Argumentative ROLES
PROPONENT, OPPONENT, THIRD PARTY

In an argumentative exchange, the participants are part of a complex system of roles and characters, according to which they speak and act. Some of these roles are general; others are specific to the argumentative situation.

1. General interactional roles (not specific to argumentation)

1.1 Roles attached to the “participation framework” (Goffman)

The concept of a participation framework details and clarifies the traditional concept of a verbal exchange between a speaker and one or more listeners. The participation framework is defined as a relationship between two complex speech structures, the production format and the reception format (Goffman, 1981). These concepts are instrumental to analyzing all argumentative interactions, from rhetorical addresses to everyday argumentative interactions. They are relevant to analyzing of the ethos, and polyphonicrespp structure of the argumentative texts.

• Reception format (id., pp. 141-142)

The people who can actually hear a speaker’s words occupy various statuses in relation to these words.

— The addressed participants are the people to whom the words are openly directed, and the pronoun you refers to the addressed participant(s). Everyday group conversations demonstrate that successfully addressing a specific person may require complex maneuvers.

— The ratified participants are the members of the group formed around the ongoing speech event. They may or may not be addressed. In order to get the floor in a discussion, one must be a ratified participant. Ratified, non-addressed participants may be addressed during  the speech event’s development.

In a current argumentative exchange, the referee of the debate, if there is one, is a ratified participant, who will be addressed only as a resource if a crisis looms, or during a planned slot in order to move the debate forward, to evaluate and conclude the session. If the debate is open to a broader audience, audience members are ratified participants but not addressed participants.

In a codified dialectical exchange, the questioner and the respondent are the only ratified and addressed participants. Both participants alternately hold the floor.

In a classical rhetorical address, the audience is ratified and addressed. The difference from the dialectical situation is that the audience does not have an official right to the floor. Nonetheless, the audience may express its reactions with applause or boos (Goffman 1981).

— Overhearers and eavesdroppers. People passing within earshot are non-ratified participants. Overhearers accidentally hear the sounds and words of the conversation, possibly without even listening. Eavesdroppers intentionally spy on the conversation.

• Production Format

Speech is produced by the speaker. Goffman (1981) and Ducrot (1980) have independently shown that the speaker should not be considered to be a unified entity but rather a complex articulation of different discursive personae. In Goffman’s words the Animator, the Author, the Figure and the Principal (id., p. 144; p. 167).

— The Animator (Goffman) is the talking machine, that physically produces the discourse. Similarly, Ducrot redefines the Speaker as “the empirical being” to which all external speech determinants can be attributed, “the psychological or even physiological processes that originate the utterance, the actual intentions and cognitive processes that render the statement possible” (Ducrot 1980, p. 34).

The counterpart of this talking machine in the reception format is the hearing machine: the listeners, and the entire range of ratified and non ratified participants who physically hear the speech and choose listen to it or not (Ducrot 1980, p. 35).

— The Author selects the thoughts to express and the words to express them. A speaker reading a book or quoting another person is the Animator of the words borrowed without being their Author (Schiffrin 1990, p. 242). The pronoun I refers to the Author of the speech (except in quoted speech).

— The Figure corresponds to the discursive self-image of the Author, that is, the ethos.

— The Principal is

(in the legalistic sense) someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say … a person acting under a certain identity, in a certain social role” (Goffman 1987, p. 144). 

“The same individual can very quickly alter the social role in which he is active, even though his capacity as animator and author remains constant” (id., p. 145). 

The same Author can address a student as a teacher, an adult, a citizen, a New Yorker, etc. and so on.
Defined as “someone who believes personally in what is being said and takes the position that is implied in the remarks” (id., p. 167), the Principal plays a key role in the polyphonic space, as the person who takes the responsibility of what is said (Ducrot’s énonciateur, 1980, p. 38), see interaction, dialogue, polyphony.

For example, consider the following statement:

The weather is nice (V1), but I must work (V2)

the Author stages two voices:

— In V1, the voice of someone arguing that a nice weather is a good reason to go for a walk.
— In V2, the voice is that of a another person arguing that having to work is a good reason to stay home.

The decisive point is that, the Principal identifies to voice V2, dropping the argument E1, and validating the argument E2.

There is no intrinsic superiority of argument E2 over E1. The speaker authors both arguments, and, as a Principal, acts upon E2, not E1.

In summary, “the Animator produces talk, the Author creates talk, the Figure is portrayed through talk, and the Principal is responsible for talk” (Schiffrin 1990, p. 241).

1.2 Roles Attached to Different Types and Genres of Speech

To account for the variety of discursive genres, one must introduce new types of roles, such as the narrator and the narratee for storytelling; the expert and the layperson for explanation; and the proponent, the opponent and the third party for argumentation.

Interactional genres bring their own share of professional or occupational roles: seller and customer for shop interactions; teacher and students in classroom interactions; physician and patient for therapeutic interactions.

1.3 Socio-Interactional Roles

Linguistic roles combine with a set of social roles, in which we distinguish (after Rocheblave-Spenlé [1962]):

— Global social roles: gentleman, cool guy, cheerleader, troublemaker, etc.
— Biosocial roles: young/old, male/female/transgender, etc.
— Social class roles: bourgeois, aristocrat, white or blue collar worker, etc.
— Professional roles: farmer, trader, truck driver, etc.
— Community roles: religious believer, member of a trade union, a political party, a sport team, etc.
— Family roles: husband, wife, child, father, uncle, etc.

2. Argument-acting roles: Proponent, Opponent, Third party

The argumentative situation is defined as a three-pole situation, that is to say a three-role situation: Proponent, Opponent and Third Party. Each of these roles corresponds to a specific discursive modality, a discourse of proposition, supported by the proponent, a discourse of opposition, supported by the opponent, and a discourse of doubt or questioning, that defines the Third Party position.

