The principle of non-contradiction is at the root of reasoning. Everyday argumentation could be defined as a style of conversation in which the principle of coherence applies: If you hold incompatible things in different contexts, you owe the other participants an explanation; if you hold incompatible things in the same context, you make conversation impossible, we have to stop it

Self-coherence of feelings

The following case appeals to the self-coherence of feelings (Leslie 1964):

12.10 Zizhang asked about […] discerning confusion. The Master said […] When one cherishes a person, one wishes him to live; when one hates a person, one wishes him to die – on the one hand cherishing and wishing him life, while on the other hating and wishing him death: that is confusion.
Truly, it is not a matter of riches, Indeed, it is simply about discernment. (Analects_Eno, 12) 

Interpersonal contradiction

Like self-contradiction, interpersonal contradiction demands clarification. Disagreement stimulates intellectual activity.
Confucius says that he prefers disagreement: 

The Master said, Hui is of no help to me. There is nothing in my words that fails to please him. (Analects_Eno, 11, 4)

Nonetheless, it is unpleasant for a teacher to be critically confronted with its own teaching (our presentation:

Zilu appointed Zigao to be the steward of Bi.
The Master said “You are stealing another man’s son!”
Zilu said, “There are people there; there are altars of state there – why must one first read texts and only then be considered learned?”
The Master said, “This is why I detest glib talkers!” (Analects_Eno, 11, 25)

Note Eno: Zilu seems to be invoking lessons Confucius himself taught, much like the ideas in 1.6-7, to confound Confucius himself, which is the basis of Confucius’s response.

Confucius teaches that the basic condition to be called learned can be extended to persons on the way to become a learned person

Analects_Eno, 1.7,
Zixia said: If a person treats worthy people as worthy and so alters his expression, exerts all his effort when serving his parents, exhausts himself when serving his lord, and is trustworthy in keeping his word when in the company of friends, though others may say he is not yet learned, I would call him learned.

In this last passage (1,7), Confucius characterizes a learned person by his correct behavior toward worthy people, his parents, his lord, his friends, and seems to attach only secondary importance to reading texts. In 11, 25 Zilu – a very bold disciple of Confucius –  indirectly reminds him of his former position.

Argumentation practice without argumentation theory

The following remarks are based upon A. C. Graham’s views on the Chinese way of argumentation, as presented in his Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989).  Speaking of the Moists, Graham writes (1989, p.  168).

Graham attributes to Mozi’s disciples[2],

a sense of rigorous proof [combined with] a disregard for logical forms. (1989, p. 169).

Although well aware of the difficulties of relating names to objects in the art of discourse, [the Moist] seems to see the lucid and self-evident relations between names as raising no theoretical problems. Chinese civilization never abstracted the forms in which we observe it reasoning in practice, as in this curiously familiar-sounding syllogism of Wang Ch’ung:

Man is a thing: though honored as king or noble, by nature he is no different from other things. No thing does not die, how can man be immortal? (1989, p.  168).

Wang Ch’ung uses a valid syllogism, that combines true propositions producing a sound conclusion, « Humans are beings, no being is immortal, no human is immortal.” In the unfriendly language of traditional logic, this reasoning is described as a syllogism of the fourth figure, said Galenic, and in the Camenes mode: « all H is B; no B is I; therefore no H is I. »
Wang Ch’ung presents this incontrovertible conclusion as a so-called “rhetorical » question, which is a challenge to any opponent (Toulmin, 1958: 97); this introduces a dialectical movement within syllogistic reasoning.

