VERBIAGE

The Port-Royal Logic stigmatizes the technique of the inventio as stimulating the « pernicious fertility of common thoughts » (Arnauld and Nicole [1662], p. 235). The same criticism applies to the techniques of elocutio, which stimulate and exalt the abundance of words (copia verborum). and is the fundamental component of eloquence, producing a verbose and redundant discourse, see ornament:

Among the causes which lead us into error, by a false luster, which prevents our recognizing it, we may justly reckon a certain grand and pompous eloquence. […] For it is wonderful how sweetly a false reasoning flows in at the close of a period which well fits the ear, or of a figure which surprises us by its novelty, and in the contemplation of which we are delighted. (Id., p. 279)

The condemnation of the techniques that stimulate the abundance of ideas as well as the abundance of words amounts to a general condemnation of rhetoric, as inherently fallacious. The rejection of eloquence, renamed verbiage to stigmatize its negative orientation, is a turning point in the relations between rhetoric and logic as a critique of discourse. This fallacy of verbiage is, as it were, the mother of all fallacies. According to Whately:

a very long discussion is one of the most effective masks of the fallacies; […] a fallacy, which, asserted without a veil […] would not deceive a child, can deceive half the world if it is diluted in a large quarto (Elements of Logic 1844) (quoted by Mackie, 1967, p. 179).

See fallacies 4: A Moral and Anthropological Perspective

VICIOUS CIRCLE – BEGGING THE QUESTION
PETITIO PRINCIPII

1. The Terms

Vicious circle, begging the question
The two expressions are equivalent. The expression vicious circle emphasizes the cognitive and textual, semantic aspects of the phenomenon, while begging the question emphasizes the dialectical interactional character of the same concept.
The speaker “begs the question”, that is, asks that what is « in question » (the disputed conclusion itself) be granted, as an argument or principle.

Petitio principii
The Latin expression petitio principii is used as the equivalent of begging the question.
In classical Latin, petitio means “request”, and principium means “beginning” (Gaffiot [1934], Petitio; Principium). A petitio principii is literally a “request” of the “principle”. Tricot considers that the expression “petition of the principle” is “vicious”. He notes that “what we ask to be granted is not a principle but the conclusion to be proved” (Note 2 on Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13, 162a30, p. 359).

2. Vicious Circle

In the Aristotelian system of fallacies, a vicious circle is a fallacy independent of language, see fallacies-2. It is a process of reasoning that attempts to prove a conclusion, by using that conclusion as an argument for the conclusion itself. Hence the image of the circle. Its logical schematic form is:

A, since, so, because… A.

There are different ways « to beg a question » (Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13).

2.1 Repetition

In ordinary discourse, the compound statements « A because A » can be regarded as begging the question from a logical point of view:

S1 — Mom, why do I have I to make my bed every morning?
S2 — You have to because you have to. It is so because it is not otherwise.

But despite its format, this is not a vicious circle. The answer is not an invalid justification but a rejection of any justification, as evidenced by the associated mood, despair or exasperation.

2.2 Reformulation

In many cases, there is a vicious circle because the conclusion is a reformulation of the argument:

I like milk because it’s good.

Fortunately, I like milk, because if I didn’t like it, I wouldn’t drink it, and that would be a shame because it’s so good.

When the very result to be demonstrated is postulated, « this is easily detected when put in so many words; but 
it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms,
or of a term and an expression, that mean the same thing” (Aristotle, Top., VIII, 13).

In the theory of argumentation within language, the concept of orientation introduces a bias which is not so different from mere petitio principii. The statement

Peter is smart, he will solve the problem.

The predicate “can solve problems” is a defining feature of “is smart”. The misleading inference is actually a reformulation.
Nevertheless, reformulations are interesting in that they are never strictly synonymous with their basis. They introduce a semantic shift that can be productive. Begging the question is deceptive only in so far as it is strictly the same term that is repeated, see orientation.

Goethe claims that, in any argumentation, the argument is only a variation of the conclusion; from this, it follows that argumentative rationality is simply vain rationalization:

§50 It is always better for us to say straight out what we think without wanting to prove much; for all the proofs we put forward are really only variations on our own opinions, and people who are otherwise minded listen neither to one nor to the other.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Maxims and Reflections[1].

2.3 Ad Hoc General Laws

 The Topics point out the frequent case in which one assumes in the form of a general law what is in question in a particular case (ibid.):

Politicians are liars / corrupt. So, this politician is a liar / corrupt.

This is a common form of argumentation. The speaker postulates an ad hoc principle, in order to apply it to the case at hand.
Such cases can also be analyzed as  poorly constructed definitions: “being corrupt” is taken to be an essential characteristic of politicians, whereas it is only an accidental characteristic, see definition; accident.

2.4 Mutual Presupposition

Not all vicious circles are reformulations. One objection to the idea of ​​a miracle for example, is that it creates a vicious circle. Miracles are supposed to justify the doctrine, to prove that it is true and holy, but a fact is only recognized as a miracle by the doctrine it is supposed to prove. It is a form of resistance to refutation:

S1₁ — This miraculous fact proves the existence of God.
S2₁ — But only those who believe in the existence of God recognize this fact as a miracle.

S2 might add that S1 does not recognize other equally surprising facts; to which the latter might reply:

S1₂ — These other facts are miracles performed by the devil to deceive people.

2.5 Equal Uncertainty

The term diallel is used by skeptics, with a meaning identical to “vicious circle”:

And the diallel mode occurs when that which ought to make the case for the matter in question requires the support of that very matter. Therefore, being unable to assume either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 15, 169)

This definition introduces a new concept of the vicious circle, which no longer focuses on a semantic equivalence or an epistemic relation, but on the very definition of argumentation as a technique for reducing the uncertainty of a claim by linking it to a less doubtful statement, the argument, see argumentation-1. Skeptics will therefore try to show that the argument is systematically no more obvious than the conclusion. In this sense, skeptics are the first deconstructionists.