2.1 Proponent and Opponent

In dialectical theory, the terms proponent and opponent are defined, as partners in an argumentative game see dialectic. From an interactive perspective, an argument becomes dialectical when the third party is eliminated and each actor is assigned a role (“you will be the proponent, and I will be the opponent”) that they must assumed for the entire “dialectic round” (Brunschwig 1967). Eliminating the third party goes hand in hand with expelling rhetoric and the establishing a system of objective-rational norms. In a figurative sense, one could say that the third party is then replaced by Reason or Nature—that is, by the rules of truth.

From a rhetorical perspective, the argumentative game is initially defined first as an interaction between a proponent, the speaker, and a third party, the silent audience to be persuaded. The opponent and counter-discourse are not absent, but consigned to the background.

By engaging into a discussion, participants acknowledge the fact that none of them has sufficient power or authority to decide the matter at hand, and that they are engaged in a problematic situation.

2.2 Third Party

Considering that the argumentative question is a full systemic component of argumentative interaction highlights the role of the third party. This figure materializes what is publicly at stake and the contact between the contradictory discourses.

In its prototypical form, an argumentative situation is an interaction between the proponent’speech , the opponent’s counter-discourse, and a third, mediating, interrogative discourse. The third party stabilizes or manages the question, and decides upon the external relevance of the participants’ interventions. Therefore, the argumentative situation, as exemplified in public adversarial exchanges, is a three-role situation. Basic argumentative situations such as political debates and court cases, are tripolar. Argumentative speech is systematically multi-addressed, the addressee is not only, or necessarily, the adversary-interlocutor, but also, in one case the public about to cast their vote, and in the other, the judge about to pronounce a verdict.

Unlike the categorical assertions and denials of the proponent and the opponent, the third party may appear softer and undecided. In reality, the third party refuses to accept either of the opposing proposals or points of view. They ask for more arguments, remaining doubtful and leaving the question open, in the name of making an informed decision. According to the most classical concept of argumentation, the judge is the prototypical figure of the third party. All ratified participants of an argumentative situation who consider that the argumentative forces balanced, or, more subtly, that even if one seems to prevail, the other cannot be considered to be null, are de facto in the third party position. In philosophy, the radicalization and reification of this position is elaborated as methodological skepticism.

Once the third party and the argumentative question are accepted as key elements of the argumentative exchange, the proponent and opponent are granted full responsibility for their arguments. One may answer, “No!” and the other “Yes, of course!” without either of them being systematically accused of manipulation, bad faith or other of fallacious speech.

Institutions may stabilize the argumentative roles and their attribution to individuals. In an ordinary interaction, the argumentative roles do not correspond to permanent roles but rather to footings, (Goffman (987, chapter 3), particularly in that they are labile. Within the same speech turn, the same person can take the role of both the Third party and the Proponent with regard to an issue (affirming a position while expressing a certain degree of doubt about it), or act as the Proponent on one issue and the Opponent on another.

3. Argument-actors [Fr. actants] and Actors [Fr. actors]

The individuals engaged in the argument are the physical participants, or actors of the argumentative situation. When clarification is needed, the term argument-actor (Fr. actant, borrowed from semiotic theory), may be used to refer to the three basic argumentative roles, Proponent, Opponent, Third Party.

Any actor can successively occupy each of the three argument-acting roles (Fr. rôle actantiel), according to all the possible paths. For instance, an actor may abandon his or her discourse of opposition in order to develop a discourse of doubt, switching from the argument-acting role of opponent to that of third party. An argumentative issue remains unsolved as long as the contradiction survives, even if some actors change their point of view. If two actors swap their argument-acting roles–that is, if they convince each other, the issue remains open.

In the case of an argumentative alliance, or co-argumentation, several actors can occupy the same argument-acting position simultaneously; that is, several individuals can produce co-oriented interventions. The study of argumentation should focus both on co-oriented interventions and anti-oriented interventions.

4. Argument is demilitarization

The distinction between argument-actors / actors makes it possible to reconsider the famous and strangely prized slogan “argument is war”, along with its related bellicose metaphors (Lakoff, Johnson 1980). Argument_2 may be a kind of war, albeit with fewer casualties, but argument_1, that is argumentation, is not. The opposition between discourses, that is between argument-actors [Fr. actants], is not necessarily confused with possible collaborations or oppositions between people, that is, between actors [Fr. acteurs]. Argumentative situations are confrontational only when the actors identify themselves with their argumentative roles. In the most obvious case, that of internal deliberation, the same actor can peacefully progress through all the argument-acting positions (argumentative roles). If a group deliberates on a question of common interest, it fortunately happens that the associated members will together examine the various facets of the problem together, that is, the different possible answers to the question and the arguments that support them. During this process, they systematically occupy the different argument-acting positions, without clearly identifying with one of these positions, and without necessarily transforming this process into a war between the actors. An argumentative situation is not inherently polemical; but it can certainly become so when features that define the participants’ identity are involved and put at risk in the discussion.

Classical RHETORICAL ARGUMENTATION

Classical argumentative rhetoric is based on the natural ability to speak. This capacity is developed through conceptualization and practical exercises on general or social issues. This type of rhetoric combines linguistic, interactional and civic skills.

1. The Rhetorical Address

The rhetorical address corresponds to the traditional definition of discourse, that is, “that which, in public, treats a subject with a certain method, and a certain length” (Littré, [Discourse]). A discourse is a “formal, ordered and usually extended expression of thought on a subject.” (W., Discourse).
This concept of discourse differs from the concepts of discourse as defined by Foucault (1969, 1971) or Pêcheux (Maldidier, 1990). This meaning of discourse is not included among the six definitions considered by Maingueneau in his foundational presentation of “French discourse analysis” (1976, pp. 11-12).

A rhetorical address is a speech delivered by a speaker or orator to an audience.

