Lat. a pari, or a pari ratione, “for the same reason”: par, “equal, same” ratio, “reason”.

A distinction must be drawn between two kinds of a pari arguments, depending on whether they deal with individuals or classes of individuals.

1. When the argument concerns individuals, the a pari argument includes an individual x in a cate­gory C. The individual becomes (is identified as) a member of the category, in logical symbols < x ∈ C >, S. Categorization.

2. When the argument concerns classes of individuals, the a pari argument reorganizes the cate­gory system (classification^@, taxonomy). It reduces two formerly distinct categories (class, species) to one, on the basis that they belong to the same super category (genus). This entry deals with this second definition.

The vocabulary of analogy and the label “argument a comparatione” are sometimes used to refer to the argument a pari, in both of its forms, S. Taxonomies and categories.

The a pari argument “[applies] to another species of the same genus what can be asserted about some particular species.” (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 241);

A pari reasons by equality of the cases if a parricide deserves death, the same ap­plies to matricide. (Chenique 1975, p. 358)

The a pari argument transfers a property (a quality, a right, a duty…) (here “— deserves death”) originally attached to a species A (here: “— is a parricide”) to an­other species B (here: “— is a matricide”), arguing that they belong to the same genus (here: “— is a murderer of a parent”). The reasoning is as follows:

The trend is towards severity
The penalty for matricide is life imprisonment.
Let’s strengthen the punishment of matricide!

The penalty for parricide is death.
Parricide and matricide are crimes of the same genus (type, genre, kind…).
The penalty for matricide should be death!

Two different situations should be distinguished for the discussion of a pari.

— Situations of complete knowledge, where the truth is fully known and can be fully contemplated; then, syllogistic reasoning applies.
— Situations where the truth is debatable and a concrete decision has to be made, i.e., argumentative situations.

1. Syllogistic a pari

From the point of view of absolute knowledge, the a pari argument is either a truism or a paralogism, depending on whether or not the property considered is generic, S. Taxonomies and categories.

If the property is generic, then it is true of all species attached to the genus, and particularly true of the two species involved in the a pari argument. The syllogism runs as follows:

Having a constant body temperature is a generic property of mammals.
Whales, humans… are mammals
So Whales, humans… have a constant body temperature.

The corresponding a pari argument is:

Both men and whales are mammals (“belong to the same genus”, here mammals)
Men have a constant body temperature (“what is true of a species”, here humans)
So whales (must) have a constant body temperature (“is applied to another spe­cies”, here whales).

If the property is not generic, then, the inference is a paralogism:

Labradors, poodles… are dogs
Labradors are gun dogs
So, poodles are / must be gun dogs.

The corresponding a pari argument is:

Both labradors and poodles are dogs (“belong to the same genus” here dogs)
Labradors are gun dogs (“what is true of a species”, here labradors)
So poodles are gun dogs (“is applied to another species”, here gun dogs).

But poodles are not gun dogs. The property “— is a gun dog” is not a generic property, it is attached to labrador as a species, not to the genus “dogs”. It follows that this property cannot be safely transferred to poodles.

In short, a property can be transferred from a species to another species belonging to a same genus only if the said property is generic. The validity of the argument depends on the quality of the taxonomy it exploits, and the argument will be considered convincing only if people agree on the classification.

2. The seeming deadlocks a pari vs. a contrario
and a pari vs. a pari

Two paradoxes are attributed to a pari argument. In the same situation:

• a contrario and a pari cancel each other out;
• a pari can destroy a pari.

2.1 A contrario against a pari

(i) A pari extends to the As the treatment given to the Bs, arguing that both are attached to a common super-category:

(1) the As are like the Bs! they should be treated as Bs!

(ii) A contrario, the argument from the opposite, justifies the difference in treatment of the As and Bs, arguing that they are indeed opposites:

(2) The As and Bs are different, so they are rightly treated as such!

In both cases, the question is whether a difference between A and B should be preserved: a contrario answers “yes!”, a pari answers “no!”.

2.2 A pari against a pari

A pari argument extends to B a characteristic of A, or to A a characteristic of B. It can be objected to (i):

(3) If the As are like the Bs, then the Bs are like the As; the Bs are the ones which should be treated like As!

Here, proponent and opponent refer to the same data and use the same rule to support contrary claims. They agree on the necessity to re-categorize As and Bs into just one category, but disagree about which should prevail.

