CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

Conductive arguments are defined by Wellman as third type of argument, parallel to deduction and induction. Using the following examples (my numbering), he notes that, “it is tempting, therefore, to define a conductive argument as any argument that is neither deductive nor inductive” (1971, p. 51):

(1) You have to take your son to the circus because you promised.
(2) This is a good book because it is interesting and thought provoking.
(3) Although he is tactless and nonconformist, he is still a morally good man because of his underlying kindness and real integrity. (Ibid.)

Wellman distinguishes between three types of conductive arguments

(i) “A single reason is given for the conclusion” (id. p. 55), as in

(4) You ought to help him because he has been very kind to you.
(5) That was a good play because the characters were so well drawn. (Ibid.)

(ii) “In the second pattern of conduction, several reasons are given for the conclusion” (id., p. 56), as in:

(6) You ought to take your son to the movie, because you promised to do so, it is a good movie, and you have nothing better to do this afternoon.
(7) This is not a good book, because it fails to hold one’s interest, is full of vague description, and has a very implausible plot. (Ibid.)

(iii) “The third pattern of conduction is that form of argument in which some conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considerations. In this pattern, reasons against the conclusion are included as well as reasons for it” (id., p. 57), as in

(8) In spite of a certain dissonance, that piece of music is beautiful because of its dynamic quality and its final conclusion.
(9) Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movie because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (Ibid.)

The key feature of conductive reasoning seems to be condition (3), where, depending on the speaker, and given the same reasons, the pros may outweigh the cons or vice versa (Blair 2011). Given the same data, another speaker might reach the opposite conclusion.

(8.1) In spite of a certain dynamic quality and its final conclusion, that piece of music is ugly because of its dissonance.

The adjective certain seems to be attached to the connective in spite of, indicating that the speaker will not argue on the basis of this argument (will not identify with this voice), S. Interaction, Dialogue, Polyphony.

A conductive argument does not seem to be amenable to default reasoning. Their conditions of refutation are different. Default reasoning might be updated or changed as new information is accessed, while conductive reasoning does not depend on information as such. A conductive argument is typically concerned with values, either moral or aesthetic. The specific problem of conduction is the hierarchization, or balancing of values. While some pairs of values will be very difficult, if not impossible, to balance, others will be quite plausibly balanced. for example, sentence (8) can be plausibly transformed into (8.1), because the three implied values cannot, in my view, be hierarchized, while (9) invokes values that seem easier to balance:

(9.1) I know, the movie is ideal for children and won’t be showing in the cinema after tomorrow, but you ought to cut your lawn!

Cutting the lawn seems to be a task that can easily be postponed, in view of the children’s education and their legitimate satisfaction, which could be prioritized. So, in the case of (9), the consensus would be that the pros clearly outweigh the cons.

In any case, more complex interactional data might provide some indications of how dissenting speakers fare when dealing with competing values.

CONDITIONS OF DISCUSSION

The Treatise on Argumentation insists on the necessity and variety of “prior agreements” between participants to develop an argumentation — that is, an argument₁; no prior agreements are necessary to engage in an argument₂:

For argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment. First, there must be agreement in principle about the formation of this intellectual community, and then about the fact of debating a particular question together: now, this does not happen automatically. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 14)

Two different kinds of agreements are mentioned here, and, as the text points out, neither of them can be taken for granted.

1. Formation of speech communities

This first type is concerned with the realization of an “effective community of minds”, constituted on the basis of the free decision of the participants. It can be considered as an ideal form of argumentative communication. Its closest approximation may be philosophical or scientific friendly encounters.

Not all argumentative practices depend on the production of such a community. The court is a prototypical argumentative venue, and no prior voluntary agreement with criminals is required to ensure their timely appearance; if necessary, legal coercion may be used. Institutions that define specific forums, problems and rules of interaction determine the social and legal conventions that govern argumentative communities. The existence of these social infrastructures makes it possible to avoid the previous cumbersome negotiations between speech communities.

2. Agreement on the issue

To discuss an issue, must we first “agree to discuss this issue together”? As in the case of the types of agreements described immediately above, the different legal systems determine who has the legal right to determine the charges that will lead to the appearance of a particular party; the defendant does not necessarily agree to discuss the matter, but is summoned by the judge.

ln institutionally structured communities, preliminary discussions may be useful in determining the items to be discussed at a given meeting. But the agenda is not necessarily determined by the prospective participants in the discussion; it may be the prerogative of an individual in charge of the organization. On the other hand, the topic itself, may be reformulated during the meeting.

Intellectual communities are also social communities, even when they deal with questions of human existence in general. The disputability of a question is itself an argumentative exercise, in the same way as is the process of discussing the question itself. There are two distinct subquestions to be considered, first, a central one, the conditions for the “disputability” of the issue properly speaking, and second, if all the potential partners agree to discuss such and such an issue, a practical question has to be settled, the material conditions for the discussion itself – where, when, who will chair the discussion, etc. — not to mention the shape of the table.

The dispute over maximizing vs. minimizing the right to discuss defines what may be called the stasis of stasis.

2.1 Maximizing the right to discuss

In terms of content, one can either emphasize the principle of radical freedom of expression according to which any point of view can be affirmed and challenged, or one can emphasize the pragmatic conditions of such discussion. The first of the “Ten Commandments for Reasonable Discussants” states that,

Commandment 1, Freedom rule: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or calling standpoints into question. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 2004, p. 190)
S. Rules.

This is also the position taken by Stuart Mill:

If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (Mill, [1859], p. 76)

2.2 Conditioning the rights to discuss

Absolute freedom of speech would give free rein to racist speech, hate speech, collective verbal and non-verbal harassment of the individual chosen as the scapegoat of a group, etc., forms of speech that many would find unacceptable. If individuals are free to discuss anything privately, provided they can find partners willing to do so, actual speech communities impose conditions on social discussion. For example, the res judicata principle prevents the reopening of an issue that has already been decided, unless a new fact is to be considered.

Moreover, the proper functioning of a speech community must take into account the fact that it is not possible to discuss anything (condition on the subject, on the agenda), with anyone (condition on the participants), anywhere and anytime (material conditions on place and time), no matter how (according to what procedure), see Manipulation:

Some Truths Are Not for Common Ears. It is lawful to speak the truth; it is not expedient to speak the truth to everybody at every time and in every way.
Erasmus, [1524], On the Freedom of the Will. (no pag.) [1]

The Treatise is very sensitive to the “anybody” condition:

There are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable. There are some with whom one cannot be bothered to speak. There are also others with whom one does not wish to discuss things, but to whom one merely gives orders.
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 15)

Aristotle limits the subjects of legitimate discussion to the endoxa, and rejects debates that question “everything”, that is, affirmations that in practice no one doubts:

Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only
 one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For those who are puzzled as to know whether one ought 
to honor the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. (Top., 11)

The uncontroversial refers to three kinds of evidence: sensory evidence, “snow is white”; religious evidence, “we must honor the gods”; and social evidence, “we must love our parents”; these statements are uncontroversial because it is inconceivable that anyone would argue otherwise — in Aristotle’s Athenian society of course. For an opinion to be worthy of doubt, it must, on the one hand, fall within the scope of the doxa. That is, it must be part of the defining beliefs of the community, or seriously held by some of its honorable members or a subset, see Doxa.

