Constructing / exploiting a reality

arguing to construct a relation or a property — arguing from a relation, appealing to a relation or a property

Four basic relations and properties : argumentative construction and argumentative exploitation

Four basic argument schemes

Before living in a house, you must first build it. Before using an analogy, you must first show that there is such a an analogy

The notions of analogy, authority, causality, and definition appear, by one name or another, in all collections of arguments.

These concepts fall into two types of argumentations.

First step, it must be shown that the relationship actually exists, if you want to exploit it later.

Stasis (1):

The existence of the relationship has to be proved through arguments that base, establish, construct, justify the answers given to these question.

The arguments and counter-arguments rely on the application of shared criteria methods and test for what is a proven causal link, a strong analogy, a true authority, and a substantial definition

Second step, this relationship can be exploited in argumentation from causality, analogy, authority or definition.  For example, if the answer are positive:

… so, it would be wise to limit  their use

… so, we must expect considerable political upheaval

… so, I will invest my money with them.

… so, why should I worry about all these elections fuss?

It is possible to admit that there is a causal link and tha

A radical rebuttal to these claims is to show that the underlying causal relationship  doesnot hold true ;  the analogy does not hold;   the authority is a sham; the definition is ridiculous.

Lat. distinguo, 1st person singular present indicative of the Latin verb distinguere, “to separate; to distinguish”.

Distinguo is a strategy developed in order to avoid a terminological difficulty or confusion, either perceived in the discourse of an opponent or envisioned in a polyphonical space as a possible mistake.
The word distinguo is also used as a synonym for paradiastole, S. Orientation Reversal.

1. Distinguo used as an analytical tool

Distinguos are useful for clarifying definitions of complex realities. In current language, to make a distinguo is to draw distinctions in order to clarify a complex notion.

The system of ‘territorial development’ is based on the interaction between its two components: the local economic system on the one hand, and the so-called ‘territorial’ system on the other.
The distinguo between the latter two systems stems from oppositions relating to the underlying logics that bear them. The economic system obeys principles that are recognized and exposed in economics. […] The territorial system, for its part, covers all the human, social, economic and urban functions of the place.
Lthe oinger & J.-C. Nemery, [Recomposition and development of territories], 1998.[1]

2. Distinguo used to rebut an argument

The distinguo is an instrument used to reduce ambiguity: “do not mix everything up!”. It can be used for example to detect a four terms paralogism , or, generally a shift in the meaning of a term in a reasoning. It is justified when it is based on socially recognized distinctions, independently established in a language dictionary or an encyclopedia, for example to eliminate the confusion created by the use of the word metal to refer to a chemically simple body as well as to an alloy.

In a second instance, distinguo is used to re-establish a blurred distinction (Mackenzie 1988). To make a distinguo is to say, “I distinguish [in your speech] some truth and some errors, and I’m going to rectify the mistakes”. Consider the following theological syllogism (after Chenique, 1975, p. 9):

Every man is a sinner
No sinner will enter heaven
No man will enter heaven.

The opponent says:

• • I agree with the minor proposition “every man is a sinner”.
  • In the major, “no sinner shall enter heaven”, distinguo, I distinguish two different statements:

— “(No sinner) as a sinner shall enter heaven”, I agree: “no man in a state of sin will enter heaven”;
— “(No sinner) as a forgiven sinner shall enter heaven”: I deny this proposition. The distinguo does not bear upon the meaning of the word sinner, but two categories of sinners.

(iii)     Therefore, I deny your conclusion.

The opponent therefore objects that the syllogism is fallacious, for the minor is true in one sense, and false in another.
This is not a case of a four terms syllogism fallacious by homonymy, S. Paralogism. Sinner is not ambiguous by homonymy, but because, it can be construed in two different ways in a theological context.

Distinguo is a figure traditionally dismissed as being “scholastic”, and used to draw spurious oppositions. Thomas Diafoirus courts Angélique, who hates him:

Angélique: — But the greatest mark of love is to submit to the will of her who is loved.
Thomas Diafoirus: — Distinguo, madam; in what does not have to do with possessing her, concedo; but in what does have to do with it, nego.
Molière, [The Imaginary Invalid], [1673][2]

Thomas Diafoirus is brutal and pedantic; he claims his right to possess Angélique, against her will; apart from this, however, he is ready to submit to her will. The distinguo is an instrument which prevents or rectifies ambiguities, but when it introduces distinctions into a perfectly clear expression, it can itself cause confusion.