A little further on, Graham attributes to Mozi’s disciples “a sense of rigorous proof [combined with] a disregard for logical forms. » (1989, p. 169); “Hsün-tzu like the later Mohists has no deductive forms like( the syllogism, but does mark off deductive inference as a separate type of thinking” (id. p. 267)

How is this possible? An analogy can be drawn from language and grammar. According to specialists, the ancient Chinese had no grammar[3]; and they certainly spoke excellent Chinese. By the same token, they did not develop a logic (an art of reasoning), and they argued very well. In other words, it is not necessary to have a clear view of what is a valid and sound argument, in order to master an effective practice of such arguments. Let us admit that this conclusion can (a fortiori?) be generalized to non-syllogistic forms of argumentation: A theory of argumentation is not a prerequisite for an effective practice of argumentation. One can develop a clear idea and an effective critical argumentative practice without formalization, that is, without developing a a logical meta-language about the process of argumentation, and the correlative critical operations.

It follows that the teaching of argumentation can do without argumentation theory. Western-style theories of argumentation are not essential to the coherent articulation of ideas. Argumentation can be taught by showing and discussing paradigmatic examples of argument. Such examples can be paraphrased, denied, contradicted, generalized; their presuppositions and implications can be explored without ever leaving the level of natural discourse.

[1] Wang Chu’ng = Wang Chong, Lun Heng — Philosophical Essays, ch.24; trad. Forke V,I, 335f.  (Note Graham). Wang Chong, 27 – c. 97 AD, « developed a rational, secular, naturalistic and mechanistic view of the world and man, and gave a materialistic explanation of the origin of the universe » (Wikipedia).

[2] Mozi (c. 479 – c.392 B.C.), eponymous author of the work Mozi.

[3] « In ancient China, a few centuries before the Christian era, linguistic reflection had already begun to produce excellent results: we find important reflections on the nature of language, very elaborate dictionaries, systems of phonological description and dialectology. However, […] the analysis of grammatical structures is practically absent. Apart from an enormous production of studies on individual words or groups of words, there is almost nothing on the organic description of language » (Casacchia, 1989: 431).

Grah. p. 267:

“Hsün-tzu like the later Mohists has no deductive forms like the syllogism, but does mark off deductive inference as a separate type of thinking”

[1] Mozi (c. 479 – c.392 B.C.), eponymous author of the work Mozi.

[2] « In ancient China, a few centuries before the Christian era, linguistic reflection had already begun to produce excellent results: we find important reflections on the nature of language, very elaborate dictionaries, systems of phonological description and dialectology. However, […] the analysis of grammatical structures is practically absent. Apart from an enormous production of studies on individual words or groups of words, there is almost nothing on the organic description of language » (Casacchia, 1989: 431).

 A Paradigm Case of Analogy

Dans la présentation occidentale des schèmes d’argument comprend deux section principales, la première tourne autour du schème proprement dit, la seconde, autour d’un exemple illustrant le schème.

The following passage may be taken as a paradigmatic case of analogy:

The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. It is similar to the problem of a physician who is attending a patient. He has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? He too has to know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.
Mozi_MEI, Universal Love 4, I.

The passage is presented as one sole paragraph in the original text. The following numbering and disposition are ours:

1. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. 2. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it.

3. It is similar to the problem of a physician who is attending a patient.
4. He has to know the cause of the ailment before he can cure it. 5. 5. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it.

6. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? 7. He too has to know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. 8.Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it.

9. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.

Mozi’s demonstration  takes place in two stages, the first justifying the thesis and the second confirming that no one dares to answer it. No rebuttal is mentioned.

Positive argumentation

— Claim: (1) and (2) state the thesis

(1)        To put the government in order = O

To know the cause of the disorder = C
Proposition (1) expresses a necessary condition (NC):
For O (to put the government in order), C (to know the cause of the disorder) is necessary
Which is noted: O => C (O requires, implies C).

(2) reformulates the thesis:

(1) C is a NC of O = (2) non-C implies non-O.

— Warrant: Elucidation of the argumentation scheme, (3) announces that the thesis will be proved by an argument by analogy. Warrant: « is similar to »; implicit backing: the traditional assimilation of the « human body » to the « social body ».

