Archives de l’auteur : Christian Plantin

Refutation by facts-e

PROOF BY FACT,
BELIEFS AGAINST FACT

A statement about a concrete fact is refuted by the observation that it is contradicted by reality: “Pierre (is French, so he) has red hair ” is refuted as soon as you observe that Pierre has brown hair. The affirmation of a general fact “all Syldavians have red hair” is falsified by a simple counterexample, “this Syldavian has brown hair”.
But the effect of facts on beliefs is much less clear than these examples suggest. The “web of beliefs » and the “web of facts » function as parallel networks. An embarrassing fact can be dealt with by declaring the fact to be marginal or misobserved. It can also be admitted and marginalized as an imperfection in the web’s meshes.

1. Falsifying a Statement of an Empirical Fact
by Showing that its Opposite is True

A statement of fact can be made as a report of directly observable evidence or as the conclusion of an argument: « You are very flushed, you feel tired, you probably have a fever. » Every argument contains such statements all of which can be contradicted and refuted.
In philosophy, « an atomic fact is the simplest kind of fact, and consists in the possession of a quality by some specific, individual thing » (SEP, Logical Atomism). An elementary proposition reports such an elementary fact.
In natural language we can assume that the elementary proposition ascribes to a being a property that is empirically evident and therefore empirically refutable.

The assertion of a concrete fact is refuted by the observation that it is contradicted by reality: “You say this, but I observe that”. This is an application of the principle of non-contradiction; the rule of opposites states that two terms that are opposites cannot both be true of the same subject.

Statement: Pierre has brown hair
Observation: Pierre has red hair
Application of the Rule of Opposites: “black” and “red” are opposites; they can be simultaneously false, but they cannot be simultaneously true. The statement Pierre has black hair is disproved.

The alleged fact and the established fact must belong to the same class of opposites: one does not disprove “Mary has a cat” by stating, on the basis of an observation, that “Mary has a rabbit”.

The same procedure works for other forms of opposition:
— Contradictory statements. In the sexual regime of  the19th century one refutes « Marie is a woman » by observing that Marie is a man. The opposition is refuted by establishing that the contradictory proposition is true.
— Terms in the relationship of possession/deprivation. I am accused of tearing off someone’s ear in anger. I ask him to come to court to show that he actually has both ears.

The verified presence of an opposite makes it possible to eliminate all the other concepts of the family of opposites to which it belongs. This argument has immense scope, it constitutes the standard refutation system for false statements concerning  judgments of elementary facts.

The assertion of a generic concrete fact, “all Syldavians have red hair” is refuted by the counterexample, by finding a Syldavian with black hair. This generic refutation is in principle much easier than refuting a claim about a singular case: any black-haired Syldave will do in the first case, while the singular claim requires concrete knowledge of the being mentioned.

Resistance to refutation by facts — Resistance to factual refutation by facts is first achieved first by maintaining the original factual assertion, « to me he has red hair. »  Then it is accepted that there is a blurred area between brown and red.

3. The Impact of Facts on Theories and Beliefs

Facts can be deconstructed and reconstructed to fit theories, and conversely, theories can be revised to fit facts.

3.1 Saving the theory

But, at least in the field of the human sciences, the opposite observation that the opposite is actually true, is less conclusive than it seems. The theory asserts, directly or indirectly, that P. However, common sense and linguistic intuition are more likely to notice Q, which contradicts P. There are several ways out of the dilemma.

Reject the theory, but this is a costly and painful solution.

Downplay the inconvenient fact, by contrasting it with the mass of facts that confirm the theory, or that the theory satisfactorily explains or coordinates.

— Put the inconvenient fact on hold until it can be integrated into the theory.

Allow for exceptions, and move from universality to generality. In classical logic, you cannot argue that “all swans are white” and concede that this particular swan is black. The quantifier all indicates that the proposition is universal, and the existence of a black swan conclusively disproves the universality of the proposition; you must then abandon universality for generality, which allows for exceptions, see reasoning by default.

— Reform intuition, and decide that the theory is brilliant, precisely because it makes us see things “differently”, in a richer and deeper way, and that in fact P is a kind of deep structure of the elementary intuition expressed by Q. In other words, one can resist refutation by choosing to reform the internal hypotheses (the theory) or the external hypotheses (what counts as a fact).

3.2 Belief Resists the Facts Against it

Predictive discourse is in principle subject to the control of facts: someone predicts that a certain event will, or must, take place, but when the time comes, everyone can see that nothing happens. The end of the world is predicted for next Wednesday, but Wednesday comes, the world goes on, and the prophet postpones the fulfillment of his prophecy.

