Analogy 2: STRUCTURAL ANALOGY

1. Terminology

Structural analogy connects two complex domains, each of which articulates an indefinite and unlimited number of objects and relations between these objects. It combines intra-categorical analogy (a property of objects) with proportional analogy (a property of relations). One could also speak of formal analogy (the domains have the same shape) or borrow the mathematical term “isomorphism”, see Intra-categorical analogy; Proportion.

The term “material analogy” refers to the relationship between two objects when one is a replica of the other. The concept covers various phenomena, such as the relationship between a model and its original, or the relationship between a prototype and the object to be produced. The reasoning based on the model or prototype is then applied to the original.

Structural analogy is used in the following two situations.

(i) A, B, C are similar ­— To determine whether the complex objects or domains A, B, C are similar, one must compare their components and the relationships between them. The result of this investigation will be a claim such as « A, B, C are similar »; « A, B, are indeed similar, but C is something different”, and so on.

One might ask whether the Great Depression of 1929, the Lost Decade of Japan in the 1990s, and the Argentine crisis of 2001 share some significant characteristics. The whole purpose of the study may be to establish a typology of economic crises, without relying — as much as possible — relying on preconceived notions of how people will use the conclusions of this study.

The areas are symmetrical from the point of view of the study, which does not favor any of the areas over the others, but only focuses only on their relationships.

(ii) A is similar to B — A contrario, the importance of the previous situation appears when the series includes the 2008 crisis. Given the topicality of this last crisis, it will certainly be tempting to see if we can « learn lessons » from the previous crises and to apply them to the case of 2008, with the intention of making provisions for the current situation. If the proponent uses the analogy 1929 ~ 2008 to predict a third world war, her opponent can refute the inference by showing that the domains are not similar, and therefore it is impossible to rely on the first instance, in 1929, to infer anything about what will happen in 20** and beyond (see below).

The difference in status between the two domains is expressed in different ways. In his analysis of the metaphor, Richards contrasts tenor and vehicle (1936); Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca speak of theme and phore ([1958], p. 501). A simple way of naming these domains might be comparing domain / compared domain; or, in terms of argument analysis, Resource domain / Target domain.
The argument by analogy works on the asymmetry of the compared domains. Therefore, these two domains are denoted, if necessary by the letter R, the resource field, and Π (Greek capital letter “pi”),   the Problematic domain, targeted by the investigation. The field R is the source or Resource on which the arguer relies to explore the target domain Π, or to derive certain consequences about Π from R. In other words, the resource field R is the argument domain and the target field Π is the inference domain.

The two domains are distinguished from epistemic, psychological, linguistic and argumentative perspectives.

— Epistemically, the resource domain is the best-known domain; the target domain is the domain under investigation.
— Psychologically, the intuitions and values that operate in the resource domain are brought to bear in the target domain.
— Linguistically, the resource domain is well covered by a stabilized, familiar and easily spoken language; the target domain is not.
—Practically, we know what to do in the resource domain but we do not know what to do in the target domain.

2. Explanatory Analogy

In Ernest Rutherford well-known analogy between the atom and the solar system, the resource field is the solar system, the goal domain is the atom:

The atom is like the solar system.

This is a didactic analogy, intended to provide a first intuitive understanding of the atomic structure, taking advantage of a (supposed) better understanding of the solar system. The asymmetry of the fields is obvious: the resource field, the solar system, has been known and understood for a long time. The targeted field, the atom, was new, then poorly understood, inaccessible to direct perception, mysterious.

The explanatory analogy retains some pedagogical merit, however partial. Comparison is not identification, and two systems can be compared only in order to identify the limits of the comparison, that is, the irreducible specificities of each field, cf. infra, §6.

The analogy has explanatory value in the following situation:

In the world Π, the proposition π is badly understood. In a world R, there is no debate about r. Π is isomorphic to R (structural, systemic analogy). The position of π in Π is the same as that of r in R. So, the knowledge, images, commitments associated with r are now transferred to π; π is now a little better understood; we know how to deal with π.

The analogical relation allows the unknown to be integrated on the basis of the known. As causal explanations, analogical explanations break the insularity of the domains.

The analogy is an invitation to see and treat the problem through the resource. The resource domain is viewed as a model of the target domain. The relationship of the domain under study to the resource domain is treated as of the relationship of the domain under study to an abstract representation of that domain. Otto Neurath uses a maritime metaphorical analogy to explain his vision of epistemology:

There is no tabula rasa. We are like sailors at sea, who must rebuild their ship without ever taking it to a dock to be dismantled and rebuilt it with better materials. (Otto Neurath, [Protocol Statement],1932/3.[1])

The analogy can be translated literally: “There is no ultimate foundation of knowledge from which we could rebuild all of our present knowledge without any presuppositions.” This resource is extremely powerful; the image could also be applied to social life: “There is no ‘good explanation’ (meaning « good discussion of our disagreements ») that would allow us to reconstruct a damaged relationship and start from scratch.”

3. Arguments Based on Structural Analogy

In ordinary situations, analogy is used argumentatively, as in the following case:

— In the world Π, we are in a difficult situation; what should we do? Should we accept or reject the perspective π?
— But we know for sure what happens in a world R.
— Fortunately, Π is isomorphic to R (structural, systemic analogy); if necessary we can argue for this.
— The position of π in Π is the same as the position of r in R.
— So, we can act, in the world Π, on the basis of the knowledge, images, obligations associated with r (in R) — That is, we can now decide about π.

This argumentative operation implies that “if the domains are analogous, so are their corresponding elements and the relations between them”, which may turn out to be true or false upon further investigation. The analogy gives us something to think about, but proves nothing; the conclusion projected onto Π may be false or ineffective.

4. From Analogy to Metaphor and Back

A language is associated with the resource domain. For example, ​​the human body is referred to in a language that may be incomplete and rather incoherent, but is generally understood, the language of the flow of organic matter, of popular physiology, of good health and illness, of life and death. This language synthetizes and builds a common intuition of the body. Other unfamiliar domains are not equipped with such a dense, effective and functional language. The analogy projects the language of the resource field, the human body, onto the problem field, society. As a result, the target can be problematized in a familiar, non-controversial language; so that social convulsions can be discussed and a cure found. The analogy is an invitation to see the problem through the lens of the resource; full metaphorization allows us to forget the glasses.

The following apologue is based on the analogy « society is like a body », as expressed in the metaphorical phrase “social body”. Note the explicitness of the vocabulary of analogy in the last section of the commentary.