Hence the conclusion may be reached that all this maneuvering is useless (in the following quotation “analogy” means a pari):

That the argumentum a contrario and analogy as means of interpretation are entirely worthless can be seen from the fact that both lead to opposite results, and that no criterion exists to decide when the one and when the other should be applied. (Kelsen 1967, p. 352).

This is the case for an abstract, syllogistic situation, where:

— A contrario is actually logically invalid, S. Opposites – A contrario.
— A contrario can be systematically opposed to a pari.
— As a “bidirectional” argument scheme, a pari can always be opposed to a pari.

3. Argumentative a pari and the situated condition of argument

Let us schematize a situation in which Gs and Bs are treated differently. A pari can be used to support the claims “All Gs!” or “All Bs!” and a contrario, to rebut both.

— A contrario is the status quo argument, which may be set up against both a pari alignments. Those arguing for a status quo do not support the burden of proof, they can simply reformulate and amplify the current “doxical” discourse, to maximize the opposition between As and Bs, and so to justify a contrario the difference in treatment:

It is not by chance that As and Bs are called A and B, precisely because they are A and B, and not something else!

— The proponent of either a pari alignments of categories must undermine this discourse, showing that the difference formerly considered as essential should now be considered a mere accident. These minimizing strategies accompanying a pari depend on the characteristics of the specific situations.

In a slightly more complicated move, the individual forwarding an a pari argument may attempt to show that it is possible to construct a super category, including both A and B. This solution implies that the former definitions of both categories needs to be amended.

The problem with the syllogistic approach of a priori is that it does not take the argumentative situation into account, whereas there are preferences and impossibilities enshrined in any such situation. These contextual conditions systematically eliminate one or the other application of a pari. A pari is logically bi-directional and contextually mono-directional, as can be seen in the following cases.

3.1 Military service: girls / boys

Context: a country where boys, but not girls, complete compulsory military service. Applying a pari to the boys, that is, claiming that they should not do their military service, amounts to requesting the dissolution of the army, its professionalization, or similar. This would be the real issue, and not that of equal treatment of boys and girls.

So, the a pari argument can only be advanced by the girls, or by the military administration willing to incorporate girls. The relevant argumentative question can only be “should the girls do military service too?”, and a pari backs a positive answer very well.

3.2 Murders: patricide / matricide

Context: a social situation in which a “civilizing process” is taking place; there is a clear effort being made to eliminate all forms of violence. In such a situation, an a pari generalization of the death penalty is “out of the question”. The only relevant issue can be “should we reduce the penalty for patricide?”, with a pari being used to back a positive answer.

If the social climate is oriented towards the strengthening of penalties, the situation is the same, with a pari serving as justification for the positive answer to the question “should we increase the penalty for matricide?”.

3.3 Employment: fixed-term / permanent contract

Context: Some employees receive a Permanent Contracts (PC), while others have a Fixed Term Contracts (FTC), the former kind of contracts being considered better than the latter from the point of view of the workers. In a period of prosperity and full employment, PCs are the golden standard, the a pari alignment of FTCs with PCs is on the agenda. The issue of a possible alignment of PCs with FTCs is irrelevant. The difference will be denied through argumentations such as:

People with FTCs are exploited, we are all workers, everyone should be able to get a PC!

In less favorable economic conditions, FTCs become the norm, and their alignment with PCs is not on the agenda. The difference will be denied by argumentations such as:

People with PCs are privileged, privileges should be ended, everyone should be put on an FTC!

3.4 Going out at night: girls / boys

Let us consider a family of consisting of both teenage boys and teeenage girls, two species of the same genus. The boys are authorized to go out in the evening, the girls however are not. Let us suppose that this prohibition annoys the girls. They can argue their point in many ways. They might, for example draw on the positive outcomes that going out at night will have on their social awareness, S. Pragmatic argument; they might also point out that their brothers go out at night, in an elliptic a pari:

G — But the boys do go out at night!

Unsurprisingly, the parents argue a contrario:

P — Yes but you are a girl…

To strengthen their case and eliminate the difference, girls might stress the common features characterizing the new catchall category “as the boys”:

Boys and girls receive the same education; they have access to the same media; they practice judo; they follow the same courses with the same requirements; they share the same tasks at home …

and minimize the gender gap:

We are mature, we know how to avoid trouble.

Lat. a fortiori ratione, “for a stronger reason”.
Ratio, “reason”; fortis, “strong”, fortior “stronger”.

The argument a fortiori applies in two directions:

(1) “From bigger to smaller” (Lat. a maiori ad minus). This formula allows infer­ences from more to less:

The hook can hold a load of up to 20kg, so it can support 10kg.
If he is capable of killing someone, he is capable of striking someone.