Facts do not penetrate the world in which our beliefs live

The “worship” that Mr. Vinteuil devotes to his daughter despite her scandalous behavior inspires the following lesson in Proust.

Facts do not penetrate the world in which our beliefs live; they did not give rise to these beliefs, nor do they destroy them; they can inflict the most constant denials on them without weakening them, and an avalanche of misfortunes or illnesses following one another without interruption in a family will not make it doubt the goodness of its God or the talent of its doctor. But when Mr. Vinteuil thought of his daughter or himself from the point of view of the world, from the point of view of their reputation, when he tried to place himself in the rank they occupied in the general esteem, then he made this judgment of a social nature exactly as the inhabitant of Combray who was most hostile to him would have done, he saw himself with his daughter in the lowest depths. (Marcel Proust, Swann’s Way, 1913[1])

The first sentence of this passage is the most often quoted. It is followed by a but that suggests passage suggests that things go beyond than simple repression or suppression. “The facts” do not change Vinteuil’s love for his daughter, but he « sees himself with his daughter in the lowest depths. » The facts remain there, under the ‘I know, but still’ rule.

Persuasion can resist the basic facts that oppose to it.

If the claim put forward corresponds to an experimental result, it is refuted by repeating the experiment, only to find that what actually happens has nothing to do with what was said, or that the experiment, as described, does not work.

But it is not enough that it works irrefutably in order to be accepted, as the case of Ignaz Semmelweis (1818-1865), “the inventor of handwashing” proves.

In the 19th century, women often died of childbed fever. The Central Hospital of Vienna had two maternity wards, and it was found that women died much more in one than in the other, 11.4% for Ward #1 compared to 2.7% for Ward #2, for the year 1846. This difference was explained by the hypothesis of a psychological shock suffered by the women in Ward #1; the priests who attended to the women at the time of their death had to cross the entire ward, where the mortality rate was particularly high, whereas in the other ward, they could go directly to the bedside of the dying women, without being noticed. Semmelweis, a pysician at this hospital, tested this hypothesis by asking the priests to stop going through that ward to get to the bedside of the dying; the mortality differential remained the same.

He observed that Ward #1 was used for the training of medical students, who performed dissections in the morning before caring for women in the maternity ward. Ward #2 was used for the training of midwives, who did not participate in the dissection sessions. Semmelweis noticed that his fingers had a strange odor after these dissections; so, he washed his hands in a solution that we would call disinfectant, and asked each of the students to do the same. Results: In April 1847, in Ward #1, 20% of the women died of childbed fever. Beginning in May, after handwashing was introduced, the mortality rate in the same ward dropped to about 1%.

This fact has a persuasive power that one might think is irresistible. But facts are one thing and beliefs are another. How can we accept that the hands of doctors who bring life can also bring death? Twenty years later, some of Semmelweis’s colleagues still attributed the mortality of women after childbirth to a psychological shock due to their special sensitivity.

Powerless proof: The wolf and the lamb

La Fontaine’s fable The Wolf and the Lamb (Fables, i, X) illustrates is about the persuasive power of facts, and argues that proof is powerless when vital needs are at stake.

The reason of the strongest is always the best:
We will show you right now.

Situation:

A lamb was quenching its thirst
in the course of a pure brook.
A wolf came along, hungry and looking for adventure,
attracted by the hunger in those places.

The interaction begins with a violent reproach, as humans usually do to their future victims:

“Who makes you so bold as to disturb my drink?”
Says the animal full of rage:
“You will be punished for your temerity.”

The offense is presupposed (you disturb my drink). The request for an explanation of the motives ([what is it] that makes you so bold?) seems to leave the lamb a possibility of justification, but it is immediately followed by the condemnation (you will be punished for your temerity). This speech is mysterious: why does the wolf speak? He could simply take advantage of the food he was seeking and which he finally found; he could eat the lamb just as the lamb drinks the water. The lamb responds with an observation of obvious fact :

« Sire, replies the lamb, may Your Majesty
not be angry;
But rather that she consider
That I am quenching my thirst
In the stream,
More than twenty paces below Her,
And that consequently, in no way,
Can I disturb Her drink. »

The conclusion is rigorous, since the laws of physics say that the stream never returns to its source. But “conclusive” does not mean “impossible to contradict. The wolf repeats his first accusation and adds a second:

« You disturb it, said the cruel beast,
And I know that you spoke ill of me last year. »

The lamb denied this second accusation, then a third, still more conclusively:

« How could I have done so if I had not been born?
I still suckle my mother, replies the lamb. »
« If it is not you, then it is your brother. »
« I have no brother. »

But the final attack is irrefutable, leaving the defense no room to respond:

« Then it must be one of your own kind:
For you hardly spare me,
You, your shepherds, and your dogs.
I’ve been told so: I must have my revenge. »

And we conclude that good reasons do not determine the course of history:

Thereupon, deep in the forests
The wolf carries him off, and eats him,
Without further ado.