The senate therefore decided to send as their spokesman Menenius Agrippa, an eloquent man, who was also accepted by the plebs because he himself was of plebeian origin. He was received into the camp, and it is reported that he told them, in a primitive and uncouth manner, the following fable. ‘In the days when all the parts of the human body did not work together as they do now, but each went its own way and spoke its own language, the other members, indignant at seeing that all that was acquired by their care and labor and service went to the belly, while the belly, undisturbed in the midst of them all, did nothing but enjoy the pleasures provided for it, entered into a conspiracy; the hands were not to bring food to the mouth, the mouth was not to receive it when offered, the teeth were not to chew it. While they, in their resentment, were trying to force the belly by starving it, the members themselves were wasting away, and the whole body was reduced to the last stage of exhaustion. Then it was found that the belly did no idle service, and that the nourishment it received was no greater than that which it gave by returning to all the parts of the body that blood by which we live and are strong, evenly distributed in the veins, after being ripened by the digestion of the food.’ By using this comparison, and showing how the internal discontent between the parts of the body resembled the animosity of the plebeians against the patricians, he succeeded in winning over his audience.
Titus Livius, The History of Rome, Volume 1, Book 2; between 27 and 9 BC [2]

The resource does not necessarily exist before it is used in an analogy. An analogy can create a self-evident resource ex nihilo, as in the following analogy, proposed by Heisenberg in 1955. The danger mentioned in the first line refers to the Cold War era, and the resource concept is “a ship built with such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing North points toward the iron mass of the ship.” Note again that there is no clear line between structural analogy and metaphor. Heisenberg calls the situation he envisions a metaphor; and in the next line, he uses a construction that expresses an analogy: “Mankind is in the position of a captain”.

Another metaphor might make such a danger even clearer. Through the seemingly un­limited growth of its material power, humanity could be likened to a captain whose ship has been built from such a large amount of steel and iron that its compass, instead of pointing north, is pointing toward the huge iron mass of the ship. Such a ship would get nowhere. It would be blown off course and go around in circles.

But to return to the situation of modern physics, we must admit that the danger exists only if the captain does not know that his compass no longer responds to the magnetic force of the Earth. Once he understands this, the danger is already halved. Because the captain who does not want to turn back, but wants to reach a known or unknown destination, will find a way to steer the boat, either by using new modern compass that does not react to the iron mass of the boat, or by steering in relation to the stars as sailors used to do. It is true that the visibility of the stars does not depend on us, and perhaps we rarely see them today. Nevertheless, our awareness of the limits of our hope for progress presupposes the desire not to go round in circles, but to reach a goal. Once recognized, this limit becomes the first fixed point that allows a new orientation.
Werner Heisenberg, [Nature in Modern Physics], [1955] [3]

5. Structural Analogy as an Epistemological Barrier

Analogy is fruitful in stimulating discovery and invention, useful in teaching and popularizing knowledge. But it becomes an epistemological barrier when the proposed explanation by analogy seems so clear and satisfying that it discourages further inquiry:

For example, blood flows like water. Canalized water irrigates the soil, so blood should also irrigate the body. Aristotle was the first to associate the distribution of blood from the heart to the body with the irrigation of a garden by canals (De Partes Animalium, III, v, 668 a 13 and 34). Galen did not think otherwise. But to irrigate the soil, it is ultimately to get lost in the soil. And this is the main obstacle to a correct understanding of the blood circulation.
Georges Canguilhem, [The Knowledge of Life], 1951.[4]

The systematic rejection of analogy as a tool of knowledge is based on such observations.

6. Refuting Structural Analogies

6.1 Vain Analogy

In an explanation, the explanation (explanans) must be clearer than the thing to be explained (explanandum). An analogical explanation must also satisfy this condition, and if the resource area is even less well known than the area under investigation the analogy will not help to understand of things.

The analogy is also useless if it is used to impress the audience and to show off the speaker’s familiarity with the resource domain. Gödel’s theorem is often used for this purpose (Bouveresse [1999]).

6.2 False Analogy

An argument by analogy can be rejected by showing that there are critical differences between the resource domain and the target domain, that prohibit the projection of the former onto the latter so that no lesson can be learned from the supposed resource domain. For example, the following passage argues that the comparison of the 2008 and 1929 crises is marred by the fact that the current situation in Germany has nothing to do with its situation after 1918 and in the years to come. It is also argued that there is nothing comparable to Hitler and Nazism in the European landscape of 2009:

Jean-François Mondot — Is the economic crisis weakening our civilization? We sometimes hear intellectuals and columnists draw analogies with the 1929 crisis that led to the Second World War.

Pascal Boniface — We often make the mistake of thinking that history repeats itself, and so we make very risky comparisons. Russia bangs its fist on the table, and everyone immediately talks about the Cold War. There is an economic and financial crisis erupts on Wall Street, and immediately an analogy is drawn to 1929, suggesting that Hitler could come to power as a result of these difficulties. But the political circumstances are obviously very different, for no great country is now being humiliated as Germany was after 1918, and so is seeking revenge. This comparison is easy to make, but it has no basis, neither strategic nor intellectual.
Pascal Boniface, [The Clash of Civilizations is Not Inevitable], 2009.[5]

6.3 Partial analogy

Partial analogy (« misanalogy », Shelley, 2002, 2004) is an analogy that has been criticized and recognized as limited. The two domains cannot be equated. Nevertheless, partial analogy still has a pedagogical use, as seen in the case of the analogy between the solar system and the atom (see §2 above):

A central body: the sun, the nucleus of the atom.
Peripheral elements: the planets, the electrons.
A central mass much greater than the peripheral masses: the mass of the sun is greater than that of the planets; the mass of the nucleus is greater than that of the electrons. —etc.

Differences (analogy breaks):

The nature of the attraction: electric for the atom, gravitational for the solar system.
There are identical atoms, each solar system is unique.
There can be several electrons in the same orbit, whereas there is only one planet in the same orbit, etc.

The fact that the limits of analogy are well known prohibits any automatic transfer of knowledge gained in one field to the other.

6.4 Reverse Analogy

A conclusion C1 has been reached about a target resource on the basis of an analogy drawn from the resource domain R. The opponent argues that the same analogy drawn from the same domain R leads to another conclusion C2 about the same target domain, that is incompatible with C1 (« disanalogy » Shelley, ibid.). These two contradictory conclusions prohibit the use of the resource domain to argue in the target domain.

This is particularly effective because the opponent is conceding to play on her opponent’s home turf. The opponent accepts the proponent’s analogy and examines it more closely in order to neutralize the proponent’s conclusions. This strategy is used in the refuting argumentative metaphors.

Argument: ­— This is the heart of our discipline.
Refutation: — That’s true. But disciplines also need eyes to see clearly, legs to move, hands to act, and even a brain to think.
Other refutation — That’s true, but the heart can keep beating very well preserved in a jar.

An advocate of hereditary monarchy speaks against universal suffrage:

Argument: — An elected president, that’s absurd, we don’t elect the  ship’s pilot.
Rebuttal: — There are no natural-born ship’s pilot either.

Both sides are staging the same metaphorical field. This form of rebuttal has the force of an ad hominem refutation, based on the speaker’s own beliefs about the speaker: “You are your own refuter”.