On the other hand, the doubt must be serious, that is motivated. Since argument is a costly activity, one must have a good reason to doubt. In other words, the person who wishes to question an accepted proposition bears the burden of proof.

In the same spirit, the theory of stasis categorizes as uncontroversial (a-stasic) misplaced, poorly formulated or intractable questions, or, conversely, questions whose answer is obvious, S. Dialectic; Self-evidence; Stasis; Argumentative question.

On the legitimizing effects of debate, see Paradoxes.

3. Agreements on what counts as an argument

Agreements on the community of speech and on the issue must be supplemented by agreements on beings, facts, rules and values ​​(Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], II, 1). Agreements here should determine what counts as an argument: the condition of truth; the relevance of the true statement to the defended conclusion; the relevance of the conclusion (defended by a true and relevant statement) for the debate itself, see Relevance.

When it is impossible to determine whether a statement is true, or relevant to a conclusion, or relevant to the debate itself, a general system of acceptance or tacit agreement is invoked. In serious global disagreements, partial agreements are difficult to reach; the disputants anticipate their opponent’s conclusion, knowing well that once the argument is accepted, the conclusion will quickly follow, hence the tendency to postulate disagreement as a governing principle, even upon what should be considered facts, see Politeness; Dissensus; Disagreement.

This “appeal to agreement” is actually based on an argument of perverse effects, considering that the absence of agreement would condemn the debate to an undesirable state of deepening disagreement, which might even lead to a collapse of the discussion (Doury 1997). In practice, two facts have to be considered. First, points of agreement and disagreement can be negotiated on the spot, during the discussion. Second, the lack of agreement does not preclude argumentation, it is sufficient for third parties to take the reins of the discussion. The judge’s decision, and more generally that of the third party, is often made on the basis of an argument rejected or ignored by one or both parties, see Roles. Judicial organizations intervene precisely when no agreement can be reached between the parties; as representatives of the ruling power, they dispense with agreements — not with arguments.

In general, if one agrees on the data and rules, the conclusion follows automatically; argumentation becomes demonstrative. But argumentation is a linguistic way of dealing with differences in a system of generalized disagreement and uncertainty. There is a crucial incompatibility between the material interests at stake: one can indeed divide the cake, but what is eaten by any one person cannot be shared with the other. Serious, deep, insoluble … disagreement between the parties, proponents and opponents, should be considered to be the basic condition of argumentation; that is why third parties play a key role in argumentative devices.

[1] Quoted from Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the Will. Trans. by E. Gordon Rupp (no pag., no date). www.sjsu.edu/people/james.lindahl/courses/Hum1B/s3/Erasmus-and-Luther-on-Free-Will-and-Salvation.pdf (05-23-17).

CONCESSION

Concessions can be negotiated in an organized discussion, or presented as an expression of the speaker’s good will in a monological discourse.

1. Negotiated concession

In negotiated concessions, the arguer modifies his or her original position by lowering the original demand or by conceding a controversial subpoint to the opponent. Strategically, this move may amount to an orderly retreat, possibly for future benefit, in the hope that the opponent will do the same on to another point.

In Aristotelian logical-dialectical games the discussion is about the truth of a statement. The consequence is that it ignores concessions, as a violation of the principle of the excluded middle, statements being considered either entirely true, or entirely false; conclusively defended or not, see Dialectic. In contrast, concession is a key moment in the negotiation process of human affairs, understood as a discussion leading to a reasonable agreement (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000).

By making concessions, the arguer acknowledges that the opponent’s point of view has some validity, while still maintaining the value of his or her own positions and conclusions. The arguer may believe that hisremaining arguments are:

— More persuasive, or of a different nature than the opponent’s
— Not strong arguments, but arguments based on personal values and deep beliefs (identity-based arguments).

The original position should thus be maintained against all odds, according to the formula “I do know, but still …”.

In everyday discussions, concessions are valued as manifestations of openness to others, and as constitutive of a positive ethos. Nevertheless, concessions can be ironic, see Epitrope.

2. Concession as a speech act

In grammar, concessive constructions “A(claim) + C(concession)” coordinate two statements with opposite argumentative orientations, while maintaining the overall orientation determined by the first claim A:

“although C, A”; “certainly C, but A”
“I concede, I understand C but I stand by A”.

C takes up or reformulates the opponent’s speech, or evokes the speech of a fictitious opponent; A reaffirms the speaker’s claim.

Social relations are indeed extremely tense these days, but we still need to continue restructuring the company.

Unlike a negotiated concession, linguistic concession is purely verbal. The speaker sets out:

— First, a virtual character or voice develops the argument that “social relations are extremely tense”, pointing to conclusions such as “stop restructuring of the company”,

—followed by a second argument, that takes the opposite position “we must continue restructuring the company”, and identifies with this second character. In Goffman’s words, the speaker is the animator of A, and the animator and principal of C. In other words, the speaker acknowledges the existence of arguments supporting an opposite conclusion, but at the same time refuses to conclude on this basis. The concession here is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that someone, somewhere, is saying, or could say something opposite to what the speaker claims. This amounts to a de-activation of the argumentative strength of the aforementioned argument. This kind of concession is not at all an expression of the good will of a reasonable negotiator, but a mere phagocytosis and castration of the opponent’s arguments

I know that, you already told me, no need to repeat it!

The two forms of concession can be superimposed, by rationalizing the linguistic concession. One assumes that linguistic concession occurs when the speaker has considered the opponent’s arguments and confronted them with his or her own (even if this examination often leaves no discursive trace), and that, in the end,  he thinks that his arguments are better. But since language takes for real and true what it signifies, a purely linguistic concession automatically produces a negotiated concession effect, whether or not this is really the case. This does not mean that linguistic concession is always mere lip service, but that negotiated concession can only be studied on corpora built for that purpose.

COMPOSITION AND DIVISION
WHOLE AND PARTS argument

Aristotle considers composition or “combination of words” and division to be verbal fallacies, that is fallacies of words, as opposed to fallacies of things or method, see Fallacies 2. They are discussed in the Sophistical Refutations (RS 4) and in the Rhetoric (II, 24, 1401a20 – 1402b5; RR p. 128).

The term argumentation by division is sometimes used to refer to case-by-case argumentation.

1. Grammar of composition and division

Composition and division involve the conjunction and, which can coordinate:

— Phrases:

(1) Peter and Paul came.                   (No and N1) + Verb
(2) Peter smoked and prayed.            No + (V1 and V2)

— Statements:

(3) Peter came and Paul came.            (N + V1) and (N1 + V1)
(4) Peter smoked and Peter smoked     (N + V1) and (N1 + V2)

In Aristotelian logical-grammatical terminology:

(3) and (4) are obtained by division from (1) and (2) respectively
(1) and (2) are obtained by composition from (3) and (4) respectively

The compound and divided statements are sometimes semantically equivalent and sometimes not.