In these cases, the distinguo may or may not be accepted according to the value of the distinction operated. In the case of the sinner, the distinguo might be justified by the parallel case of the criminal: a criminal having served his or her sentence cannot be called a criminal without qualification: one cannot say, “he is a criminal, let’s call the police!”, a distinguo is clearly necessary.
In the case of Angélique, the distinguo invokes an arbitrary, ad hoc distinction. In this case it can be countered by a third round of speech such as “stop it now!, enough with your scholastic distinguos!”, “stop quibbling please, you are obnoxious!”.

[1] Loinger G. & Nemery J.-C.. Recomposition et Développement des Territoires, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998. P. 126.
[2] Molière, Le Malade imaginaire [1673], act II, scene 6. Quoted after Ch. Franks, D. Lettau, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/9070/9070-h/9070-h.htm (11-08-2017)

1. Current definition

The ad consequentiam argument scheme is currently defined as follows:

(1) Appeal to consequences, also known as argumentum ad consequentiam (Latin for « argument to the consequence »), is an argument that concludes a hypothesis (typically a belief) to be either true or false based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences. (Wikipedia, Appeal to consequences).
God must exist: if he does not exist, then very many people pray for nothing!
(Wikipedia, Argumentum ad consequentiam, in French)

Walton (1999) traces the “Historical Origins of Argument Ad Consequentiam”.

2. Different meanings of ad consequentiam

The Latin word consequentia means:

1. 1. “What comes after” in space or in time.
   2. The logical consequence: per consequentias, “it follows that” (Gaffiot, Consequentia)
      Lat. ex quo natura consequi ut… “from which it is a natural consequence that” [1]

In the first meaning, an argument ad consequentiam refers to something that happened after a central event. For example, a large sum of money was stolen from Paul. The investigator notes that after the date of the robbery, James, an acquaintance of Paul’s, spent large sums of money, while nothing changed in his income. The investigator uses  an argument based upon « what happened after (the theft) » to charge James with the theft, S. Circumstances.

In the second meaning, an argument ad consequentiam is an argument based on causal or logical consequences. With this meaning, the label ad consequentiam covers all the range of appeals to consequences (effect-to-cause arguments), be they positive or negative:
— The pragmatic argument appealing to positive consequences is an ad consequentiam argument.
— In the same way, appeals to absurdity are a form of refutative appeal to consequences deemed absurd a) from a logical point of view (they lead to a contradiction), or b) undesirable from a psychological or moral point of view, or c) contrary to the pragmatic interests and values of the speaker.

So, one may fear that definition (1) misleadingly reduces the various effect/consequence to cause arguments to what can more conveniently be called pathetic argumentation, if we are to judge by the example.

[1] « Again, [the Stoics] hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that = ex quo natura consequi ut we should prefer the common advantage to our own. 
(Cicero, De Finibus, Bk 3) https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Finibus/home.html]

Lat. “tu quoque!”; tu “you”, quoque “too”

In Latin and in English, the “you too” argument scheme is named after the statement that typically realizes the argument.
In the general case the reply:

S1:   — I do A because X does so.

is a strategy of legitimation by imitation. The fact that X makes A creates a precedent^@ legitimizing A, and if S1 considers X as a model, it gives A a second form of legitimacy. Such legitimations are part of the “You too!” argumentation; its scenario is as follows:

S1 performs such action A.
S2 blames him
S1 replies: “But you do it too! You do the same!”

S2 criticizes S1 for an action that he presents as blameworthy. S1 can reply in a variety of ways:

(i) He can first answer to S2 that others do the same: since Landru (a popular French serial killer) murdered his mistresses, why couldn’t I? The degree of legitimation depends on the severity of the transgression and the number of transgressors. I run a red light in the open country, when there is no traffic and the visibility is perfect, and I feel justified in saying “well, this is forbidden, but everyone does it, the guy ahead went through, I just followed him”.