Counter-analogy — As with any argument, an argument by analogy can be countered with a counter-argument (an argument whose conclusion is incompatible with the original conclusion). This rebuttal can be of any kind, including another argument by analogy, taken from a different resource domain; one analogy balances another analogy:

Argument:   — The university is (like) a business, so …
Rebuttal:     — No, it is (like) a day-care center, an abbey …

[1] Otto Neurath, “Protokollsätze”. Erkenntnis 3 (1932/3), p. 206. Quoted in A. Beckermann “Zur Inkohärenz und Irrelevanz of Wissensbegriffs”. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55, 2001. P. 585. [« On the incoherence and irrelevance of concepts of knowledge ». Journal for Philosophical Research, etc.] [2] Translated by Rev. Canon Roberts, edited. by Ernest Rhys. J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 1905. Quoted from; http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/Livy02.html. No pag. (11-08-2017)
[3] Quoted from Werner Heisenberg (1962) La Nature dans la Physique Contemporaine. Paris: Gallimard, 1962. P. 35-36. [Nature in Contemporary Physics] [4] Quoted after Georges Canguilhem, La Connaissance de la Vie. Paris: Vrin, 1965. P. 26-27. [The Knowledge of Life.
[5] Pascal Boniface, “Le clash des civilisations n’est pas inévitable”. Interview by J.-F. Mondot, Les Cahiers de Science et Vie, 2009. www.iris-france.org / Op-2009-03-04.php3] (09-20-2013) [“A clash of civilizations is not inevitable”.]

INTRA-CATEGORICAL ANALOGY

Intra-categorical analogy is based on the relationship between individuals belonging to the same category. See Categorisation and Nomination for a definition of the concept of category; the process of categorising individuals; the organisation of categories into classifications and the corresponding forms of syllogistic reasoning,

1. From identity to intra-categorical analogy and circumstantial analogy

1.1 Individual identity

An individual is identical with itself (neither similar nor dissimilar); it is not “more or less” identical with itself. This self-evidence establishes the principle of identity “A = A”.

1.2 Identity of indiscernibles

Two different perfectly identical individuals, for example products from the same industrial production chain, are materially identical, i.e. perceptually indistinguishable. Everything that can be said about one can be said about the other; their descriptions coincide, they share all their properties, whether essential (categorical) or accidental (incidental).

Distinction depends on the observer, the layman sees no difference, and believes that “it’s all the same”, while the specialist makes crucial distinctions.

1.3 Intra-categorical analogy

Intra-categorical analogy is the relationship between the members of a category C. All members share, by definition, the characteristics defining the category. The expression “another C” refers to another member of the same category C. Two beings belonging to the same category are identical for this category; a whale and a rat are identical from the point of view of the category “­— be a mammal”. This categorical identity is a partial identity, compatible with major differences; two beings of the same category are said to be analogous or similar. They are comparable in respect of their other non-categorical properties. Chicken eggs are all similar as eggs; one egg is identical to another egg; it is comparable to all other eggs in terms of freshness, size, color, etc. See Comparison.

1.4 Circumstantial analogy

An individual a who has the characteristics (x, y, z, t), is similar to all individuals who have any of those characteristics, whether essential or incidental.

The descriptors of two objects define the point of view from which they are equivalent; two entities are similar when their descriptions overlap, contain a common part, which may or may not include all or some of their essential characteristics. In other words, this common part generates a category, which may or may not make sense. We might speak of circumstantial analogy..Alice and a snake are identical from the point of view of the category « – is a long-necked egg-eater », S. Definition.

2. Intra-categorical analogy as induction or deduction

Intra-categorical analogy can be reconstructed as an induction or a deduction:

2.1 As an induction

O is similar to P
P has the properties w, x, y, m
O has the properties w, x, y
So O probably has also property m.

From an overall judgment of analogy between two beings, based on the shared features w, x, y … we conclude that if one has the property m then the other most probably also possesses m. In other words, analogy is pushed towards identity.

2.2 As a deduction

O is similar to P
P has the property m
Conclusion: O probably has the property m.

O is similar to P. This means that they share a common set of properties, and therefore belong to the category C defined by these properties. As members of the same category C, O and P are likely to share other properties, including m. This means that the predicate « — is like” is to be interpreted as a weaker form of « — is the same as »; analogy is to be seen as a weakened identity.

Deduction and induction are regarded as valid forms of reasoning. The purpose of discussing about the possibility of reducing analogy to deduction or induction is to determine whether or not analogy is also a valid form of reasoning. Analogical reasoning is sometimes used to prove the existence of God, so the ideological stakes are high.

3. Arguments based on intra-categorical analogy

— Two individuals belong to the same category if they have the same definition.

— Categories may be graded S. Rule of Justice.

— Categorical analogies may be restructured see A pari; Definition (III). 

4. Refutation of categorical analogy

In one or other aspect, everything is like everything else, and analogies can be more or less “far-fetched”. Any rejected categorical analogy will be dubbed fallacious and denounced as a confusion, an amalgam (Doury 2003, 2006).

Intra-categorical analogy can be refuted by showing that the category created from those two beings is not based on essential features, but on some accidental property; in general, the generated class is deemed irrelevant. The nonsensical analogy “Chinese ~ Butterfly”, ironically discussed by Musil, illustrates the perils of circumstantial analogy, based on the arbitrary choice of a non-essential feature, here the “lemon-yellow” color.

There are lemon yellow butterflies; there are also lemon-yellow Chinese people. So, in a sense, butterflies can be defined as miniature winged Chinese people. Butterflies and Chinese people are symbolic of sensual pleasure. Here we can see for the first time a glimmer of a possible match, never considered before, between the great period of the moth fauna and Chinese civilization. The fact that butterflies have wings and not the Chinese people is only a superficial phenomenon. […] Butterflies did not invent powder: precisely because the Chinese have done it before them. The suicidal predilection for the lights of some nocturnal species is still an artifact of the past, which is difficult to explain in view of the daylight understanding of this morphological relationship between butterflies and China.
Robert Musil, [Spirit and Experience], [1921] [1]

The analogy relationship has difficulties with transitivity, S. Relation. Intra-categorical analogy is transitive: if A and B on the one hand, B and C on the other hand, are said to be similar because they possess the same essential features, A is thus similar to C. Circumstantial analogy is not transitive: nothing proves that if, on the one hand, the descriptions of A and B have common parts, and, on the other hand, the description of B and C have common parts, then the description of A and C will also have also common parts. Khallaf invokes a traditional analogy to criticize the concatenation of analogies:

A man is walking on the beach trying to find similar shells; once he finds a shell similar to the original, he throws away the original shell and goes on to find a seashell which resembles the second, and so on. When he has found the tenth shell, he should not be surprised to see that it is totally different from the first in the series. (Khallâf [1942], p. 89)

[1] Quoted in Jacques Bouveresse, Prodiges et vertiges de l’analogie [Wonders and Dizziness of Analogy]. Paris: Raisons d’Agir, 1999. P. 21-22.