Truth and Power

The previous examples may seem depressing. Truth has enemies and needs interpreters.

[1] Marcel Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, T. 1. Paris, France Loisirs, p. 226.

Strength

STRENGTH

The words strength and force are used with three different meanings:

— Argument from or by force, argument from strength, see threat -promise
Force or strength of circumstances, see weight of circumstances
— Force or strength of an argument, this entry.

The graded concept of strength of an argument contrasts with the binary notion of valid or invalid argumentation. An argument is strong (or weak) either by itself or in relation to another argument.
This strength is evaluated according to several criteria.

Strength as validity
In a scientific field, to be strong an argument must first of all be valid. That is, it must be developed according to a method that is accepted in this field.
However, an argument can be valid and not so strong, but really relevant and interesting for the discussion a hypothesis.

In philosophy
From a philosophical point of view, one might consider that some argument schemes are inherently stronger than others. The strength of an argument is thus determined on the basis of ontology. An adept of moral realism will think that an argument based on the nature and definition of things is stronger than a pragmatic argument; a practical mind will think the opposite.
The New Rhetoric defines the strength of the argument according to the quality and universality of the audiences that accept it, see persuade – convince.

Strength as effectiveness
With respect to a goal such as persuasion, the strongest argument will be the most efficient, the argument that most quickly achieves the arguer’s goal, whether it is selling a product or electing a president. A degree of strength can be assigned to an argument based on a study on the target audience, see persuasion.

Subjective attribution of relative strength
In linguistic, wo arguments that lead to the same conclusion belong to the same argumentative class. Both provide some support for that conclusion; they share the same orientation. Within the same argumentative class, the strength of an argument may be determined by some objective gradation, such as the temperature scale, or it may simply be assigned to the argument by the speaker, who values such an argument over another. This hierarchization is marked by the means of argumentative morphemes (e.g., even) and realizing or de-realizing modifiers.
The resulting arrangements of the arguments on an argumentative scale are governed by the laws of discourse.


 

ATC White horse Discourse

ATC

White Horse Discourse Two versions

Two translations of Gongsun Long White Horse discourse
— Chinese Text Project (CTP) translation = White HorseCTP
— Forke translation = White HorseFORKE

White horse discourseCTP

1[A]: Can it be that a white horse is not a horse?
2[B]: It can.

3[A]: How so?
4[B]: « Horse » is how the shape is named; « white » is how the color is named. That which names color does not name shape. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

5[A]: Having a white horse cannot be said to be having no horses. Is not that which cannot be said to be having no horses a horse? Having a white horse is having a horse; how can a white one not be a horse?

6[B]: Requesting a horse, a brown or a black horse may arrive; requesting a white horse, a brown or a black horse will not arrive. By making a white horse the same as a horse, what is requested [in these two cases] is the same. If what is requested is the same, then a white horse is no different to a horse; if what is requested is no different, then how is it that in one case brown and black horses are acceptable, and in the other they are not? Acceptable and unacceptable are clearly in opposition to each other. Thus brown and black horses are also one in that one can reply that there is a horse, yet one cannot reply that there is a white horse. It is clear indeed that a white horse is not a horse.

7[A]: If a horse with color is not a horse, then since there are no colorless horses in the world, can it be that there are no horses in the world?

8[B]: A horse necessarily has color; thus there are white horses. If one makes horses have no color, then there are merely horses – how can one pick out a white horse? Thus that which is white is not a horse. A white horse is horse and white, horse and white horse. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».

9[A]: A horse not yet with white is a horse, and white not yet with a horse is white. Combining horse with white, it is together named a « white horse ». This is to use an uncombined name for a combined thing, and is inadmissible. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse » is inadmissible.

10[B]: Taking their being white horses as there being horses, as calling there being white horses there being brown horses – is this admissible?

11[A]: No.

12[B]: Taking their being horses as different to there being brown horses, is to take brown horses as different to horses. Taking brown horses to be different to horses, is to take it that brown horses are not horses. To take brown horses as not horses, and yet take white horses as being horses, is to have the flying in a pond and the inner and outer coffins in different places: a contradictory claim and misuse of statements as there is under heaven!

13[A]: Having white horses cannot be called having no horses, this is what is meant by the separation of white. Not separating it, having white horses cannot be said to be having horses. Thus the reason why it is taken as having horses, is merely that « horses » are taken as « having horses », and « having white horses » is not « having horses ». Thus on your taking it as having horses, one cannot call a horse a horse.