– The orator addresses a pressing issue of general concern, typically seeking to influence an ongoing decision-making process that is developing under certain time constraints.
Classical rhetoric focuses on an orator, addressing an audience. In reality, a full rhetorical situation involves choice, and includes as many orators or voices as there are possible choices.

— The speech is a relatively long, planned monologue composed of a series of speech acts that construct a unified representation of the disputed subject, and are intended to lead to action.

— It is produced in the context of a discursive competition that takes place between different speeches of mutual opponents, with incompatible proposals. The rhetorical address occurs in a space of contradictory discourse, where all interventions are positioned in relation to  each other. Even if the speaker tries to erase all traces of the surrounding counter-discourses, the speech is still structured by such competing discourses.

— The speech is delivered to an audience, composed of everyone who will play a role in the decision-making process concerning the issue in hand. The audience is divided on what the right decision would be, and includes staunch supporters and opponents of each proposal, as well as undecided individuals, see roles. The traditional emphasis on persuasion suggests that the orator focuses more on the doubters and questioners, than on radical opponents. His task is to remove doubt, create and guide opinion, see logos, ethos, pathos.

The rhetorical audience is both diminished and enlarged. It is diminished, because it is defined by its lack of knowledge and its indecision. However, at least within the framework of the New Rhetoric  the audience is also elevated as a critical instance, somewhere on the path to achieving a universal, deeply rooted and justified consensus.

Argumentative rhetoric has theorized, codified, evaluated and stimulated this type of public communication, the only type of public address possible before the advent of radio, cinema, television and the internet. Its theoretical object remains well defined, the circulation of contradictory speeches within a decision-making group, see argumentation-2; persuasion.

2. The Rhetorical Catechism

At least until the modern times, rhetorical argumentation was the backbone of teaching and education in the Western world. In the Middle Ages, it served as one of the three arts of discourse that made up the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric), and was preparatory to the quadrivium (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music).

For such pedagogical purposes, rhetoric has constructed a standard self-representation of the speech production process and the resulting speech delivered to an audience:

– A five-step production process, invention, disposition, speech, memory, pronunciation.

– Three genres of discourse, deliberative, judicial, and epideictic.

– Three rhetorical roles: the rhetorical interaction is functionally tripolar, “the speaker who wants to persuade, the interlocutor whom he must convince, and the opponent whom he must refute” (Fumaroli 1980, p. 3).

– Three discursive means of pressure focus on transforming the audience’s representations and desire for action. The speaker must:

– Inform and teach, through his logos, that is, through the cogency of his arguments and the plausibility of the facts as he reports them.
– Please and attract through his style, and his ethos, the self-image he projects in his speech.
– Move the audience to action, through pathos.

– According to the tradition, the actions aimed at producing these effects are concentrated in the strategic moments of the discourse:

The introduction is the ethotic moment.
The narrative and the arguments are dominated by logos.
The conclusion is the emotional, pathemic, moment, through which the speaker hopes to wrest the final decision.

3. Organization of the Process

The process of constructing an argumentative rhetorical discourse is traditionally described as involving five stages. The corresponding Latin words for these stages are provided in order to avoid confusion with the English terms, which are false cognates.

(i) Inventio: Finding the arguments

“Invention [inuentio] is the invention of things, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing” (Ad Her., i, 3). Inventio is the cognitive step corresponding to the methodical search for arguments, guided by the technique of “topical questions”, see common places.
The Latin word inventio does not mean “invention” in the sense of creating something that did not exist before. Here, « to invent » means “to find or discover something” (Gaffiot [1934], Inventio).
Psycholinguistic research on the production of written and oral discourse has expanded upon the reflection on inventio techniques.

Rhetorical arguments are « found » based on an exploration of reality, guided by a natural, substantial ontology.
Religious arguments have introduced a fundamental change to this vision. Instead of being plausible statements, good reasons are sacred statements drawn from foundational sacred texts and, to a lesser extent, from the texts of the relevant religious tradition.

(ii) Dispositio: Planning the sequence of arguments

“Arrangement [dispositio] is the ordering and distribution of the matter” (ibid.), that is, the planning of speech, particularly the organization of arguments. Inventio and dispositio are the two cognitive stages of this process.

(iii) Elocutio: Expressing the argumentation

“Style [elocutio] is the adaptation of appropriate words and phrases to the matter under consideration” (ibid.).
Although the word style used in the Ad Herennium translation may suggest a superficial arrangement of expression, elocutio is more than that. It corresponds to the “putting into language” of the arguments, their semantization, and the entire linguistic expression.

The elocutio is characterized by four qualities, the grammatical correctness (latinitas), the clarity of the message (perspicuitas), the adaptation of the message to suit the audience (aptum) and the density and richness of its expression (ornatus). A discourse may be rejected as defective on any one of these levels, see destruction.

Currently, the English word elocution refers to “the skill of clear and expressive speech, especially of distinct pronunciation and articulation” (W., Elocution). With this meaning, elocution clearly belongs first to pronuntiatio, and only peripherally to elocutio, as expression and style.

(iv) Memoria: Memorization of speech

Speeches must be memorized because they are intended to be delivered orally, without the use of paper or autocue. Like the « invention » process, memorization involves cognitive factors. The cultural importance of this memorization work, which may seem anecdotal, has been demonstrated by Yates (1966).

(v) Pronuntiatio: Delivering the speech

“Delivery [pronuntiatio] is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture” (ibid.).
The Latin word pronuntiatio refers not only to the physical process of speech production and modulation, but also to the idea of ​​assertive speech. A pronuntiatio is a “declaration, announcement, or proposal” (Gaffiot [1934], Pronuntiativus). A judge does not say or read his judgment; he pronounces it.
The rhetorical tradition views delivery as the moment of performance, and dramatization of the discourse, that requires a special training of the body, gestures and the voice. Orators, preachers, and actors are subject to the same constraints of public performance, though their techniques, social statuses and messages differ greatly.