(ii) In the case where the wrongdoer is not another third party but S2, S1 has two possibilities:

— As in the previous case, S1 can quietly legitimize his or her action by the (bad) example given by S2.

— S1 can also reply using a counter-accusation, which seeks to put S2 in the face of the contradiction between what he preaches and what he does, S. Ad hominem. S1 acknowledges his or her misbehavior, but considers that, due to his or her own misbehavior, S2 is in no position to teach him or her a lesson. In terms of stasis, the defendant does not recognize the legitimacy of the judge, S. Stasis:

S1: — It suits you well to blame me! Please, not you! I have no moral lessons to receive from you.

“Two wrongs don’t make a right”

The phrase “two wrongs don’t make a right” can be understood in two different ways.

— First, as “one does not fight evil with evil”, that is, “evil must be fought by legal means”, a very important principle; many would be tempted to add the clause “as far as possible”. In other words, the good end — the struggle against evil — should not be pursued by evil means; such as torturing the former torturer to stop torture. This would amount to a case of autophagy.
This principle is invoked to reject the justification of a mistreatment made to somebody by arguing, in a sort of anticipatory law of retaliation, that, had he been in our place, this is what he would have done to us, S. Reciprocity (after FF, Two wrong).
— Secondly, it can express the rule that “bad behavior does not become legitimate because widespread”; many wrongs never make a right. The common transgression (argument from number) never creates an against-the-law legitimacy, S. Consensus.

In practical life, thanks to a minor miracle, an error sometimes compensates for another. This also seems to occur in science:

Kepler knows that Tycho Brahe [obtained] the best possible accuracy on the measurements of the positions of the planets (including the planet Mars), and this accuracy was of two minutes of degree. With the mathematical model of a circular orbit on the Mars planet that he (Kepler) used, Kepler noticed discrepancies of eight minutes of degree between the positions observed by Tycho Brahe and the calculated positions. Trusting the precision of Tycho Brahe’s measurements, Kepler renounces the circular orbit of Mars. He revises the orbit of the Earth and, thanks to two compensating errors, discovers his first law: “In the motion of a planet, the vector ray sweeps equal areas in equal times.”
Edgar Soulié, [Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), the Protestant astronomer who discovered the laws of motion of the planets], (no date).[1]

[1] Edgar Soulié, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) L’astronome protestant qui a découvert la loi du mouvement des planètes. http://www.astrosurf.com/rtaa/rtaa2016/documents/kepler-edgar-soulie.pdf (01-09-2017).

1. The scheme

The argument from waste is defined as follows by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca:

The argument of waste consists in saying that, as one has already begun a task and made sacrifices, which would be wasted if the enterprise were given up, one should continue in the same direction. This is the justification given by the banker who continues to lend to his insolvent debtor in the hope of getting him on his feet again in the long run. This is one of the reasons which, according to Saint Theresa, prompt a person to pray, even in a period of “dryness.” One would give up, she says, if it were not

‘… that one remembers that it gives delight and pleasure to the Lord of the garden, that one is careful not to throw away all the service rendered, and that one remembers the benefit one hopes to derive from the great effort of dipping the pail often into the well and drawing it up empty’. (1958], p. 279)

According to the tradition established by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, the Treatise introduces the scheme of waste by a definition immediately followed by two illustrations. The defining topos is given in the following passage:

as one has already begun a task and made sacrifices, which would be wasted if the enterprise were given up, one should continue in the same direction.

The topos is given as a generic sentence, outlining a typified situation. The agents are impersonal (“one”); “(one has) already begun” / “should continue”; “a task”, an “enterprise”; “(one has made) sacrifices.

The topos corresponds to the following script (the elements of the affective scenario are underlined):

(i) A complex initial situation:

(a) A task has been started in the hope of a significant benefice.
(b) The task is long and difficult: sacrifices have been made.
(c) Nothing has been obtained (implicit).

(ii) These hard conditions generate an interrogation:

(d) Implicit: despair looms; it is possible and one is tempted to stop: “should I continue?” This key point is not explicitly mentioned in the scheme.
(e) The situation is now radicalized, as a risk of losing everything:

— Either (e1) I “give up” and all the efforts will be wasted.
— Or (e2), I go on, “hoping” that things will finally turn better.