ANALOGICAL THINKING

From an anthropological perspective, analogy is a way of thinking that assumes that things, people and events are reflected in each other. For analogical thinking, knowledge is the decoding of similarities; analogy reveals a world of secret connections underlying reality, and creates a “cosmic sense in which order, symmetry, perfection triumph”, a closed world (Gadoffre & al. 1980, p. 50); thus conceived, analogy is the foundation of gnosis. From the perspective of the history of ideas, this way of thinking culminated in the Renaissance, when our “sublunary » world was mapped by analogy with the celestial spheres, and with the divine world i.n general

In one of its manifestations, the doctrine of analogical correspondences validates the following type of argument:

Data: This plant looks like this or that part of the human body.
Conclusion: This plant has a hidden virtue, that is effective in curing the ills that affect the corresponding part of the body.
Guarantee: If the shape of a plant is like a part of the body, then it cures diseases that affect that  part of the body.
Support: This is a divine arrangement.

This form of analogical thinking postulates that plants have hidden medicinal properties. The plant carries a divine signature, that is a representation of the human body part that it can heal. This signature or “analogical sympathy” is a motivated signifier, a similarity or “resemblance” of the given body part. God, in His benevolence, has given this signature to certain plants in order to make them useful to us. Thus, a plant that resembles the eyes, could cure eye irritation.

Since the skin of the quince is covered with small hairs, it bears the “signature” of the hair, and eating the quince can make your hair grow. In the words of Oswald Crollius [1609]:

Data: ‘This downy hair that grows around quinces […] represents hair in some way.” (id., p. 41)
Conclusion: “So, their decoction makes hair grow back, that has fallen out because of smallpox or some similar disease.” (ibid.)
Rationale: The healing power of plants « can be more easily recognized by the signature or analogous and mutual sympathy with the members of the human body with these plants than by anything else. » (ibid., p. 8)
Support: “ »God has given each plant an interpreter so that its natural virtue (but hidden in its silence) may be recognized and discovered. This interpreter can be nothing other than an external signature, that is, a resemblance of form and shape, true indications of its goodness, essence and perfection. » (id., p. 23)
Oswald Crollius, [Treatise on Signatures, or the True and Living Anatomy of the Great and Small Worlds]; [1609] [1]

From this doctrine derives a research programme o research for “those who wish to acquire the true and perfect science of medicine, » « they should devote all their efforts to the knowledge of signatures, hieroglyphics and characters” (ibid., p. 20). The training will enable them to recognise “at first sight, on the surface of the plants, the capacities with which they are endowed” (ibid., p. 9).

Knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants is acquired by learning how to read and understand the “discourse of nature,” that is , by mastering the signs scattered throughout the world. Such an analogical reading of the world is opposed to empirical causal investigation, which consists of observation and experience, practising dissection or prescribing a remedy to the patient and then finding out whether he or she is better, dead, or neither better nor worse. Analogical knowledge is a specific way of thinking, constitutive of magical thinking, which replaces causal knowledge with mysterious correspondences that convey influences, and bypasses the hierarchical system of categories organised according to genus and species, for which it replaces a network of similarities

[1] Quoted from Oswald Crollius, Traicté des Signatures ou Vraye et Vive Anatomie du Grand et Petit Monde. Milan: Archè, 1976.
[Treatise on Signatures or True and Lively Anatomy of the Large and Small Worlds.

AMBIGUITY

The words ambiguity (N), ambiguous (Adj) come from the Latin verb ambigere, “to discuss, to be in controversy”: qui ambigunt ‘those engaged in a discussion’ (Cic. Fin. 2,4)” (Gaffiot, Ambigo). To refer to the issue, to the point on which the partners disagree, Cicero uses the expression “illud ipsum de quo ambiguebatur”, “precisely that – on which – [they] disagree” (ibid.).
Ambiguitas means « doubt »; the answers given by the Oracles were ambiguous in this sense.
The word amphiboly is sometimes used in discussing the Aristotelian fallacy of ambiguity. It adapts a Greek word [amphibology] composed of amphi- « on both sides”; bolos “throwing on all sides”; logos, « word”, and means “having a double meaning, ambiguous. Literally, an amphiboly is an “explosion of meaning”.

The word ambiguity can be used to refer to three fallacies “dependent on language”, homonymy, amphiboly, and accent. These fallacies are defined as violations of the rule of syllogism or of dialectical reasoning, which requires that language be unambiguous, see Dialectic; Fallacies (2): Aristotle basic list.

Problems of ambiguity arise at the level of words (homonymy, accent), at the level of sentences (syntactic ambiguity), or at the level of discourse. Such problems are combined with the fact that non-ambiguous sentences may have multiple layers of meaning, see Presupposition; Words as Arguments.

1. Syntactic ambiguity

Sentence ambiguity, discussed by Aristotle from the perspective of a grammar of argumentation, is now seen as a syntactic problem. The famous Chomskyan ambiguous statement “flying airplanes can be dangerous” can be paraphrased as:

Under some circumstances, flying airplanes is a dangerous activity
Airlanes are dangerous when they fly.

These paraphrases are not equivalent. The no less famous statement “The teacher says the principal is an ass” is syntactically ambiguous, it allows for two syntactic structures whose difference is marked by intonation or punctuation:

“The teacher,” says the principal, “is a donkey”
The teacher says: “The principal is a donkey”.

Ambiguity is sometimes an artifact of decontextualization, produced for the sake of grammatical or logical theory. In practice, the addition of a sufficient amount of left and right context is sufficient to clarify the intended meaning, as shown by the re-contextualization of the sentence “We saw her duck” (Wikipedia, Ambiguity), which is four times ambiguous when decontextualized:

We saw her duck swimming in the pool
We saw her duck picking up something on the floor
We do not have a knife, so we saw her duck
She is a clever bridge player, so we saw her duck

Serious ambiguity occurs when the context does not disambiguate the sentence. The reduction of ambiguity to univocity is no less important for the interpretation of texts, sacred and otherwise, than it is for logic. In De Doctrina Christiana, St Augustine gives a rule to be applied when trying to interpret religious texts:

But when proper words make Scripture ambiguous, we must see in the first place that there is nothing wrong in our punctuation or pronunciation. Accordingly, if, when attention is given to the passage, it shall appear to be uncertain in what way it ought to be punctuated or pronounced, let the reader consult the rule of faith which he has gathered from the plainer passages of Scripture, and from the authority of the Church.
Augustine, [397] On Christian Doctrine, in Four Books, (our emphasis)[1]

The rule of interpretation in the highlighted passage appeals to the consistency of the field of theological argument. It applies to the interpretation of the first verse of the first chapter of the Gospel of John, the Genesis. Nothing less than the very concept of God is at stake. It must be shown that the correct “punctuation”, that is the correct reading of this verse, is consistent with the orthodox conception of the Trinity, which affirms the divine identity and equality of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The reading that ascribes a syntax of coordination to the utterance results in the denial the identity of the Word, that is the Holy Spirit, with God; it must therefore be considered heretical and rejected as such.