In short, the rhetorical prescriptions for finding, ordering, and expressing arguments in writing are particularly well-suited to general academic essays. These prescriptions seem clear, and easy enough to teach ­— but, unfortunately, they are not so easy to put into practice.

In Divisions of Oratory Art, Cicero frames the concepts of ancient rhetoric as a series of questions and answers, “very much like  a catechism”, as Bornecque notes ([1924], p. VII). Rhetoric may have suffered from such an ostensibly pedagogical presentation, where everything must be done and said by the book.

4. Textual Organization of the Speech

This process leads to the final product, the speech delivered in a specific situation. It is articulated in parts, traditionally called:

– Introduction (exordium)
– Narration
– Argumentation (a confirmation of one’s position followed by a rebuttal of the opponent’s positions)
– Conclusion.

Argumentation is the central part of the speech. Contrary to a simplistic view of discourse, there is no opposition between argumentation, narration and description. Like literary narratives or descriptions, argumentative narratives or descriptions, are made from a particular point of view.

5. Extensions and Restrictions of Rhetoric

Ancient argumentative rhetoric has been redefined on various dimensions.

– Limitation to its expressive dimension. Argumentative rhetoric can be oriented towards persuasive communication or the quality of expression.

– Generalization to its persuasive dimension. Nietzsche assimilates the rhetorical function to the persuasive function of language, see persuasion.

– Restriction to the linguistic dimension and liquidation of the cognitive dimensions. The apparent logic of the five components of rhetorical production was profoundly challenged in the Renaissance (Ong 1958). The three components related to thought (invention, disposition, and memory) were separated from the two components related to language (expression and delivery). Inventio, the foundation of argumentation, was removed from rhetoric. Rhetoric redefined its subject matter, shifting its focus from social discourse to literature and belles-lettres, and developing a passion for the autonomous study of the discourse variations and stylistic figures.
A language deprived of thought and a thought deprived of language: this orphaned rhetoric would become the target of violent attacks from Locke, see ornamental fallacies.
In nineteenth-century France, Fontanier ([1827], [1831]) was the emblematic figure associated with this “restricted rhetoric” (Genette, 1970), as opposed to the so-called “general” rhetoric, which was revived by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). The question of reviving an integral concept of rhetoric remains a topos of rhetorical studies.

– Generalization along its linguistic dimension. A rhetoric limited to figures of speech can itself be called “general”: this paradoxical term corresponds to the “Group μ” approach in their General Rhetoric (1970). Figures are examined within a structuralist framework, and figures are reconsidered under the two basic dimensions of language, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes. Issues of argumentation, public speaking, interaction, and communication, are not considered, nor is the aesthetics of figures. During the 1970s, this General Rhetoric was practically the only concept of rhetoric to be considered in the French literature , and Perelman’s New Rhetoric occupied only a marginal position. Wenzel devoted an avenging paragraph to this “alarming” view of rhetoric (1987, p. 103; see Klinkenberg, 1990, 2001). The contrast with the status of rhetoric in speech and communication departments in the United States could not be greater.

– Extension to ordinary speech. The rhetorical approach can be extended to everyday  speech, insofar as it involves managing one’s face (ethos), processing data oriented toward a practical end (logos), and correlating affects (pathos) (Kallmeyer, 1996). Thus, the rhetorical trilogy can thus be seen as the precursor of the various theories of the language functions (Bühler 1933, Jakobson [1960]), in a different theoretical atmosphere. This extension also preserves a fundamental characteristic of rhetorical speech: altering reality by participating in ongoing action. This view may resonate with Bitzer’s evocation of the dialogue between fishermen at work in the Trobriand Islands, and his definition of the “rhetorical situation” as involving a degree of “urgency”:

Rhetorical situations may be defined as complexes of persons, events, objects and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence, which can be partially or completely removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence (Bitzer [1968], p. 5).

– Extension to any semiotic domain. Rhetoric naturally extends to the co-verbal and paraverbal signifiers. Furthermore, the strategic implementation of any semiotic system can be legitimately be considered rhetorical practice: rhetoric of painting, of music, of architecture for example.

---

 

Argument of RESPECT

Argument ad reverentiam, Latin reverentia “respectful fear’.

Respect is a feeling projected by authority, regardless of who or what it may be. Organizations and individuals who are legally vested with the proper authority to carry out a mission claim respect in that role, regardless of one’s private opinion about its relevance or effectiveness.

Claiming respect is different from claiming obedience. One can be compelled to obey by lawful force, but showing respect is essentially an adjunct to obedience. Interactions with common authorities are therefore governed by specific conventions of courtesy, for example, the closing formula “Yours respectfully,” conveys this conventional respect to the addressed in a formal letter.

As an internal feeling toward a person or institution, respect must be earned. Nevertheless, some behavior, whether intentional or not, may be perceived as disrespectful. If it involves a public official or police officer, it may be considered as an insult and punished as such. The argument from respect is used to justify sanctions for a lack of respect, see authority; modesty.

Any person in a position of authority who feels that their prerogatives are not being respected may invoke the argument from respect. The problem arises when this claim to authority is not recognized, or is even seen as oppressive, as may be the case with religious authorities. At a more abstract level, the right to respect is claimed for all beliefs in general, and for one’s own beliefs in particular. Disrespect is considered a provocation, scandal, or blasphemy that seriously hurts a believer’s feelings, and a complaint can be filed in court to uphold the right to respect. Consider the following case.

« Despicable Profanation of a Christ on the Cross”

A controversial situation involving an argument about respect developed around a photographic work by the American artist Andres Serrano, entitled Immersion Piss Christ. The piece features a crucifix submerged in the artist’s urine. On Sunday, April 17, 2011, it was vandalized at the Yvon Lambert Collection of Contemporary Art in Avignon, France.