This key element, hope, is not mentioned in the scheme, it only appears in the first example.

(e2) can be derived from (e1) by application of the opposite scheme:

 give up and waste everything
continue and not to lose, or even to win (implicit).

(iii) Conclusion: A decision, actually a bet: “one should continue in the same direction”.

All these conditions are crucial, for example (e). If it was a cumulative task (like weight training), then one could justify the decision to stop by saying that, well, “it is something anyway”.

*

The scheme is structured by a concatenation of emotions:

hope → temptation of despair → renewed hope

2. Related forms

The scheme of waste is related to the proverbial scheme, “one does not stop in mid-stream”, to which one can reply “either you stop or you drown yourself”. It is vulnerable to a counter-discourse such as, “we have already lost enough time like that.”

Slippery Slope

The scheme of waste ratifies the slippery slope argument, “we must not begin, because, if we start, we will not be able to stop”. This last scheme justifies an initial abstention, whereas the argument of waste is that of perseverance in action, S. Direction.

Sunk cost fallacy

The sunk cost argument is discussed in Walton 2002, Walton & al. 2008, p. 326-327. Economic theory distinguishes between sunk costs (retrospective costs), which have already been incurred and are therefore irrecoverable, and forecast costs (future costs). This theory states that, in decision-making, only theforecast costs should be taken into account. It follows that taking into account past costs and sacrifices already made is irrational and fallacious (Wikipedia, Sunk cost).
The banker must know how to evaluate the situation of his debtor at any moment and then, according to this evaluation alone, without taking into account past costs, take his losses, as he knows how to take his profits.

3. Examples

The following example introduces a formula frequently associated with this scheme when used to justify the continuation of a war “then they would have died for nothing!”:

“Beating a retreat is tantamount to recognizing that all our guys died for nothing!” claims [John McCain’s ⁽¹⁾ fan] Private Carl Bromberg, having returned home.
 ⁽¹⁾ Republican Presidential nominee for the 2008 United States presidential election.
Marianne, 1-10 March 2008, p. 59.

The key elements of the scheme can be scattered across the passage (our emphasis):

He [the philosopher Alain] does not believe in the war in the name of law. From the end of 1914 on, he favors a peace of compromise, and he follows very closely, through the Tribune de Genève ⁽¹⁾ sent to him by the household Halévy, everything which looks like the beginning of a negotiation, however fragile. But he is under no illusion: precisely because it is so hideous, so murderous, so blind, so total, war is very difficult to stop. It does not belong to this category of armed conflicts that cynical princes can stop if they consider that the costs exceeds the possible gains, and that the game is not worth the candle. It is led by patriots, honest men elected by their people, who are locked up every day more and more in the aftermath of the decisions of July 1914⁽²⁾. The sufferings have been so great, the deaths so numerous that no one dares to act as if they had not been necessary. And how do we move forward without being labeled as a traitor? The longer the war lasts, the longer it will last. It kills democracy, from which it nevertheless receives what perpetuates its course.
⁽¹⁾ A Swiss newspaper ⁽²⁾ Date of the declaration of war.
François Furet, [The Past of an Illusion], 1995[1].

Leaders of democracies may be using the sunk cost argument when they decide to continue the war, despite heavy losses, thinking they had a good chance of winning.

*

On the method of identifying a topos in a passage, see Argument scheme, which uses the waste argument as an example.

[1] François Furet, Le Passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle. Paris: Robert Laffont & Calmann-Levy, 1995, p. 65. [The Past of an Illusion. Essay on the communist idea in the twentieth century]

The word norm has two main meanings.