14[B]: White does not fix what is white, this can be put aside. « White horse » speaks of white fixing what is white. That which fixes what is white is not white. « Horse » does not pick or exclude color, thus a brown or black horse can be brought. « White horse » does pick or exclude color; brown and black horses are excluded by color, thus only a white horse can be brought. That which does not exclude is not that which does exclude. Thus I say: « a white horse is not a horse ».


White HorseFORKE

1— Is it possible that a white horse is no horse
— Yes.

3 How ?
4 A horse denotes a shape, white a colour. Describing a colour one does not describe a shape, therefore I say that a white horse is no horse.

5. There being a white horse, one cannot say that there is no horse. If one cannot say that there is no horse, can the existence of the horse be denied?There being a white horse, one must admit that there is a horse; how can whiteness bring about the non-existence of a horse ?

6. When a horse is required, yellow and black ones can all be brought, but when a white horse is wanted, there is no room for yellow and black ones. Now let a white horse be a horse ! It is but one kind of hose required. Then, one of those required, a white horse would not be different from a horse. Those required do not differ. Would then yellow and black ones meet the requirement or not ? In so far as they would meet the requirement or not, they would evidently exclude each other. Yellow as well as black horses are each one kind ; they correspond to a call for a horse, but not to a call for a white horse. Hence it results that a white horse cannot be a horse.

7. — A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth ! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth?

8 A horse having colour is considered no horse. But there are no colourless horses on earth! Are there, therefore, no horses on earth?
9.
Horses of course have colour, therefore there are white horses. If horses had no colour there would be merely horses. But how can we single out white horses, for whiteness is no horse? A white horse is a horse and whiteness. Such being the case, I hold that a white horse is no horse’.

ATC  White Horse at the Frontier

ATC  A  DIALECTICIAN AT THE FRONTIER

Kung-sun Lung’s paradoxical claim:

Kung-sun Lung was a dialectician who lived at the time of the Six Kingdoms. He wrote a treatise on “Hard and White” and, to illustrate his theory, said that a white horse is not a horse. To show that a white horse is not a horse, he said that « white » is that by which one names the color and horse that by which one names the form. The color is not the form, and the form is not the color.
Huan T’anPokora  “New Treatise”. Fragment 135A, p. 124.

Does it work?

Kung-sun Lung often argued that “a white horse is not a horse”. People could not agree with this. Later, when riding a white horse, he wished to pass through the frontier pass without a warrant or a passport. But the frontier official would not accept his explanations, for it is hard for empty words to defeat reality.
Huan T’anPokora Ibid.. Fragment 135B, p. 124.

That kind of argument is all the fashion these days:

There are now people who doubt everything. They say that the oyster is not a bivalve, that two time five is not ten.
Huan T’anPokora Ibid.. Fragment 135B, p. 124.

Huan T’an (43 B.C. – 28 A.D.). Sin-Lun, “New Treatise” and Other Writings.
An Annotated Translation with Index by Timoteus Pokora. Ann Arbor Center for Chinese Studies. The University of Michigan, 1975.

ATC Irony

ATC

IRONY

Ba Jin 1904-2005.  Jia, « Family », 1933.

Two days later […] the revision of the articles for the next issue of the magazine took place. The youngest attended as usual. When he arrived, Such as smile read aloud a police proclamation forbidding women to wear their hair short. The young man was already familiar with it; it was said to be the work of a blossoming talent (1) of the ancient dynasty. The content, simplistic, and even the form, not very correct, aroused the gaiety of all the listeners at each sentence.
— This is really making fun of people! What does he mean? exclaimed Such as smile, while throwing the sheet on the ground.
— We could publish this masterpiece in the next issue under the heading « Let’s laugh a bit », proposed Reserve of benevolence.
— Bravo! applauded the girl.
All approved. Such as grace added that it would be good to attach a scathing refutation.

(1) Official title of the ancient dynasties, generally translated by the term: bachelor.

Translation from the French, Pa Kin, Famille. Translated in French from Chinese by Li Tche-houa and Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979. Chap. 29. 


In French: Pa Kin, Famille. Traduit du chinois par Li Tche-houa et Jacqueline Alezaïs. Paris, Flammarion, 1979. Chap. 29.