— Argument
Source domain: Medicine. (4) presents a fact (as) known and admitted by all.
The structure of the argument strictly follows the structure of the thesis by substituting the doctor (who repairs the human body) for the wise man (who seeks how to repair human society).

The modes of sentence construction are identical. The presentation of the analogy as a parallel case pushes the similarity to identity.

Search for a refutation

A test of the validity of the analogy follows in the form of a rhetorical question, (5), interpreted as a challenge to a possible opponent, who is given the floor to show that the analogy is invalid. Question (5) remaining unanswered, this maneuver concludes with an argument from ignorance.

The argumentation repeats (reinforces, confirms) the essential element of the argument, the claim: (6) and (7) repeat word for word (1) and (2). This introduces into the reasoning an element of rhetorical persuasion (epikeirema) into the argumentation.

(8) repeats the thesis by replacing the expression « must know » (1) with « must investigate », the first step on the way to knowledge. To investigate and to know must not be understood in their contemporary sense.  .

Schemes and Paradigm Cases

The same idea of argumentation scheme can be understood in two equivalent ways.

– In intension, as an abstract, logico-semantic form expressing the essence of reasoning. The scheme of the opposites and the a fortiori scheme are examples of such forms.
– In extension, as the potentially very large set of passages assembled on the basis of their argumentative similarity; the set of arguments that can be paraphrased by the same formula; the set of arguments that derive from the same phrasal pattern. A functional knowledge of arguments can be based on paradigmatic examples.

Necessity of controversy

Disputation is central to the period of the Hundred Schools of Thought, which flourished during the periods known as the « Spring and Autumn » and the « Warring States, » from the 779 to 221 BC.

The Confucian philosopher Mencius (Mengzi, 372-289 BC), a disciple of Confucius, justifies his practice of disputation as a necessity if one wants to preserve the truth in times of proliferation of systems of thought, which, according to Mengzi, endanger the true,

Gongduzi said, Master, outsiders all say you are fond of disputation. What do you say to that?’

Mencius said, How could it be that I am fond of disputation? I simply have no choice. The world has existed for a long time, now in order, now in chaos. In the time of Yao, the waters ran awry and flooded the central states; eels and dragons dwelt there and the people had no security. […]

But after the deaths of Yao and Shun the Dao of the sages declined and tyrants arose one after another. They leveled homes in order to create their pleasure ponds and the people had no place to rest. They took fields out of cultivation to create their pleasure parks and the people had no way to eat. And then there arose errant teachings and patterns of violent conduct. […]

But no sage king has arisen [after Confucius]. The lords of the states act with abandon and gentlemen in retirement proclaim deviant doctrines. The words of Yang Zhu and Mo Di fill the world such that those who do not preach the doctrines of Yang Zhu preach those of Mozi. The maxim of the Yangists is ‘Each for himself,’ a world of men without rulers; the maxim of the Mohists is ‘universal love,’ a world of men without fathers. To know no father and no ruler – this is to be nothing but a beast! […] If the daos of Yang and Mo don’t cease and the Dao of Confucius is not clear to all, then deviant doctrines will deceive the people and humanity and righteousness will be blocked. To block out humanity and righteousness is to lead the beasts and devour the people, and the people will be led to eat one another.

This is why I am alarmed, and why I defend the Dao of the past sages and confront Yangists and Mohists, driving out depraved speech so that errant doctrines will no longer flourish.
(Mencius_Eno 3B.9)

In this passage, « disputation » is not used as a tool to find a common superior truth, but to eradicate the « bad doctrines » of the opponents. The outcome of the controversy is fruitless , entirely negative.

This position is very different from that of dialecticians philosophers, who enjoy paradoxes and controversy, the controversy being a way to impose their position.

Live up to your name — or rectify you name

Natural categories group beings are named according to a certain organization of their natural characteristics, based on the similarity of the object with the beings recognized as typical of the category.