Other expressions to the same effect: “for stronger reason”, “all the more reason to/for”, “those who can do hard things can readily do easy ones”, etc.

(2) “From smaller to bigger” (Lat. a minori ad maius). This formula rejects inferences from less to more:

The hook cannot hold a load of more than 20kg, so it certainly cannot support a 30 kg burden.
If one has no right to strike, one has no right to kill.

Other expression to the same effect: “still / much / even less”, etc.

This scheme can be specified in a discursive domain, for example as a consolation discourse:

The idea that “death should spare young people” is more acceptable (more normal) than “death should spare the elderly”. And you know that around you many younger people have died. Therefore, accept death.

This form underlies the statement “others died much younger”, said to comfort the living for the death of an elderly relative.

1. A fortiori, a transcultural topos

The a fortiori argument scheme is a clear example of a cross-cultural interpretative – argumentative rule.

1.1 Greco-Latin tradition

In the Greco-Latin tradition all collections of argument schemes throughout the history of Western argumentation mention the a fortiori rule. Aristotle illustrates this rule via the following examples:

If even the gods are not omniscient, human beings are certainly not. (Rhet, II, 23, 1397b15, RR, p. 359)
A man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbors […] for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbors (ibid.).

The second argument can be used in the following situation. Somebody was assaulted. Who is guilty? We know that someone in the victim’s neighborhood committed violence against his own father. The a fortiori line casts suspicion upon he who has already committed more strongly prohibited forms of violence. The conclusion is that the police should question him.

1.1 Muslim legal argumentation

In Muslim legal argumentation, the bi-l-awla argument corresponds exactly to the a fortiori argument. The problem is discussed in the Koran (Surah 17, verse 24), dealing with the respect that a child owes to his parents:

Do not make “pffft!” to them!

The prohibition refers to a minimal impolite retort of a child shrugging off the words of his parents, or obeying them reluctantly, puffing out a sigh of exaspera­tion. The a fortiori principle extends the prohibition to all disrespectful behavior: “since it is forbidden even to say “pff!” to one’s parents, it is all the more forbid­den to say harsh words to them, to bully or to hit them”.
The prohibition takes its support on the lowest point on the scale, the epsilon of disrespect. Commentators have noticed that a fortiori argument can be a case of semantic deduction (Khallâf [1942], p. 216).

1.3 Talmudic exegesis

The rules of Talmudic exegesis have been established by various authors since Hillel (1^st century CE). The entry “Hermeneutics” of the Encyclopædia Judaïca, enumerates the thirteen interpretation rules of Rabbi Ishmael.
The first one is the rule qal va-homer, “how much more”, going a fortiori from the “minor” (qal) to the “major” (homer). (Jacobs & Derovan 2007, p. 25).

This rule helps to determine what is lawful and what is not, for example the conditions under which the Easter sacrifice, Pesach, should be offered. The Bible asks that Pesach be offered at Easter. Some actions are forbidden on the Sabbath, so what is one to do when Pesach coincides with the Sabbath? The calculation a fortiori gives the answer: the sacrifice Olat Tamid (“daily burnt-offering”[1]) is offered every day, including Shabbat. Pesach is more important than Tamid (proof: if one does not respect Tamid, one does not incur penalties; if one does not respect Pesach, the sanctions are severe). Since not to celebrate Pesach is more serious than not to cele­brate Tamid, and Tamid is lawful when Easter falls on the day of Shabbat, it is therefore a fortiori lawful to proceed to sacrifice Pesach when Easter falls on the day of Sabbath.
The reasoning can be expressed as a rhetorical syllogism:

Problem: the Pesach sacrifice must be offered on Passover.
Some actions are forbidden on Shabbat
Question: What should we do when Passover coincides with Shabbat?

Data: We know that 1) Tamid must be celebrated on Shabbat 2) Not celebrating Pesach is worse than not celebrating Tamid
Argumentation: Topos of the opposites on (2):
Celebrating Pesach is more important than celebrating Tamid.
This, combined with (1), leads to the conclusion:

Conclusion: Pesach can be celebrated when Easter coincides with Shabbat.

1.4 Chinese tradition

Confucius, The Analects. Bk 11, §12. Trans. Robert Eno [3]

Ji Lu asked about serving the spirits. The Master said, “While you are yet not able to serve men, how could you be able to serve the spirits?”
“May I ask about death?”
“When you do not yet understand life, how could you understand death?”

Han Fei Tzu, “Precautions within the palace”.  Trans. Burton Watson [4]

Thus, the actor Shih aided Lady Li to bring about the death of Shen-sheng and to set Hsi-ch’i on the throne.¹ Now, if someone as close to the ruler as his own consort, and as dear to him as his own son, still cannot be trusted, then obviously no one else is to be trusted either.
¹ Lady Li and Hsi-ch’i “forced Shen-sheng to commit suicide in 656 BC”. “Hsi-ch’i (…) succeeded to the throne in 651 BC” (Burton Watson’s note to the text)

A fortiori can therefore be considered a good candidate for universality.

2. Nature of gradation

The application of the a fortiori rule presupposes both that the facts put in relation fall within a certain category and that they are hierarchically positioned within this category. This gradation may follow very different principles:

— Objective gradation: “he can hardly go from his bed to the window, and you would like to take him shopping downtown?”
— Socio-semantic gradation: “even grandparents sometimes make big mistakes, so their grandchildren…”
— Gradation based on the authority of the sacred book: “the Pesach sacrifice is more important than the Tamid sacrifice”.

When there is a consensus on the gradation, ratified by the dictionary, the argumen­tative or interpretive deductions is purely semantic, S. Definition.

In the “Argumentation within Language” theory (Ducrot 1973) the concept of a graduated category is represented as an argumentative scale, the a fortiori rule being an argumentative operator on such scales.

3. A fortiori in paragon scales

Some of these scales are topped by an ultimate individual, the paragon, the most excellent specimen of the category. The absolute degree in the category is estab­lished in terms of comparability with the paragon: “sly as a fox”.These paragon scales are effective in rejecting a complaint: “You say that what happens to you is unjust. That’s true. But consider that Christ is the Innocent par excellence. Now, you are not Christ, and Christ accepted an unjust death. You must therefore accept this injustice.”

An episode of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Paco, a somewhat turbulent villager, turns himself in after the war, upon the request of Mosén Millán, a priest. Mosén Millán as­sures him that he would be convicted but that he would have his life saved. Paco surren­ders, and now he is to be shot with his companions.
— Why do you want to kill me? What did I do? We didn’t kill anyone. Tell them I’ve done nothing wrong. You know very well that I’m innocent, that we’re all innocent.
—Yes, my son. You are all innocent. But what can I do?
— They want to kill me because I fought back at Pardinas; OK, but the other two did nothing wrong.
Pedro clung to the cassock of Mosén Millán, and repeated: “They did nothing, and they are going to kill them. They did nothing.” Moved to tears, Mosén Mil­lán said to him:
— Sometimes, my son, God allows the death of an innocent. He allowed it for his own son, who was more innocent than you three.
On hearing these words, Paco remained paralyzed and mute. The priest said noth­ing either.
Ramón J. Sender [Requiem for a Spanish Peasant] [1953][4]

[1] After https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tamid (11-08-2017)

[4] Ramón J. Sender [1953] = (1981). Requiem por un campesino Español. Barcelona: ​​Destinolibro, 7th ed.. P. 100-101.

Oxymore

Wuttke, Walter 1977. Zu Fragen des Zustandekommens potentieller sprachlicher Wirkingen des Oxymoron… Beiträge zur Geschischte des deutschen Sprache und Literature, 98. 83-90

Des emplois récents du mot oxymore lui-même illustrent de façon frappante cette ambivalence pragmatique de la figure. Lors de la constitution de mon corpus, j’ai en effet été frappée de constater que ce terme savant, peu usité dans les manuels de rhétorique eux-mêmes jusqu’à une date récente, s’était suffisamment répandu dans l’usage courant pour apparaître dans des commentaires métalinguistiques à forte orientation argumentative, de sorte qu’on peut parler de jugement d’oxymorisation, comme A. Krieg-Planque (2004) parle de jugement d’euphémisation.