The Archbishop of Avignon issued a statement protesting the exhibition of the piece, and thus justifying its destruction. The argument of (lack of) respect is invoked in the following passage:

Should the local authorities not ensure respect for the faith of believers of any religion? Nevertheless, such a work is a desecration that touches us deeply on the eve of Good Friday, when we remember Christ, who died on the cross for us.

The argument is then repeated and amplified (our emphasis):

– The despicable desecration of a Christ on the Cross (title)
– Can art be in such bad taste for no other reason than to insult?
– I must respond to this despicable image that disrespects the image of Christ on the cross–the heart of our Christian faith. Every attack on our faith hurts us, every believer is deeply affected.
– Given the gravity of such an affront
– For me, as a bishop, and for every Christian and every believer, this is a provocation, and desecration that hurts us in the heart of our faith!
– Did the Lambert Collection not realize that these images would seriously hurt all those for whom the Cross of Christ is the heart of their faith? Did they intend to provoke the faithful by disrespecting what is at the heart of their lives?
– This is a grave desecration, a scandal that affects the faith of these believers.
– [These images] seriously harm the faith of Christians.
– This behavior hurts us at the heart of our faith.
Infocatho, [Ugly Desecration of a Christ on the Cross], 2011[1]

In some countries, blasphemy laws punish what they consider to be contempt and disrespect for the state religion, and blasphemy is treated as any other crime. Campaigns against blasphemy laws develop a counter-discourse arguing that such laws are medieval, obscurantist, incompatible with the basic democratic principle of freedom of expression, and that they make all philosophical and historical inquiry into religious belief impossible.
Other countries have laws prohibiting hate speech or discriminatory speech, to guarantee equal rights for minority communities, religious or otherwise.

The argument of (a lack of) respect was at the heart of the case concerning the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish satirical weekly in 2005. The case culminated in the 2015 terrorist attack on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, in which two Islamist terrorists shot dead 11 journalists and staff.

---

[1] “Odieuse Profanation d’un Christ en Croix”, Infocatho. http://infocatho.cef.fr/fichiers_html/archives/deuxmil11sem/semaine15/210nx151europeb.html 09-20-2013

---

 

REPETITION

Proof by repetition is sometimes referred to by its Latin name, « argumentum ad nauseam », meaning « to the point of nausea. »

In ordinary conversation, any meaningful or pragmatically relevant segment may be repeated for various reasons. For instance,a speaker may repeat something if it was not clearly heard or understood; a second speaker may repeat the end of the first speaker’s turn to connect it with their own.
Repetition may consist of reproducing a segment of speech word for word, as is the case in formal quotations. It may also be a slightly modified restatement of something ubiquitous, such as a familiar argument borrowed from an argumentative script. Deliberate, strategic repetition of slightly modified core content is key to traditional educational methods, and repetition of the same action is the basis of learning by doing, etc.

Persuasive repetition is characterized by the following elements.
– Invariance of the repeated formula.
– Frequency of these repetitions.
– They are produced as catchphrases by a social medium for political or commercial purposes.
– Their format excludes listener participation.
– The act of repetition can continue indefinitely.

While most repetition is unplanned and goes unnoticed, argument by repetition or proof by repeated assertion is part of a strategy used to impose a one-sided, uncritical view on people. The focus is on a single key claim, presented as a necessary truth. The specific function of repetition is to create a sense of a familiar self-evidence, beyond proof.

Although this process is called “argument (by repetition)”, it is characterized by the absence of argument. It offers no reasons, good or bad, to support the claim. Reasons are not implied or contextually retrievable, rather, they are carefully ignored.
Therefore, repetition can be considered argumentative only if an argument is defined by its persuasive effect; but persuasion is not a defining effect of argumentation
Repetition is instrumental to persuasion, which itself could be considered as a  willingness to repeat something under appropriate circumstances.
Repeating an entire complex argument results in an argument by repetition rather than any other kind of argument: “We will win because we are the strongest”.

Sociologist Gustave Le Bon emphasized the power of repetition to win people’s approval:

Pure and simple assertion [affirmation], kept free from all reasoning and all proof, is one of the surest means of getting an idea into the minds of crowds […]
Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I think, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, and that is, repetition. By repetition, what is affirmed becomes so fixed in the mind in such a way that it is finally accepted as proven truth. […]
It is to this fact that we owe the amazing power of advertising. When we have read a hundred, or a thousand times that X’s chocolate is the best, we imagine that we have heard it said from many sides, and we finally acquire the certainty that it is a fact. (Le Bon [1895], p. 126-127)

This last remark shows that repetition can create an illusion of legitimacy through the authority of large numbers, see consensus.

From an evaluative standpoint this form of repetition is considered a fallacy, and even as the fallacy par excellence, since it imposes the acceptance of a statement not only without justification but against any justification.

---

 

RELEVANCE
IGNORATIO ELENCHI

1. “Ignorance of refutation”, a fallacy of method

The fallacy of “ignorance of refutation” (Latin ignoratio elenchi [1]) is defined in relation to the dialectical game. In this game,
– One participant, the respondent (or proponent), is committed to a proposition P.
– His partner, the questioner (or opponent), tries to lead the respondent, into a contradiction by making him assert not-P, i.e., refute the proposition he had previously accepted.

Only contradictory propositions are considered In this game (one and only one of them is true). The opponent must follow the rules of the dialectical method to actually refute the original proposition in reality (and not just appear to do so, as the Sophists do).

In Aristotle’s catalog of fallacies the fallacy of ignorance of refutation is independent of language, it occurs “because the terms ‘proof’ or ‘refutation’ have not been defined, and because something is left out in their definition”. (Aristotle, R. S., 167a20, §5).
In other words, the misconception of refutation is a general term that covering all methodological errors that may occur in a dialectical game.

This concept can be extended to the argumentative language games: “The arguer argues and does not know how to argue; he thinks something is being proved or refuted successfully, when it is not; his practical concept of argument is flawed.”