3. Now look at some examples. The heretical pointing, « In principio erat verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat » (In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
God, and God was), so as to make the next sentence run, « Verbum hoc erat in principio apud Deum » (This word was in the beginning with God), arises out of unwillingness to confess that the Word was God. But this must be rejected by the rule of faith, which, in reference to the equality of the Trinity, directs us to say: « et Deus erat verbum » (and the Word was God); and then to add: « hoc erat in principio apud Deum » (the same was in the beginning with God). (Id., Chap. II, 3)

The disputed passage is a sentence taken from the Sacred Text: « et verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat » (« the Word was with God₁ and God was »). I can’t and don’t want to touch the theological discussion. I risk the following bracketing, and leave the last word to the wise.

Orthodox bracketing – For Augustine, the orthodox punctuation and construction of the verse is: « In principio erat verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum. »
(Biblia Sacra…Parisiis, Letouzey et Ané, 1887).

{The Word [was with God] and [was God]}

The argument is not grammatical, but drawn, as indicated above, « from the plainer passages of Scripture, and from the authority of the Church.”

Heretical bracketing:

{[the Word was with God] and [was God]} 

Disambiguation is the foundational operation for the vast and important domain of interpretive argumentation.

2. Word ambiguity: homonymy, polysemy

Two words are homonymous when they have the same signifier (the same spelling (homographs), the same pronunciation (homophones) or both), but completely different meanings. Homonymous words are listed as separate entries in the dictionary:

Mine: “that which belongs to me.” (MW, Mine)
Mine: “a pit or excavation in the earth from which mineral substances are taken” (ibid.).

Polysemous words are semantic particularizations or acceptances of the same signifier within the same grammatical category. In the dictionary, they are listed under the same entry, and correspond to the first subdivision of meaning:

Mine, noun
1 a: a pit or excavation in the earth from which mineral substances are taken. b: an ore deposit.
2: a subterranean passage under an enemy position.
3: an encased explosive that is placed in the ground or in water and set to explode when disturbed.
4: a rich source of supply (id.)

When two different series of derived words come from the same root word, that word is in the process of splitting into two homonyms. This is the case of the three series derived from the word argument, see To Argue, Argument.

2.1 Paralogism and Sophism of Homonymy

A syllogism is fallacious by homonymy when it articulates not three but four terms, one of which is taken in two different senses, see Paralogism.

In the Euthydemus, Plato provides an example of sophisticated practice using a very special kind of homonymy. The sophist Euthydemus, the eponymous character of this dialogue, asks Clinias, “Who are the men who learn, the wise or the ignorant? » (Euth., 275d; p. 712). Poor Clinias blushes and replies that “the wise are the learners”; and six turns of speech later, he must agree that « it is the ignorant who learn » (Euth., 276a – b; p. 713). The young Clinias is quite stunned, and Euthydemus’ followers “broke into applause and laughter” (ibid.). Such sophisms are not intended to deceive their victims, but to destabilize their naive certainties about the language. Through this salutary shock, the public becomes aware of the opacity and the proper form of language, S. Persuasion; Sophism. As Socrates later explains, “the same word is applied to opposite
 sorts of men, to both the man who knows and to the man who does not” (id., 278a, p. 715).

In general, the subject and object of a verb are not interchangeable; the situation in which “A loves B” is different from the situation in which “B loves A”. To learn, to be the host of, to rent are examples of this property:

to rent 1. pay someone for the use of (something, typically property, land, or a car). 2. (of an owner) allow someone to use (something) in return for payment. (MW, Rent)

2.2 Homonyms and Polysemy

The polysemy of words is considered a major source of confusion. Scientific language prohibits both polysemy and homonymy, and requires the use of unambiguous, well-defined terms stabilized in their meaning and syntax, in a given scientific field. Homonymy between a scientific term and a common word is harmless. In physics, the use of the word charm to refer to a particle, the charm quark creates no ambiguity.

In a natural language argument, the meaning of terms is constructed and recomposed in the course of the discourse, see Object of discourse. The meaning of a word used by the same speaker may change from one stage of the argument to the next. This results from a variety of mechanisms, such as the use of homonymous or closely similar words, or the use of a word in both its literal and figurative senses in the same discourse. For example, when discussing the credit to be given to a person, there may be a, subtle shift between « determining the amount of a loan » and « trusting » that person. In German, the economic discussion of financial debt seems to remain linked to the discussion of moral guilt, the same signifier, Schuld, has these two meanings. (Reverso, Schuld).

Homonymy and polysemy can be readjusted by the operation of distinguo.

3. “Accent”: stress and paronomasia

In a language where word stress is linguistically relevant, shifting the stress from one syllable to another can change the meaning of the word, for example in Spanish (my underlining):

Hacía: stress on the second syllable, 1st pers. sing of the verb hacer, « I did”.
Hacia: stress on the first syllable, means “to, towards”, preposition.

The words seem to be the same, except for the accent (oral and written), but they are actually two different words. Much like the fallacy of homonymy which shifts the meaning of a single signifier, the fallacy of accent also shifts the meaning of the word through a minimal but crucial suprasegmental change. This process occurs as though the difference between the signifiers is not considered salient enough to distinguish between the variations in meaning.

This is a special case of paronomasia (or annominatio), defined as a:

(pseudo-) etymological play on the slightness of the phonetic change on the one hand and the interesting range of meaning which is created by means of the change on the other. In such cases, the range of meaning can be raised to the level of paradox. (Lausberg [1960], §637)

Generally speaking, paronomasia creates a meaning-generating cell, by contrasting or assimilating a word (signifier) W₀ with a minimally different word (signifier) W₁.

In the dialog, the paronomastic resumption of a term functions as a rectification, breaking the orientation of this discourse, S. Orientation Reversal, “this is not a crisis of conscience, this is a crisis of confidence”.

[1] Book III, Ch. 2, 2. No pag. Quoted from https://www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/doctrine.txt . (11-08-2017)

AGREEMENT

Agreement can be viewed from four perspectives.

(1) Consensual interactions are characterized by a preference for agreement (Bilmes 1991), see Politeness. Fully developed argumentative interactions are characterized by a preference for disagreement,

(2) The existence of “preliminary agreements” (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca), in regard to both in terms of the organization of the discussion and the issues to be discussed, can be considered as a necessary condition for a fruitful conclusion of the argument. In a dialectical exchange, prior specific agreements are imposed on the participants, just as the rules of a game are imposed on the players. In a rhetorical address, the speaker seeks a priori areas of agreement with the audience.
In civic life, argumentative encounters (courts, arbitration offices, parliaments, decision-making meetings…) follow predetermined standard procedures that the participants agree to and follow,  whether they consider them fair or not. See Rules; Conditions of Discussion.

(3) The production of an agreement can be seen as the ideal purpose of argumentative interactions. Combined with (2), this makes argumentation a technique for transforming preliminary agreements into a final consensus. See To persuade; Persuasion.