Social categories are groupings of persons sharing the same type of social role. King, nobleman, were considered as natural categories, now clearly as social categories, as minister, teacher, leader are social functions. There is a dispute about man, woman, father, son… whether they should be considered as social roles or natural categories. In a famous passage of the Analects,

Live up to the name of the social category you belong to!

The  speech made by General de Gaulle on 3ay 30 1968 uses self-argued statements:

As for the legislative elections, they will take place within the period established by the Constitution, unless the whole French people are to be gagged, preventing them from speaking as they are prevented from living, by the same means that prevent students from studying, teachers from teaching and workers from working.
(Charles de Gaulle, Speech on May 30, 1968[1])

In a well-made world, “students study, teachers teach and workers work” if not, the semantic disorder argues the abnormality of beings who don’t act according to their essential principle.

This is an argument based on the name, « let the students study » that is to say « be worthy of their name ». The argument traces the social order over the natural order (Plantin 2021, Name; Derivatives). The name of the category to which the person belongs expresses the norm that governs his behavior.

These self-evident arguments are based on a license to infer according to which the derivational families are semantically consistent. The morphological similarity may obscure deep semantic differences between the root word and the derived word, which meaning may range from the conservation of the root meaning, to opposition between their connotations or argumentative orientations, to the complete independence of meanings in synchrony. By a kind of antanaclasis S. Orientation, the following exchange plays on the opposite argumentative orientations of words belonging to the same lexical family, politic:

S1 — By signing this compromise at a convenient moment, the president made a highly political decision.
S2 — We are just witnessing a new example of the President’s usual politicking

***

Or rectify your name

Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied,
« Let the ruler be ruler, the ministers ministers, the fathers fathers, the sons sons sons. » (Analects_ENO, 12.1)

We consider that « to be ruler, minister… » is to fulfill a social function while « to be father, to be son » is to fulfill a natural function. A father, a son cannot not be father, son. Confucius’ requirements seem empty, because tautological; but they are not.

The social category name is not equivalent to a set of descriptive property; it  is an imperative.

A ruler is a ruler only if he governs according to the model of exemplary Kings, such as King Wen. A bad ruler is not a ruler; he should not be called a ruler. A bad father is not a father; he should not be called a father.
A woman who does not behave according the rules of exemplary women is not a woman and should not be called woman nor considered as a woman.
By turning bad, they lose their name.

To unduly bear a name is an usurpation. When such  wrong names become current – most of the rulers, fathers, students are actually not fathers, etc, chaos prevails.

It seems that this vision extends to artefacts. A table is defined by  its place and function as defined in the ritual. In the West, we sit and eat at a table. If we dance on a table, the table is no more a table. Same for a gourd:

[1] Quoted after http://archives.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/espace-pedagogique/le-point-sur/les-textes-a-connaitre/discours-du-30-mai-1968.php (11-08-2017)

Argumentation Schemes — Means of Persuasion

Toulmin, Rieke, Janik distinguish nine forms of argumentation, «most frequently to be met with in practical situations” (1984, p. 147-155),

Analogy                                     Dilemma                             Generalization
Classification                           Sign                                        Opposites
Cause                                        Degree[1]                             Authority

[1] In the argument from degree, « The different properties of a given thing are presumed to vary in step with one another » (id., p. 155).

Levi (1992) considers that the essential rhetorical means of persuasion used in Chinese are

Metaphor                                    Analogy
Example                                      Quoting an authority.

Quoting an authority comes with the argument from authority. Metaphor comes with the argument from analogy; Analogy and authority are  common to both lists.

Examples are associated with a number of argumentative operations. They are associated with any law, according to the type / occurrence principle; they are powerful instruments of refutation. Generalizations are based on one or more cases or examples. A paradigmatic example has the value of a general law. Precedents are memorable examples that function as rules. In addition, examples function as crucial cases that, which can disprove a proposed law or generalization (The N are blue – Yes, but that one is red)[2]). As anecdotes, examples can have the most persuasive power in everyday argumentation; when they involve the speaker’s credibility, they are conversationally untouchable, armored against rebuttal: any tentative refutation becomes a personal attack and ruins the conversation.