1. The statisticians’ norm, the average

In France, the average age of / for first sexual intercourse is 16.8 years. 27% of young people are sexually active before 16. In a lifetime, the French have, on average, 16.7 partners. Only 10% will be satisfied with the same one all their lives. on average, our contemporaries perform 121 somersaults per year. « 

Source: [http://www.uniondesfamilles.org/sexualite_ en_chiffres.htm] (20-09- 2013)

2. The norm as imperative

Its description involves the injunction of an obligation, which is expressed by a rule whose content belongs to / falls within the particular institution or domain concerned, for example:

Moral and legal domain: Thou shalt not kill

Ordinary civility: Thou shalt respond when spoken to

Proper use of language: Thou shalt not say « I is », thou shalt say « I am »

Rational behavior: Thou shalt not use ambiguous statements; thy tongue shall not be forked

Road driving: Thou shalt remain in control of thy vehicle.

3. Norms in argumentation

The different theories of argumentation have very different relationships with norms; only some express them in the form of rules.

Generalized theories of argumentation

The generalized theories of argumentation, such as the theory of argumentation in language or natural logic, have no relation with norms of morality, truth or rationality. When the theory of argumentation in language speaks of norms, it is about linguistic norms, which are expressed in terms of acceptability or non-acceptability of the statements and of the sequences of statements. The rules considered are the structural forms of language.

Rhetoric as an ars bene dicendi

Argumentative rhetoric as an ars bene dicendi, defines rhetoric as form, “art of speaking well”, and as content “art of saying what is morally good”.

The speech does not have an autonomous standard, its norms are externalized as a moral of discourse, combine with a art of speaking in agreement with the rules of good taste,

Both are diffuse norms, adaptable to the tastes of the time, which would be difficult to transpose into a set of rules.

New Rhetoric

The New Rhetoric takes as a norm the quality of the audience, in particular the universal audience, S. Persuade and convince

The norm is not provided by a system of rules but by an ideal instance, the universal audience.

Classical logic

As a natural form of argumentation, classical logic uses as a norm the rules of the syllogism, S. Syllogistic paralogisms.

Pragma-dialectic

The Pragma-dialectics proposes a system of normative rules, S. Rules; Evaluations and evaluators.

1. A word as a hologram of the argument

Holography is a technique that provides a two-dimensional representation of three-dimensional phenomena. In metaphorical sense, a word can function as the hologram of a whole argumentation (actually a set of co-oriented speeches) and mirror the totality of the argumentative discourse it is part of. The line of discourse is condensed into one of its points, that being the word. Such hologrammatic words are termed oriented (in the Argumentation within Language theory) or biased (in standard Fallacy theory).

Argumentations containing oriented words are considered to be fallacious and sophistical insofar as they actually presuppose the conclusions they apparently construct. The conclusion is embedded in the wording of the argument, and the reasoning is trapped in a vicious circle. Metaphorically, one may say that the target (the conclusion) is tailored to the measure of the arrow (the argument); the arrow cannot miss the target, and is therefore irrelevant.

This is true if an argumentation is considered to be a self-sufficient piece of reasoning, contained in an autonomous discursive episode. If argumentation is seen as an on-going process, however, the orientation of words testifies to the fact that the argumentative discourse not only constructs its conclusion on the spot, but also recalls that this conclusion has been previously established. Oriented words refer to the whole script corresponding to the arguer’s discourse; they are the memory of argumentation, and the clearest example of objects of discourse. The word biased has a negative orientation (“prejudiced; to be avoided”) while orientation, oriented can have a neutral-positive orientation (“taking bearings”), while admitting, if need be, a negative orientation (“biased”).

The global issue is that of the argument orientation and the persuasive definition. The first case involves language data and the second speech activity, in the first case the discourse is biased per se, in the second case it is made biased by the participant.

2. Designations as issues

Let us consider the pro-life vs. free choice debate. If a participant speaks of babies and the other of fetuses, we already know that the former is most probably pro-life and the latter pro-free-choice. The antagonistic words are “loaded” with the antagonistic conclusion towards which they are oriented. Baby refers to a human person, and implies that we must feel for this being all the value-loaded emotions we feel for young children, and treat him or her accordingly. Fetus puts these attitudes between parentheses, and technically refers to a “product of the conception of vertebrates during prenatal development, after the embryonic stage, when it begins to form and to present the distinctive characteristics of the species.” (TLFi, Fetus). A word might be value-loaded in a discourse and not in another. In the developmental discourse of medicine, for example, fetus opposes to embryo and is a non-controversial technical designation, as is baby when referring to a pre-toddler child.
The idea of human selection is generally repulsive. The search for a positive designation for babies which have been genetically selected in order to treat his or her sick brother or sister, continues. Candidate terms include, designer baby, medicine baby, savior baby, doctor baby….