(4) The existence of a consensus can be used as an argument, to justify a proposal by claiming that it is the subject of a general consensus on which everyone agrees. The actual opponent of the claim thus appears therefore as an isolated eccentric individual, excluded from « our community ». His or her opinion is disqualified, and can be dismissed without bothering to refute or even consider his or her arguments, See Dismissal.

AD LAPIDEM argument ► DISMISSAL

AD LITTERAM argument ►Appeal to the LETTER

AD ORATIONEM argument ►MATTER – STRICT MEANING

AD PERSONAM ► AD HOMINEM – PERSONAL ATTACK

AD POPULUM

Latin populus, “people”.

1. Populist Speech

The label “populist speech” is both descriptive and evaluative. Such speech is stigmatized and is widely considered to be used to promote negative values, xenophobia and other irrational and brutal social phobias; to call for action based on uncontrolled emotion and poor analysis rather than cold rational conclusions; and to make indiscriminate promises, suggesting that the proposed solutions are the only possible ones, easy to implement, that they will work miracles, with no negative consequences.

Populist discourse appeals to immediate gratification, and is opposed to the hardship discourse of perseverance and slow improvement: “If you vote for me, you will have to accept sacrifices. But, later, maybe…”

“Populist” is the new label for ancient and modern demagogic speech, that develops fraudulent discourse for the sake of purely short-term electoral gain.

1. Appeal to the Beliefs of a Group

The ad populum argument can be defined as an argument that starts from premises that are accepted by the audience, rather than from universal premises. Such an argument aims to obtain adherence rather than truth (Hamblin 1970, p. 41, Woods & Walton 1992, p. 211).

According to the Socratic critique of assembly discourse as focusing on social persuasion when addressing the audience about their everyday affairs, to the detriment of transcendental truth, and moral rectitude, all political speech would be inherently populist, see probable. In this sense, all rhetorical or dialectical arguments would be ad populum. Thus, the ad populum argument is no different from an argument based on the audience’s interests, beliefs and passions of the audience, i.e., an ex concessis, ex datis, or ad auditores argument.

2. Appeal to Emotion

We can define the paralogism known as argumentum ad populum as an attempt to win the popular assent to a conclusion by arousing the emotion and enthusiasm of the masses (Copi 1972, p. 29; cited in Woods and Walton 1992, p. 213).

The ad populum argument is negatively related to hatred and fanaticism, and not always positively related to enthusiasm: it gets caught in the general condemnation of passions, without taking into account the fact that on the one hand, emotions may or may not be justified, and that, on the other hand, good and bad arguments may be based on strong emotions, see Emotion.

This definition corresponds to the expression ad captandum vulgus “playing to the gallery”, i.e., to theatrical oratory, which is not an exclusive characteristic of politicians. The speaker becomes an actor. The criticism of ad populum joins the moral criticism of flattering discourse, and the criticism of enthusiasm, conformism and group effects in general, as “bandwagon fallacies” and alignment with the majority crowd (ad numerum), see Pathos; Emotions; Laughter; Consensus.

As in all cases of appeals to the passions, a substitution of the passions for the logos, and thus a lack of relevance may be suspected (Woods, Walton 1992, p. 215), see Vicious circle.

3. The argumentative orientation of the word people

The word people can have two opposing argumentative orientations. The individualist, who believes that all virtue resides in the individual, can use the scheme  of the opposites to conclude  that the crowd is inherently corrupt, and that any argument that appeals to popular sentiment is therefore fallacious. The people are always the populace, the madding crowd.

On the other hand, the adage vox populi vox dei, “the voice of the people, is the voice of God,” gives the people a kind of infallibility. The popular corruption argument mirrors the ad superbiam fallacy, that is the charge of pride (ad superbiam), a sin committed by  those who consider themselves superior to an inherently corrupt people, see Dismissal; Collections (2).

Boldly relying on an effect of compositional effect, supported by two analogies, Aristotle supports the superiority of the many over the one:

According to our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate, and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now, each member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is composed of many individuals. And just as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual.

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water, which is less easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to be supposed that a great number of people would all be overcome by a passion and go wrong at the same moment. (Aristotle, Politics, III, 15. Jowett, p. 99)

— Perhaps “hardly to be supposed”, but historically well documented.

4. Populum and plebs: The people and the crowd

In Republican Rome, the appeal to the people, provocatio ad populum, was a right of appeal (jus provocationis) in criminal trials, a basic human right of the accused. As a last resort, an accused Roman citizen could take his case to the populus. The populus is the assembled people, constituted as a political-judicial body, in the comitia centuriata, the solemn assembly of the people, in which full citizens vote and make decisions. In these assemblies, the gods themselves speak through the voice of the people. The populus is thus very different from the vulgus or the plebs as random, unorganized whole.

This right is linked to Republican institutions: “Tradition claims that the provocatio ad populum was created by a law of the consul Publicola the same year the Republic was founded.” (Ellul [1961], p. 278). With the Empire, “the provocatio ad Cæsarem evicted the provocatio ad populum” (Foviaux 1986, p. 61), that is, that Caesar replaced the People.

AD INCOMMODUM

Bossuet [1] defines the ad incommodum argument[1] as “the argument that brings one into inconvenience” ([1677], p. 131). It is a variant of the refutative use of pragmatic argument through unacceptable or contradictory consequences, see absurd.

This pattern  is illustrated with an example designed to refute the doctrines of opponents of absolute political power over bodies and absolute ecclesiastical authority over souls.

Without political authority to which one obeys without resistance, men would devour one another. Likewise, if there were no ecclesiastical authority to which individuals are obliged to submit their judgment, there would be as many religions as there are heads. However, it is false that we should allow people to devour one another, or that there should be as many religions as there are heads. Therefore, we must necessarily recognize a political authority to which we submit without resistance, and an ecclesiastical authority to which individuals yield their judgment.
Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Logic for the Dauphin, p. 131. [1990].

The refutation takes the form of two hypothetical syllogisms:

Without Absolute Political Authority, men would Devour each other: no APA → D
Without Absolute Religious Authority, religions would Multiply: no ARA → M

Men must not Devour each other: no D
Religions must not Multiply: no M

Therefore, we need absolute political authority: AP
Therefore, we need absolute religious authority: AR

The two arguments are presented in strict parallel. This textual or stylistic turn fuses and freezes the two arguments, and therefore the two powers, to the point of their identification [2]. See parallel cases (in French).

[1] Bishop Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, (1627-1704). In Logique du Dauphin / Logic for the Dauphin., 1677. The Dauphin is the heir apparent of the French Kingdom. Quoted after Paris, Éditions universitaires, 1990, p. 131.

[2] This identification excludes, for example, the plurality of religions in an absolute monarchy.

AD HOMINEM

Latin homo, “human being.”