This basically happens when an argument does not respect the principles of relevance. On the one hand, the argument must be relevant to the conclusion (internal relevance) and, on the other hand, the conclusion must be relevant as an answer to the argumentative question that organizes the debate (external relevance).

2. Relevance of the Argument to the Conclusion

In the context of a dialectical game, the respondent asserts P.  Starting from P, the questioner deductively constructs a chain of propositions admitted by the respondent that ends with the proposition not-P. Admitting  P and not-P , the respondent is apparently refuted, and the questioner has won the game.
However, the respondent claims that the chain of evidence supporting not-P is not valid because the arguments presented do not actually support that conclusion. Thus, the respondent holds that the questioner has actually failed to prove not-P.

This illustrate the general situation in which an arguer claims to have refuted an opponent ex datis, that is using only beliefs and modes of inference that the opponent admits.  The opponent can resist the refutation by breaking the chain of  inferences leading to the conclusive step that he is supposedly forced to concede. In other words, the opponent argues that the arguments are irrelevant to the conclusion.
This point actually involves the entire program of argumentation criticism.

3. Relevance of the Conclusion as an Answer to the Question

In the general case, the proponent commits himself to P, the opponent then constructs a chain of propositions from P , ending with proposition Q. The proponent claims that “Q = not-P”.
The proponent replies that proposition Q is not equivalent to not-P, and that P has therefore not been refuted.
In other words, the proponent claims that the opponent’s argument may be relevant to the conclusion Q, but that this conclusion does not disprove the original proposition to which the opponent is committed.

To argue that an intervention is externally irrelevant is to argue that it misses the point, or is off-topic. It may also be denounced as an attempt to mislead the opponent (red herring). The charge of paralogism is then reinforced by the suspicion of sophistry.

Criticisms of internal relevance and external relevance are cumulative. They invalidate an argument by saying that 1) it does not support the conclusion, and that, moreover, 2) the conclusion is irrelevant to the question.

4. The Question is Irrelevant to the “Real Debate”

The dialectical framework is binary, the proposition to be discussed is expressed as a simple, explicit statement, and the methodology of a refutative discussion is well-defined. Since the question is “P or not-P?”, claiming that the opponent’s conclusion does not logically contradict P, is  claiming that it is not relevant to the debate.

The situation can be equally clear in an ordinary debate. A student disputes, that is, wants to “disprove” the grade he has received.

If you don’t raise my grade, I’ll fail the exam; please, I desperately need just three more points!

The argument from consequences is quite valid, but the negative consequences of the bad grade are irrelevant to determining the grade (at least according to the classical scientific and educational regimes). The student’s conclusion is irrelevant, because it fails to address the real question: “What grade does my work deserve in itself?”. The student’s question is different from the teacher’s, and the teacher is the master of the question.

Things can be more complicated. When the proponent refutes the rebuttal by saying, “What you disagree with has nothing to do with what I am saying”, it can be difficult to pin down what he is actually saying. His claim can be constantly reformulated and reinterpreted see reformulation of speech.
Even when the original claim and its intended refutation have been previously written down, the connection between the two does not necessarily have the clarity of a binary contradiction. For example, does S2 refute S1, or does it merely show that the issue is complex:

S1: — Speculators buy commodities in advance just to speculate on future price fluctuations. Such operations with commodities should be prohibited by law.
S2: — However, it is essential for companies to buy the raw materials they need in advance to protect themselves against price fluctuations.

Finally, in ordinary argumentation, the issue itself may be controversial. When none of the participants is the master of the question, each key participant will be tempted to define the question, and reject the opponent’s answer as irrelevant:

S1: — That’s not the question!
S2: — That’s is my answer to the real problems. You’re not asking the right question.

The charge of fallacy of conclusion irrelevant to the question under debate can be answered by a counter-charge of a fallacious, wrongly formulated question, irrelevant to the “real” debate.

The role of the third party, be it the judge, the universal audience or the informed participants, is to construct, manage and decide upon the question. Accordingly, they have the responsability to determine what is or is not relevant to the debate.  The Aristotelian dialectical method has not third parties. This may explain why it cannot be applied directly to human-human disputes in natural language.

---

[1] Latin ignoratio elenchi. The Greek word [elenkhos] means: “1. Argument to refute … 2. Proof in general” (Bailly, [elenkhos])”. The Latin title of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations is De Sophisticis Elenchis (Hamblin 1970, 305).

---

 

RELATIONS

A relation is a two-place predicate R that associates two objects, a and b. This is denoted by “aRb”. Relations are characterized by three general properties, symmetry, transitivity, and reflexivity:

– Symmetry, or reciprocity: The same relationship holds between a and b and b and a.
– Reflexivity: The relationship connects an object to itself.
– Transitivity: The relationship connecting a to b and b to c also connects a to c.

1. Symmetry, or reciprocity

A relation is symmetric or reciprocal if it relates both a to b and b to a.
In other words, both “aRb” and “bRa” hold.
If a loves b, b does not necessarily love a: a love relationship is not symmetrical.
“Meeting” is a symmetric relationship. The following argument is no more or less logical than any other, but it would be a valid point in a detective novel. It can only be rejected by accusing Peter of lying.

If Peter confessed to meeting Paul at the bar, then we must assume that Paul met Peter. Paul cannot deny the obvious.

2. Reflexivity

A reflexive relation relates a being to itself. It is noted “aRa”.
“— Being contemporary of —” is a reflexive relationship: a is his own strict contemporary.
For the average person, the causal relationship is not reflexive. Only God is causa sui, his own cause.

The reflexive relation can be used ad hominem. For example, the principle “charity begins at home” for example forces the reflexivity of the relationship “a makes charity to b”. Nevertheless, the love of others can be used to encourage self-care:

If you love all humanity, then you should try to love yourself as well!

A counselor’s competence can be challenged by inviting them to make a reflexive use of their talents:

Doctor, heal thyself!

Such replies correspond to the ad hominem variety, setting up practices against words.