Le surlendemain […eut lieu la révision des articles pour le n°8. Le cadet y assista comme d’habitude. Á son arrivée, Telle que Sourire lisait à haute voix une proclamation de la police interdisant aux femmes de porter les cheveux courts. Le jeune homme la connaissait déjà; elle était, disait-on, l’œuvre d’un talent en fleur (1) de l’ancienne dynastie. Le fond, simpliste, et la forme même, peu correcte, suscitaient à chaque phrase la gaieté de tous les auditeurs.
— C’est vraiment se moquer des gens! Que veut-il dire? s’écria Telle que sourire en jetant la feuille à terre.
— On pourrait publier ce chef-d’œuvre dans le prochain numéro sous la rubrique « Histoire de rire”, proposa Réserve de bienveillance.
— Bravo ! applaudit la jeune fille.
Tous approuvèrent. Telle que grâce ajouta qu’il serait bon de joindre une réfutation cinglante.

(1) Titre officiel des anciennes dynasties, traduit généralement par le terme : bachelier.

ATC Difficulties in the way of persuasion

ATC

Difficulties in persuasion

1. Falling out of favor: The Reversal of Discourse Orientation

Han Fei TseLiao
Therefore, if you talk about great men to him, he thinks you are intimating his defects. If you talk about small men to him, he thinks you are showing off your superiority. If you discuss an object of his love, he thinks you are expecting a special favor from him. If you discuss an object of his hate, he thinks you are testing his temper. If you simplify your discussion, he thinks you are unwise and will spurn you. If your discussion is lucidly wayward and extensively refined, he thinks you are superficial and flippant. If you omit details and present generalizations only, he thinks you are cowardly and incomplete. If you trace the principles of facts and use wide illustrations, he thinks you are rustic and arrogant. These are difficulties in the way of persuasion, which every persuader should know.

Han Fei TseLiao Ch. XII Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion, p. 78-79

 

In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State, « whoever in secret rides in the Ruler’s coach shall have his feet cut off. » Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia’s mother fell ill. Somebody, hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night. Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler’s order rode in the Ruler’s coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded his act as worthy, saying: « How dutiful he is! For his mother’s sake he even forgot that he was committing a crime making him liable to lose his feet. » Another day, when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: « You love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach. »

When the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler’s love for him slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the Ruler said: « This fellow once rode in my coach under pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten peach. » The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and later found guilty because his master’s love turned into hate.

Id., p. 80.

 

 … et dangereux
Le monarque stupide peut mettre à mort son  conseiller; « tranformé en hachis, il marine dans la saumure ».

En effet, pour juste que soit votre jugement, pour sensés que soient vos arguments, seront-ils pour autant entendus ? Et ne peut-on craindre d’être au mieux calomnié et mis à mort?
Wou Tse Hsiu eut la tête tranchée malgré son astuce, l’éloquence de Confucius ne lui évita pas d’être assiégé à K’ouang . […] Était-ce parce que ces personnages manquaient de vertu ? Nullement, mais leurs maîtres n’étaient pas des monarques éclairés.

Le marquis de Yi fut rôti, celui de Kouei salé et séché ; le prince Pi-kan eut le cœur arraché ; Mei Po transformé en hachis, marina dans la saumure ; Kouan Yi-wou fut emprisonné, Tchao Ki dut s’enfuit à Tch’en, Po-li tse mendia sur les chemins

Correlative terms-e2

CORRELATIVE TERMS

Correlative terms are also called relative or reciprocal terms, and can be thought of as opposite terms. Mother and child are correlative terms, that is, they are related by immediate inference:

If A is the mother of B, then B is the child of A.

Correlative terms are defined by reference to each other; mother is defined as « woman with children »; child is defined as « son or daughter of a woman ». The following are correlative terms:

cause / effect; double / half; master / slave
action / passion; sell / buy

Generally speaking, two predicates R1 and R2 are in a correlative relation if

A_R1_B <=> B_R2_A
A_Mother_B <=> B_Child_A

« By definition, correlatives are opposites »; they are « ontologically simultaneous » (Hamelin [1905], p. 133). The theme of the correlative is #3 on Aristotle’s list:

Another line of proof is based on correlative ideas (Rhet, II, 23, 3; RR, p. 357).

The topos is illustrated by the enthymemes:

Where it is right to command obedience, it must have been right to obey the command.

If it is no shame for you to sell it, it is no shame for us to buy it (ibid.).

.These conclusions have limits:

If it is legal/tolerated to buy 2 grams of marijuana, then one may sell 2 grams of marijuana.

But what about « possession » and « purchase »?

If it is legal/tolerated to possess 2 grams of marijuana,
then it is legal/tolerated to buy 2g,
then it is legal/tolerated to sell it.

Since the only way for me to get marijuana is to buy it. But the law can distinguish between two kinds of « possession »: possession for personal use is not a crime, but possession for trafficking is.