In what follows, we suggest some  passages from classical Chinese texts as instances of some of these argument schemes.

[2] Dans le langage ordinaire, le contre-exemple correspond à une exception : C’est vrai, mais…

Critères de sélection des partenaires de dialogue

Dans la culture occidentale classique, est convenable ce qui est dit ou fait selon les règles floues de la bienséance, c’est-à-dire ce qui est “contrôlé, calme et poli” (Cambridge, decorum). La bienséance implique la prudence et la décence.

Dans la culture chinoise classique, le discours et le comportement approprié  sont définis part  les règles du rituel, qui régisent toutes les conduites, qu’il s’agisse de boire de l’alcool, du thé ou de s’entretenir avec un maître. Ces règles sont exposées dans le Liji, le Classique des rites (Book of rites), l’un des cinq classiques chinois.

Dans le premier chapitre de ses écrits, Exhortation to learning, le philosophe Xunzi (¿298 – ¿238 AÈC) propose les principes suivants ; nous avons introduit la numérotation et la présentation par segments.

1. 1. Do not answer one who asks about something improper.
   2. Do not ask questions of one who speaks on something improper.
   3. Do not listen to one who tries to persuade you of something improper.
   4. Do not debate with a person of combative demeanor.
   5. Only if people approach you in the proper way should you receive them. If they do not approach you in the proper way, then avoid them.
   6. And so, only if they follow ritual and are reverent should you discuss the methods of the Way with them.
   7. Only if their speech is calm should you discuss the methods of the Way with them.
   8. Only if their countenance is agreeable should you discuss the culmination of the Way with them.
   9. To discuss these things with those unfit to discuss them is called being presumtuous.
   10. Not to discuss these things with those fit to discuss them is called being secretive.
   11. To discuss these things without first observing the person’s manner and countenance is called being blind.
   12. The gentleman is neither presumptuous nor secretive nor blind; he carefully acts according to the other person’s character. The Odes says: The gentlemen are not indolent or haughty /Rewarded by the Son of Heaven shall they be.(
       (Xunzi_Hutton, p. 6-7)

Les recommandations de Xunzi s’adressent au Sage, approché par quelqu’un qu’il ne connaît pas.[1] Cet aspirant au dialogue avec le Maître est évalué dès son approche, dans les tout premiers moment de la discussion. Cette évaluation se fait sur la base de sa capacité à se conformer à ce que nous appelons le “rite”. Les termes improper, proper, (1. 2. 3. 5.) et ritual (6.) renvoient à la notion de propriety “ce qui convient”, ce qui est conforme aux règles du rituel. Ces règles définissent le comportement approprié (4. demeanor) ainsi que l’expression du visage (8. countenance). Est particulièrement bannie l’agressivité (4. combative demeanor) les “argumentative personalities” sont indésirables, et le calme est valorisé ; c’est une qualité confucéenne.

The Master was warm, yet severe; awesome, yet never harsh; reverent, yet calm.
Analects_Eno, 7.38

Dans la tradition confucéenne, le Sage vit selon le rite, donc selon la nature :

Rules of propriety are not a body of ceremonies, but natural principles.
Chu Hsi, Lü Tsu Ch’ien. Reflections on things at hand, p. 128.

