socially legitimized knowledge.