A similar debate is also reflected in the designation for products used as crop treatments, and suspected to be carcinogenic. The terms agro-pharmaceutical product or phyto-sanitary product sound highly chemical, and the latter has even been appropriated by a French association “Phyto-Victims”. Pesticide has also a negative orientation, despite its etymological meaning, “pests killer” (as if the negation of a negation was interpreted as an hyper-negation). The terminological fight continues, and the industry has turned to plant protection product and crop protection product.

The orientation of ordinary words strongly differentiates natural language and logical languages. Biased language can be considered an obstacle to the objective treatment of the issue, and has thus been banned from argumentative discourse as an instrument of monological rationality. The problem is how to agree upon the purification principle, as it could significantly affect most of out common vocabulary.

Categorization operations are not too problematic for plants, animals and other natural species. Things are more complicated when it comes to beings and situations whose designations cannot be agreed upon before the debate, but is actually the very issue at stake.

In the debate about abortion for example, the discussion of the correct designation, fetus or baby, cannot be dissociated from the discussion on the merits and disadvantages of abortion itself.

In practice, the persuadee must assent not only to a position, but also to the corresponding expression, S. Persuasion. It is not possible to remediate biased language by a conventionalism, consisting in agreeing on the meaning of the words before the debate in which they are to be used, refraining from using loaded terms, or creating neutral terms. The discussion of the nature of the object is not separable from the discussion of its name. The fact of being at the heart of a debate results in duplication of the designation of the object. Its objective designation and “real name” will eventually be attributed to it at the end of the debate; objectivity is not a condition but a product of the debate.

The search for “neutral” terms shows, on the one hand, the desire to put ordinary language between parentheses when it comes to serious issues, insofar as it does not correspond to a pure referential and inferential ideals, and, on the other hand, the wish to consider that the debate between rational beings consists only in clarifying semantic misunderstandings, which are the consequence of the defects of natural language. The task of argumentation would be relatively simple if we could assume that some data are accepted as such by both parties; this is true only for peaceful neutral facts, external to the heart of the debate. In the other case, the division of discourses is openly exposed by the use of so-called biased, loaded or oriented designations. The designation is already argumentative, S. Schematization. Agreeing on the designation of facts is a matter of identity, focus, emotional empathy. As there is a conversion to new beliefs, there is a conversion to new facts and words.

1. The mistake about camels in the Koran is traditional and I probably borrowed it from Borges:

A few days ago, I discovered a curious confirmation of the way in which what is truly native can and often does dispense with local color; I found this confirmation in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon observes that in the Arab book par excellence, the Koran, there are no camels; I believe that if there ever were any doubt as to the authenticity of the Koran, this lack of camels would suffice to prove that it is Arab. It was written by Mohammed, and Mohammed, as an Arab, had no reason to know that camels were particularly Arab; they were, for him, a part of reality, and he had no reason to single them out, while the first thing a forger, a tourist, or an Arab nationalist would do is bring on the camels, whole caravans of camels on every page; but Mohammed, as an Arab, was unconcerned; he knew he could be Arab without camels. I believe that we Argentines can be like Mohammed; we can believe in the possibility of being Argentine without abounding in local color.

Jorge Luis Borges, The Argentine Writer and Tradition (1951) (my emphasis)
Quoted from https://arabist.net/blog/2006/6/30/borges.html (10-29-2021

Borges is a writer, not a historian. Borges’ Gibbon is a “fiction”, which should not be mistaken for the historical Gibbon.