(i) Equivalent — (1) and (3) on the one hand, (2) and (4) on the other hand are roughly equivalent, although it seems that (1), not (3), implies that Peter and Paul came together. In this case, composition and division are possible, and the coordination is used simply to avoid repetition.

(ii) Not equivalent — sometimes phrase coordination (composed statement) is not equivalent to sentence coordination (divided statement). The semantic phenomena involved are of very different kinds.

Peter got married and Mary got married.
≠ Peter and Mary got married.

If Peter and Mary are brother and sister, the custom being what it is, the composition is unambiguous. Without such information, the composition introduces ambiguity.

The operation of division can produce a meaningless discourse:

The flag is red and black.
* The flag is red and the flag is black.

B is between A and C.
* B is between A and B is between C.

Sometimes a syntactic operation applied to a proposition produces a paraphrase of that proposition. At other times, the same operation applied to another proposition having apparently the same structure as the first one produces a proposition that has no meaning, or whose meaning and truth conditions are completely different from those of the original proposition.

2. Aristotelian logic of composition and division

The study of paraphrase systems is a classical object of syntactic theory. Aristotelian logic regards composition and division as a problem of logic. As Hintikka (1987) has repeatedly pointed out, the Aristotelian notion of fallacy is dialogical, see Fallacy (I). The fallacious maneuver confuses the interlocutor, and this is exactly what happens with composition and division. The following case is one of the oldest and most famous illustrations of the fallacy of composition:

This dog is your dog (is yours); and this dog is a father (of several puppies).
So this dog is your father and you are the brother of the puppies.

The interlocutor is disoriented, and everyone finds it very funny (Plato, Euth., XXIV, 298a-299d, pp. 141-142). see Sophism.

Aristotle analyzes this kind of sophistical and sophisticated problem in the Sophistical Refutations and in the Rhetoric under the heading of “Paralogism of composition and division”. He shows that the question extends to a variety of discursive phenomena, under what conditions can judgments made on the basis of isolated statements be “composed” into a discourse in which the statements are connected? The discussion is illustrated by several examples , which, although their formulation may seem contrived, show the full scope of the interpretative issues that are raised

(i) Consider the statement: “It is possible to write while not writing” (RS, 4); it can be interpreted in two ways:

— Interpretation 1 composes the meaning: “one can write and not write at the same time” (ibid.), in the sense of: “one can (write and not write)”. This construction is misleading and absurd.
— Interpretation 2 divides the meaning; if one does not write one still retains the ability to write, viz: « one can know how to write while not writing », which is correct. Under certain circumstances, a person who can write cannot physically do so, e.g., if his hands are tied. The modal force is ambiguous between “having the ability to” and “having the possibility of exercising that ability”.

 (ii) The following example also uses the modal can, this time in its relation to time and circumstances. Consider the statement “if you can carry one thing, you can carry several” (RS, 4, 166a30: 11):

(1) (I can carry the table) and (I can carry the cupboard)

Therefore, by composition of the two statements into one:

(2) I can carry (the table together with the cupboard).

Which is not necessarily the case.

(iii) The fallacy of division is illustrated by the example “five is equal to three and two” (after RS, 4, 166a30, p.12):

— Interpretation (1) divides the meaning, i.e., it divides the utterance into two coordinated propositions, which is both absurd and fallacious:

(five equals three) and (five equals two).

— Interpretation (2) composes the meaning, which is correct:

Five is equal to (three and two)

In the Rhetoric, the notion of composition is discussed with several examples that clearly show its relevance to argumentation. The argument by composition and division “[asserts] of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole” (Rhet, II, 24, 1401a20-30; RR, pp. 381), which makes it possible to present things from quite different angles. This technique of argumentation involves statements constructed around evaluative and modal predicates such as:

— is good; — is just; — is able to —; — can —;
— knows —; — said.

The following example is taken from Sophocles play, Electra. Clytemnestra has killed her husband, Agamemnon. Then their son Orestes kills his mother to avenge his father. Was Orestes morally and legally justified in doing so?

“‘T’is right that she who slays her lord should die’; ‘it is right too, that the son should avenge his father’. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.” Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. (Rhet., II. 24, 1401a35-b5, RR, 383).

Orestes justifies what he has done by arguing that his two actions can be composed. His accuser denies the composition.

This technique of decomposing a dubious action into a series of praiseworthy, or at least innocent action, is arguably very productive. Stealing is simply taking the bag that is there, taking it somewhere else, and not putting it back in the same place. The division blocks the overall evaluation.

A second example clearly shows that fallacy and argument are two sides of the same coin:

If a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative “for one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things”. The whole line of argument is fallacious. (Rhet., Ii. 24, 1401a30, RR p.381-383)

The teetotallers begin by an agreeing that “drinking a lot makes you sick”, and they divide: “so having one drink makes you sick”. Permissive people follow the other line: “having a drink is good for your health”, and proceed by composition. Abstainers argue by division, and this is considered to be fallacious by permissive people. Permissive people argue by composition, and this is considered to be fallacious by abstainers.

3. Whole and part argument

The two labels “composition and division” and “part and whole” are considered equivalent in practice (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009).

3.1 Whole to parts and division

The whole argument assigns to each of its parts a property that is proved on the whole:

If the whole is P, then each of its parts must be P.

If the country is rich, then each of its regions (inhabitants …) must be rich.
The Americans are rich, so this one must be rich; let’s ransom him!

The problem faced by the whole-to-parts argument is the same as that of the division argument: can the property evidenced on the whole be transferred to each of its parts?

3.2 Parts to whole and composition

The argument based on the parts assigns to the whole they make up the properties evidenced on each of its parts:

If every part of a whole is P, then the whole is P.
If every player is good, then the team is good (?).

The problem faced by parts to whole arguments mirrors that of the argument by composition: is the property evidenced by each part also evidenced by the whole?

4. Complex wholes and emergent properties

Accidental or mechanical wholes are composed of a set of unrelated objects in a neighborhood relation. Essential or complex wholes consist of the conjunction of the parts plus some emergent additional properties, that distinguishes them from an inert juxtaposition of components. The degree of complexity of the whole is superior to the simple arithmetical addition of its parts. This process is called the composition effect. Aristotle’s case of the superiority of the group over the individual alleged by is an example of such an effect, see Ad populum.

This issue is also found in rhetoric, where a distinction is made between metonymy and synecdoche, the former focusing upon neighborhood relations and the latter on relations between a complex whole and its parts.

Argument of COMPREHENSIVENESS
A completudine

The evolution of society can manifest itself by the emergence of legal cases that do not find clear solutions in the existing legal system, be it in national, international or human rights legislation (Tarello 1972, cited in Perelman 1977, p. 55).
Nevertheless, the judge has an obligation to judge, i.e., he or she has to give a verdict upon all the cases before him or her, S.. Silence. That is, he or she cannot refuse to decide a case by arguing that there is no law applicable to that case, or that no interpretation of an existing law can settle it.
In other words, the principle of completeness presupposes that the existing legal body of law, properly interpreted, can qualify each and every human action as permitted, tolerated, or prohibited.

Meta-principles such as the following supplement the legal system:

In civil matters, in the absence of specific law, the judge is bound to proceed according to equity. In order to decide according to equity, he must refer to natural law and to reason, or to received usages, when the primitive law is silent.
Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, [Concordance between the Foreign Civil Code and the Napoleonic Code], 1856.[1]

The argument of comprehensiveness [2] is parallel to the topos of the impotent legislator, the nature of things that makes the application of the law impossible, see Weight of Circumstances.

[1] Fortuné Anthoine de Saint Joseph, Concordance entre les codes civils étrangers et le Code Napoléon, 2^nd ed. t. II. Paris: Cotillon, 1856. P. 460.
[2] Argument a completudine; Lat. completudo, “completeness”.

Argument from COMPARISON

Comparison is the process of determining whether or not two objects,, two situations, two systems… have some similarities or analogies. A process of comparison is involved in many argumentative activities, so the label argument by comparison (a comparatione) is used with different meanings.
These meanings correspond primarily with the argument: a fortiori; a pari;, by analogy; by example or exemplum.

Comparison and categorization — Comparison is the basis for the categorization-nomination process; the individual to be categorized is compared either with a known individual belonging to the category, or with the prototypical member defining the category. S. Justice

Intra-categorical comparison — Two beings belonging to the same category are identical from the point of view of that category. Nevertheless, they can still be compared in terms of:

— their non-categorical properties; S. Intra-categorical analogy.

— their position relative to a prototypical subcategory of that category. A rat and a whale, for example, are identical insofar as both are mammals; considering that the cow is a prototypical mammal, we can say that a rat, being nearer to a cow than to a whale, is “more” a mammal than a whale.

— Hierarchical categories,by definition, contain built-in comparisons: Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate are three types of academic degrees, listed by ascending order, see a fortiori argument.

Comparison and structural analogy — Establishing a structural analogy also involves a process of comparison.

INVENTION and COMMON PLACES

The term commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, which translates the Greek topos.

— Often reduced to a place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential commonplace is an inferential topic, or argumentation scheme.

— A substantive commonplace is an endoxon, that is, a formulaic expression of a common idea. Traditional rhetorical invention specialized in the argumentative use of substantive commonplaces.

1. Chapter Heads of Reality

According to Aristotle’s Categories (1b 25 sq.; Tricot, p. 5), events and reality are organized according to a basic ontology, whose ultimate components (categories) are:

Person, Action, Time, Place, Manner, Cause or Reason

The parameters of this is a Western ontology can vary from author to author.

According to Benveniste (1966, ch. VI), these parameters, which are supposed to reflect reality, are also closely related to the Greek language, particularly the system of sentence complementation and to interrogative words.

Category                         Question

Person focus                  Who?                                  Peter
Kind of action                What?                                 met Paul
Quantity                          How many times?          twice
Place                                Where?                              in Washington
Manner                            How.                                  reluctantly
Medium                           How?                                  on Paul’s instigation
Purpose, reason             Why?                                  to discuss their business

The systematic use of this interrogative grid is a survey method for gathering and organizing information about any event.

[Interrogatives] have already been recognized in different languages ​​for different purposes: such as, for speculative purposes, in scholastic Latin: cur?, quomodo?, quando? [why? how? when?]; or for military purposes in German, where the tetralogy Wer? Wo? Wann? Wie? is taught to all military recruits as the framework of information that every scout on a reconnaissance mission must be able to provide and report to their superiors. (Tesnière 1959, p. 194).

This method is known as ”Five Ws” : Who? What? Where? When? Why? –plus How? How many?

When applied to a particular field, these parameters correspond to words with full lexical meaning. For example, a classic guide to political decision-making includes questions such as:

“Honorable? Will the proposed measure be honorable or embarrassing to us?

See political arguments: two collections and infra, the parameters for portraying human beings.

In the Middle Ages, it guided confessors looking for sins, who were anxious not to overlook any (Robertson & Olson, 2017). We can speak of “inquisitorial” questions [1] , in the sense that an inquisition is defined as an “investigation, methodical, rigorous research” (TLFi, Inquisitoire). It is a cornerstone of ordinary Western thought.

The same type of questions also guide moral evaluations. For example an act such as “having carnal intercourse” is considered shameful if it is done “with forbidden persons” (with whom?), or “at the wrong time” (when?) or “in the wrong place” (where?) (Aristotle, 1383b 15-20; RR p. 279).

2. The Rhetorical “Technical” Method

The distinction between rhetorical and non-rhetorical elements,  i.e.  between what belongs to “rhetorical technique” and what does not, is a key aspect of this method. This distinction is nonintuitive, and surprising a priori. This is most evident at the beginning of the rhetorical process, the inventio, or the research of arguments. The grid of questions remains  operative, the radical change lies in how the answers are constructed.

These questions can be answered a posteriori, i.e., after a full documented investigation into the specifics of the case–the kind of work a police investigator is supposed to do. The inspector does fieldwork, the rhetor as such does not. The rhetor can answer a priori, on the basis of endoxa, or preconceived common ideas, that are “ruling ideas ».
In both cases, the collected material must be presented in a convincing discourse to the court and the public. Ultimately, it’s all a matter of language, the result of the concrete investigation makes all  the difference. In any case, rhetorical discourse is particularly powerful in creating doubt and shifting the burden of proof.
When material data is scarce—no witnesses, no contracts, not even a corpse—the case must still be discussed and this is where rhetoric comes in, in full force, not necessarily to manipulate people, but to clarify the situation and circumscribe zones of doubt avoiding for example, the condemnation of an innocent person, for example.

Giving undue prominence to stereotyped ideas in the construction of arguments, leads to strong and indignant criticism of rhetoric as a fallacious verbiage, see ornamental fallacy and §5 below.

Consider the argumentative question “Did Mr. So-and-So commit this horrible murder?”
— The question Who? “Who is the defendant, Mr. So-and-So?”. The subtopic Which country? provides the categorizing information: “Mr. So-and-so is Syldavian,” and likewise for all questions about the person.

— Endoxon about the Syldavians: The Syldavian category is associated with a set of defining endoxic predicates (“the Syldavians are like this”), each of which has a specific argumentative orientation.

The Syldavians are peaceful / bloodthirsty people.

These predicates provide an encyclopedic endoxic semantic definition of the Syldavian.

— The instantiation of the endoxic definition supports the conclusion:

The guilt of Mr. So-and-So is probable / improbable.

Other topical questions about the same Mr. So-and-So will provide different, possibly contradictory, perspectives that the opponent can use.
Such answers can help to organize a previous serious documentation, and a bunch of pre-established judgments  regardless of the outcome of any detailed investigation of the matter.

3. Portrait Based on Commonplaces

Each of these questions can become the source of several sub-questions that can be developed considerably, to produce a detailed grid of investigation. The results produced by this technique depend entirely on the method of inquiry used to answer the questions. An armchair argument where the ‘research’ is based on common sense and commonplaces will produce commonplace conclusions.

A rich set of detailed questions focuses on the key element of rhetorical scenarios: the person (Who?). Quintilian distinguishes the following facets in order to identify a person and compose an a priori rhetorical representation of that person, independent of any concrete information about the situation under discussion.

