FALLACY 4:
A MORAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole conclude the third part of their Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662) with two chapters devoted to sophisms and bad reasoning. Chapter XIX, “Of the different ways of reasoning which are called Sophisms”,addresses the Aristotelian fallacies. Chap. XX, “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary Discourse” redefines the concept of fallacious reasoning as a moral and anthropological issue concerning fallacious discourse and discussion.
1. The Aristotelian Fallacies
The list of “ways of evil reasoning that we call sophisms” combines Aristotelian linguistic and nonlinguistic fallacies, see fallacies 3.
The linguistic fallacies are grouped under two headings. The list does not mention the fallacy of many questions, and adds two new types of fallacies independent of language: “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction.”
2. On Bad Reasonings in Civil Life
Chapter XX “Of the bad reasonings which are common in Civil Life and in Ordinary discourse” is much more original. It consists of two parts:
1) Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion.
2) Of the false reasonings which arise from objects themselves.
These sophisms and bad reasoning no longer reflect logical or scientific concerns, and are not related to dialectics. Based on a thorough and hypercritical description of the of the discussants’ concrete behavior, the chapter emphasizes the difficulty of reaching a successful conclusion in a debate and demonstrates how deceptive and fruitless disputes can be when the truth is at stake. Rather than appealing to follow the rules of debate, the conclusion makes an ascetic appeal for the moral reformation of the disputants.
Note that the religious and philosophical disputes over Jansenism and Cartesianism form the backdrop of the disillusioned discussions mentioned in this chapter.
The various sophisms and bad reasoning will be designated by an expression taken from their definition below.
2.1 “Of the sophisms of self-love, of interest, and of passion”
(1) “To take our interest as the motive for believing a thing.” The first of the causes that determine belief is the spirit of belonging to “some nation, or profession, or institution” (Ibid., p. 268). Beliefs are not determined by truth and reality, but by the social position of the believer. The disputant borrows his beliefs from the group in which he finds “his interest” and his identity.
(2) “[The] delusions of the heart” (Id., p. 269). This sophism expresses the ad passiones fallacies of love and hate (ad amicitiam, ad amorem and ad odium). It is a variant of the pathetic argument:
‘I love him, therefore, he is the cleverest man in the world; I hate him; therefore, he is nobody.’ (Ibid.)
(3) Those “who never distinguish their authority from reason”
They decide everything by a very general and convenient principle, which is, that they are right, that they know the truth; from which it is not difficult to infer that those who are of their opinion are deceived, — in fact, the conclusion is necessary. (Ibid.)
The self-centered person claims to know the truth with immediate certainty, in both the profane and sacred realms, whereas it would require a demonstration, see authority; modesty.
This can be read as a criticism of the Cartesian criterion of truth, as clear and distinct ideas. Interest and self-love determine clarity and distinctness better than truth does.
(4) “The clever man[‘s]” sophism is related to the preceding one:
‘If this were so, I should not be a clever man; now, I am a clever man; therefore, it is not so.’ (Id., p. 270)
Enthymemes:
‘What,’ said they, ‘if the blood circulates, […] if nature does not abhor a vacuum […] — I have been ignorant of many important things in anatomy and in physics. These things, therefore, cannot be’. (Ibid).
This is another fallacy ad passiones, the fallacy of pride, ad superbiam.
These first four “sophisms” are not really sophisms since as they deceive both themselves and others. Nor are they properly called fallacies since as they are neither public reasoning nor propositional arguments. Their premises remain unspoken and perhaps even unconscious:
I’m a Syldavian, Syldavians are always right, therefore, I’m right.
I’m right, therefore my opponent is wrong.
I hate him; therefore, he is a nobody.
I know everything, therefore what I don’t know must be wrong.
Interests, inflated egos and passions, are epistemological obstacles ingrained in human nature.
Chapter XIX reiterates the classical belief that training in argumentation requires a thorough knowledge of language and logic.
Chapter XX adds that the arguer must first work on himself in order to avoid sophisms (1)-(4).
They must also avoid the pitfalls of argumentative interactions, corresponding to sophisms (5) through (9). The following subset complements the first moral and psychological subset with factual observations of experienced arguers’ interactional behavior.
(5) “Those who are in the right, and those who are in the wrong, with almost the same language make the same complaints and attribute to each other the same vices” (Id., p. 271). This empirical observation leads to a recommendation for the wise and thoughtful, about how to properly advocate the truth in a controversy.
First recommendation, to the debaters: Do not begin a debate until you have “[thoroughly established] the truth and justice of the cause you are asserting.”
Only after these rules have been applied can one move on to a meta-discussion of the opponent’s poor argumentative tactics. Of course, this presupposes that one can decide whether the rules have been correctly applied.
(6)“The spirit of contradiction”, is a « malignant and envious disposition »:
“Someone else said such a thing; it is therefore false. I did not write that book; it is, therefore, a bad one”. This is the source of the spirit of contradiction so common amongst men, and which leads them, when they hear or read anything of another, to pay but little attention to the reasons which might have persuaded them, and to think only of those which they think may be offered against it. (p. 272)
(7) “The spirit of debate”
Thus, unless at least we have been accustomed by long discipline to retain the perfect mastery over ourselves, it is very difficult not to lose sight of truth in debates, since there are scarcely any exercises which so much arouse our passions. (p. 277),
Observations (6) and (7) have a clear connection with the sin of contentio, see fallacies as sins of the tongue.
From the observation that “speaking of ourselves, and the things that concern us” can “excite envy and jealousy”, comes a new recommendation: When defending the truth, one should minimize self-exposure. The arguer should “seek, by hiding in the crowd, to escape observation, in order that the truth which they propose may be seen alone in their discourse” (p. 273).
(8) “The Complaisant”
For as the controversial hold as true the contrary of what is said to them, the complaisant appear to take as true everything which is said to them. (p. 278)
This sophism of accepting without examining, or at least of refusing to take a position, corresponds exactly to Locke’s ad verecundiam fallacy, see modesty. It is different from yet related to the guilty character alluded to in (7): those who “in the midst of [the discussion] become obstinate and are silent, affecting a proud contempt, or a stupid modesty to avoid contention” (p. 277), see modesty; contempt.
(9) “The determination to defend our opinion” leads us to
no longer to consider whether the reasons we employ are true or false, but whether they will avail to defend that which we maintain. We employ all sorts of reasons, good or bad, in order that there may be some to suit everyone. (p. 279).
The section concludes with a final recommendation:
To have no end but truth, and to examine reasonings with so much care, that even prejudice shall not be able to mislead us. (p. 276)
As noted in (5), each discussant will claim to be doing exactly that. The attempt to expose the sophism seems to be doomed from the start, as if we are condemned in a conflictual dialogue in which we will never know who is telling the truth.
2.2 “Of the false reasoning which arise from objects themselves”
This section focuses on the following points:
— There is only a small margin between truth and error; see above, (5):
In the majority of cases, there is a mixture of truth and error, of virtue and vice, of perfection and imperfection (p. 277)
— Rash induction also applies to human affairs; see above §1, “incomplete enumeration”, and “defective induction”:
[Men] judge rashly of the truth of things from some authority insufficient to assure them of it, or by deciding the inward essence by the outward manner. (p. 284)
Decisions are made on the basis of “exterior and foreign marks” (ibid.), i.e., peripheral arguments.
— “We rarely avoid judging purposes by the event”, a very pertinent point.
If somebody succeeds, he had carefully planned his deeds; if he fails, he miscalculated. (p. 283)
No distinction is made between “the fortunate and the wise” (Ibid).
— For “pompous eloquence”, see verbiage.