3. Circularity in Explanation

Circularity is welcome in definitions, but not in demonstrations or explanations. An explanation is circular, if the explanans is at least as obscure as the phenomenon it purports to explain.

[1] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Maxims and Reflections. Trans. by E. Stopp. London: Penguin Books, 1998. Quoted after https://issuu.com/bouvard6/docs/goethe_-___maxims_and_reflections__ No pag. Goethe collected these maxims during all his life.

Appeal to the TRUE MEANING OF THE WORD

The appeal to the « true meaning of the word » is made in opposition to discourses that are said to use a false, improper, or superficial meaning of a given word. This appeal produces a stasis of definition (2).
The true meaning of a word can be sought in:

– its etymological meaning
– its morphology
– the meaning of the corresponding word in another language.

1. Argument by Etymology

The label « argument by etymology » corresponds to different kinds of arguments, depending on the meaning given to etymology.

1. Under the heading « argument from etymology », some modern texts discuss phenomena related to related words (Dupleix, 1603).
2. In modern usage, the etymological meaning of a word is the meaning of the oldest historical root identified in the history of the word.

The etymological argument valorizes the meaning of that root by assuming that this ancient meaning is the true and permanent meaning of that word, which has been altered by historical evolution to produce a contemporary perverted and misleading meaning. This etymological meaning is used in arguments that exploit a definition.

Atom comes from / is a Greek word composed of the negative prefix a- and a noun meaning « to cut »; it means « in-divisible ». So, you cannot break the atom.

Democracy comes from / is a Greek word composed of demos “people » and” kratos « rule ». In Syldavia, the people don’t rule, they vote and forget. So, Syldavia is not a democracy.

The appeal to etymology is itself supported by an argument from etymology, since the word etymology is derived from the Greek root ètumos meaning « true ».

Because knowledge of etymology is culturally valued, the argument from etymology gives the speaker a certain ethotic posture of majesty and erudite authority. It serves the strategy of discourse destruction well « You don’t even know the language you claim to speak », see destruction.

2. Argumentation Based on the Structure of the Word, Ex Notatione

Latin notatio, « the act of marking a sign … to designate […] to note », as well as « etymology » (Gaffiot [1934], Notatio).

Cicero in the Topics defines the argument « ex notatione » (Topics, VIII, 35: 78), translated as « argument by etymology ». This translation takes the word etymology in its ancient sense of « true ». The true sense of the word in question is now defined as the meaning reconstructed by the correct analysis of the word (and not as its original historical meaning).

One of the examples of argument discussed by Cicero in this context concerns a conflict over the interpretation of a compound legal term (still in use today), the postliminium (Top., VIII, 36, p. 78). The postliminium is the right of a prisoner returning to his country to regain the property and social position he held before his captivity.

Cicero’s discussion concerns the determination of the correct meaning of the word, on the basis based of its linguistic structure, without any clear allusion to its etymology in the contemporary sense of the term.

A contradictory report (joint report) is a report that reflects the statements of both parties, and not a self-contradictory verbal report, or a report that contradicts another.

The argumentation from the structure of the word thus combines two argumentations:

— The first argumentation establishes the meaning of the compound word on the basis of the meaning of its constituent terms and its morphological structure. This type of argumentation is relevant to all idioms whose meaning depends more or less on the meaning of the terms that compose them. It is based on linguistic knowledge and technique, see definition (1).

— A second argumentation uses the « true » meaning thus established for some legal conclusion, according to the general mechanisms of argumentation by the definition, see definition (3).

The argument from the structure of the word functions as a way of resolving a conflict of interpretation.

3. Argument from the Meaning of the Word in Another Language

One can look for the true meaning of the word in another language, which for various reasons is considered to be closer to the « origin » or the « essence » of things. One such language is Chinese. For example, the word crisis, can be defined as « a time of intense difficulty or danger » (Google, Crisis). When searching for « what crises really are », one can move on to « what the word crisis really, truly, means », and look up the Chinese equivalent of the word. The Chinese word for crisis is a compound of two characters, meaning respectively « danger » and « opportunity ». So, crises are opportunities; and, by an argument based on the Chinese definition, we deduce that:

The opportunistic approach to the crisis then takes on its full meaning: Not to seize the opportunity of a crisis, is to miss an opportunity, perhaps hidden, but within reach. (Stéphane Saint Pol, [Wei Ji, Return to the Roots][1])

The argument assumes that the Chinese language has elaborated and preserved a better concept of crisis, closer to the essence of the thing, and better adapted to the modern world.

[1] www.communication-sensible.com/articles/article0151.php]. (09-20-2013).

TOPOS IN SEMANTICS

In Ducrot and Anscombre’s theory of the argumentation in language, a topos is defined as a general gradual principle, that relates two predicates, and is « presented [by the speaker] as accepted by the group » (Ducrot 1988, p. 103; Anscombre 1995a).
The word topos (pl. topoi) will be used to refer to this specific concept as distinct from classical argumentation schemes.

Topoi are pairs of predicates (indicated by capital letters). The factor (+) or (–) indicates that these predicates are gradual.

This kind of linking between predicates was also observed by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca in their discussion of values ([1958], pp. 115-128).

All predicates are gradual. For example, in a Syldavian subculture, the following topos might structure a conversation about « being a real man » (M) and « drinking BeverageB », (B); this relation is expressed by the topos (+)M, (+)B; advertisers claim that « real men drink BeverageB« ; the more of BeverageB you drink, the more of a real man you are.

The same predicate can be associated by the four topical forms, for example in the following argumentations.

(+) Money (–) Happiness: He is a rich financier, so he has many fears and sleeps badly
(–) Money (+) Happiness: Money can’t buy happiness: The poor cobbler sings all the day[1].

(–) Money (–) Happiness: Lack of money is terrible
(+) Money (+) Happiness: Money buys everything

In the case of sports and health:

(+) Sports (–) Health: Champions die young
(–) Sports (+) Health: To stay healthy, abstain from sports (Churchill, “no sport”).

