CONCESSION
Concessions can be negotiated in an organized discussion, or presented as an expression of the speaker’s good will in a monological discourse.
1. Negotiated concession
In negotiated concessions, the arguer modifies his or her original position by lowering the original demand or by conceding a controversial subpoint to the opponent. Strategically, this move may amount to an orderly retreat, possibly for future benefit, in the hope that the opponent will do the same on to another point.
In Aristotelian logical-dialectical games the discussion is about the truth of a statement. The consequence is that it ignores concessions, as a violation of the principle of the excluded middle, statements being considered either entirely true, or entirely false; conclusively defended or not, see Dialectic. In contrast, concession is a key moment in the negotiation process of human affairs, understood as a discussion leading to a reasonable agreement (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000).
By making concessions, the arguer acknowledges that the opponent’s point of view has some validity, while still maintaining the value of his or her own positions and conclusions. The arguer may believe that hisremaining arguments are:
— More persuasive, or of a different nature than the opponent’s
— Not strong arguments, but arguments based on personal values and deep beliefs (identity-based arguments).
The original position should thus be maintained against all odds, according to the formula “I do know, but still …”.
In everyday discussions, concessions are valued as manifestations of openness to others, and as constitutive of a positive ethos. Nevertheless, concessions can be ironic, see Epitrope.
2. Concession as a speech act
In grammar, concessive constructions “A(claim) + C(concession)” coordinate two statements with opposite argumentative orientations, while maintaining the overall orientation determined by the first claim A:
“although C, A”; “certainly C, but A”
“I concede, I understand C but I stand by A”.
C takes up or reformulates the opponent’s speech, or evokes the speech of a fictitious opponent; A reaffirms the speaker’s claim.
Social relations are indeed extremely tense these days, but we still need to continue restructuring the company.
Unlike a negotiated concession, linguistic concession is purely verbal. The speaker sets out:
— First, a virtual character or voice develops the argument that “social relations are extremely tense”, pointing to conclusions such as “stop restructuring of the company”,
—followed by a second argument, that takes the opposite position “we must continue restructuring the company”, and identifies with this second character. In Goffman’s words, the speaker is the animator of A, and the animator and principal of C. In other words, the speaker acknowledges the existence of arguments supporting an opposite conclusion, but at the same time refuses to conclude on this basis. The concession here is a simple acknowledgment of the fact that someone, somewhere, is saying, or could say something opposite to what the speaker claims. This amounts to a de-activation of the argumentative strength of the aforementioned argument. This kind of concession is not at all an expression of the good will of a reasonable negotiator, but a mere phagocytosis and castration of the opponent’s arguments
I know that, you already told me, no need to repeat it!
The two forms of concession can be superimposed, by rationalizing the linguistic concession. One assumes that linguistic concession occurs when the speaker has considered the opponent’s arguments and confronted them with his or her own (even if this examination often leaves no discursive trace), and that, in the end, he thinks that his arguments are better. But since language takes for real and true what it signifies, a purely linguistic concession automatically produces a negotiated concession effect, whether or not this is really the case. This does not mean that linguistic concession is always mere lip service, but that negotiated concession can only be studied on corpora built for that purpose.