CONDITIONS OF DISCUSSION
The Treatise on Argumentation insists on the necessity and variety of “prior agreements” between participants to develop an argumentation — that is, an argument1; no prior agreements are necessary to engage in an argument2:
For argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment. First, there must be agreement in principle about the formation of this intellectual community, and then about the fact of debating a particular question together: now, this does not happen automatically. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 14)
Two different kinds of agreements are mentioned here, and, as the text points out, neither of them can be taken for granted.
1. Formation of speech communities
This first type is concerned with the realization of an “effective community of minds”, constituted on the basis of the free decision of the participants. It can be considered as an ideal form of argumentative communication. Its closest approximation may be philosophical or scientific friendly encounters.
Not all argumentative practices depend on the production of such a community. The court is a prototypical argumentative venue, and no prior voluntary agreement with criminals is required to ensure their timely appearance; if necessary, legal coercion may be used. Institutions that define specific forums, problems and rules of interaction determine the social and legal conventions that govern argumentative communities. The existence of these social infrastructures makes it possible to avoid the previous cumbersome negotiations between speech communities.
2. Agreement on the issue
To discuss an issue, must we first “agree to discuss this issue together”? As in the case of the types of agreements described immediately above, the different legal systems determine who has the legal right to determine the charges that will lead to the appearance of a particular party; the defendant does not necessarily agree to discuss the matter, but is summoned by the judge.
ln institutionally structured communities, preliminary discussions may be useful in determining the items to be discussed at a given meeting. But the agenda is not necessarily determined by the prospective participants in the discussion; it may be the prerogative of an individual in charge of the organization. On the other hand, the topic itself, may be reformulated during the meeting.
Intellectual communities are also social communities, even when they deal with questions of human existence in general. The disputability of a question is itself an argumentative exercise, in the same way as is the process of discussing the question itself. There are two distinct subquestions to be considered, first, a central one, the conditions for the “disputability” of the issue properly speaking, and second, if all the potential partners agree to discuss such and such an issue, a practical question has to be settled, the material conditions for the discussion itself – where, when, who will chair the discussion, etc. — not to mention the shape of the table.
The dispute over maximizing vs. minimizing the right to discuss defines what may be called the stasis of stasis.
2.1 Maximizing the right to discuss
In terms of content, one can either emphasize the principle of radical freedom of expression according to which any point of view can be affirmed and challenged, or one can emphasize the pragmatic conditions of such discussion. The first of the “Ten Commandments for Reasonable Discussants” states that,
Commandment 1, Freedom rule: Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or calling standpoints into question. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 2004, p. 190)
S. Rules.
This is also the position taken by Stuart Mill:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. (Mill, [1859], p. 76)
2.2 Conditioning the rights to discuss
Absolute freedom of speech would give free rein to racist speech, hate speech, collective verbal and non-verbal harassment of the individual chosen as the scapegoat of a group, etc., forms of speech that many would find unacceptable. If individuals are free to discuss anything privately, provided they can find partners willing to do so, actual speech communities impose conditions on social discussion. For example, the res judicata principle prevents the reopening of an issue that has already been decided, unless a new fact is to be considered.
Moreover, the proper functioning of a speech community must take into account the fact that it is not possible to discuss anything (condition on the subject, on the agenda), with anyone (condition on the participants), anywhere and anytime (material conditions on place and time), no matter how (according to what procedure), see Manipulation:
Some Truths Are Not for Common Ears. It is lawful to speak the truth; it is not expedient to speak the truth to everybody at every time and in every way.
Erasmus, [1524], On the Freedom of the Will. (no pag.) [1]
The Treatise is very sensitive to the “anybody” condition:
There are beings with whom any contact may seem superfluous or undesirable. There are some with whom one cannot be bothered to speak. There are also others with whom one does not wish to discuss things, but to whom one merely gives orders.
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], p. 15)
Aristotle limits the subjects of legitimate discussion to the endoxa, and rejects debates that question “everything”, that is, affirmations that in practice no one doubts:
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For those who are puzzled as to know whether one ought to honor the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. (Top., 11)
The uncontroversial refers to three kinds of evidence: sensory evidence, “snow is white”; religious evidence, “we must honor the gods”; and social evidence, “we must love our parents”; these statements are uncontroversial because it is inconceivable that anyone would argue otherwise — in Aristotle’s Athenian society of course. For an opinion to be worthy of doubt, it must, on the one hand, fall within the scope of the doxa. That is, it must be part of the defining beliefs of the community, or seriously held by some of its honorable members or a subset, see Doxa.
On the other hand, the doubt must be serious, that is motivated. Since argument is a costly activity, one must have a good reason to doubt. In other words, the person who wishes to question an accepted proposition bears the burden of proof.
In the same spirit, the theory of stasis categorizes as uncontroversial (a-stasic) misplaced, poorly formulated or intractable questions, or, conversely, questions whose answer is obvious, S. Dialectic; Self-evidence; Stasis; Argumentative question.
On the legitimizing effects of debate, see Paradoxes.
3. Agreements on what counts as an argument
Agreements on the community of speech and on the issue must be supplemented by agreements on beings, facts, rules and values (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca [1958], II, 1). Agreements here should determine what counts as an argument: the condition of truth; the relevance of the true statement to the defended conclusion; the relevance of the conclusion (defended by a true and relevant statement) for the debate itself, see Relevance.
When it is impossible to determine whether a statement is true, or relevant to a conclusion, or relevant to the debate itself, a general system of acceptance or tacit agreement is invoked. In serious global disagreements, partial agreements are difficult to reach; the disputants anticipate their opponent’s conclusion, knowing well that once the argument is accepted, the conclusion will quickly follow, hence the tendency to postulate disagreement as a governing principle, even upon what should be considered facts, see Politeness; Dissensus; Disagreement.
This “appeal to agreement” is actually based on an argument of perverse effects, considering that the absence of agreement would condemn the debate to an undesirable state of deepening disagreement, which might even lead to a collapse of the discussion (Doury 1997). In practice, two facts have to be considered. First, points of agreement and disagreement can be negotiated on the spot, during the discussion. Second, the lack of agreement does not preclude argumentation, it is sufficient for third parties to take the reins of the discussion. The judge’s decision, and more generally that of the third party, is often made on the basis of an argument rejected or ignored by one or both parties, see Roles. Judicial organizations intervene precisely when no agreement can be reached between the parties; as representatives of the ruling power, they dispense with agreements — not with arguments.
In general, if one agrees on the data and rules, the conclusion follows automatically; argumentation becomes demonstrative. But argumentation is a linguistic way of dealing with differences in a system of generalized disagreement and uncertainty. There is a crucial incompatibility between the material interests at stake: one can indeed divide the cake, but what is eaten by any one person cannot be shared with the other. Serious, deep, insoluble … disagreement between the parties, proponents and opponents, should be considered to be the basic condition of argumentation; that is why third parties play a key role in argumentative devices.
[1] Quoted from Desiderius Erasmus, On the Freedom of the Will. Trans. by E. Gordon Rupp (no pag., no date). www.sjsu.edu/people/james.lindahl/courses/Hum1B/s3/Erasmus-and-Luther-on-Free-Will-and-Salvation.pdf (05-23-17).