57 Qualifier tel objet de discours d’oxymore devient alors un acte argumentatif décisif, soit pour disqualifier l’objet de discours ou le locuteur qui l’a désigné ainsi, soit au contraire pour les parer de toutes les vertus. C’est ainsi que le syntagme « TVA sociale » se voit dans des échanges récents sur la Toile (mai 2007) qualifier d’oxymore par les détracteurs de l’impôt ainsi désigné afin de montrer la fausseté du caractère social de cet impôt. Une blogueuse voit même dans l’oxymore une tare du discours politique contemporain :

58

(29) C’est ainsi que depuis une dizaine d’années on voit fleurir dans la sphère politico-économique d’aussi brillants oxymores que la « croissance zéro » pour éviter de dire la stagnation, le « développement durable » pour taire toute notion de consommation prudente, la « discrimination positive » ou encore le « libéralisme raisonné » pour faire passer la pilule, quand il ne s’agit pas tout bonnement de nous faire croire à l’impossible avec des expressions comme la « guerre propre » et ses fameuses « frappes chirurgicales ». (Article publié sur Agoravox dans l’édition du 04/12/2006, http:// wwww. agoravox. fr/ article. php3 ? id_article= 16263) [29][29]On peut noter que les exemples cités, hormis « discrimination…

59 Dans les débats à l’Assemblée Nationale sur le Traité Constitutionnel Européen, l’expression de « traité constitutionnel » est qualifiée d’oxymore par les défenseurs de ce traité, qui parviendrait selon eux à ménager les prérogatives des États tout en approfondissant la construction de l’unité européenne, alors que, quatre ans auparavant, l’appellation d’ « oxymore » est utilisée pour critiquer le concept de « fédération d’États-Nations » qui masquerait tout bonnement une conception fédéraliste de l’Union européenne :

60

(30) M. Léonetti. Contrairement à ce que certains prétendent en arguant du terme de Constitution, ce nouveau traité ne fait pas de l’Union européenne un super-État. C’est un traité entre États. Pascal Clément a brillamment expliqué comment l’expression de traité constitutionnel faisait coïncider deux concepts a priori contradictoires, mais synthétisés dans la notion de construction européenne. – M. Pascal Clément, président de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République, rapporteur. Un oxymore ! (première séance du 26/01/2005)
(31) M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement. À rien ne sert de se réfugier, Monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères, dans les oxymores, du type « fédération d’États-nations » ; c’est d’avance concéder à la logique du super Etat fédéral. (deuxième séance du 5/06/2001)

Conventions

La méthode des abréviations latines

ibid. (de ibidem, au même endroit) Abréviation utilisée pour une référence suivant immédiatement une référence à un même document.

1. (de idem, le même auteur) Abréviation utilisée pour une référence à un autre ouvrage d’un auteur cité dans la note de référence précédente (de moins en moins utilisé).
2. cit. (de opere citato, dans l’ouvrage cité) Cette abréviation est généralement utilisée pour les références à des ouvrages publiés. Elle remplace le titre et toute l’information relative à l’édition.

loc. cit. (de loco citato, au lieu cité)1 Cette abréviation est généralement réservée aux références des articles ou des mémoires et thèses non publiés.

Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction : perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (1991)

Analyse de l’argumentation > Représentation

L’ambition du Dictionnaire est de caractériser un langage de représentation des pratiques argumentatives. Modéliser, c’est construire une représentation d’un certain domaine de données, en s’appuyant sur un langage où les concepts et leurs relations et leurs conditions d’application sont définis le mieux possible. Le langage de représentation détermine un ensemble d’opérations techniques qui permettent de traiter une classe de phénomènes objets. Il n’a pas pour ambition première de représenter l’essence du phénomène argumentation.

Les modèles sont évalués selon leur adéquation aux données, qui a elle-même trois facettes, l’adéquation observationnelle, l’adéquation descriptive et l’adéquation explicative. Ces notions sont proposées par Chomsky (1964) pour évaluer des grammaires concurrentes ; on peut en faire une adaptation modeste au cas du langage de l’argumentation. On parlera d’adéquation descriptive si le langage théorique permet de rendre compte d’un ensemble de données telles qu’elles sont réunies dans un corpus, de façon généralisable (non ad hoc), en respectant les intuitions d’argumentativité d’un locuteur compétent.

Une notion, par exemple un type d’argument comme l’argument par la pente glissante a un pouvoir descriptif si elle peut être mise en correspondance avec un ensemble de productions discursives concrètes ; si elle capte l’air de famille d’une collection de cas intuitivement proches.

Une théorie n’est pas descriptivement adéquate si elle ne respecte pas cette intuition première : par exemple, une théorie de l’argumentation qui ne prend pas en compte la dimension émotionnelle n’est pas descriptivement adéquate.