— “Birth, for people are generally considered to be similar in character to their fathers and forefathers, and sometimes derive motives for living an honorable or dishonorable life from their origins” (Quintilian IO, V, 10, 24 ).

To answer the subquestion “Birth?”, the inquiry about the family gathers information such as “he comes from a well-known honorable family”, or “his father was condemned.” The first piece of information provides arguments that allow one to apply rules such as “like father, like son”, or “he is a chip of the old block”,leading to conclusions such as:

He made a mistake, but his family provides all the necessary guarantees. Good blood cannot lie, he deserves a second chance.

The second piece of information leads to different conclusions:

The father was convicted, so the son has a heavy inheritance. Bring me more information about him!

The saying “the son of the miser is a spendthrift” contradicts the previous conclusion. If the father has a vice, the doxa does not attribute the corresponding virtue to the son, but rather the same vice or an opposite one.

—  “Nation?” (ibid.) and “Country?” (ibid., 25). The answers will introduce national stereotypes: “If he is Spanish, he is proud, if he is British, he is phlegmatic.” These conclusions, “he is proud, he is phlegmatic”, can be useful for the ensuing discussion,  “He is Spanish, so he is proud. He certainly reacted strongly to this personal attack.”

— “Sex? – For you would more readily believe a charge of robbery with regard to a man, and a charge of poisoning with regard to a woman” (ibid.) The prejudiced investigator will follow the commonplace suggestion: he will tend to look for a woman in the second case. A French book, “The Famous Poisoners” (Les Empoisonneuses Célèbres), is devoted exclusively to famous female poisoners.

—  “Age?”, “Education?”, “Bodily constitution? – For beauty is often used as an argument for libertinism, and strength for insolence. Contrary qualities are used to justify for contrary conduct” (id., 25-26). In other words, “He is handsome, he must be a libertine” is more credible, and considered as more probable than “He is handsome, therefore he must live an austere life.” If A is stronger than B, then “A is more aggressive than B” is likely. Therefore, if A and B fought, “surely, A attacked B. » In other words, A bears the burden of proof. These conclusions can be reversed by applying the paradox of plausibility: “Actually, B must have attacked A, because he knew that the evidence will be against A.”

— “Wealth? – For the same charge is not equally credible in reference to a rich man and a poor man, in reference to one who is surrounded with relations, friends and clients, and to one who is destitute of all such support” (id., 26). Commonplaces associated with social roles and positions come under this category. For example, an elderly man from the country, sitting on a bench in the setting sun, will certainly have deep thoughts about the present state of affairs, see rich and poor.

— “Natural disposition –  for avarice, passion, sensibility, cruelty, austerity, and other similar affections of the mind, frequently either cause credit to be given or to be withheld from an accusation” (id., 27). The murder was committed in a peculiarly cruel manner. Peter is cruel, therefore he is the murderer, see circumstances.

— “Manner of living – for it is often a matter of inquiry whether a person is luxurious, or parsimonious, or mean” (ibid.).

The following questions refer to arguments based on desires and motives (ibid.):

— “What a person affects, whether he wishes to appear rich or eloquent, just or powerful” (id., 28)

— “Previous doings and sayings” (ibid.), are used to find motives and precedents.

— “Commotion of the mind, […] a temporary excitement of the feelings, such as anger, or fear” (ibid.), see emotions.

— “Designs” (id., 29)

This set of commonplaces underlies portraits such as:

A man in his thirties. Canadian. West Coast. Athletic. From a well-known and respected family. Has never finished law school. Very friendly with his neighbors. Lives a conventional life. Works in a pharmacy, with limited prospects for the future.

This portrait could be read as a literary draft, as a police report. In any case, it is a set of potential premises.
Doxa-based argumentation uses pieces of information such as “the man is X”, relies on the stereotyped categories attached to X’s, “the X are like this”, and concludes that “the man is like this.” See categorization; cefinition.

4. Literature of Characters

This topology has a derived argumentative function and a direct aesthetic-cognitive function. It builds a bridge between argumentation and literature by providing a technique for constructing  portraits, through the genre of “characters”, such as those of the Greek Theophrastus. We are no longer in the realm of ethos as autofiction, but in the pure world of the ethopoeia, that is, the vivid fictional representation of a “character”, such as « the Miser” or “the Garrulous Person” through their conventional typical manners, discourse and actions. These decontextualized portraits can serve as authorized and respectable sources of information about the represented character and as preparatory exercises for real-life argumentation.
This combination constitutes a coherent educational, aesthetic and cognitive process of controlled writing and thinking—the very antithesis of any automatic writing.

5. “This Noxious Fertility of Common Thoughts” (Port-Royal)

When based solely on linguistic associations and doxa-based knowledge, this technique quickly produces fairly convincing, true-to-life images of things and events. These images are very difficult to refute, because they are merely expressions of shared preconstructed  knowledge. The vicious circle between persuader and persuadee is an example of such a situation, see persuasion.
Such compositions are the opposite of the in-depth characterizations of individuals, that can be developed in psychology or philosophy. They are a perfect stronghold for all positive or negative social prejudices.

Port-Royal condemned this « noxious fertility of the common thoughts » in the strongest terms:

Now, so far is it from being useful to obtain this sort of abundance, that there is nothing which more depraves the judgment, nothing which more chokes up good seed, than a crowd of noxious weeds ; nothing renders a mind more barren of just and weighty thoughts than this noxious fertility of common thoughts. The mind is accustomed to this facility, and no longer makes any effort to find appropriate, special, and natural reasons, which can only be discovered by an attentive consideration of the subject. (Arnauld, Nicole, [1662], III, XVII; p. 235).

COLLECTION 4: CONTEMPORARY INNOVATIONS
AND STRUCTURATIONS

1. Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, A Treatise on Argumentation — The New Rhetoric, 1958

In The New Rhetoric — A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca propose a sophisticated typology of arguments. Some twenty years later, in The Rhetorical Empire [L’Empire Rhétorique, 1977], Perelman takes up the essential elements of the 1958 typology, and makes some significant simplifications. In Juridical Logic [Logique Juridique, 1979] he presents a specific set of legal arguments.

1.1 The typology of the Treatise

According to Conley, the Treatise contains “more than eighty different forms of argument, and illuminating remarks on more than sixty-five figures” (1984, p. 180-181), and contrasts these achievements with “Toulmin’s renegade logic” (ibid.).

The “Forms of argumentation” are described in the third part of the Treatise, entitled “Techniques of argumentation”. They are presented as a set of “association techniques”, (Chap. 1 to 3), along with two other kinds of techniques, the “technique of dissociation” (Chap. 4), and the “Interaction of arguments” (Chap. 5). The latter chapter presents a number of dispositional techniques, and discusses the relative persuasive effects of different arrangements of arguments in a speech, i.e questions of classical “dispositio”.