1. Ad Hominem as Personal Attack, Ad Personam

Today, ad hominem is commonly used to mean ad personam, but classical ad hominem argument is quite distinct from personal attack (or ad personam attack), which seeks to disqualify the person in order to dismiss their arguments.

2. Ad Hominem as Self-Contradiction or Inconsistency

The concept of the ad hominem strategy can be found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, scheme ≠ 22:

Another line of argument is to refute your opponent’s case by noting any contrast or contradiction of dates, acts or words that it anywhere displays. (1400a15; RR p. 373).

Under that name, Locke defines the ad hominem argument as a discussion technique in which the speaker “[presses] a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem” ([1690], p. 411).

The term “principle” can be taken in the moral or intellectual sense of “first principles.” In both cases, the speaker rearticulates the opponent’s system of beliefs and values, in order to identify a contradiction. Locke rejects this form of argument as fallacious, because it is based on a person’s specific belief structure, which is irrelevant to the truth of the debated: “[it does not] follow that another man is in the right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong” (ibid.).
The ad hominem argument has no force and plays no role as an alethic instrument, in the process of establishing truth, see collections 3: modernity and tradition

Regarding this definition, Leibniz notes that:

The argument ad hominem has this effect, that it shows that one or the other assertion is false and that the opponent is deceived whatever way he takes it. ([1765], pp. 576-577)

Leibniz thus recognizes the merits of this form of argument in the context of a discussion, as an epistemic instrument, that urges a reorganization of a system of knowledge.

According to Locke’s, the ad hominem argument relates to explicit propositions as put forth in a knowledge-acquisition dialogue and is clearly deductive and propositional.
Gnerally, ad hominem argumentation occurs in dialogue when a speaker builds a discourse, that refers not only to propositional beliefs but also to an opponent’s  behavior and actions, in order to point out a contradiction. This embarrasses the opponent, causing them to reconsider their speech, positions, or actions.
Ad hominem argumentation typically results in the feeling of “embarrassment”, which  Ekman (1999, p. 55) considers as a basic emotion. This emotion is not an accidental byproduct of ad hominem; it is inherent to the argument, as revealed by the verb “to press”, meaning “to assail, harass; afflict or oppress.” “Embarrassment” is a cognitive-emotional feeling, as is the basic argumentative emotion, “doubt.” However, ad hominem is not emotional in the same vein as personal abuse can be, S. Personal Attack.

3. Setting up the Words Against the Words

We have an ad hominem reply in the following case:

Proponent: — P. I propose P.
Opponent: — Before, you proposed entirely different things.

Issue: — Should the presidential term mandate, currently five years, be reduced to four years?
Proponent (former president): — I am in favor of reducing it to four years.
Opponent: — But in an earlier statement, when you were president yourself, you argued that five years were necessary for the proper functioning of our institutions. Please, clarify.

The quoted statement opposing the current one may come not only from what the opponent has said in the past, but also from what “his or her people” have said. “His or her people” are members of the discursive community who share the same argumentative orientations.  Such people may be members of the same party, religion or scientific trend, etc.. Such statements cannot easily be disavowed by another member.

An ad hominem reply allows the speaker to participate in the discourse as a third party, without committing himself to the substance of the debate. The speaker does not explicitly take on the role of an opponent, but rather speaks as a participant in good faith, seeking clarification.

In an accusatory context, the charge of narrative incoherence enables the accused to reject the accusatory narrative, see consistency.

Reactions to Ad Hominem Refutation of What has been Said Before

The target of the ad hominem argument may choose to sacrifice her former position, reject the contradiction, or accept it.

(i) Sacrifice the former position:

— Circumstances have changed, we must follow the times.
— I have developed my system.
— I have changed, only madmen never change their minds. Do you prefer psychorigid people?

(ii) Use a direct rebuttal. The opponent points out the contradiction: “You say both A and Z, which is inconsistent.” The force of this argument comes from the quotation mechanism. The proponent did not necessarily say A or Z but rather something else, A’ or Z’, that the opponent paraphrases, rephrases or reinterprets as A or Z.
The contradiction may therefore stem from a reworking of the speech, see straw man. The proponent can then respond directly to the letter, and reject the key ad hominem phrase “You yourself admitted” in their second turn:

— You make me out to say what I have never said. You distort my words.

In other cases, the precise relationship between A and Z—that is, the nature and degree of the inconsistency—may be debatable, see denying; opposites.

The ad hominem imputation can be directly dismissed on these two counts.

(iii) Accept the contradiction. The ad hominem reply seeks an individual who is free from contradiction. Using a classic maneuver of stasis theory, the recipient may choose to assume the very thing they have been criticized for, see stasis:

— I fully accept my inconsistencies. I love rain and good weather.

4. Setting Up the Beliefs of the Speaker Against Their Words

In the preceding case, there was direct opposition between a present claim and an earlier assertion. Consider the issue of withdrawing troops sent to intervene in Syldavia:

Q:    —Should we withdraw our forces from Syldavia?
S1:    — Yes!

However, let us suppose that S1 has admitted A, B, and C; or, at least that S2 speaks as if she sincerely believes that S1 supports these propositions:

S2: — But you said yourself that (A) the Syldavian troops are poorly trained, and (B) that the political unrest in Syldavia is likely to spread to the whole region. There is a real contagion risk. You will agree that such an extension would threaten our own security (C); and no one denies that we must intervene if our security is threatened. Therefore, you have to admit that we have to stay in Syldavia.

S1 claims that P; S2 argues ex datis, that is, from the beliefs held by S1 (or attributed to him), and concludes not-P. This is the case considered by Locke. Does this mean that S1 must admit that he has made an error, and that we shouldn’t withdraw our troops? Obviously not. S2 merely showed through his objection that one cannot support both {A, B, C} and not-P.

Reactions to the Ad Hominem Refutation of Reconstructed Beliefs

S1 can adjust and rearticulate all the key components of S2‘s discourse. For example, she could argue that A, B and C are abusive reformulations of his beliefs, or that the full analysis of the Syldavian situation is much more complex than these three assertions suggest.

If S1 accepts this reconstruction of her speech and beliefs, then she must reject one or more of these propositions. She could reject the idea that the troubles in Syldavia could extend to the entire region.
S1 is only expected only to correct, clarify or explain more thoroughly why this system of beliefs {A, B, C} cannot expand into non-P. This is precisely the point the ad hominem argument is getting at. In this context, ad hominem responses are a powerful educational tool.

5. Setting up the Prescriptions and Practices Against the Words

A contradiction can also be raised between, on the one hand, what I require of others, what I prescribe or forbid them, and, on the other hand, what I do myself, that is, the kind of example I set. It is paradoxical to ask others not to smoke, while I smoke myself. In our culture, actions are considered “to speak louder than words”, and injunctions are systematically flouted if the speaker does not comply with them:

Doctor, heal thyself!
He’s not a good marriage counselor, he’s always arguing with his wife!
You claim to teach argumentation, yet you can’t argue your own positions!!
You advocate for women’s rights, yet you never do the dishes at home.