The following case deals with two pairs of correlatives, knowing/learning and ordering / obeying, articulated by the topos of opposites:

If you want to command, you must first learn to obey (see supra).
The executive, on his way up, had to learn to obey in order to know how to command (quoted in Linguee).

ATC Do you think Yan should be attacked ?

ATC  Do you think Yan should be attacked?
Who should attack Yan?

Mencius, “If he had asked me, ‘Who should attack Yan?’”

2B.8 Shen Tong asked Mencius in private confidence, Do you think Yan ought to be attacked?”

Mencius said, “Yes. Zikuai had no authority to give Yan away, and Zizhi had no authority to receive it from Zikuai. Let’s say there was a gentleman here whom you liked; what if you, without consulting the King, privately granted to him your court rank and salary, and he accepted them without any commission from the King? What difference is there in the case of Yan?”

The armies of Qi attacked Yan, and someone said to Mencius, “Is it true that you urged Qi to attack Yan?”

Never!” said Mencius. “Shen Tong asked whether Yan ought to be attacked and I said yes, in response to his question. Then they went off and attacked Yan! If he had asked me, Who should attack Yan? I would have replied, ‘He who acts as the agent of Tian should attack Yan.’

“Let’s say there were a murderer here, and someone asked, ‘Should this man be executed?’ I would say yes. If he asked, ‘Who should execute him?’ I would reply, ‘The Chief Judge should execute him.’

“As it is, this is simply one Yan attacking another Yan. Why would I ever urge such a thing?”

2B.8 We return here to events surrounding Qi’s invasion of Yan in 314 (see 1B.10-11). Mencius is reported in a different early text to have given his approval of the invasion of Yan by Qi, and here the Mencius seems at pains to explain that this is not so. Note how it is specified that the courtier Shen Tong visited Mencius in an unofficial capacity.

The background events in Yan are that the ruler, Zikuai, abdicated to his minister, Zizhi, prompting Zikuai’s son – the original heir to the throne – to initiate a civil war.


Deux questions

Stase sur l’acte : Question1:  — Y a-t-il eu meurtre? OUI
[— le meurtrier doit être puni = exécuté]

Stase sur l’agent Question2:  — Qui doit prendre en charge l’exécution?


Dictionnaire, Composition et division

L’exemple suivant est emprunté au drame de Sophocle Électre : Clytemnestre tue son mari, Agamemnon. Oreste, leur fils, tue Clytemnestre pour venger son père. Mais avait-il le droit légal et moral de tuer sa mère ?

Il est juste que celle qui a tué son mari meure, et il est juste aussi, assurément que le fils venge son père ; ces deux actions ont donc été accomplies justement ; mais peut-être que, réunies, elles cessent d’être justes. (Rhét., II, 24,1401a35-b5 ; p. 407).

Réunir les deux actions signifie qu’elles n’en font plus qu’une. Oreste soutient que cette composition est licite :

Composition : X est juste et Y est juste => X et Y sont justes
(X) “venger son père” est juste et “ (Y) exécuter la femme qui a tué son mari” est juste

Or si “venger son père” est juste, “tuer sa mère” est un crime. Pour les accusateurs d’Oreste, le fait qu’il soit le fils de Clytemnestre bloque la composition, car il n’est pas possible de composer une action vertueuse et une action criminelle. La stase dramatique se noue autour de l’argument de la composition.

Cette technique de décomposition d’une action douteuse en une suite d’actes louables, ou au moins innocents est argumentativement très productive : voler, ce n’est jamais que prendre le sac qui se trouve là, le déplacer ailleurs et négliger de le remettre à la même place. La division bloque l’évaluation globale.


 

What Is Shun's Awful Family Doing in the Mencius?

Warp, Weft, and Way

Chinese and Comparative Philosophy 中國哲學與比較哲學

Take 2B/8 as an example. In Qi, Shen Tong asks Mencius whether Yan should be invaded, and he says it should. The text insists that Shen wasn’t acting in an official capacity, but of course it only does that because it’s obvious that Mencius’s answer will be passed on. Indeed, Qi invades Yan and the invasion is a brutal mess. Questioned about this, Mencius insists that he only said that Yan should be invaded, he didn’t say anything about who should do the invading. (Imagine—of course I mean remember—someone in early 2003 saying that Iraq should be invaded, and then after the fact complaining that George Bush hadn’t been the one to do it.)

2B/8 isn’t in the Mencius because of any philosophical point it makes. Even the passages where the Mencius uses the invasion of Yan to present the Mencian fantasy of a true king (whose armies are welcomed with rice and wine wherever they invade) aren’t there just to present that view (1B/11). Mencius’s involvement in the invasion of Yan left him with an image problem, and these passages are attempts to address that problem. Mencius still comes off as a coward and a liar, but I guess that’s better than leaving the criticisms unanswered.