1.2 The association techniques

The association techniques correspond to the classical argument schemes. They are classified under three categories:

Chap. 1. Quasi-logical arguments
Chap. 2. Arguments based on the structure of reality
Chap. 3. The relations establishing the structure of reality

“Quasi-logical arguments” (§46-59)

This category lists arguments which “lay claim to a certain power of conviction in the degree that they claim to be similar to the formal reasoning of logic or mathematics” (p. 192); this definition should be brought closer to the definition of a fallacious argument as “one that seems to be valid but is not so.” (Hamblin 1970, p. 12), see. Fallacies (1). The category includes the following argument schemes:

• • • 46-49 Contradiction and incompatibility
    • 50 Identity and definition
    • 51 Analyticity, analysis and tautology
    • 52 The rule of justice
    • 53 Arguments of reciprocity
    • 54 Arguments by transitivity
    • 55 Inclusions of the part in the whole
    • 56 Division of the whole into its parts
    • 57 Arguments by comparison
    • 58 Argumentation by sacrifice
    • 59 Probabilities

In The Rhetorical Empire, the chapter on “Quasi-Logical Arguments” essentially recapitulates the class as presented in the Treatise.

“Arguments based on the structure of reality” (§60-77)

From a linguistic point of view, he broad label “argument based on the structure of reality” can be interpreted as referring to arguments that exploit syntagmatic, or metonymic relations. Indeed, this category lists arguments “alleged to be in agreement with the very nature of things” (p. 191); these arguments “make use of [the structure of reality] to establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261). The “causal link” and the “relation of succession” are fundamental to this category.

Arguments within this category include:

• • • 61-63 “Causal link”, “Pragmatic argument”
    • 63-73 discuss arguments in which the person is considered to be a causal agent, such as:
      • • 64-68 “Ends and means”, among which:
        • 65 “Argument of waste”
        • 66 “The Argument of direction”
        • 68-73 “The Person and his acts”, including:
        • 70 “Argument from authority”
        • 73 “The Group and its members”
    • 74-75 extend the notion of “relation of coexistence” to:
    • 74 “Act and essence”
    • 75 “The symbolic relation”
    • 76-77 present “more complex”, second level arguments:
    • 74 “Double hierarchy”
    • 75 “Differences of degree and of order”

The Rhetorical Empire, Chapter VIII, recapitulates the same class of arguments based on the structure of reality under different groupings:

— Relations of succession
— Relations of coexistence
— The Symbolic relation, the double hierarchy argument, argument about the differences of order.

“Relations establishing the structure of reality” §78-88

The inclusive label “Relations establishing the structure of reality” could be interpreted as referring to a set of arguments that exploit paradigmatic or metaphorical relations. This category of relations is defined on the basis of two of its prototypical members, arguments from “the particular case”, and “arguments by analogy”. The following argument schemes come under this category:

• • 78 “Argumentation by example”
  • 79 “Illustration”
  • 80-81 “Model and anti-model”
  • 82-87, On analogy
  • 87-88, On metaphor.

In the Rhetorical Empire, the title “establishing the structure of reality” is not retained; its contents are grouped under two distinct chapters:

Chap. IX, Arguments by example, illustration and model
Chap. X, Analogy and metaphor

This can be construed as a waiver of the distinction between arguments “establishing” the structure of reality, and those “based on” the structure of reality.

It might, however, also be argued that this couple of concepts does not characterize causal arguments in opposition to analogical ones, but indeed applies to both argument schemes. The successful use of an argument “based on” authority, for example, presupposes that the invoked authority has been previously “established”. This distinction is especially helpful in the case of arguments from authority, definition, causality and analogy.

1.3 The dissociation techniques

The basic difference between association and dissociation techniques is that the former operates on judgments; they “establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” (p. 261); they correspond to argument schemes. In contrast, dissociation techniques operate on “concepts” (p. 411; my emphasis): “[they] are mainly characterized by the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted language than at moving towards a new formulation” (p. 191-192), see Dissociation, Distinguo; Persuasive Definition.

The two terms of the opposition association / dissociation are thus of a very different nature.

2. Toulmin, Rieke, Janik, An introduction to reasoning (1984)


Toulmin, Rieke, Janik consider nine «forms of reasoning» «most frequently to be met with in practical situations (1984, p. 147-155; p. 155).

In the argument from degree, « the different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155)

Like the following one, this restricted group of argumentative schemes has a family resemblance with the classical lists derived from Cicero, see Collections 2.
They are good candidate for universality.

3. Kienpointner, Alltagslogik [Everyday Logic] 1992.

Kienpointner (1992, p. 231-402) synthetizes six contemporary typologies (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958] ; Toulmin, Rieke, Janik 1984 ; Govier 1987; Schellens 1987; van Eemeren, Kruiger 1987; Benoit, Lindsey 1987), summarized in the following table (1992, p. 246):

3.1 Rule-using argument schemes

Classificatory Schemes

Definition
Genus – Species
Part – Whole

Comparison Schemes

Equivalence
Resemblance
Difference
A fortiori

Opposition Schemes

Contradictories
Contraries
Relative terms
Incompatibility

Causal Schemes

Cause – Effect
Consequences
Reason
Means – End

3.2 Rule-establishing argument schemes

Argumentation by example
Inductive argument

3.3 Other schemes

Argument by example, illustrative argument
Arg. by analogy
Arg. by authority

4. Douglas Walton, Chris Reed, Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, 2008.

Walton, Reed and Macagno present an extensive and exhaustive survey including “a user’s compendium of argumentation schemes” (2008, pp. 308-346).

The schemes are consistently referred to as argument schemes, with the exception of (19), (20), (21), which are referred to as argumentation from values, from sacrifice, from the group and its members.

The following list mentions only the main schemes; they may include subtypes.

(1) Authorities: position, expertise, testimony, number (p. 309-314)

1. 1. 1. Argument from position to know
      2. Arg. from expert opinion
      3. Arg. from witness testimony
      4. Arg. from popular opinion, ad populum
      5. Arg. from popular practice.

Arguments (4) are based on what people generally believe, whereas arguments (5) are based on what people generally do.

(2) Example, analogy (p. 315-316)

1. 1. 6. Argument from example
      7. Arg. from analogy
      8. Practical reasoning from analogy

Arguments (7) concern beliefs; arguments (8) concern ways of doing things.

(3) Composition and division (p. 316-317)

1. 1. 9. Argument from composition
      10. Arg. from division

(4 ) Negation, opposition (p. 317-318)

1. 1. 11. Arg. from opposition (contradictory, contrary, converse, incompatible)
      12. Rhetorical argument from opposition

Negation-based argumentation schemes may or may not be logically valid or not; they are often not well defined.

(5) Alternative (p. 318-319)

1. 1. 13. Arg. from alternatives

This scheme concludes by eliminating a member of an alternative because of the requirement of the other member. It corresponds to a case-by-case argument between two cases.

(6) Classification (p. 319-320)

1. 1. 14. Arg. from verbal classification

“for all x, if x has property F, then x can be classified as having property G.”

The set F is contained in the set G.

1. 1. 15. Arg. from definition to verbal classification

If an individual a is defined (categorized) as a D, and if Ds in general have property P, then a has property P.

1. 1. 16. Arg. from vagueness of a verbal classification
      17. Arg. from arbitrariness of a verbal classification

Schemes 16. and 17. conclude with the rejection of an argument as “too vague” or “too arbitrarily defined” in some aspects. These cases can also be seen as an application of Grice’s cooperative principle.