As the context makes clear,Borges uses the case of camels and the Koran as a resource domain for an analogy about the local color and the Argentine literature, an Argentina without gauchos is paralleled with a Koran without camels (certainly in relation with the Florida – Boedo antagonism)

2. Gibbon, Gagnier and the milk of the camel

Edward Gibbon never said that there was no camel in the Qur’an. Speaking about the life of the Arabs at the time of Mohammed, he praises the camel:

Alive or dead, almost every part of the camel is serviceable to man: her milk is plentiful and nutritious; the young and tender flesh has the taste of veal (¹³)

Footnote 13 […] Mahomet himself, who was fond of milk, prefers the cow and does not even mention the camel. But the diet of Mecca and Medina was already more luxurious (Gagnier, Vie de Mahomet, tom. iii, p. 404).

Edward Gibbon The History of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, … Vol. IX, New York, Fred de Fau, 1907.

Speaking of Muhammad’s diet, Gagnier actually says,

« milk was the prophet’s most favorite element » (p. 401).

Later, he quotes Muhammad saying:

« Cow’s milk nourishes & sustains the body (…) It is the most commendable of all milks, & it surpasses by its good qualities the milk of Sheep & the milk of Goat, especially by its delicacy and unctuousness » (p. 404).

Jean Gagnier, La vie de Mahomet… [The life of Mahomet…] Amsterdam, Wetstein & Smith. 1748.

This is a hierachization of the milks, topped by goat’s miks, followed by sheep’s milk, followed down by cow’s milk, etc.

The fact that came’s milk is not mentionned is not silence, but a relevant omission, by application of relevance rule, as shown by the possibility to add an etc to capp-off Gagnier’s enumeration.

3 A misreading of Gibbon’s text? A tentative reconstruction

A quick reader goes over the trivial « accessory » (between brackets):

Mahomet himself, [who was fond of milk], prefers the cow and] does not even mention the camel

but on the “essential” beginning and end of the sentence:

Mahomet does not even mention the camel.

This could be seen as a case of omission of relevant circumstances (S. Accident), resulting in a misconstruction of the reference chain and of the topic of the passage.

Finally, since, basically, Muhammad is the Koran, the conclusion is that:

Gibbon says that the Koran does not mention the camel.

QED.

The Port-Royal Logic stigmatizes the technique of the inventio as stimulating the “noxious fertility of common thoughts” (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 235). The same criticism applies to the techniques of elocutio, which stimulates and extolls the abundance of words (copia verborum) S. Ornamental, producing a verbose and redundant discourse:

Among the causes which lead us into error, by a false luster, which prevent our recognizing it, we may justly reckon a certain grand and pompous eloquence. […] for it is wonderful how sweetly a false reasoning flows in at the close of a period which well fits the ear, or of a figure which surprises us by its novelty, and in the contemplation of which we are delighted. (Id., p. 279)

The condemnation of the techniques stimulating the abundance of ideas as well as the abundance of words amounts to a general condemnation of rhetoric, as inherently fallacious. Cicero defines eloquence as copia verborum; that is eloquence; the rejection of eloquence, re-named verbiage to stigmatize its negative orientation, is a turning point in the relations between rhetoric and logic as a criticism of discourse. This fallacy of verbiage is, as it were, the mother of all fallacies. According to Whately:

a very long discussion is one of the most effective masks of the fallacies; […] a fallacy, which, asserted without a veil […] would not deceive a child can deceive half the world if it is diluted in a large quarto (Elements of Logic 1844) (quoted by Mackie, 1967, p. 179).

S. Systemic — Superfluity  — Fallacies (1)  — Fallacies (4): A Moral and Anthropological perspective

1. “Vicious circle”, “begging the question”, “petitio principii”

Petitio principii — In classical Latin, petitio means “request”, and principium “beginning” (Gaffiot [1934], Petitio; Principium). A petitio principii is literally a “request” of the “principles”. Tricot considers that the rendition as “petition of principle” is “vicious”. He notes that “what we ask to grant is not a principle but the conclusion to be proved” (note 2 to Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13, 162a30, p. 359).

The two expressions vicious circle and begging the question are equivalent. The expression vicious circle stresses the cognitive and textual, semantic aspects of the phenomenon, while begging the question emphasizes the dialectical interactional character of the same concept.

The speaker is “begging the question”, that is asking that what is « in question » (the disputed conclusion itself) be granted, as an argument or principle.

The Latin expression petitio principii is used as an equivalent of begging the question.