My suggestion is that the stories about Shun’s awful family, or at least 5A/2–3, are there for the same sort of reason. There was a mythology surrounding Shun, and that mythology was not under the control of pious moralists such as the authors of the Mencius. As a consequence, elements creeped into the mythology that would make pious moralists extremely nervous—elements such as Shun’s predilection for putting up with murderers in his family

ATC Pragmatic Argument

ATC

PRAGMATIC ARGUMENT

« Profit, moreover, does not fall from Heaven,
nor does it spring forth from the Earth. »

The following text is an extract from Discourses on Salt and Iron, a compilation of a debate held at the imperial court in 81bce, by Huan K’uan, translated by Esson M. Gale. [1] China had been unified a century and a half earlier by Emperor Qín Shǐhuáng, who was overthrown by the First Han Dynasty in 206bce.
In the debate, the Lord Grand Secretary is pitted against a group of sixty Confucian scholars on ssues of ieconomic and social policy  issues, with the focus being on the Grand Secretary’s policy of establishing state monopolies on salt and iron.
The dispute took place in the presence of the emperor.

1. The Lord Grand Secretary speaks first

a. The Lord Grand Secretary: Formerly when the Lord of Shang was Chancellor of Ch’in he pursued in internal affairs the policy of putting the laws and regulations on a firm basis, of making punishments and penalties harsh and severe, and of ordering government and education. In this no mercy was shown to the criminals and the cheats. In his external policy he managed to obtain profits of a hundred fold and collected taxes on mountains and
marshes. The state became rich, the people, strong; weapons and implements were kept ready, complete in every detail, and grain-stores had a surplus.

b. As a result of these measures he was able to wage war on enemy countries, to conquer foreign states, to annex new lands, and to extend wide his territories, without overtaxing the people for the support of the army. Thus he could draw constantly upon the resources of the people and the people would not even notice it; he could extend the territory of Ch’in to include all west of the Yellow River and the people bore no hardships on this account.

c. The profits derived from the salt and iron monopolies serve to relieve the needs of the people in emergencies and to provide sufficient funds for the upkeep of military forces. These measures emphasize conservation and storing up in order to provide for times of scarcity and want. The beneficiaries are many; the State profits thereby and no harm is caused to the masses. Where are those hardships of the common people which cause you so much worry?

The Grand Secretary uses a pragmatic argument based on the positive consequences.
As a determinant of action, the pragmatic argument is a universal anthropological principle that is integral to human activity. We sow in order to reap, and we reap in order to eat. If an action will have positive consequences, then we should perform it; if the consequences of an action are beneficial, then this action was right, and we are justiifed in pursuing it.
In §a The Grand Secretary first recalls the harsh policies inaugurated by Shang Yang (c.390–338bce), a former minister of the State of Ch’in. He claims that this policy was successful in both internal affairs (§a, profit of  a hundredfold) and external affairs (§b, extension of the territory), and presents himself as his continuator.
In §c, the Grand Secretary claims that the salt and iron policy he has initiated is beneficial to the state and neutral for the people (it does not harm the masses).

The floor is now with the literati.

The literati utterly reject the positive consequences alluded to by the Grand Secretary, at the point of implicitly accusing him of lying.

d. The Literati: At the time of Wên Ti was there not no profit from salt and iron and was not the nation prosperous? Now we have this system and the people are in dire circumstances. We fail yet to see how profitabe is this « profit » [of which you speak], but we see clearly the harm it does. Profit, moreover, does not fall from Heaven, nor does it spring forth from the Earth; it is derived entirely from the people. To call it hundredfold is a mistake in judgment similar to that of the simpleton who wore his furcoat inside out while carrying wood, hoping to save the fur and not realizing that the hide was being ruined.
e. Now, an abundant crop of prunes will cause a decline for the year immediately following; the new grain ripens. at the expense of the old. For Heaven and Earth do not become full at the same time: so much more is this the case with human activities! Profit in one place involves diminution elsewhere just as yin and yang do not radiate at the same time and day and night alternate in length.
f. When Shang Yang introduced his harsh laws and increased his « profit », the people of Ch’in could not endure life and among themselves wept for Duke Hsiao. When Wu Ch’i increased the army and engaged in a series of conquests, the people of Ch’u were grievously disturbed and among themselves they shed tears for King Tao. After their death Ch’u’s position became more precarious every day, and Ch’in grew weaker and weaker. So resentment increased with the growth of « profit », and sorrows multiplied with the extension of territory. Where is all that « inexhaustible profit to use without the people noticing it, and the territory extended to include all west of the Yellow River without the people suffering from it? »
g. At the present time, as the Government uses in the management of internal affairs Shang Yang’s system of registration and abroad Wu Ch’i’s methods of war, travellers are harassed on the road and the residents are suffering from want in their homes, while old women cry bitterly and grieving maidens moan. Even if we, the Literati, try not to worry, we cannot help it.
[End of the discourse of the literati]