(7) Persons, values, actions and sacrifice (p. 321-327)

1. 1. 18. Argument from interaction of act and person
      19. Arg. from values
      20. Arg. from sacrifice
      21. Arg. from the group and its members

These schemes consider a group whose members are said to share a quality Q, and attribute that quality to each member of the group. A member of a racist group can legitimately be assumed to be racist.

Not all the characteristics of its members can be composed and attributed to the group as such; a large set is not necessarily composed of large elements.

1. 1. 22. Practical reasoning
      23. Two-person practical reasoning

If you have an end, then you must accept the means and steps necessary to attain it.

1. 1. 24. Argument from waste
      25. Arg. from sunk costs

Pages 10-11 (id.) consider as synonyms the labels argument from waste, (with reference to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca), and argument from sunk costs. Nevertheless, they are discussed here as two separate entries.

(8) Ignorance (p. 327-328)

1. 1. 26. Arg. from ignorance
      27. Epistemic argument from ignorance

This argument covers the case “if it were true, the newspapers would surely be talking about it” (id., p. 99)

(9) Cause, effect; abduction; consequence (p. 328-333)

1. 1. 28. Argument from cause to effect
      29. Arg. from correlation to cause
      30. Argument from sign
      31. Abductive argumentation scheme
      32. Argument from evidence to a hypothesis
      33. Arg. from consequences
      34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives

Scheme (34) is a special case of (33), the choice is between doing/not doing something and suffering/not suffering negative consequences.

(10) Arguments from threat, fear, danger (p. 333-335)

1. 1. 35. Argument from threat
      36. Arg. from fear appeal
      37. Arg. from danger appeal

Schemes (35), (36), (37) schematize different fear strategies.

1. 1. 38. Arg. from need for help
      39. Arg. from distress

(11) Commitments, ethos, ad hominem (p. 335-339)

40. Arg. from commitment
41. Ethotic argument
42. Generic ad hominem
43. Pragmatic inconsistency
44. Argument from inconsistent commitment
45. Circumstantial ad hominem

Scheme (44) distinguishes between committed and not really so.

Schemes (43) and (45) express forms of contradiction between personal commitments and actions.

1. 1. 46. Argument from bias
      47. Bias ad hominem

Patterns (46) and (47) are closely related. According to (46), the argument from bias says: “L is biased, so the conclusions are suspect”. According to (47), the “bias ad hominem”: “L is biased, so I do not trust him”. Biases are relative to a domain, but it is convenient to consider that the whole personality is biased; L has a “false mind”.

(12) Gradualism; slippery slope (p. 339-341)

1. 1. 48. Argument from gradualism

The comments (id. p. 114-115), show that this scheme can be compared to the slippery slope forms, (49) to (53). It expresses the sorite paradox, also mentioned in (52): “If you remove a grain from a pile of grains, you always have a pile; if you remove another grain, you still have a pile … up to what extent?”

1. 1. 49. Slippery slope argument
      50. Precedent slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to oppose an exception, on the grounds that the exception would open a line of precedent leading to something unacceptable.

1. 1. 51. Sorites slippery slope argument
      52. Verbal slippery slope argument

The slippery slope argument is used to reject the attribution of a property to an object on the grounds that this property is transmitted by contiguity up to an object that obviously does not or should not possess it. This is a variant of the argument to the absurd, based on a demonstration by recurrence.

1. 1. 53. Full slippery slope argument

(13) Rules, exceptions, precedent (p. 342-345)

1. 1. 54. Argument for constitutive-rule claim

Scheme (54) refers to rules of language (synonymy) and to principles of categorization in institutionally codified languages (“D counts as W”).

1. 1. 55. Arg. from rules
      56. Arg. for an exceptional case
      57. Arg. from precedent
      58. Arg. from plea for excuse

When faced with an exceptional case, the usual rule  may be waived (56) or modified (57). Excuses and extenuating circumstances may suspend the rule.

(14) Perception, memory (345-346)

1. 1. 59. Arg. from perception
      60. Arg. from memory

Schemes (59), (60) argue that one can reasonably believe in a given fact on the basis of the perception or memory of this fact.

COLLECTION 3: TRADITION AND MODERNITY

1. Scipion Dupleix, Logic, or the Art of Speaking and Thinking (1607)
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin (1677)

These works probably have no particular historical significance, but they certainly give an idea of the terminology of the seventeenth century, which clearly resembles the Ciceronian system, see Collections (2).

As the title suggests, Bossuet’s Logic functions as a pedagogical guide to everyday argumentation: ‘Dauphin’ was the title given to the heir to the French kingdom.

Table:
— First column, Bossuet, 1677
— Second column, Dupleix, 1607

The order of the lines is Bossuet’s. For ease of reading, Dupleix’s order of has been changed, so that the same types of arguments are on the same line; the numbering corresponds to the order in Dupleix’s typology.

(¹) S. Circumstances

(²) Bossuet’s topic n°18 (here, topic = topos, arg. scheme), “enumeration of the parts” is akin to the topic of definition. For example, what is a “good captain” is defined by enumerating his relevant qualities: brave, wise, etc. Dupleix’s topic n°2, “all and parts” is more related to composition and division

(³) Dupleix’s topic n°12, from “repugnants” refers to predication: “stone” and “man” are repugnant because “ — be a stone” cannot be said of man — whereas Bossuet’s topic n°17, “a repugnantibus”, refers to a kind of ad hominem.

Both typologies prioritize arguments that exploit the resources that contribute to the definition of a word or a concept, with a view to the future use of this definition in syllogistic reasoning. This enumeration of the core set of arguments is followed by the usual enumeration of argument schemes based on causality, analogy, comparison, peripheral circumstances, opposites and induction. This set will reappear under a new reorganization in the New Rhetoric.

2. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)
Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (1765)

In An Essay concerning Human Understanding John Locke briefly mentions “four sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasoning with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition” (IV, 17, “Of Reason”, § 19-22; p. 410). These four arguments are:

— ad verecundiam, S. Ethos; 
Modesty; Authority.
— ad ignorantiam, S. Ignorance.
— ad hominem, S. Ad hominem.
— ad judicium, S. Matter

In his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Leibniz comments on this list, and qualifies Locke’s abrupt and general condemnation by taking into consideration the circumstances; see the above mentioned entries. In addition, Leibniz adds a new kind of argument, the argument ad vertiginem, S. Vertigo.

This short list has nothing to do with the previous Ciceronian ones; its purpose is to contrast the first three fallacious arguments with the last one, the only one that “brings true instruction and advances us in our way to knowledge” (op. cit., p. 411). Mathematics and experimental sciences are introduced under the heading ad judicium. Contrary to the classical typologies, these arguments are not associated with a logic itself based on a natural ontology, but rather with the requirements of the scientific method, S. Fallacy. We are thus entering a new argumentative world.

3. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of fallacies (1824) see Political Arguments.