3. Transitivity

A relation is transitive if, when it connects a to b and b to c, then it also connects a to c.
In other words, “aRb and bRc” implies that “aRc”.

However if a loves b, and if b loves c, then a does not necessarily love c. Thus a relationship of love is not transitive.
The relation “being the father of ” is not transitive, but “being an ancestor of” is transitive. If a is an ancestor of b and if b is an ancestor of c, then a is an ancestor of c.

These inferences based on the transitivity of a predicate apply whenever at least three objects are positioned on a graduated scale.

If a is bigger, older, richer … than b
and b larger, older, richer … than c,
Then a is bigger, older, richer … than c.

These inferences are part of the unnoticed evidence exploited by everyday reasoning and argument. They are sometimes considered to be “quasi-logical”, see quasi-logic; but being sound and valid does not preclude being an argument.

4. Conversion

S. Conversion

RELATED WORDS
A CONJUGATA

Latin A conjugata argument, conjugatus, “related, of the same family”

There are three types of arguments based on the fact that two words are morphologically (materially) related, depending on the nature of their relationship:

An etymological relation see true meaning of the word.
A morphological relation, see derived words.
A phonic or graphic resemblance, see homonymy.

Synonymy and antonymy are semantic relationships.

---

REFUTATION

All components of a written or spoken discourse in a given situation can be used and/or manipulated by the opponent to show that the discourse needs to be corrected or is totally intolerable.

Two main types of strategy can be distinguished refutation and destruction, or combinations thereof. Discourse destruction is an all-out global attack aimed at invalidating both the discourse and the speaker. Discourse refutation is a  reactive speech act involving an explicit and, at least partially, to the matter argued rejection of a claim, usually extended to the position which it supports. Such refutations are usually accompanied by negative evaluations and signs of tension, which may be expressed paralinguistically:

A congress of mathematicians. During the discussion session of a paper, a participant is given the floor  He goes to the blackboard, without speaking, and writes a few lines of mathematics, without saying a word. Violently, he adds a final comma to his writing, throws the chalk into its box and returns to his seat, still without saying a word.

From a scientific point of view, a proposition is refuted when it is shown to be false; the calculation from which it is derived contains an error; it affirms something that contradicts the observed facts.
From the point of view of ordinary interaction, a line of argument line is contextually refuted when, after being discussed, it is abandoned, either explicitly or implicitly. Accordingly, the question itself disappears, and the interaction moves on to another structuring topic.

As a reactive speech act, refutation can only be handled in a verbal (face-to-face) or written (text-to-text) dialogue. Monological discourse knows only the concession, there are no refutative subordinate clauses, and concessive clauses reduce the refutation to an objection.

1. Refutation Targets at a Key Structural Component of the Argument

Any component of the propositional argument model can be targeted by the act of refutation, see argumentation-3 – layout of argument

1.1 Rejecting the Argument

An argument supporting a conclusion can be rejected in several ways.

(i) The argument is declared to be false:

S1 — Peter will certainly arrive on Tuesday; he has been invited to Paul’s birthday party.
S2 — But Paul’s birthday is on Monday.

(ii) The argument is rejected as irrelevant to the conclusion:

S1 — He is very intelligent, he read all of Proust’s works in three days.
S2 — Intelligence has nothing to do with reading speed.

(iii) The argument may be accepted as such, recognized as somehow relevant to the conclusion but may be dismissed as too weak, or of poor quality:

S1 — The President has spoken, the stock market will go up.
S2 — Yes, and what he says goes! (said sarcastically).

Rejecting the argument may lead to a new argumentative question (sub-debate), about the truth, strength or relevance of the disputed argument.

Reject the argument and maintain the conclusion.

S1 — Peter will certainly arrive on Tuesday, he wants to be there for Paul’s birthday.
S2 — Paul’s birthday is on Monday, but Peter will not arrive until Tuesday, I bought his tickets.

Nevertheless, in ideological debates, only the most ascetic arguers will refute questionable or bad arguments in favor of conclusions that they consider good or virtuous.

1.2 Rejecting the support

The support invoked, implicitly or not, is declared false:

S1 — Pedro was born in the Malvinas Islands, so he is an Argentine citizen.
S2 — The Falkland Islands are British territory.

The adverbs exactly, precisely (not) can substitute one support for another (Ducrot & al., 1982), see orientation:

S1 — Noodles for dinner!
S2 — Again! We had noodles for lunch!
S1 — (Exactly!), we have to eat the leftovers, we don’t waste food.

The resulting stasis is caused by the conflict of two topoi:

Diet or taste: « you have to vary your diet« .
Economic principle « food should not be thrown away« .

2. The argument is not relevant

See relevant

— Not relevant to the conclusion:

S1 — Cannabis should be legalized; the taxes will pay off the National Health Service deficit
S2 —It will certainly increase tax revenues, but it will further increase the number of drug addicts. Prohibition must be maintained.

— Not relevant to the issue:

Discussion: Town council; about the new school
S1 — Did you know that the law requires us to offer a weekly vegetarian menu from the start of the school year?
S2 — I think this is an excellent idea!
Chair — Please, catering is not on the agenda, we have to decide about the matter of the documentation center.

3. Refutation using the resources of counter-discourse

In the previous section, the concept of refutation was approached in the general terms used to describe the « argument pattern » in general. Now, each argument pattern can also be rebutted on the basis of its specific defining structure and components. The possible rebuttal strategies correspond to the fuzzy set of critical questions attached to the specific argument pattern under consideration.

Testimony: Was the witness able to see and hear what he reported?
Authority: Was the quotation accurately reported?
Definition (lexical): Does the definition include the main uses of the word?
Structural analogy: Were the relevant elements and relationships in the resource and target domains clearly defined and connected?
Induction: Were the cases cited to support the generalization correctly tested for the characteristic in question?
Causal claim: Is the claimed effect properly constituted?