Le niveau de l’adéquation explicative est atteint si le langage théorique jette quelque lumière sur les phénomènes. Dans le cas précédemment évoqué de la pente glissante, on comprend sans problème les discours qui exploitent cette forme ; c’est précisément parce qu’on les comprend qu’on peut dire que la définition proposée du concept est ou n’est pas adéquate. L’adéquation explicative est atteinte si l’intuition seule ne permet pas de comprendre de façon satisfaisante ce qui se passe, et le langage théorique permet de comprendre. Par exemple, le début du corpus “Débat sur l’immigration et la nationalité” m’est resté longtemps totalement incompréhensible, il me semblait que rien ne se passait, jusqu’à ce que, un peu grâce à Bentham et à la forme d’intervention, ou type d’argument “Laissez-nous tranquilles !”, et à la distinction entre ouverture de l’interaction et ouverture de l’argumentation, les choses prennent un peu d’ordre et de sens (voir Plantin 2006). C’est une définition modeste de l’adéquation explicative, relative à une personne. Mais il est essentiel que la théorie soit capable aussi d’éclairer des phénomènes, c’est-à-dire produire du sens là où il n’y en avait pas.

facts, practice speaks louder etc

Refutation by facts ?

Pelosi, who has five children, recounted that during a debate years ago on women’s reproductive health, GOP lawmakers “said, on the floor of the House, Nancy Pelosi thinks she knows more about having babies than the pope”

Stratégies de vérité
dans l’Encyclopédie de Diderot et  D’Alembert (1751-1772)

Comment se jouer d’une censure despotique ?
Indirection : Les « articles détournés » de l’Encyclopédie

La stratégie d’indirection des encyclopédistes est explicitée par Condorcet, un des collaborateurs de L’Encyclopédie.

[L’Encyclopédie], « est un dépôt où ceux qui n’ont pas le temps de se former une idée d’après eux-mêmes, devaient aller chercher celles qu’avaient eues les hommes les plus éclairés et les plus célèbres ; dans lequel  enfin des erreurs respectées seraient ou  trahies par la faiblesse de leurs preuves ou ébranlées par le seul voisinage des vérités qui en sapent le fondement.
Condorcet, Vie de Voltaire. 1798.
Cité d’après les Œuvres complètes de Voltaire. Tome I. Paris, Ozanne, 1838, p. 27-28.

Un argument faible pour P affaiblit P ,  et une réfutation faible d’ une position renforce cette position, V. Paradoxes de l’argumentation ; Loi de discours.
Les effets du mélange d’erreur et de vérité sont contrastés.
— Un peu de vérité mélangé au mensonge fait passer le mensonge.
— Juxtaposée à une erreur , la vérité ébranle l’erreur : alors que dans le cas du révisionnisme, l’erreur tente d’ébranler la vérité durement acquise, dans le cas de l’Encyclopédie, la vérité ébranle l’erreur traditionnelle.

L’éditeur de Diderot, Jacques-André Naigeon, accompagne l’article de l’Encyclopédie « Mosaïque et chrétienne philosophie », rédigé par Diderot, de l’avertissement suivant à propos du contraste   entre les termes « si mesurés, si respectueux » de l’article et « les principes philosophiques » de leur auteur

Diderot n’avait donc pour ce qu’il appelle ici très pieusement les saintes écritures, qu’un respect apparent, et à proprement parler, de pure circonstance et il pensait même avec un savant théologal* dont les paroles sont remarquables, que toutes les religions ont cela, qu’elles sont étranges et horribles au sens commun : mais il écrivait sous le règne d’un tyran jaloux de son autorité à qui les prêtres répétaient sans cesse qu’il se rendrait d’autant plus puissant, qu’il saurait mieux faire respecter la religion, c’est-à-dire ses ministres. Il ne se dissimulait pas tout ce qu’il avait à craindre de ces apôtres du mensonge (p. 411)

[Diderot]  s’exprime avec la même circonspection dans tous les articles où il était à peu près sûr que ses ennemis iraient chercher curieusement* sa profession de foi mais dans d’autres articles détournés & dont les titres assez insignifiants semblent ne rien promettre de philosophique, il foule aux pieds ces mêmes préjugés religieux avec d’autant plus de mépris qu’il avait été forcé de les respecter ailleurs. (p. 412-413)

(*) professeur de théologie
(*) avec grand soin

Naigeon, Œuvres de Denis Diderot. publiées, sur les manuscrits de l’auteur, par Jacques-André Naigeon. T. VI. Paris, Desray et Deterville, An VI – 1798 ; p. 411-413.
https://books.google.fr/books?redir_esc=y&hl=fr&id=7OpLLvpB47YC&q=mosaique+#v=snippet&q=mosaique&f=false