COLLECTIONS 2: ARISTOTLE, CICERO

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric (between 329 & 323 b.c)

1.1 The catalog and its position in the Aristotelian system of proofs

The catalogue of the Rhetoric must be seen within the framework of the Aristotelian typology of the different types of proofs carried by different types of discourses. In this typology of proofs, rhetorical discourse is opposed to diaIectical dialogue and to scientific (syllogistic) discourse. Tricot points out that “syllogism is the genre, scientific (producer of science) [is] the specific difference that separates the scientific demonstration from the dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms” (S. A., I, 2, 15-25; p. 8, note 3). The concept of persuasion in the Rhetoric must be seen in this context: scientific discourse produces apodictic knowledge; dialectical interaction produces probable truth and rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is an element of persuasive discourse. Thus, by its very definition, rhetorical discourse cannot be probative; in short, the phrase “rhetorical evidence persuades” is a pleonasm.

The catalogue of arguments is located in the subtypology that organizes the rhetorical proofs (proof = pistis, “means of pressure”), as follows

1.2 Wavering distinctions

Aristotle makes the following distinctions between the different types of rhetorical proofs:

The proofs attached to the logos are enthymemes, which correspond to deduction; examples, which corresponds to induction; and arguments based on natural signs, that are probable or certain. Enthymemes and examples are said to be common to the three ancient rhetorical genres (epideictic, deliberative, judicial, S. Rhetoric.)
The articulation of these different kinds of proofs, and the consistency of the text of the Rhetoric such as we read it now, is problematic (McAdon 2003, 2004). The classification of proofs attached to logos has important variants:

(a) “I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes, and nothing else.” (Rhet., I, 2, 8; Fr., p. 19)

(b) “The materials from which the enthymemes are derived […] being probabilities and signs […].” (Ibid I, 2, 14; p. 25)

(c) “Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources — probabilities, examples, necessary signs and signs.” (Ibid II, 15, 8; p. 337)

The example is placed on the same level as the enthymeme in (a), but is considered a form of the enthymeme in (c); enthymemes have four sources in (c), and two in (b). So, it would be risky to look for a rigorous system in these presentations of rhetorical proof, and the above table must be taken as a simple reminder.

1.3 The topoi of the Rhetoric

The Rhetoric enumerates twenty-eight topoi (topics) or “lines of argument” (Rhet, II, 23), as listed in the following table. An enthymeme is a discursive instance of a topos.

They are identified by their English label or by a brief description, both quoted from Freese (F) or Rhys Roberts (RR).

1. 1. 1. “From opposites” (F). S. Opposites
      2. “From similar inflexions” (F). S. Derived words
      3. “From relative terms” (F); “upon correlative ideas” (R). S. Correlative terms
      4. “From the more or less” (F); a fortiori (R). S. A fortiori
      5. “The consideration of time” (F). S. Consistency
      6. “Turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves” (F). S. Ethos; A fortiori.
      7. “From definition” (F). S. Definition
      8. “Topic from the different significations of a word” (F). Aristotle explicitly refers to this topos in his Topics. S. Ambiguity.
      9. “From division” (F). S. Case-by-case
      10. “From induction” (F). S. Induction
      11. “From a previous judgment in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter”, that judgment having been given by one of “those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict” (F). S. Precedent; Ab exemplo; Authority; Modesty; Politeness
      12. “From enumerating the parts” (F). S. Case-by-case
      13. “Since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, […] employing the consequences to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame” (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma
      14. [id. 13], “but there is this difference that in the former case [i.e., 13] things of any kind whatever, in the latter [i.e., 13] opposites” (F). S. Pragmatic argument; Dilemma
      15. “Men do not praise the same thing in public and in secret” (F). S. Motives
      16. “From analogy in things” (F). S. Analogy; Opposites.
      17. “Concluding the identity of precedents from the identity of results” Instance: “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist” (F). S. Consequence; Implication.
      18. “The same men do not always choose the same thing before and after but the contrary” (F).  S. Consistency.
      19. “Maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it” (F). S. Motives
      20. “Examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not” (F). S. Motives
      21. “Things which are thought to happen but are incredible” (F). S. Probable.
      22. “Another line of argument is to refute your opponent’s case by noting any contrast or contradiction of dates, acts or words that it anywhere displays” (RR). S. Contradiction;  Consistency; Ad hominem.
      23. “Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander […] consists in stating the reason for the false opinion” (F). S. Motives; Interpretation
      24. “Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist” (F). S. Motives
      25. “Whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been carried out” (F). S. Consistency; Motives
      26. “Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together” (F). S. Consistency
          
      27. “Another topic consists in making use of errors committed for purposes of accusation or defense” (F). S. Contradiction; Consistency
          
      28. “From the meaning of a name” (F). S. Proper Name

Even if no clear order emerges from this enumeration, it can be noted that an important subset of topics is essentially concerned with the world of human action and its determination, where motives have been substituted for causes, and behavioral stereotypes about human nature and human motivations have replaced strict scientific causality and taxonomies.

2. Cicero, Topica, “Topics” (44 b.c.)   

Cicero proposes a typology of arguments in an early work, De Inventione, “On Invention” and in his last book on arguments, Topica, “Topics”. Unlike the Topics of Aristotle, which exposes a method for finding and criticizing arguments in the context of a dialectical philosophical exchange, Cicero’s observations and examples always refer to rhetoric as a legal practice. In this context, Cicero makes the following distinction:

• Intrinsic arguments, either “inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion” or “closely connected with the subject which is investigated” (, I, 8; p. 387-389).
• Arguments taken “from external circumstances”, or “extrinsic arguments” (, II, 8; p. 388; IV, 24, p. 397), corresponding to the so-called non-technical arguments, mainly testimonies and their conditions of validity, and including authority (Top., IV, 24; p. 397).

Objects and facts are constructed and discussed on the basis of arguments drawn from five main sources.

Arguments from definition:

— from genus and species of the genus (a genere; a forma generis).
— by enumeration of the parts (partium enumeratio)
— from “etymology” (ex notatione)
— from words of the same family (a conjugata)
— “based on difference” (a differentia).

See Categorization and Nomination; Definition; Genus; Case-by-case; True meaning of the word; Derived Words

Arguments from causal relations

— from efficient causes (ab efficientibus causis)
— from effects (ab effectis).
See Causality.

Arguments from analogy (a similitudine).
See A pari; Intra-categorical analogy; Structural analogy

Arguments from opposites (ex contrario). See Opposites

From circumstances. Arguments: ­

— from antecedents, ab antecedentibus,
— from consequents, a consequentibus
See Circumstances

This short and organized list of arguments is all important in the Western tradition of argumentation studies. They were transmitted in the Middle Ages by Boethius (around 480-524) On Topical Differences (Top., c. 522), and were taken up by medieval logic, dialectic and philosophy. They remained in use until well into the modern era, S. Collections (3).

3. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, “The Orator’s Education” (c. 95)

In Book V, Chap. 10 of the Institutes of Oratory, dealing with arguments, Quintilian summarizes a list of 24 argumentative lines (IO, V, 10, 94). A first series deals with common places.
A second series is a catalog of argument schemes: the French translator, J. Cousin, notes that

This list-summary, which seems to be a loan, recalls previous classifications, with their elements arranged in a different order: […] Later rhetoricians condense or develop without apparent reason. (1976, p. 240).