A negative answer to any of these critical questions contributes to the refutation of the argument under consideration.

In the skeptical philosophical style, these lines of criticism, can be cumulated to reject the argumentative type itself as inherently weak in a « discourse against authority, etc. which rejects all forms of argument from authority, and so on.
These discourse cumulate in a general discourse « against argumentation”.

These questions on refutation go to the heart of evaluating arguments (enthymemes), that is, weighing their weaknesses against their strengths, and this requires some expertise in the ecology of arguments, that is, the specific domain and circumstances in which they operate.
This is the overarching condition for a correct evaluation of an argument, and that is why, in the case of any somewhat complex argument, the evaluator must at least be familiar with in the field in which he or she claims to intervene, see

A question remains: is it possible to correctly delimit and characterize the discursive concrete elements of the text that correspond to the abstract entities that are supposed to characterize the basic structure of the argument, for example, what are the data considered, the correct levels of support and warrant, the condition of refutation and the precise meaning of the conclusion, in the scientific field in which it lives? Or should we prudently limit ourselves with what we call everyday discourse?

4. Paradoxical effects of refutation

See Paradoxes of Argumentation and Refutation, §2:

– The absence of rebuttal confirms the position that it attacks, even if this position is false, inconsequential, or absurd.

– A weak rebuttal strengthens the position it attacks.

–  An weak rebuttal by a recognized good debater strongly confirms the attacked position.
=> Hence the possibility of knowingly proposing a weak rebuttal to support a position when it cannot be openly supported.

 

---

 

« RED HERRING »

Herrings turn red when smoked; red herrings were used by fugitives to lead dogs on a false trail.

The expression is used figuratively in argumentation, where the so-called “red herring” strategy is referred to as a diversionary strategy, where a distraction is used to avoid the issue, and divert the discussion to an irrelevant issue, see relevance.

---

 

RECIPROCITY

1. Reciprocal (Symmetric) Verbs

Consider a statement linking two noun phrases: N 1 — Verb — N2.
By permuting the actants, we get the statement: N 2 — Verb —N1.
— In general, these statements have different meanings:

Big fish eat small fish: A eats B.
Small fish eat big fish: B eats A.

— In some cases, the two statements have the same meaning. The verbs that allow the permutation of the complements are called symmetrical (or reciprocal)

The weight of the apples is equal to that of the cherries
is equivalent to:
The weight of the cherries is equal to that of the apples.

<being equal to>, <being the friend of>, <being the brother or sister of>, <meeting> are reciprocal.

Peter is  Paul’s friend = Paul is Peter’s friend = Peter and Paul are friends. Peter and Paul are equal for the friendship relationship.

If a has met b, then b has a, in other words, a and b have met. The following argument would make sense in a detective novel; it can only be rejected by accusing Peter of lying:

If Peter confessed to meeting Paul at the bar,then,  we must assume that Paul met Peter. Paul cannot deny the obvious.

The distance from one point to another point is a symmetrical relationship, but the time it takes to travel that distance is not necessarily so.

Logical and Linguistic Aspects of Reciprocity
In mathematics, the relation of reciprocity is strict: if a function F is reciprocal, then F(ab) is strictly equivalent to F(ba). This is not the case in ordinary language:

Peter has met Paul:
The situation develops from Peter’s point of view.
In other words, we follow Peter and meet Paul.

Paul met Peter:
The situation develops from Paul’s point of view.
We follow Paul and meet Peter.

The difference between a mathematical function < F(a, b)> and an ordinary verb <to be friend with> is that ordinary language presents events from a particular perspective. This is a trace of subjectivity in language.

The relation of reciprocity (symmetry) is considered as “quasi-logical” by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca. Quine would probably say that there is a a stylistic difference (see connectives) between the logical construction and the grammatical construction. Both lead to their elimination.

1. Principle of Reciprocity

In some human groups, reciprocity is a moral and social imperative.  Reciprocity is a kind of egalitarian principle, defined on the basis of the set of actions that bind two persons.
The strict principle of reciprocity says that that if A does something positive to/for B, then B must reciprocate to A, by doing the same thing to/for A.
This is the principle of returning favors. The individuals A and B are equal in this relationship.
If A has given B a gift, such as an invitation to dinner, then B concludes that he must do the same, i.e. give A some gift or invitation.

The principle of reciprocity acts as a constraint: « If you invite me to dinner, I must invite you to dinner.
If A has given B a decisive advantage, then B must do something equivalent for A when the situation arises: “a favor is never lost.

As a form of natural morality, the imperative of reciprocity is a correlative of  the principle:

Do to others as you would have them do to you. (Gospel of Luke, 6:31)
Do not do to others what you do not want done  to you.

In the latter form, “do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you,” this second principle opposes to the talion principle, « an eye for an eye ». This is a special case of the “you too!” argument.

The principle of reciprocity is a resource that can be used to regulate social interactions, for example in arguments such as « I am polite to you, so be polite to me.
The speaker defines himself and his  partner as members of the same category, who must be treated in the same way, see rule of Justice.

The principle of reciprocity can only be strictly applied only to acts for which A and B can be treated as equals. It makes no sense if there is a fundamental inequality between A and B: if A gives B alms, or if A fines B, there is no question of B mechanically applying the strict reciprocity. But in a romance novel, B may save A‘s life, and in a detective novel B may take revenge on the person who condemned him.

In modern times, we might consider nuclear deterrence, based on the certainty of mutual destruction, as a concrete application of this principle.

Reciprocity as a legal principle allows different states to assert their equal international dignity, and possibly to justify a retaliation:

if country A requires a visa for the nationals of country B, it is right for country B to require a visa for nationals of country A as well.

Reciprocity can be used for retaliation and revenge: « An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. If A has wronged B in some way, then B can legitimately do the same wrong to A.

If your jilted lover has disfigured you with vitriol, the court grants you the right to treat him in the same way.

---