ORIENTING WORDS

A morpheme (a concept, an expression) is said to be argumentative if its introduction into an utterance

– does not change the factual referential value of this utterance (it has no quantifying function)
– changes its argumentative orientation, i.e. the set of conclusions compatible with this utterance; the set of propositions that can follow it, see orientation.

The semantic concept of an argumentative morpheme or orienting word is developed by Anscombre and Ducrot as an essential part of the Awl theory; see orientation; orientation reversal.
The concept has been applied to the linguistic description of « empty » words or « argumentative operators » such as little / a little, as well as to « full » words such as the pair helpful / servile.

1. Anti-oriented words

The pair helpful/servile (Eng) serviable/servile (Fr)
Servile (Fr) and servile (Eng) derive from the word serf (a kind of slave in medieval times). Servile (Fr) can be translated with servile (Eng) as a synonym for “submissive, obsequious, subservient”.
Serviable (Fr) comes from the root [serv-], which is also found in serviceable (Eng), plus the suffix -able in both languages.
Serviable and serviceable are false friends. Both words come from the same root as the word service, plus the suffix -able. This morphological similarity covers very different meanings:
– Serviceable (Eng) refers to objects, etc.: « suitable for use » (CD)
– Serviable (Fr) refers exclusively to persons and denotes a « kind, helpful person ».

The discussion of the opposition between serviable/service is especially attractive because their morpho-semantic similarities. The general discussion remains roughly the same in English, servile being the opposite of helpful, not serviceable, Consider the statements (1) “Peter is helpful” and (2) “Peter is servile [submissive]”. Do these two statements describe two different types of character and behavior, or one and the same attitude? Either position can be argued.

♦ Statements (1) and (2) describe two types of behavior. Helping your grandmother set the table would be helpful; offering to carry your boss’s small suitcase would be submissive. As a result, each behavior is assigned a different value; helpfulness is assigned a positive value, while submissiveness is assigned a negative value. In order to determine the nature of Peter’s behavior, one must examine the realities of Peter’s behavior.

♦ It can also be considered that these two words describe a single behavior and cast it in two different lights, i.e., two subjectivities involving emotions and value judgments. I judge this behavior positively and say, « Peter is helpful« ; I judge it negatively and say, « Peter is servile« . Reality says nothing about helpfulness or servility. The origin of the distinction is not in reality, but in the active structuring of the speaker’s perception.

Statements (1) and (2) create opposite discursive expectations in the listener: Helpful is a recommendation, “A nice guy!”, while servile, submissive are a rejection, “I can’t stand his ways. »

If the job implies contacts with a person specifically concerned  with deferential behavior, then Peter is servile might also serve as an ironic recommendation, implying disapproval of the two people: “they will make a nice couple”.

These opposing orientations correspond to the rhetorical phenomenon known as paradiastole, “the world is moving backwards, words have lost their meaning: the miser is thrifty, the unconscious is brave”; they are interpreted by normative theories of logical inspiration as the expression of linguistic bias, see orientation Reversal.

Antithetical designations — The opposition discourse vs. counter-discourse is sometimes reflected in the morphology of words, as in the previous case, see antithesis; derived words; ambiguity:

disputation vs. disputatiousness
politician vs. politico
philosopher vs. philosophizer
scientific vs. scientistic

In general, the parties will use different terms to refer to the beings at the center of the debate: you are the persecutor, I am the victim; he is the evil rich man, I am the poor but honest person; your approach is scientistic while mine is scientific, see discursive object.

According to what criteria can I classify this person as a terrorist or as a resistance fighter? Is the resistance fighter a successful terrorist, and the terrorist the resistance fighter of a lost cause? Should his actions be considered (categorized) as a cowardly act of terrorism or as a heroic act of resistance? Should we say that everyone has dirty hands and that everything depends on the speaker’s partisan options?
Accepted international principles are needed; the systematic discussion goes back to the works of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, who are landmark thinkers in the debate on the laws of war, and to the modern world for the definition of crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Universal criteria are needed.

2. Adverbial orientation operators

2.1 Even

The adverb even is argumentative in:

Leo has a bachelor’s degree and even a master’s degree.