2. Vicious circle

In the Aristotelian system of fallacies, a vicious circle is a fallacy independent of language, S. Fallacies (2). It is a process of reasoning which seeks to prove a conclusion, by giving as an argument this conclusion itself. Hence the image of the circle. Its schematic form is:

A, since, so, because A.

There are different ways in which to beg a question (Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13).

2.1 Repetition

In ordinary discourse, compound statements “A because A” might be considered as begging the question from a logical point of view:

S1 — Mum, why do I have I to make my bed every morning?
S2 — You have to do it because you have to do it. It’s like that because it’s not otherwise

Nonetheless, despite its format, this is not a vicious circle. The answer is not an invalid justification but a refusal of justification, as testified by the associated mood, exasperation.

2.2 Reformulation

In common cases, there is a vicious circle where the conclusion is a paraphrastic reformulation of the argument:

I like milk because it’s good.

Fortunately I like milk, because if I did not like it I would not drink it, and it would be a pity because it’s so good.

When the very result to be demonstrated is postulated, “this is easily detected when put in so many words; but 
it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms,
or a term and an expression, that mean the same thing” (Aristotle, Top, VIII, 13).

In the theory of Argumentation within Language, the concept of orientation^@ introduces a bias which is not so different from mere petitio principii. The statement

Peter is clever, he will solve the problem.

The above example has a misleading deductive appearance, because the predicate “can solve problems” is in fact included in the definition of “is clever”. The misleading inference is actually a reformulation. Reformulations are interesting insofar as they are never strictly synonymous with their basis. Instead, they introduce a semantic shift, which can be productive. Begging the question is deceitful only in so far as it is strictly the same term that is repeated, S. Orientation.

Goethe claims that, in any argumentation, the argument is only a variation of the conclusion; hence it follows that argumentative rationality is simply vain rationalization:

§50 It is always better for us to say straight out what we think without wanting to prove much; for all the proofs we put forward are really just variations on our own opinions, and people who are otherwise minded listen neither to one nor to the other.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Maxims and Reflections.[1]

2.3 Ad hoc general laws

 The Topics point out the frequent case in which one assumes in the form of universal law what is in question in a particular case (ibid.):

Politicians are liars / corrupt. So this politician is a liar / corrupt

This is a most common kind of argumentation. The speaker postulates a one shot, ad hoc principle, in order to apply it to the case at hand. Such cases can also be analyzed as ill-constructed definitions: “being corrupt” is considered an essential characteristic of politicians, whereas it is only an accidental characteristic, S. Definition, Accident.

2.4 Mutual presupposition

Not all vicious circles are reformulations. An objection to the idea of ​​a miracle for example, is that it establishes a vicious circle. Miracles are said to justify the doctrine, to prove that it is true and holy, but a fact is recognized as a miracle only by the doctrine it is supposed to prove. It is a form of resistance to refutation:

S1_1 — This miraculous fact proves the existence of God.
S2_1 — But only those who believe in the existence of God recognize this fact as a miracle

S2 may add that S1 does not recognize other equally surprising facts; to which the latter might reply that:

S1_2 — These other facts are miracles operated by the devil to deceive people.

2.5 Equal uncertainty

The term diallel is used by the Skeptics, with a meaning identical to “vicious circle”:

And the circularity mode occurs when what ought to make the case for the matter in question has need of support from that very matter; whence, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 15, 169)

This definition introduces a new concept of the vicious circle that no longer focuses on a semantic equivalence or an epistemic relation, but on the very definition of argumentation as a technique to reduce the uncertainty of a claim by connecting it to a less doubtful statement, the argument. S. Argumentation. Skeptics will therefore endeavor to show that the argument is systematically no more obvious than the conclusion. In this sense, Skeptics are the first deconstructionists.

3. Circularity in explanation

Circularity is welcome in definitions, but not in demonstrations or explanations. An explanation is circular, if the explanans is at least as obscure as the phenomenon it claims to account for.

[1] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Maxims and Reflections. Trans. by E. Stopp. London: Penguin Books, 1998. Quoted after https://issuu.com/bouvard6/docs/goethe_-___maxims_and_reflections__ No pag. Goethe gathered these maxims during all his life.