YOU TOO!
Latin “tu quoque!« ; tu « you », quoque « too ».
In both Latin and in English, the « you too! » argument scheme is named after the statement that typically realizes the argument.
S1: Why do you do (action) A?
S2: I do A because my friend X is does it too.
S2 explains and justifies his action. In the general case the answer « S2: – I do A because X does it, he showed me » is a strategy of legitimation by imitation. The fact that X does A creates a precedent that legitimizes doing A. If S1 considers X as a model, it gives A a second form of legitimation. Such legitimations are at the origin of “you too!” argumentation.
When S2 blames S1 for an action, S1 can respond in several ways.
(1) First, S1 can respond to S2 « Everyone does it! ». Since Landru (a popular French serial killer) murdered his lovers, why can’t I?
The degree of legitimacy depends on the seriousness of the transgression and the number of transgressors. If I run a red light in the open country, when there is no traffic and the view is perfect, I feel justified in saying, “Well, it is forbidden, but everyone does it, the guy in front of me went through, I just followed him.
S2 can respond that “a bad behavior doesn’t become legitimate because it’s widespread”; many wrongs never make a right. The common transgression (argument from numbers) never creates legitimacy against the law, see consensus.
(2) In the case where the perpetrator is not another third party but S2, S1 has two options:
– As in the previous case, S1 can quietly legitimize his action by the (bad) example of S2: “But you do it too! You do the same thing!
– S1 can also expand his answer with a counter-accusation, that tries to show S2 the contradiction between what he preaches and what he does, see ad hominem.
– S1 may admit his wrongdoing, but feels that S2 is not in a position to teach him a lesson because of his own wrongdoing. In terms of stasis, the defendant does not recognize the legitimacy of the judge.
S1: – It suits you well to blame me! Please, not you! I have no moral lessons to learn from you!
“Two wrongs don’t make a right”
The phrase « two wrongs don’t make a right » can be understood in two different ways.
– First, as in (1) above « everybody does it, so we have the right to do it »
– Second, as “one does not fight evil with evil”, i.e., “evil must be fought by legal means”, a very important principle; even if many would be tempted to add the clause « as far as possible ».
In other words, the good end – the fight against evil – should not be pursued by evil means; such as torturing the former torturer to stop the torture. This would be a case of autophagy.
By extension, a mistreatment inflicted on someone cannot be justified by arguing, in a kind of anticipatory law of retribution, that, « if he had been in my place, he would have done this to me”, see reciprocity (after Fallacy Files, Two Wrongs) [1]
In practical life, sometimes, thanks to a small miracle, one mistake compensates for another to produce a happy result. that is, This also seems to happen in science:
Kepler knows that Tycho Brahe [obtained] the best possible accuracy in measuring of the positions of the planets (including the planet Mars), and this accuracy was of two minutes of degree.
With the mathematical model of a circular orbit of the planet Mars that he (Kepler) used, Kepler found discrepancies of eight minutes of degree between the positions observed by Tycho Brahe and the calculated positions.
Trusting the accuracy of Tycho Brahe’s measurements, Kepler abandoned the circular orbit of Mars. He revised the Earth’s orbit and, thanks to two compensating errors, discovered his law: “In the motion of a planet, the vector ray passes over equal areas in equal times ».
Edgar Soulié, Johannes Kepler [1]
[1] https://www.fallacyfiles.org/twowrong.html
[2] Edgar Soulié, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630). Johannes Kepler, the astronomer who discovered the laws of planetary motion [L’astronome qui a découvert la loi du mouvement des planètes]. No date. http://www.astrosurf.com/rtaa/rtaa2016/documents/kepler-edgar-soulie.pdf (01-09-2017).