Il ne peut se laisser approcher que par quelqu’un qui sait s’y conformer. Le rite exprime les principes qui définissent l’être humain et ses activités. Il fournit le critère permettant d’évaluer le degré d’excellence des individus, dignes ou non de poursuivre la recherche intellectuelle et spirituelle,

The parrot can speak, and yet is nothing more than a bird; the ape can speak, and yet is nothing more than a beast. Here now is a man who observes no rules of propriety; is not his heart that of a beast? But if (men were as) beasts, and without (the principle of) propriety, father and son might have the same mate. Therefore, when the sages arose, they framed the rules of propriety in order to teach men, and cause them, by their possession of them, to make a distinction between themselves and brutes.
Liji – Chap. 1, Qu Li “Summary of the Rules of Propriety – Part 1” §9

Nous sommes loin de la conception occidentale du rite comme mode d’organisation conventionnelle d’un type d’événements, voire comme symptôme névrotique. Cette vision du monde étant étrangère au monde occidental contemporain, il n’y aurait pas grand sens à rapprocher ces recommandations des règles de politesse (empiriques), ou de règles sur le dialogue argumentatif (normées par la raison), ou des règles conventionnelles explicites qui organisent les cérémonies occidentales.
Les grands systèmes occidentaux ne mentionnent pas de tels critères d’exclusion des discutants, à l’exception peut-être de Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), qui n’admettent pas n’importe quel interlocuteur

[21] […] Il y a des êtres avec lesquels tout contact peut sembler superflu ou indésirable il y a des êtres avec lesquels nous ne voulons pas parler il y en a aussi avec lesquels nous ne voulons pas discuter, mais nous nous contentons d’ordonner. (1958, p. 20)

Les règles du dialogue argumentatif ont pour fonction de dégager le terrain permettant d’atteindre une vérité ou une vraisemblance, consensuelles, rationnelles et raisonnables, ces mêmes caractéristiques étant partagées par la conversation ordinaire, en vertu du principe de coopération qui la régit.[2]

[1] Dans le lexique qui accompagne sa traduction de Mencius, conserve le mot chinois junzi pour désigner le Sage ayant atteint un haut degré de développement moral et utilise le terme gentleman pour désigner le shi, simple aspirant à l’excellence morale (Mencius_Eno, p. 146). Nous assistons ici à la démarche du shi qui désire prendre un junzi pour modèle.

[2] Voir Plantin, Dictionnaire de l’argumentation, 2016 et 2021, art. Règles – Coopération – Rationalité et rationalisation – Normes – etc.

Comme l’autocontradiction, la contradiction interpersonnelle exige une clarification. Le désaccord stimule l’échange et l’activité intellectuelle,

The Master said: I can speak with Hui all day and he will never contradict me, like a dolt. But after he withdraws, when I survey his personal conduct, indeed he is ready to go forth. He’s no dolt! (Id. , 2.9)

Confucius dit implicitement qu’il préfère le désaccord, “Hui ne me contredit jamais, comme un imbécile” — donc les imbéciles ne contredisent jamais leur maître, et c’est cette inférence implicite qui nous intéresse. Mais, en ce qui concerne Hui, cette première conclusion, tirée du comportement verbal de Hui est renversée par une constatation décisive, d’un ordre supérieur, tirée de l’observation de sa conduite. Hui est le disciple préféré de Confucius, et sa mort le plongera dans le désarroi le plus profond (Id. 11.8-11)

Zilu fait face au maître

Apprendre dans les livres, Bien se comporter: l’accord

Ad hominem refutation always requires a certain amount of editing of the target’s words or words and actions. For example, it is always unpleasant for a master to be critically confronted with his own teaching. In passages 1.6 and 1.7 of the Confucius Analects, the scholar is characterised by his correct behaviour towards worthy people, his parents, people in general, his masters (those who are ren), and seems to attach only secondary importance to knowledge of the texts.

1.6. The Master said: A young man should be filial within his home and respectful of elders when outside, should be careful and trustworthy, broadly caring of people at large, and should cleave to those who are ren. If he has energy left over, he may study the refinements of culture (wen).