(–) Sports (–) Health: When I stop exercising, I feel bad
(+) Sports (+) Health: If you exercise, you will feel better

In such cases, the predicates are linked by four different topoi < +/- S, +/- H >; nevertheless, communities have preferences, in this case for the last two.
In other words, the four topical forms define the « opinion space » defined by the issue « sports, health »; having an opinion here means choosing one of these links.

These topoi are the exact linguistic expression of the “active associative nodes for ideas” mentioned by Ong (1958, p. 122); see collections-1. They express the possible linguistic associations between “having money” and « being happy », between « living a healthy life » and “exercising”.
Apparently, in Syldavia, the current talk about money and happiness prefers the (-, -) association, which doesn’t mean that the (+,+) association is also preferred: Certainly (-, -), but I can’t say whether (+, +).

Such associations will emerge in the discourse as reasonable and convincing inferences. In ordinary discourse a complex causal elaboration such as “some/all plant protection products are the/a cause of the disappearance of bees” boils down in ordinary Syldavian talk to an accepted, doxical association (+)PPP, (-)bees.

These expressions are semantic inferences, and are pseudo-reasoning insofar as they say nothing about reality; discourse is an inference machine, an argumentative machine; language can and does speak. This vision justifies the skepticism of the theory of argumentation in language about ordinary argumentation as a form of reasoning, see critique. Reasoning emerges from ordinary talk only under certain conditions; there might be a big step between debating and learning (Buty & Plantin 2009).

[1] According to La Fontaine, « The Cobbler and the Financier », Fables, Book VIII, Fable 2.

TOPOS – TOPIC – ARGUMENTATION SCHEME

1. Topic

In general vocabulary, the word topic refers to (MW, Topic):

• 1 a: one of the general forms of argument in probable reasoning
  b: argument, reason
• 2
 a: a heading in an outlined argument or exposition
  b: the subject of a discourse or of a section of a discourse

The two meanings of topic go from topic₁ a formal, inferential pole (meaning 1) to a substantive pole (meaning 2). They correspond to the two different meanings of argument used in its definition, see (to) argue, argument.

— Topic₁: According to (1), argument in a “reasoning” context, means “argument₁”. Correspondingly, a topic₁ here is an argument₁ scheme or an argumentation derived from such a scheme. In this sense, it can be seen as a translation of the Greek word topos.

— Topic₂: According to (2), argument in an “exposition” and “subject” context,  means  argument₃. Correlatively, a topic₂ is an argument₃, that is to say, the matter, the content of a discourse.

2. Topos

In contemporary English, the word topos is defined as “a traditional or conventional literary or rhetorical theme or topic” (MW, Topos).

2.1 Topos as “Argumentative Scheme” and “Topic₁”

In Greek, the word topos (pl. topoi) has the basic meaning of “place”. In argumentative rhetoric, topos is used metaphorically to refer to “the place where arguments are found”; a topic is an argumentative scheme.
Thus the Greek word topos is translated as topic by Freese and as argumentative line by Rhys Robert in their respective translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In Latin, the corresponding word is locus (pl. loci), which also means “place”, translated as topic by Hubble in his translation of Cicero’s Topica, as “presumptive proof” by Caplan in his translation of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, etc. In a famous metaphor, Cicero defines the argumentative places (Lat. loci, sg. locus) as “the name given by Aristotle to the ‘regions’ from which arguments are drawn” (Top, I, 8, p. 387). “Region” is translated from the Latin sedes, which also means “position, ground”; the loci are the foundations or “patterns” of arguments (id., I, 9, p. 389).

In the argumentation in language theory, the concept of an inferential topos is redefined as a pair of semantically related predicates, see topos in semantics.

2.2 Topos as “topic₂”

In the substantive sense, a topic (topos, commonplace) is an endoxon, a formulaic element corresponding to an answer to a « topical question »; or the whole discourse developing such a formula, « the lawyer developed the topos of the well-known peaceful character of the Syldavians« , see doxa. Such discourses are suspected of being false and insincere, because they are traditional:

it is not easy to distinguish fact from topos in these documents (OD, Topos)

2.3 Topos in Literary Analysis

The concept of topos (pl. topoi) was introduced into literary analysis by Ernst-Robert Curtius to refer to a substantial, traditional idea that the writer develops, comments on and expands in the light of the circumstances. From a cultural and psychological point of view, a topos is “an archetype, […] a representation of the collective unconscious as defined by C. G. Jung” (Curtius [1948], vol.1, p.180).
For example, the topos of “the old man and the child” is consistently exploited in advertisements for wealth management and inheritance arrangements.

The topoi can be used to fill an obligatory discursive slot. Thus, at the end of a presentation, the speaker declares that “he is quite ready to submit to possible negative observations, objections or even refutations, which are really considered as a contribution to a better understanding of his own data.

Curtius’ suggestions have led rise to an important research trend on the topoi, especially in Germany (Viehweg, 1953; Bornscheuer 1976, Breuer & Schanze 1981).

3. Common place

1. In argumentation theory, the term commonplace corresponds to the Latin locus communis, translated from the Greek topos.
Often reduced to place (locus, pl. loci), an inferential commonplace is an inferential topos, or argument scheme.

– A substantive commonplace is an endoxon, a formulaic expression of common thought. Traditional rhetoric specialized in the argumentative use of substantive commonplaces.

2. In the general vocabulary, the expression commonplace is synonymous with cliché, both having the same depreciative orientation. Topos can be used with the same value.

3. In literary analysis, a commonplace is a “substantial topos”, in the sense of Curtius [1948].

4. Argument Schemes

The terms argument type, or argument scheme, or presumptive proof unambiguously denote a general, formal, inferential scheme.
The terms topic and commonplace are ambiguous between a formal and a substantive meaning.

The term argument line is somewhat ambiguous, since it can be used to refer to an argument scheme or to a whole, coherent argumentative strategy, see argument scheme; collections (I).

4. Line of Argument

The term argument line can refer to:
— A discourse that develops a series of co-oriented or convergent arguments, developed by the same arguer or by allied arguers to support a conclusion, either in the same interaction or in different verbal or written interventions.
– Marginally, to an argument scheme.

WEIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES

1. Weight of Circumstances – Strong Will Argument

The weight of circumstances argument invokes the nature of things or the external constraints, as imposing a deterministic solution to a social problem. Choice is presented as causally determined by the context: « the facts leave us no choice », « what is happening in the world forces us to do this.

In 1960, Charles de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, held a referendum on the question of the independence of Algeria, with which France had been at war since 1954. He urged the people to vote for Algerian independence.

No one could doubt the extreme importance of the country’s response. For Algeria, the right granted to its peoples to determine their own destiny will mark the beginning of a whole new era. Some may regret that prejudices, routines and fears previously have prevented the assimilation of Muslims, if it were possible. But the fact that they make up eight ninths of the population, and that this proportion is increasing  their favor; the evolution of men and things that has been set in motion by events, and in particular by the insurrection; and, finally, what has happened and is happening in in the world — make these considerations chimerical and these regrets superfluous.
Charles de Gaulle, speech of December 20, 1960 [1].

The strong will argument denies precisely this determinism: « where there is a will, there is a way« . In May and June 1939, the Belgian, British, French and Dutch armies were completely routed by the German Nazi armies. In what seemed to many to be a desperate situation, General de Gaulle rejected the armistice that Marshal Petain had just signed with the German Nazi enemy, and called on the BBC from London to continue the fight:

Of course, we were subdued by the mechanical, ground and air forces of the enemy. Infinitely more than their number, it was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans which made us retreat. It was the tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans that surprised our leaders to the point to bring them there where they are today.
But has the last word been said? Must hope disappear? Is defeat final? No!
Believe me, I speak to you with full knowledge of the facts and tell you that nothing is lost for France.
[…] Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance not must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished.
Charles de Gaulle, text of the appeal of June 18, 1940[2]

Important political decisions combine the two forms of argumentation, strong will and the weight of circumstances.

2. Naturalistic argument

In law, the naturalistic argument refers to the hypothesis of an impotent legislator who argues that it is impossible to legislate in certain areas, or of a judge who waives the application of the law on the pretext of special circumstances, see legal arguments.

The naturalistic argument is also used in the area of religious law; Luther uses it in connection with the pope’s prohibition of priestly marriages. According to Luther, most priests « [cannot] do without a woman », at least for their household:

So if [the priest] takes a wife, and the pope allows it, but does not let them marry, what is this but expecting a man and a woman to live together and not to fall? I t is as if one were to set fire to straw, and command that it should neither smoke nor burn.
Since the pope has no authority for such a command [forbidding the priests to marry], any more than for forbidding a man to eat and drink, or to digest, or to become fat, no one is bound to obey it, and the pope is responsible for every sin against it.
Martin Luther, Address to the Nobility of the German Nation, [1520][3]

A priori, the naturalistic argument has little to do with the naturalistic fallacy, which systematically privileges ​​the natural, see fallacious (2). However, the charge of fallacious naturalism could be used to refute the argument of the force-of-circumstances argument.

[1] http://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00063/speech-of-20-December-1960.html (20-09- 2013).
[2] http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/index.html (01-20-2017).
[3] Quoted after http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/luther-nobility.asp, (01-20-2017).

THREAT

Threats can be direct (§1) or veiled (§2). The so-called ad baculum argument, i.e. open threats are used by the stronger to force the weaker to do things in the stronger’s interest; on the same unethical level, to get revenge, the weaker may have no choice but to manipulate the stronger. When the speaker presents his threats as the negative consequences of his victim’s bad will, blackmail is disguised as « the advice of a good friend » (§2).

In the legalistic Chinese empire (§3), far from Confucian idealism, threats of punishment combined with promises of reward were elevated to the rank of basic political principle, as the two handles by which the prince could manipulate his subjects and ensure their subservience.[1] The appeal to supernatural powers is based on the same emotional pair, the hope of heavenly rewards and the fear of infernal punishments (§4).

1. Threat: Danger and Fear

The prospect of a more or less imminent situation perceived as dangerous and threatening distracts the person from his routine plan of action and induces new, more or less adapted types of behavior.
In such a situation, people feel emotions ranging from an ill-defined negative apprehension of the situation to fear, to panic. The precise associated negative feeling depends on three main situational parameters

• Whether the source is controllable or not: we live in a clash of civilizations.
• Whether the source is known and well defined (this road is dangerous) or not (something bad is coming).
• Whether the source is an intentional agent (an individual or a group) or not.

– Non-Intentional Agent
Danger comes from the material world, and is interpreted as causal: « The storm is threatening the crops« ; « You are at risk of cancer.
People can be harmless and perceived as frightening. The « dark shapes passing by in the fog » may be perceived as threatening, when in fact they are actually peaceful workers returning home from the office [1].

– Intentional Agents (Humans)
« Threatening enemies are attacking our civilization. When the threat comes from (is attributed to) a group of people, threat/fear speech generates hate speech.

2.  Interpersonal Threat Speech – Ad Baculum

Threat speech, argument from fear, or appeal to fear (Latin ad metum; metum, « fear ») has also been called:
–  By metonymy of the instrument of the threat, the « argument from the stick » (Lat. ad baculum; baculum, « stick »), or « from the prison » (ad carcerem; carcer, « prison »), or « from the purse » (ad crumenam; crumena, « purse »; by a double metonymy).
– By metaphor, the « thunderbolt argument » (Latin ad fulmen, fulmen, « lightning; violence »).

The threat becomes an instrument of blackmail when it is conveyed by the following « either… or…  » schematic message:

Either you do this to me – which is, I agree, is rather unpleasant for you,
or I’ll do this to you – which is really much more unpleasant for you.