The ad hominem game is played in several moves:

Question: Should hunting be prohibited?
S1:   — Yes, hunters kill animals for pleasure.
S2:   — But you eat meat, don’t you?

S1‘s argument can be reconstructed as, “We must prohibit hunting, hunters kill for pleasure. That’s awful!” The opponent S2  constructs an ad hominem argument:

You say that killing animals for pleasure is wrong. But you eat meat, which presupposes that animals are killed for you. You condemn the hunters but support butchers. There is a contradiction here.

In his follow-up, S1 could retort that there is a decisive difference. The hunter kills for pleasure, the butcher by necessity; and S2 can refute this refutation by arguing that eating meat is unnecessary, whereas having fun is quite necessary.

This last form of ad hominem corresponds to what Bossuet calls an a repugnantibus argument, or argument based on a contradiction: “Your conduct does not suit your speech” ([1677], p.140).

The expression “circumstantial ad hominem” refers to cases in which the speaker the notices a contradiction between the opponent’s speech and their personal circumstances, material welfare, lifestyle or personal position, see circumstances.

Defense Against Such an Accusation — The preacher of virtue, to whom it is pointed out that her practices do not support her advice, finds support in the Lockian analysis of ad hominem, which is declared inherently fallacious:

My personal circumstances have no bearing on the truth or moral validity of my preaching.

Such a person may add that they have a divided personality:

It’s true, I am a sinner, but one feels the necessity of light best from the depths of darkness.
This is natural, the cobbler’s children go barefoot.

Nevertheless, preachers fear this form of argumentation because they are expected to preach by example as well as by words and exempla

The real impact of an ad hominem argument is not on the truth of the claim, but on the of the person making the claim to do so. The next reply may be

“What you say is probably true and right, but you say everything and its opposite, so I do not want to hear it from you.”
“That’s true, but it’s not your place to say so, since you’ve said the opposite”.

6. Setting up Facts Against Words:  see Irony

7. Argumentation Upon the Beliefs of the Partner

While ad hominem arguments t target inconsistencies in an opponent’s discourse, arguments based on an opponent’s or audience’s beliefs are a positive form of exploitation of the partner’s belief system, considered as a coherent whole, see ex datis; ex concessis.

AD – arguments
e. g. “Ad hominem arg.”

Some argument schemes are designated by Latin labels, see a/ab —; ad —; ex —. This entry lists the labels using the Latin preposition ad. In Classical Latin, the preposition ad is used with the accusative case and introduces a goal complement. The phrase “argument ad hominem” reads “argument addressing the person”.
According to Hamblin, the oldest agument scheme in this grouping is ad hominem argument which appears in the Latin translations of Aristotle. This naming method was popularized by Locke ([1690]) and by Bentham ([1824]). Most of these terms seem to be creations of the nineteenth or twentieth century (Hamblin 1970, p. 41; pp. 161-162).

1. A list of “ad + N” arguments

2. Characteristics of the “ad + N” family

2.1 A productive pattern

There are many more “ad +N” arguments than there are “a / ab + N” arguments. Only the “ad +N” construction is still productive; the pattern is popular and mocked (ad bananum argument).

2.2 Origin of the labels

Some of these names were defined and used by Locke and Bentham, S. Collections 3.

Locke has defined the arguments:

Bentham defined the following arguments:

2.3 Semantic subsets of “ad + N” arguments

These arguments refer to very different strategies. Nonetheless, some groupings can be proposed according to their semantic content.

(i) Arguments related to affects and emotions, often via positive incentives (rewards) or negative conssequences (threats):

(ii) Arguments involving a subjective system of beliefs:

Categories (i) and (ii) list arguments that are often considered as misleading, because they express the speaker’s subjectivity. In other words, they are related to the ethotic and pathemic components.

(iii) Arguments dealing with the substance of the issue (contrasting with the subjective series (i) and (ii))

Fallacy of ACCENT ► AMBIGUITY

ACCIDENT

1. Accident and Fallacy of Accident

In the context of fallacy analysis, the term accident does not have its ordinary meaning of “crash » or « mishap » (Linguee)
Accident is taken in its philosophical meaning, which contrasts accident with essence. A being is characterized by a set of essential features that determine its place in a scientific classification. Its generic features express its genus and its specific difference indicates its species.
Unlike “is a mammal”, which is always true of all dogs, the truth of the accidental predicate “is tired” depends on the circumstances, it may be true of a dog at a given time but it becomes false as soon as the dog’s condition changes.

The fallacy of accident is the first on Aristotle’s list of fallacies independent of discourse, see Ffallacies 2: Aristotle’s foundational list.
The idea is that a valid syllogistic inference develops within the same category (domain), for example, the class of animals: “Socrates is a man, man is a mammal, so Socrates is a mammal. »
The following fallacious inference develops from an accident « Socrates is white, white is a color, so Socrates is a color« .

The fallacy of accident occurs when an accidental characteristic of a being is mistaken for an essential one. In a definition, the corresponding defect is defining a being by a feature that belongs to it only accidentally.
For example, “wanders off in the middle of the road” is a relevant definite description, that allows for an unambiguous reference to a dog, but is not a defining feature of « dog”.
Similarly, from an essentialist point of view, “is a good time for having a nap” is not a defining feature of “afternoon”, see two-term reasoning.

2. The Ad Accidens Counter-Argument

Charging someone with committing the dialectical fallacy of accident is possible only if the accuser can refer to a solid and stabilized categorization, corresponding to a set of essentialist definitions, see definition 1. In ordinary speech, accusing someone of committing a fallacy of accident is just a counterargument, which opens a stasis of definition and can be defeated itself.
The ethical value of a profession is evaluated based on an examination of the moral worth of its values and practices. In a classical democratic regime, a politician can be either honest or dishonest without ever ceasing to be a politician. Dishonesty is not a prerequisite for becoming a politician; it is an accidental feature. “He is an honest politician” is not an oxymoron, “He is a dishonest politician” is not necessarily true. For those who share this view of things and people, characterizing political activity as an intrinsically dishonest activity, is committing the fallacy of accident. The person blamed for committing the fallacy might retort that his argument is based on an inductive generalization, from “a number of politicians we all know very well”, or on the actual structural condition of our political system, not on any transcendental organization of things.

The argument from the opposites plays with the « essential vs. accidental » character of the differences between two categories of beings, “boys can go out at night, so girls should not, well, you know, girls are different from boys”. This argument is refuted by demoting the difference from essential to accidental. The same strategy applies to the distinction between a fact’s definition, and its circumstantial, contextual characteristics.

Dissociated from the strict Aristotelian ontology, the “essence vs. accident” opposition corresponds to the distinction between central traits and peripheral traits, and, in everyday life, to the distinction between important and the incidental traits.
In the absence of backing by an accepted ontology, the so-called fallacy of accident functions as a refutation that argues from the incidental nature of an element, and finally corresponds to a strategy of minimizing the disputed character.