DOUBT

Doubt is a mental state and a behavior typically associated with an argumentative situation.

— As a psychological state, doubt implies discomfort and apprehension, see Emotion. Argumentation is a costly and time-consuming activity, from the cognitively, emotionally and interactionally. Non-argumentative individuals are reluctant to engage in an argumentative situation, where they will have to face the resistance of the other party.

— At the cognitive level, to doubt is to be in a state of suspended assent to a proposition, or a state of indecision about what to do.

— From a linguistic point of view, doubtful propositions are formulated by the speaker, without being affirmed or denied. In Goffman’s terms, the speaker is, at most, the « Author » of the proposition, not its ‘Principal’; he or she is not committed to the statement, S. Roles.

— From an interactional point of view, a turn of speech is doubted if it is not ratified or openly rejected by the interlocutor, see Disagreement; Question. Such rejection cannot remain unfounded and reservations must be justified, by adding arguments in support of another point of view, or by refuting the reasons given in support of the original proposal.

— In a full-blown argumentative situation, one party or the other does not necessarily assume doubt. One party may be absolutely certain of the truth and validity of his argument, and argue in perfectly good faith that P is the case or the right thing to do, while the other party will have no doubt that it is not the case. The doubt is systematically taken over by the third party.

Dialogue outsources these different operations by giving them specific linguistic forms and micro-social configurations.

Argumentative doubt, Cartesian doubt, skeptical doubt

Argumentative doubt is opposed to Cartesian doubt. Descartes rejects “all such merely probable knowledge and makes it a rule to trust only what is fully known and incapable of being doubted » ([1628], Rule II; Geach). He reconstructs a system of certain beliefs on the basis of the only absolute certainty, that of the cogito: “I think, therefore I am”. This type of doubt is opposed to skeptical doubt:

Cartesian doubt does not consist in floating, uncertainly, between affirmation and negation. On the contrary, it clearly shows that what is in doubt is false, or insufficiently self-evident, and so cannot be asserted to be true. Skeptical doubt regards uncertainty as the normal state of thought, whereas Descartes regards it as a disease he seeks to cure. Even when he takes up the arguments of the skeptics , it is in a spirit quite opposite to theirs. (Gilson, Note 1, p. 85. to Descartes [1637])

Argumentative doubt differs from skeptical doubt in that it does not privilege the indefinite suspension of assent over the resolution of disputes.