So, am I going to buy this land from you or from your widow?

This kind of threatening language is not an argument: blackmail is not a line of reasoning, an argument cannot be accepted under duress. Nevertheless, once trapped, the victim makes a quick calculation of interest and waste, which is certainly not irrational.
It is not irrational to accept serious injury or significant loss to avoid fatal injury, just as it is not irrational to exchange a minor disadvantage for a major advantage.
Legend has it that some animals caught in traps mutilate themselves in order to escape.

If we are approached on a street corner and given the choice of keeping our money or our lives, we are likely to make a choice so reasonable, so perfectly understandable that we will choose to keep our lives, and pay. If we are later asked to explain what money has become, the existence of such a threat will be considered to be a good reason and a satisfactory justification for the loss of money.

2. Threat and Argument by the Consequences

Threats can be effectively presented as an argument by consequences, where agency is masked by causality. Instead of openly assuming the role of the villain, the speaker poses as the unwitting agent of a negative event provoked by the irresponsible behavior of his future victim. The blackmailer presents himself or herself as an advisor, and frames the interlocutor as the one responsible for future misfortune:

Question:  – Should the company give its employees a raise?
Worker’s representative: – If there’s no raise, we’ll occupy the factory!
Employer’s representative: – If you persist in your unrealistic demands, we’ll be forced to close down the plant and cut jobs.

The same switch is made by the politician who presents his own political decision as motivated by the order of things, see weight of circumstances.

3. Punishment and Reward Arguments

In the hands of the established power, threat and fear, as well as their opposite pleasure and reward, can be used as powerful instruments of social cohesion and social control in societies that adhere to the doctrine of « let the good rejoice and the wicked tremble« .
The Chinese philosopher Han-Fei proposes a theory of power as an expert mixture of the two measures (Han-Fei, Tao); that is the two basic material interests that motivate human actions, punishment and reward, excluding the question of rationality, or other kinds of value, such as justice.

This kind of management of human actions exploits two antagonistic psychic movements, the fear and suffering of punishment, and the desire and satisfaction of reward. If arguing is making someone do something, or keeping someone from doing something, then threatening and rewarding would be the two argumentative speech acts par excellence, see authority; pragmatic argument.

The everyday expression « the carrot and the stick » rightly associates the appeal to financial interest, with the traditional ad baculum argument; which might more appropriately be called ad baculum carotamque argument. The latter is no more « rational » than the former, though it is certainly more acceptable to many.

Offering pleasures, honors, and money is not the only way to get what you want; rewards and punishments could be based on anything and everything that people might desire. In particular, this could include power, pleasure, and money, see values.

The ad crumenam argument (Lat. crumena, «purse»), is mentioned in Tristram Shandy, where it refers to introducing considerations of money into a debate:

Then, added my father, making use of the argument Ad Crumenam, – I will lay twenty guineas to a single crown piece, […] that this same Stevinus was some engineer or other,– or has wrote something or other, either directly or indirectly, upon the science of fortification
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman, [1760][1]

4. Appeal to Superstition

The label appeal to superstition was introduced by Bentham, to refer to the fallacy of « irrevocable commitment », which prohibits the revision of prevailing political dispositions ([1824], p. 402); see political arguments.

– Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem: « But we have sworn! »
– Fallacy of irrevocable laws: « But that wouldn’t respect the Constitution! »

Superstition is invoked here because of the oath was supposedly taken to honor the will of a sacred supernatural power, or the Founding Fathers themselves « who knew better », and « to whom we owe everything ». Failure to do so would be not only a lack of respect for the authority of the Founding Fathers, but also a religious or moral sin that would provoke some supernatural vengeance. It can be assumed that such threats are the flip side of the promise that submission to the law will be duly rewarded. Consequently, the appeal to superstition as defined here is a subspecies of the appeal to threats and rewards of transcendent powers. In this case, the argument is a more materialistic version of the argument from faith.

[1] In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013, p. 98.

TESTIMONY

A testimony is a special type of authoritative statement, see authority:

– Preconditions:

• • • • The issue I under discussion is related to an event E. Criminal or not, E has an exceptional character.
      • Person W was in a position to see or hear something about the event E in question.
      • Some discussants have limited or no access to E,
      • Thus, in the discussion I, W qualifies as a witness to E.

– Essential Conditions: Witnesses are subject to a special duty of truthfulness:

• • • • W says T.
      • T is relevant to I.
      • [In justice, T swears to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.]
      • T is presumed to be true

1. Criticisms of Testimony

Discourses against testimony of any kind are based on two options, the examination of the fact, the questioning of the witness. These discourses can be schematized as follows.

– The fact is in itself is not credible, not possible, not probable.

– The witness is not credible because:

• • • • He could not have seen or heard what he claims to have seen or heard
      • He is partial, biased, or lying; he has been manipulated; he has been corrupted.
        
      • He is not competent about tin the matter.
      • In other cases where his testimony could be verified, it turned out to be false.
      • Other witnesses say otherwise.
      • He is the only witness, so his testimony is not acceptable (testis unus, testis nullus, “one testimony, no testimony”).

Testimony and criticism of testimony play a particularly important social role in matters of law and faith. They also play an important private role in everyday matters, as they underlie the narratives of witnesses to critical life events.

2. Testimony in Rhetorical Argumentation

In the Topics, Cicero clearly posits judicial testimony as part of the data on which the court must rely, as opposed to rhetorical evidence, see “technical” and “non-technical”. According to the modern democratic concept of testimony, witnesses are in principle accorded the same status; they and their testimony are subject to the same critical scrutiny.
The ancient rhetorical concept of testimony is quite different. According to Cicero, in Roman legal practice, the weight of a testimony is a priori proportional to the social authority granted to the witness.

For our present purpose, we define testimony as everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to gain conviction. Now it is not every sort of person who is worthy of consideration as a witness. To gain conviction, authority is sought; but authority is given by one’s nature or by circumstances. Authority from one’s nature or character depends largely on virtue; in circumstances there are many things which lend authority, such as talent, wealth, age, good luck, skill, experience, necessity, and even occasional fortuitous events. (Cicero, Top., XIX, 73; Hubbell, p. 439)

In this quotation, the “circumstances” mentioned include basic elements that determine the social status of the witness. “Necessity” refers to testimony obtained under duress and torture. The expression “fortuitous events” refers to emotional speech, emotion being considered a guarantee of truth.

In the Roman world, in fact, testimony was actually guaranteed not only by a thorough examination of the witness and the alleged fact but also by a preliminary oath and the precise social status of the witness, if a citizen, or by the amount of pain the witness could endure, if a slave. The use of torture to obtain true information is now morally condemned, and practically recognized as an ineffective means of obtaining information, “Beer, cigarettes work better than waterboarding”[1].

The concept of testimony in the ancient texts covers a wider field than personal testimony about a particular fact. Testimony can also guarantee principles, and in this case, the witnesses are “the ancient authors, the oracles, the proverbs, the sayings of the illustrious contemporaries” (Vidal 2000, p. 60).

3. Witness in matters of faith

The capacity of truth to be more compelling than any kind of pain is inherent in the Christian tradition of martyrdom. The word martyr comes from the Greek word for witness; the martyr is a witness to the divine word. Martyrdom is a kind of torture; truth is confirmed through torture. As Pascal says: “I believe only those stories whose witnesses let themselves be slaughtered” (Meditations, p. 117).

The validation of testimony by martyrdom leads to a paradox. People have been tortured and killed for a variety of beliefs and values; Giordano Bruno for example is a “martyr of atheism”. Therefore, the proposal must be reversed, and, according to Saint Augustine, “it is not the punishment but the cause that makes the martyr.”[2] If the cause is bad (heresy), the so-called “martyr” is an offender and has been punished as such.

4. Confession and Testimony

Denials are weak arguments for innocence, but confessions are strong arguments for guilt. If it contradicts a denial, a testimony is believed over and above the denial. Consider, however, the case of a person who confesses to murder against a trustworthy witness who declares that he materially could not have committed the crime he just confessed to.

Confession is a testimony against oneself, but should confessions be trusted over contrary testimony? Can I validly testify to myself, positively or negatively?
The Evangelist John reports that Christ said no, “If I bear witness of Myself, My witness is not true.” (John 5:31)[3]; see relations, §2 Reflexivity.

5. The Paradox of « Weak » Testimony

The Latin word testis means “witness” and “testicle”. In Roman culture, as in some contemporary cultures, testimony is reserved for men; a woman’s testimony, if allowed at all, is considered weaker and less credible than a man’s. A single testimony of a man for example, has the same value as the testimony of several women.

Consequently, if a text claims only the testimony of a woman to support a fact, it can be argued that this is indirect evidence for the authenticity of that fact, because, if the fact were invented, the text would have claimed to be supported by the testimony of men. This argument is developed from the Gospels, which, in reference to the resurrection of Christ, mention that women discovered the empty tomb. The cultural weakness of their testimony is taken as indirect strong evidence for the fact.

[1] “Mattis to Trump: beer, cigarettes work better than waterboarding”. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/11/23/mattis-trump-beer-cigarettes-work-better-waterboarding.html (05/07/2017)

[2] Augustine, Second Discourse on Psalm 34. In St; Augustine on the Psalms. Trans. and An. by S. Hegbin, and F. Korrigan, Vol. II, Ps. 30-37. New York & Mahwah: The Newman Press, p. 220.

[3] New King James Version (NKJV); Quoted after https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+5%3A31&version=NKJV (05/05/2017)

« TECHNICAL » and « NON-TECHNICAL » Evidence

1. The opposition “technical” / “non-technical”

Aristotle distinguishes between two instruments of persuasion, or rhetorical proof (pistis):

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset – witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principle of rhetoric.
(Rhet., I, 2; RR, p. 105)

Rhetoric is a technique, a “techne”, i.e. « a process that strives for perfection, and that occurs through the conscious action of a human being » (Lausberg [1960] §1). Therefore, rhetorical proofs are called technical proofs (or artificial proofs), as opposed to non-rhetorical, or non-technical proofs (Lausberg [1960], § 351-426).

The distinction is made in relation to the legal situation.
– “Technical” evidence is discursive, oratorical evidence as means of pressure on the audience (the judge).
– “Non-technical” evidence is evidence in the modern sense of the word. It corresponds to the facts presented to the court, the “given” material facts that the orator cannot manipulate, such as the public testimony of witnesses or the contracts signed between the two parties. The language of the contracts and the discourse of the witnesses is considered to be free of rhetoric, at least in its basic formulation, while the language of the orator is rhetorical, i.e., endowed with an autonomous power of persuasion, capable of challenging, if necessary, material evidence, see pathos.

The technical/non-technical distinction can be applied to the three components of rhetorical action:

— Technical logos is defined by the use of topoi, signs, etc.; non-technical logos is defined by the parallel intervention of witnesses, contracts, etc.

— Technical ethos is a speech product, the self-made image of the orator embedded in the discourse (Amossy 1999); non-technical ethos is the other-made image of the orator, something like his or her reputation, which can run counter to the first.

— Technical pathos is the strategic communication of emotion, while non-technical pathos corresponds to the spontaneous communication of emotion, see emotion.

2. A Now Misleading Terminology?

First and foremost, this terminology is now obscure and counterintuitive, incompatible with the contemporary use of the word “technical”.

“Non-technical” evidence is simply evidence in the ordinary contemporary sense of the word.
All the elements called “non-technical” are the raw material submitted to the court. They may be practically sufficient to settle the issue definitively, but “[they] very often require to be supported or overthrown with the utmost force of eloquence” (Quintilian I. O., V, 2, 2). In other words, the orator must interpret the testimonies, the contents of the contract, the confessions, in order to transform this raw material into data, that is, to lead it to a conclusion in favor of the party he represents. Thus, “non-technical evidence” is not free of language and rhetoric.
The distinction is closely related to legal situations, but argumentation too in general develops in everyday semi-technical discourse and presents mixed kinds of evidence.
For these reasons, and to emphasize the terminological difficulties the terms “technical” and “non-technical”, when used in their traditional rhetorical sense, are placed in quotation marks throughout this book.

The opposition has a distinctly structuralist character, redefining emotion, character, and situation as nonreferential discursive objects. This position has proved fruitful but it has its limits. At issue is the definition of the object of argumentation studies: should it be purely discursive data, and we will consider only purely linguistic phenomena, or should it be contextualized interactional discourse, taking into account the situation and the ongoing collaborative actions?

3. “Non-Technical” Evidence

3.1 What is “non-technical” evidence?

The “non-technical” evidence is the material, the factual elements that are presented to the court. They define the issue that structures the debate, and may include elements such as, “witnesses, examinations, and the like are things that decide on the subject that is before the judges” (Quintilian, IO, V, 11, 44). They may receive a secondary rhetorical treatment, but their existence is beyond the reach of the rhetorician.

The list of « non-technical » proofs varies somewhat. Aristotle counts as non-technical, “witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on.” (Rhet, op. cit. supra). Quintilian counts as non-technical “presentiments, public reports, evidence obtained by torture, writings, oaths, and the testimony of witnesses, with which the greater part of forensic pleading is wholly concerned. (IO, V, 1, 2). Traditional lists include the following elements.

• An important means of argument, the appeal to authority, was sometimes considered technical, sometimes to be non-technical. Different kinds of authority must be distinguished, and first, the authority of a judicial decision made by a judge recognized for his competence, and passed into judicial custom; in other words, a precedent turned into a law. This is clearly a “given” of the legal situation, that is to say, a “non-technical” element.
• A sentence of a socially recognized personality can also be an authoritative one.
• “Presentiments », i.e., prejudices, rumors, public opinion are a form of authority, perhaps linked to the possibility of appealing to the populus in Roman law.
• Whether there is a contract or a written document is a fact that can be determinative.
• Material elements, such as the murder weapon, or the victim’s bloody tunic, etc., all constitute the hardware of justice.

• Oath guarantees the testimony of the citizen.
• Torture guarantees the testimony of the slave. Ancient democracies and republics  tolerated slavery and torture. The Rhetoric to Herennius presents the basic arguments for the use of such testimony. The first argument is that it should be considered in court, the second that it should be discounted:

We shall speak in favor of the testimony given under torture when we show that it was in order to discover the truth that our ancestors wished investigations to make use of torture and the rack and that men are compelled by violent pain to tell all they know […] Against the testimony given under torture, we shall speak as follows: In the first place our ancestors wished inquisitions to be introduced only in connection with unambiguous matters, when the true statement in the inquisition could be recognized and the false reply refuted; for example, if they sought to learn in which place an object was put, or if there was in question something like that which could be seen, or be verified by means of footprints, or be perceived by some like sign. We then shall say that pain should not be relied upon, because one person is less exhausted by pain, or more resourceful in fabrication than another, and also because it is often possible to know or divine what the presiding justice wishes to hear, and the witness knows that when he has said this his pain will be at an end. (Ad Her., II, VII, 10)

The list of “non-technical” evidence could be expanded to include such items as the following:

• For some cultures or beliefs, miracles can provide a form of non-technical evidence.

• In the early Middle Ages, the trial by ordeal, or God’s judgment, was also believed to establish the truth in a non-technical way: if the accused can pass through the fire more or less alive, he or she is acquitted; if he or she dies, the punishment proves the guilt.

• In contemporary times, it would be necessary to add forensic evidence, for example DNA testing. Such evidence would typically be called technical, in contrast with rhetorical or discursive argument.

3.2 Superiority of Non-Technical Evidence

In actual cases,

If one of the parties had “non-technical” evidence, the case was clear for the judges, and needed only a few words. (Vidal 2000, p. 56).

Of course, language plays an important role in the presentation and orientation of facts. Evidence produced by rhetorical arguments is used for lack of anything better, when factual evidence is not available.
“Technical” evidence comes to the fore in rather special cases, where there is no legal document, no physical evidence, no testimony, etc.

Such an exceptional situation is staged in the comic anecdote in which Tisias confronts Corax. Corax has agreed to teach Tisias his rhetorical skills and to be paid according to the results achieved by his pupil. If Tisias wins his first trial, he will pay his master; if he loses, he will have nothing to pay.
After completing his training, Tisias sues his master, claiming that he, Tisias, owes him, Corax, nothing. In fact, this is Tisias’ first trial, and he will either win or lose. First hypothesis, he wins; according to the judge’s verdict, he owes his master Corax nothing. Second hypothesis, he loses; according to their private agreement, he owes Corax nothing. How can Corax meet this challenge? He repeats Tisias’ argument verbatim, but in reverse. First hypothesis, Tisias wins the case; by private agreement, Tisias must pay. Second hypothesis: Tisias loses the case; by law, Tisias must pay for the education he received. In either case, Tisias must pay. It is said that the judges threw out the litigants.

Rhetorical evidence that operates in a language that has no contact with the world is evidence by default. This is a borderline case, not a prototypical case of argumentative rhetorical use of language, which generally operates with elements of reality and conventions that constrain its unbridled use.

TAGGING THE ARGUMENTATIVE TEXT

Analyzing an argumentative text or an interaction means tagging it according to three main levels.

1. 1. To delineate the different sequences that make up the text or the interaction to be analyzed. To characterize the type and degree of argumentativeness of these sequences.
   2. For each argumentative sequence, identify the different lines of argument and their structures; the argument(s), the conclusion(s); the role of the counter-discourses, that is, the type of mutual criticism and evaluation implemented by each argumentative line.
   3. Specify the argumentative schemes.