(§d) — The literatis first argument is that are alternative policies to those enacted by the Grand Secretary. At the time of Wên Ti, was there not no profit from salt and iron and was not the nation prosperous?  (§d).
— Introduction of the literati leitmotif: « People are in dire circumstances; »
The literati explicitly and utterly reject the positive consequences claimed by the Grand Secretary, thereby implicitly accusing him of lying.
The Confucians claim that profit cannot be neutral. ‘Profit does not fall from Heaven’ (§d), meaning painless spontaneous and autonomous generation of profit does not exist.
– Speaking of hundredfold profit (§d) is a gross and ridiculous mistake, similar to that of a simpleton (§d).

(§e) Moreover, the Grand Secretary’s pretensions  go against the basic law of nature. According to the Confucian literati « profit in one place involves diminution elsewhere, just as yin and yang do not radiate at the same time » (§e). Thus, profit and pain are a zero-sum game.  Remember that, carried away by his eloquence, the Grand Secretary, assumes that it is possible to bring good into the world without bringing evil (§c).
Therefore, pragmatic argumentation is flawed  in both its practical consequences and in its very concept.
Western pragmatic argumentation assumes that the recommended action is positive overall and will improve the world, despite minor negative side effects. The literati reject this moderate position, they argue that the so-called negative side effects balance the touted main effect.

(§f) rejects the alleged positive, painless benefits attributed to Shan Yang policies.

(§g):  The same applies to the policy implemented by his follower, the Lord Grand Secretary.

The profits of some are inseparable from the losses of others. Like the natural world, the human world, functions according to a principle of balance; the good that happens here is correlated with the evil that happens elsewhere.


Huán Kuān (compiler), Discourses on Salt and Iron – A debate on  state control of commerce and Industry in Ancient China. Chapters I–XXVIII. Translated from the Chinese of HuanK’uan with introduction and notes by Esson M. Gale. Original Publishers: E.J. Brill 1934. Reprinted by  Che’ng Wen Publishing Company.

ATC Common people, true Sages, great Dialecticians, small Dialecticians and Ideal man.

ATC Dialecticians and Other Human Types
Common people, true Sages, great Dialecticians,
small Dialecticians and Ideal man.

Teng HsiFORKE
Teng Hsi Tse, I. Unkindness, § 11

(11)  […] To say that honour is not like disgrace is no correct statement, and to pretend that obtaining is not like losing no true saying. Not advancing one goes back; not enjoying one’s self, one is sad; not being present, one is absent. This is what common people always think.

The true sage changes all these ten predicates into one32.

The great dialecticians distinguish between actions in general, and embrace all the things of the world. They choose what is good, and reject what is bad. They do what must be done in the right moment, and thus become successful and virtuous.

The small dialecticians are otherwise. They distinguish between words and establish heterogeneous principles. With their words they hit each other, and crush one another by their actions. They do not let people know what is of importance. There is no other reason for this than their own shallow knowledge.

The ideal man33, on the other hand, takes all the things together and joins them, combines all the different ways and uses them. The five flavours, he discerns in his mouth, before he has tasted them. The five virtues, though residing in his body, are nevertheless extended to others. There is no certain direction which he follows. He rejects justice before the eyes. Measures to suppress disorder, he does not take. He is contented, having no desires; serene, for he takes everything easy. His devices are unfailing, his perspicacity enters into the smallest minutiae.

 

Notes Forke

Note 32 — The true sage does not care the least for honour and disgrace, obtaining or losing and all these contraries, which play such an important role in the world. To him they are all one and the same.

Note 33 — The bad dialecticians and controversialists multiply distinctions and differences, which exist but in their imagination, the great dialecticians distinguish only between some few general principles. The ideal man, i.e., the mystic does mot make any distinctions at all. He has no fixed purpose, but instinctively always hits the right and knows things, which others do not understand after long study.

 

Alfred Forke 1901.The Chinese Sophists 1901. Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXXIV, Changhai, 1901, p. 1-100.
Cité d’après Les classiques des sciences sociales, Chicoutimi, Québec, p. 58.

https://classiques.uqam.ca/classiques/forke_alfred/the_chinese_sophists/forke_sophists.pdf