Zixia, a disciple of Confucius, offers a definition of a scholar along the same lines, though perhaps less categorically,

1.7. Zixia said: If a person treats worthy people as worthy and so alters his expression, exerts all his effort when serving his parents, exhausts himself when serving his lord, and is trustworthy in keeping his word when in the company of friends, though others may say he is not yet learned, I would call him learned.
Analects_Eno, 1.6-7

Zilu fait face au maître

In another passage, Zilu, one of Confucius’ disciples, has just hired another of his disciples, Zigao. Confucius seems to reproach him for this:

Zilu appointed Zigao to be the steward of Bi. The Master said, “You are stealing  another man’s son!”
Zilu said, “There are people there; there are altars of state there – why must one first read texts and only then be considered learned?”
The Master said, “This is why I detest glib talkers!”
Analects_Eno, 1, 25

The Master seems to take offence at Zilu’s repartee.
Again, R. Eno’s note clarifies the passage by relating it to an earlier passage,

Note Eno : Zilu seems to be invoking lessons Confucius himself taught, much like the ideas in 1.6-7, to confound Confucius himself, which is the basis of Confucius’s answer.
En effet, en 11, 25 Zilu lui rappelle qu’il a dit qu’un comportement parfaitement réglé vis à vis des personnes de référence – parents, Seigneur, amis – suffisait pour que quelqu’un soit reconnu comme « a learned [person] », et traité comme tel, par exemple en recevant un emploi. Zilu se défend ainsi de lui avoir “volé Zigao”, ou défend la décision de Zigao.

This contradiction is just one way of exercising the right of admonition, which is the counterpart of the right and duty of obedience to the ruler and the father.

_______________

“Le bras de la balance”: Une métaphore alternative ?

L’argumentation occidentale est “controversielle”, mot qui n’est pas reçu en français. Elle est fondée sur le fait qu’il est possible que deux locuteurs honnêtes et impliqués dans leurs paroles et leurs actes développent, sur un thème donné, deux discours, bien construits, bien informés, plausibles, relativement raisonnables, mais aboutissant à des conclusions (des visions, des opinions…) incompatibles, produisant ainsi une question argumentative.

Nous partons ainsi de l’argumentation occidentale, définie comme une activité mixte, cognitive et langagière, dont l’étude systématique s’est développée à partir d’Aristote, sur la base de données principalement fournies par les discours judiciaires, discours tenus au tribunal, par les discours délibératifs, discours d’assemblée, ainsi que par les épisodes épidictiques qui entrent dans ces discours. S’y sont ajoutés les discours politico-religieux, les discours publicitaires, etc. Ces discours sont prototypiques de ce que la tradition occidentale entend par argumentation. C’est dans ces contextes dialogaux, ouvertement argumentatifs que les phénomènes se présentent le plus clairement et sont, par conséquent, plus faciles à étudier, là où les concepts et méthodes qui lui sont propres sont le plus productifs. Ce qui n’empêche évidemment pas l’argumentation de se manifester dans d’autres contextes ; si on la définit, par exemple, comme la mise en œuvre d’un effort de persuasion, alors elle devient une propriété universelle de la parole humaine. Par ailleurs, on sait que l’intension d’un concept (son contenu définitionnel) se réduit alors que son extension augmente (on l’applique à des objets ne relevant pas de son domaine fondamental). La généralisation perpétuelle d’un concept à de nouveaux objets entraîne une dilution de sa signification, voir ce qui est arrivé avec le concept de structure.

A.C. Graham, dans un ouvrage de référence intitulé Disputers of the Tao – Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (1989), remarque que la philosophie confucéenne a beaucoup à dire sur les problèmes du choix et de l’action à entreprendre, et qu’elle sait contourner les écueils des alternatives :

Confucius is of course very much concerned with choice in the most general sense of the word, as settling after due consideration on a particular course of action,

If you don’t say “What shall I do about it, what shall I do about it ?” there is nothing I can do about you (Analects 15/16)

But choice in this general sense does not necessarily imply even the posing of alternatives. It might be the contemplation of one’s situation, and the examples of the sages in similar situations until inclination spontaneously settles in a certain direction. (1989, p. 27)[1]

Cela suggère que le domaine des études sur l’argumentation peut abandonner la métaphore du carrefour (id.), c’est-à-dire l’idée d’alternative, et la remplacer par celle du bras de la balance,

The overriding imperative is to learn and arrive at knowledge; once you know, orientations towards action may be left to take care of itself as confused inclinations sort themselves out. To apply the metaphor of weighing which Confucius does not use, the agent is not the weigher but the arm of the balance itself. (1989, p. 28)

La métaphore du bras de la balance est présente dans le modèle occidental, elle est très appropriée pour décrire le rôle du Tiers et, précisément, celui du Juge[2] (Plantin 2021, Rôles Argumentatifs). Mais pour que le bras de la balance se stabilise et indique clairement une tendance, deux conditions doivent être réunies, d’une part, que l’on soit “parvenu à la connaissance”, et, d’autre part, que l’on dispose de tout le temps nécessaire pour que les orientations et les inclinations finissent par s’organiser elles-mêmes, ce qui suppose que la décision ne soit pas extrêmement urgente.

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Des cultures de l’argumentation

Selon moi, les théories occidentales n’ont pas épuisé leurs capacités à éclairer leurs champs de données traditionnels, et ces données en constante évolution continuent d’apporter de nouveaux défis théoriques.
Il reste qu’il y a dans notre monde des discours mondialisés enracinés dans leurs propres histoires et cultures, développant leurs propres concepts de bonnes raisons et de bonne vie. Nous sommes habitués à penser l’argumentation et à argumenter dans notre zone de confort, même si nous savons très bien que la culture occidentale ne peut être définie comme « la » culture de la rhétorique et de l’argumentation, mais seulement comme « l’une » de ces cultures. Amartya Sen nous a présenté The Argumentative Indian (2005), on peut aussi parler de l’argumentation musulmane[1] ou de l’argumentation chinoise, sans oublier l’argumentation inuit (Plantin & Tersis 2021). Il nous faut inventer une autre façon de présenter et de penser notre domaine, qui ne soit pas uniquement fondée sur ce qu’ont dit nos grands ancêtres grecs et latins.

On se heurte immédiatement au problème de Babel, mais l’Occident est aussi un petit Babel synchronique et diachronique. Certains spécialistes de l’argumentation qui ne sont pas des spécialistes des langues grecques et latines accèdent couramment à la littérature grecque et latine par le biais de textes traduits ; pourquoi ne ferions-nous pas de même avec les textes chinois ? L’analogie est peut-être risquée : le concept occidental d’argumentation a été façonné par des millénaires de cultures latine et grecque, pas par des millénaires de culture chinoise.

Néanmoins il est relativement facile de trouver des passages de textes classiques chinois traduits qui correspondent à ce que la tradition occidentale considère comme des faits argumentatifs, y compris des schémas d’argumentation parmi les plus courants. Par exemple, on rencontre des épisodes de discours en contradiction, amorçant des situations argumentatives, ainsi que des schèmes considérés comme des formes classiques d’argumentation, par exemple des argumentations a fortiori ou par les termes opposés, sans parler de l’usage de l’analogie ou de l’exemple.[2]

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[1] J’ai tenté de faire une présentation de l’argumentation théologico-juridique dans le monde musulman à l’aide du grand livre de Khallâf Les fondements du droit musulman, (1942), qui peut être mis sur le même plan que le Traité d’argumentation (1958) de Perelman et Olbrechts-Tyteca ; voir Plantin 2005, chap. 7.

[2] À plus long terme, nous nous proposons de constituer ainsi une collection de passages traduits du chinois qu’il serait possible d’intégrer au Dictionnaire de l’argumentation en ligne (2022)

[1] Pour des raisons d’homogénéité, nous avons maintenu la langue originale des citations et des traductions du chinois

[2] Voir Plantin 2016 – 2022, Rôles argumentatifs (version papier – version en ligne) Dictionnaire de l’argumentation ou la version anglaise, Dictionary of argumentation, (idem)