The analysis of an argumentative passage must be based on relatively objective criteria, that is, on criteria that are as well defined as possible, stable and communicable, even if they are not always decisive. The analysis of an argumentative passage is an argumentative activity, whose claims can be criticized and must be justified.

In formal language, there would be markers, i.e., unambiguous and automatically identifiable material elements that would allow us to have discourses such as:

– Presence of marker(s) S: so, this section is an argumentative sequence.
– Presence of marker(s) A: so, this passage is an argument.
– Presence of marker(s) C: so, this passage is a conclusion.
– Presence of marker(s) T: the underlying argumentation scheme is of such and such a type.

Natural language arguments do not have such markers. Actual linguistic markers are systematically polysemic and polyfunctional. Their strictly argumentative function must be evaluated according to the context. It is as much the context that designates a marker as argumentative just as the marker designates the context as argumentative.

1. Defining an Argumentative Sequence

1.1 Sequencing the Flow of Speech

At the most general level, if we postulate that language or speech is inherently argumentative the problem of identifying specific argumentative sequences does not arise. If we postulate that, within the large linguistic data set (text, interaction) under consideration, only some sequences are more or less argumentative, the boundaries of these sequences must be clearly positioned in the flow of language.

A sequence is a relevant unit of analysis. The argumentative passages used in textbooks as well as in scientific presentations, are the product of this first sequencing operation. Sequencing and subsequencing the flow of speech seem to be routine operations. However, the selection of relevant argumentative passages is the first serious problem that the analyst has to face. His decision to impose such and such limits on the sequence to be analyzed should therefore be explicit and justified. The correct implementation of this operation requires a foray into the broader domains of case and corpus construction.

For example, in classroom interactions, the sequence, “problem solving” is different from the sequence, “homework and instructions”. In a meeting, the sequence, “setting the agenda” is different from the sequence “discussing and deciding on agenda item #19”. For a participant, identifying the sequence simply means “knowing what we are doing”.

Sequences and subsequences of any kind can be defined externally by their boundaries and internally by their own structure and foreground activity.

– Externally, the boundaries of the sequence are transition points characterized by topic changes, by specific closing and opening formulas, and by a redesign of the interaction format.

– Internally, the sequence is defined by a type of linguistic activity, by a specific interaction format, and by a semantic-thematic coherence, that globally obeys a completion principle. Exactly what a complete sequence consists of depends on the type of sequence considered; the internal principle of completion of a problem-solving sequence is not the same as that of an agenda-setting sequence.

1.2 Demarcation of Argumentative Sequences

Argumentative sequences are isolated according to the same internal and external criteria, argumentativeness being their specific difference.
Argumentation can be the defining activity of the sequence. It follows that the sequence, “discussion and decision on agenda item  #19” should normally be highly argumentative. The outer limits of such an institutionalized argumentative sequence depend on the rules of the institution.
Argumentation can be an emerging activity in any kind of sequence; for example, someone disagrees or makes other suggestions during the presentation of the agenda. The left boundary (opening) of an emerging argumentative sequence is characterized by the concretization of an opposition into an argumentative question. The right boundary (closing) can be of any kind, and is sometimes easier to grasp when it is considered in contrast to the following sequence; for example, the chair looks at the clock and says, “Well, I suggest that you discuss this very interesting point further during the coffee break. Thank you for your participation.

When dealing with a local issue, a contentious situation may develop and be resolved on the spot, possibly leaving no trace in the participant’s memory.
When dealing with a pre-existing question, such as a socio-scientific question, the current discussion is only one episode in the larger development of the question as discussed in various settings and crystallized in a specific script. In this case, the question has a history and the sequence is just one episode, that does not close the file.

2. Reconstruction of Argumentative Lines

The internal structure of an argumentative sequence is characterized by the type and the density of the argumentative operations it articulates. Classical points of analysis include coalitions; argument(s), conclusions; criticism and counter-discourse.

– If the text is a multi-speaker interaction or a polyphonic monologue, the analyst must attribute to each participant her own, i.e., the positions she holds and the roles she plays in the global dispute.
Positions are identified as segments that provide, or point to, an answer to the argumentative question. Experience shows that this seemingly elementary task can be quite challenging.

– Once oppositions and positions have been localized in this way, coalition systems can be observed, by looking at how the surrounding discourse relates to the coalition systems around the globally relevant positions, as well as their evolution in the dispute.

– Once the positions have been localized in this way, one looks at how the surrounding discourse relates to the proposed conclusion-answer, that is, one identifies the argument(s).
 Indicators of argumentative function, if available, help to identify the passage as an argument or a conclusion.

– The analysis of the critical strategies implemented by the participants refers to the different modalities of counter-discourse management: Direct repetition of other discourses, or evocation, reformulation, of these discourses; refutation of the opponents’ arguments: see destruction; refutation; objection.

— A very interesting point is to observe the interactions between the participants, not only the interactions between the opponents and the proponents, but also their interactions with the third parties, and the public at large.

— Observations about the relationship between the arguments developed on the spot by the participants and the general script attached to the question, if available, will be always be very instructive.

— Other questions concern the global characterization of the lines of argument developed by key participants, as the implementation of this or that strategy.

3. Argumentation Schemes

The argumentation scheme may be explicitly formulated in the passage as a general law. To identify it, one could look for general statements, that generally work as good support for the affirmation of values, principles or laws.

In order to decide on the correct argumentation scheme, one must investigate whether there is an acceptable paraphrase relationship between the generic discourse corresponding to the argumentation scheme, and the actual current argumentative discourse under investigation; in other words, between the topos and the enthymeme; for a detailed example of this mapping see argumentation scheme.

The operations required to determine whether such an argument scheme is reflected in the actual argumentation depend strongly on the scheme in question. The same concrete argumentative discourse may correspond to several, non-exclusive schemes.