THREAT
Threats can be direct (§1) or veiled (§2). The so-called ad baculum argument, i.e. open threats are used by the stronger to force the weaker to do things in the stronger’s interest; on the same unethical level, to get revenge, the weaker may have no choice but to manipulate the stronger. When the speaker presents his threats as the negative consequences of his victim’s bad will, blackmail is disguised as « the advice of a good friend » (§2).
In the legalistic Chinese empire (§3), far from Confucian idealism, threats of punishment combined with promises of reward were elevated to the rank of basic political principle, as the two handles by which the prince could manipulate his subjects and ensure their subservience.[1] The appeal to supernatural powers is based on the same emotional pair, the hope of heavenly rewards and the fear of infernal punishments (§4).
1. Threat: Danger and Fear
The prospect of a more or less imminent situation perceived as dangerous and threatening distracts the person from his routine plan of action and induces new, more or less adapted types of behavior.
In such a situation, people feel emotions ranging from an ill-defined negative apprehension of the situation to fear, to panic. The precise associated negative feeling depends on three main situational parameters
- Whether the source is controllable or not: we live in a clash of civilizations.
- Whether the source is known and well defined (this road is dangerous) or not (something bad is coming).
- Whether the source is an intentional agent (an individual or a group) or not.
– Non-Intentional Agent
Danger comes from the material world, and is interpreted as causal: « The storm is threatening the crops« ; « You are at risk of cancer.
People can be harmless and perceived as frightening. The « dark shapes passing by in the fog » may be perceived as threatening, when in fact they are actually peaceful workers returning home from the office [1].
– Intentional Agents (Humans)
« Threatening enemies are attacking our civilization. When the threat comes from (is attributed to) a group of people, threat/fear speech generates hate speech.
2. Interpersonal Threat Speech – Ad Baculum
Threat speech, argument from fear, or appeal to fear (Latin ad metum; metum, « fear ») has also been called:
– By metonymy of the instrument of the threat, the « argument from the stick » (Lat. ad baculum; baculum, « stick »), or « from the prison » (ad carcerem; carcer, « prison »), or « from the purse » (ad crumenam; crumena, « purse »; by a double metonymy).
– By metaphor, the « thunderbolt argument » (Latin ad fulmen, fulmen, « lightning; violence »).
The threat becomes an instrument of blackmail when it is conveyed by the following « either… or… » schematic message:
Either you do this to me – which is, I agree, is rather unpleasant for you,
or I’ll do this to you – which is really much more unpleasant for you.
So, am I going to buy this land from you or from your widow?
This kind of threatening language is not an argument: blackmail is not a line of reasoning, an argument cannot be accepted under duress. Nevertheless, once trapped, the victim makes a quick calculation of interest and waste, which is certainly not irrational.
It is not irrational to accept serious injury or significant loss to avoid fatal injury, just as it is not irrational to exchange a minor disadvantage for a major advantage.
Legend has it that some animals caught in traps mutilate themselves in order to escape.
If we are approached on a street corner and given the choice of keeping our money or our lives, we are likely to make a choice so reasonable, so perfectly understandable that we will choose to keep our lives, and pay. If we are later asked to explain what money has become, the existence of such a threat will be considered to be a good reason and a satisfactory justification for the loss of money.
2. Threat and Argument by the Consequences
Threats can be effectively presented as an argument by consequences, where agency is masked by causality. Instead of openly assuming the role of the villain, the speaker poses as the unwitting agent of a negative event provoked by the irresponsible behavior of his future victim. The blackmailer presents himself or herself as an advisor, and frames the interlocutor as the one responsible for future misfortune:
Question: – Should the company give its employees a raise?
Worker’s representative: – If there’s no raise, we’ll occupy the factory!
Employer’s representative: – If you persist in your unrealistic demands, we’ll be forced to close down the plant and cut jobs.
The same switch is made by the politician who presents his own political decision as motivated by the order of things, see weight of circumstances.
3. Punishment and Reward Arguments
In the hands of the established power, threat and fear, as well as their opposite pleasure and reward, can be used as powerful instruments of social cohesion and social control in societies that adhere to the doctrine of « let the good rejoice and the wicked tremble« .
The Chinese philosopher Han-Fei proposes a theory of power as an expert mixture of the two measures (Han-Fei, Tao); that is the two basic material interests that motivate human actions, punishment and reward, excluding the question of rationality, or other kinds of value, such as justice.
This kind of management of human actions exploits two antagonistic psychic movements, the fear and suffering of punishment, and the desire and satisfaction of reward. If arguing is making someone do something, or keeping someone from doing something, then threatening and rewarding would be the two argumentative speech acts par excellence, see authority; pragmatic argument.
The everyday expression « the carrot and the stick » rightly associates the appeal to financial interest, with the traditional ad baculum argument; which might more appropriately be called ad baculum carotamque argument. The latter is no more « rational » than the former, though it is certainly more acceptable to many.
Offering pleasures, honors, and money is not the only way to get what you want; rewards and punishments could be based on anything and everything that people might desire. In particular, this could include power, pleasure, and money, see values.
The ad crumenam argument (Lat. crumena, «purse»), is mentioned in Tristram Shandy, where it refers to introducing considerations of money into a debate:
Then, added my father, making use of the argument Ad Crumenam, – I will lay twenty guineas to a single crown piece, […] that this same Stevinus was some engineer or other,– or has wrote something or other, either directly or indirectly, upon the science of fortification
Laurence Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, gentleman, [1760][1]
4. Appeal to Superstition
The label appeal to superstition was introduced by Bentham, to refer to the fallacy of « irrevocable commitment », which prohibits the revision of prevailing political dispositions ([1824], p. 402); see political arguments.
– Fallacy of vows or promissory oaths; ad superstitionem: « But we have sworn! »
– Fallacy of irrevocable laws: « But that wouldn’t respect the Constitution! »
Superstition is invoked here because of the oath was supposedly taken to honor the will of a sacred supernatural power, or the Founding Fathers themselves « who knew better », and « to whom we owe everything ». Failure to do so would be not only a lack of respect for the authority of the Founding Fathers, but also a religious or moral sin that would provoke some supernatural vengeance. It can be assumed that such threats are the flip side of the promise that submission to the law will be duly rewarded. Consequently, the appeal to superstition as defined here is a subspecies of the appeal to threats and rewards of transcendent powers. In this case, the argument is a more materialistic version of the argument from faith.
[1] In The Complete Work of Laurence Sterne. Delphi Classics, 2013, p. 98.