The statements “ p, and even p’ ” are characterized by their relative position on an argument scale:

There is a certain [conclusion] r which determines an argument scale where p’ is [a stronger argument] than p [for the conclusion r]. (Ducrot 1973, p. 229)

In other words, some even statements are inherently argumentative; they are oriented toward a conclusion r, that can be recovered from the context; they coordinate two arguments p and p’ that support that conclusion; and they hierarchize those two statements, presenting p’ as stronger than p.

Statement (1) is argumentative; it coordinates two arguments “Leo has a bachelor’s degree” and “Leo has a Master’s degree”; both are directed towards a conclusion, e.g., “Leo can teach some mathematics”; and it considers that the latter “Leo has a Master’s degree” is a stronger argument than the former for this same conclusion. This gradation can be represented on an argument scale as follows:

The relative positions of p and p’ on this scale depend on the speaker:

We had a great meal, we even had cheese pasta.

Other gourmets may not consider macaroni and cheese to be an essential part of a great meal.

2.2 Too

The theory of scales is governed by a “plus” principle: the higher you are on the scale, the closer you are to the conclusion. But this principle leads to a paradox:

You reluctantly bathe in water with a temperature of twenty-two degrees, you’d be happier to bathe in water at twenty-five, at thirty, or even warmer. The hotter the water, the better for you; so you really should try bathing directly in the cauldron.

Too inverts the argumentative orientation:

S1       — It’s cheap, buy it.
S2       — It’s too cheap.

And sometimes reinforces this orientation:

S1       — It’s expensive, too expensive, don’t buy it

2.3 Almost / hardly

Almost is a paradoxical word: “almost P” presupposes not-P and argues as P. If Leo is almost on time, he’s not on time. Nevertheless, you can say:

Excuse him, he was almost on time, he should not be punished.

In other words, “almost on time” is co-oriented with “on time”. The argumentative orientation of an almost utterance might be rejected by an inflexible superior, who rejects the positive framing being imposed on him. The superior applies the topos of the strict meaning of the law:

So, you confirm that he was not on time. The sanction will be applied.

This co-orientation of P and almost P does not apply to predicates referring to the crossing of a threshold. When transporting a critically ill patient, the nurse might urge the ambulance driver: “Hurry, he is almost dead” but the nurse would not say, “Hurry, he is dead”. However, in an alternative scenario, say a rather laborious assassination, the killer might say to his accomplice, “Hurry up, he’s almost dead, and you haven’t found anything to wrap his body in yet”, and a fortiori “Hurry up, he is dead, etc.”

The permutation almost / hardly reverses the argumentative orientation of the statements in which they appear:

You’re almost cured, you can join our party!
I’m hardly cured, I can’t join your party.

The appeal to the strict meaning is opposed to the raising of the thresholds produced by almost and hardly.

2.4 Little / A Little

These two adverbs give opposite argumentative orientations to the predicates that they modify:

(1) There is now little faith in market mechanisms.
(1′) There is now a little faith in market mechanisms.

(2) He has eaten a little, he feels well
(2′) He feels unwell, he has eaten little

(1) is oriented towards “there is no confidence at all”, while (1′) is oriented towards “confidence”. Little and a little are not quantifiers referring to different amounts of faith or food (a little trust being more than little trust), but give opposite orientations to what is essentially the same quantity.

3. Adjectives as orientation operators

Adjectives can change the argumentative strength or the orientation of a sentence.

De-realizing operators are defined as follows:

A lexical word Y is de-realizing in relation with respect to a predicate X if and only if the combination XY is on the one hand is not perceived as contradictory, and, on the other hand, reverses or reduces the argumentative strength of X. (Ducrot 1995, pp. 147)

Consider the following statements (Ducrot 1995, p. 148-150)

He is a relative, and even a close relative
He’s a relative, but a distant relative

Close is a realizing operator (id., p. 147) “They are close relatives” is co-oriented with “They are relatives”, towards conclusions such as “They know each other well”. They are located on the corresponding argument scale as follows:

Distant is a de-realizing operator. The sentence “He is a distant relative of mine”:

— can be oriented towards “We don’t know each other well”, i.e., it has an opposite orientation to “He is a relative of mine”.

— can be oriented towards “we know each other well”, like “he is a relative of mine”, but with less force: